Hi all, I’m new to this forum, and most interested into the Germany/USSR war (which is called Eastern front...from a Wessie point of view).

I wanted to start a thread to know what you people think is the turning point of the Eastern front.

This is a very hard question, and I think there’s no 100% correct answer, since it leads to “what-if” scenarii.

But it’s been some kind of a debate between historians, so we could maybe point out the strong and weak points of the different theories on this subject.

1-- Turning point means that germans where bound to win the war before the turning point. For some historians, germans where not likely to win at all, so there’s nothing like a turning point inthe East.


2-- Summer – fall 1941. (Fugate’s theory) In mid august 1941, after a forced pause for refitting armored units and stabilize positions in the Smolensk area, there’s a long hesitation on the german’s side on the next objective, several weeks are lost and a part of army group center is diverted to the south and the capture of Kiev.

The operations against Moscow will be postponed until the begining of october, to be eventualy stoped by the weather and the very stiff defenses that germans gave USSR the time to gather on the way to Moscow. The delay cost the germans their last opportunity to capture Moscow and win the war.

From this point, the blitzkrieg will turn into a protracted war, and this will seal the fate of Germany.

3-- Stalingrad. Everybody knows the amazing amount of deads and POW that germans lost inthis battle, along with the very deep Soviet counterstrike (against group army south), during winter 42-43. Some historian say that the German army from this point, German army lost the potential to conduct any strategical scale operation for the rest of the war, and therefore this is the turning point on the Eastern front.

4-- Kursk : July 1943, after a few days, the german strong armored offensive is stopped by soviets, and then german army gets washed away. From this point, the question is : how much time will it take for the red army to reach Berlin ?

5-- Other theory anybody ?

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chocapic, welcome to the forum Germany lost on the Eastern Front on 22nd June 1941 but at the time it would had looked different to the Germans anyway to many errors from start to finish as for Kursk that was a debacle the Germans should never went ahead with that one. I shall past you over to some of the guys here who will give a more detailed response to your questions.

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Man of the Year 1942

Regards, Richard

I have to agree with Richard42. The turning point was the start. The Germans never had any real outlook of winning against the Russians. There are the what-if scenarios but it really comes down to the fact that the German industrial machine could not produce enough to fight against a determined opponent that did not give up in the first few months of contact. Combinations of success in areas like Moscow or Stalingrad may have prolonged the conflict but the Germans did not have the logistical infrastructure to conquer or occupy Russia's vast territory. They held the Russian people in contempt so they even lost the chance to have a puppet government like in France. Russia was too big, too rural, and too old a blood enemy to roll over and play dead. They lost the war on the day the invasion began in my opinion.

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PEOPLE SLEEP PEACEABLY IN THEIR BEDS AT NIGHT ONLY BECAUSE ROUGH MEN STAND READY TO DO VIOLENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. GEORGE ORWELL

thks folks

2 votes on number 1 theory so far [img]smile.gif[/img]

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Just my un-connected thinking here....

I think it all comes down to Hitler's famous remark about kicking in the front door and the whole rotten edifice would come down. Of course, it didn't.

As with the Battle of Britain, Hitler's goal was a moral or political collapse ( as happened in France ). When that didn't happen, all was lost. So you could in effect say that the moment the tanks crossed the border was the decisive one.

Now, as to whether there could have been a moment in the Autumn of 1941 when the Soviets could have thrown in the towel, I'm not sure.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Naturally if we consider how much Hitler believed that he was only facing a weak opposition and the war would be over in 8 weeks he was totally wrong and starting the war was a major mistake.

But looking at both sides also Stalin had several problems to face. Could the army recruit enough men in time? Would the "Mother Russia" politics work? Would the church after years of terror support him all of a sudden? And biggest of all:Would the people support him?

If you look at the Moscow situation in 1941 in November Stalin was unsure whether he should leave the city or stay. He decided to stay which definitely made the defence of the city more solid and perhaps even saved the war. By leaving Moscow who knows what? Would the troops protect the city that even Stalin had left on its own?

Of course taking Moscow doesn´t mean you´re winning the war but politically what would have happened? Would the Generals take over and make peace with Hitler? Or would there just be a huge trap for German soldiers in Moscow once the Red Army winter attack started?

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Failure to take Moscow during the initial pushes. This was (in my opinion) the lynch-pin.
First defeat and all. Showed the Germans that they were not super-human, and the Russians that they could stop them/win.
I don't believe there was any stopping Hitler and his quest for Liebesraum, so the start may not be a real option, or I'd have picked it and gone farther and said the start of the whole shooting aspect.
Moral is more important than most consider it to be. It's kinda like "trust", difficult to obtain, simple to lose, and almost impossible to get back.
If Moscow fell, the domino theory may have taken place in Leningrad/Stalingrad.
Connect the dots between the three, and that's all Hitler wanted. Well, not all, but enough for his original ambitions.
Add Stalingrad and it's way over.
Kursk was adding insult to injury.
Foolish pride...perhaps stubborn and vendictive as well.

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There's one way to find out if a man is honest-ask him. If he says "Yes", you know he's a crook. Groucho Marx

Take away Hitler's obsession with Stalingrad and things may have been different. Averting that disaster, maybe Moscow would have been possible.

Later

Moscow showed the Soviets the Germans could be stopped, Stalingrad showed them they could win a major battle. And Kursk showed them they could win the war against the German invader.

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Man of the Year 1942

Regards, Richard

Holy mackerel, Dicky42, which foruns have you been reading lately? [img]tongue.gif[/img]

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This one Za don’t tell me last post above your one here a bit of goof?

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Man of the Year 1942

Regards, Richard

No, no, quite the opposite, I was being ironic You were stating what passes by the "orthodoxy" here in such a succint and clear way that I was caught.

Nice Comet pic, by the way.

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Are right, I am with you thanks [img]smile.gif[/img] [img]smile.gif[/img]

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Man of the Year 1942

Regards, Richard

BTW, didn´t Zhukov manage to change Stalin´s view so that Kursk should be 1. a defensive battle to wear down the German men and tanks 2. a huge offensive after that to drive Germans far away. Stalin wanted to attack from the beginning. What if Stalin had ordered his troops to attack in the first place? Would the summer 1943 end in a different way or would the Red Army "roll through" the same way as it did?

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Damn, Kai, this would require some research effort, but I think that at the beginning the Soviets were as badly prepared as the Germans. Off the cuff, hadn't the Soviets just been repulsed from Bielgorod?

After Zhukhov convinced Stalin that yet another precipitate attack was not the brightest idea, the operation was planned from the very start as a stop to the Germans (something that tended to fail bar a few notable exceptions) followed up by a very strong counter-attack by a powerful reserve, a reserve that would lay low and still until the moment came.

The Maskirovka was so good that the Germans never imagined this counter-attack reserve ever existed. Now that's operational security!

The final effect was as intended: instead of having the Germans parading in the Red Square - as as I normally see in numerous more apologist locations gloating over Prokhoroka etc [img]tongue.gif[/img] - two months later we see Kiev being liberated [img]graemlins/salute.gif[/img]

[ 12. March 2006, 03:19 PM: Message edited by: Za Rodinu ]

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In my view the maskirivka was probably one that could rival Fortitude South and North.

Digging an amasing 22000 miles of trench systems and AT ditches without the Germans catching it..

I also think that the Kursk battle was the climax of the OMG doctrine.

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

No, you can't camouflage all those trench lines, these were in plain sight to any reconnaissance plane. What was out of sight was the reserves of the two Fronts - Central and Voronezh, plus the entire Koniev's Steppe Front, way behind the main lines!

Can you expand on your OMG idea? I was under the impression this was a post-war development of the Deep Battle doctrine...

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I beleive that the Soviet generals created the OMG concept in the early 30ies.

At any rate the very fronts you speak of acted in the intention of the OMG concept. Beeing sprung on the enemy and racing through into the rear to tear up the defencive structure. To put it in context to the rivaling concepts in it's time. The Blitzkrieg aimed at destroying the will to fight on, by using speed and agression to keep the initiative. Constantly making the enemys situation more unatainable. Encirclement of pocets and pushing on. The Blitzkrieg ended as soon as the Allies started to defend deep.
Monty's balancing tactic aimed at applying pressure to the front, drawing enemy reserves into the battle. At the same time it was important to keep a sizable reserve on his own to smash through the enemy lines. This force would then drive deep, thus threatening to encircle the remainder of the front, or taking the assembly areas. The enemy would have the option to die in their trenches or retreat. The OMG fits in the latter category, but this force was on a scale Monty could only dream of.

The Red Army proved another thing after Kursk. Two great battles had been fought in two very different manners. The double encirclement at Stalingrad, and the colossal crack at Kursk. For the remainder of the war the Germans would be outgunned, outmaneouvered and outfought.

[ 13. March 2006, 11:13 AM: Message edited by: Jaeger ]

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

Going back to the period straight after Stalingrad. Perhaps Stalin did not press on fast enough? If he could have got the German troops in the Caucasus trapped ( Army group A ) after the destruction of the 6th Army in Stalingrad it probably would have meant perhaps as many as 300-400,000 more German POW´s...

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