when (if any) is the turning point on Eastern front ?

chocapic · #1 (**permalink**) February 27th, 2006, 02:45 PM

Hi all, I’m new to this forum, and most interested into the Germany/USSR war (which is called Eastern front...from a Wessie point of view).

I wanted to start a thread to know what you people think is the turning point of the Eastern front.

This is a very hard question, and I think there’s no 100% correct answer, since it leads to “what-if” scenarii.

But it’s been some kind of a debate between historians, so we could maybe point out the strong and weak points of the different theories on this subject.

1-- Turning point means that germans where bound to win the war before the turning point. For some historians, germans where not likely to win at all, so there’s nothing like a turning point inthe East.

2-- Summer – fall 1941. (Fugate’s theory) In mid august 1941, after a forced pause for refitting armored units and stabilize positions in the Smolensk area, there’s a long hesitation on the german’s side on the next objective, several weeks are lost and a part of army group center is diverted to the south and the capture of Kiev.

The operations against Moscow will be postponed until the begining of october, to be eventualy stoped by the weather and the very stiff defenses that germans gave USSR the time to gather on the way to Moscow. The delay cost the germans their last opportunity to capture Moscow and win the war.

From this point, the blitzkrieg will turn into a protracted war, and this will seal the fate of Germany.

3-- Stalingrad. Everybody knows the amazing amount of deads and POW that germans lost inthis battle, along with the very deep Soviet counterstrike (against group army south), during winter 42-43. Some historian say that the German army from this point, German army lost the potential to conduct any strategical scale operation for the rest of the war, and therefore this is the turning point on the Eastern front.

4-- Kursk : July 1943, after a few days, the german strong armored offensive is stopped by soviets, and then german army gets washed away. From this point, the question is : how much time will it take for the red army to reach Berlin ?

5-- Other theory anybody ?

Richard · #2 (**permalink**) February 27th, 2006, 10:56 PM

chocapic, welcome to the forum Germany lost on the Eastern Front on 22nd June 1941 but at the time it would had looked different to the Germans anyway to many errors from start to finish as for Kursk that was a debacle the Germans should never went ahead with that one. I shall past you over to some of the guys here who will give a more detailed response to your questions.

bigiceman · #3 (**permalink**) February 28th, 2006, 04:49 AM

I have to agree with Richard42. The turning point was the start. The Germans never had any real outlook of winning against the Russians. There are the what-if scenarios but it really comes down to the fact that the German industrial machine could not produce enough to fight against a determined opponent that did not give up in the first few months of contact. Combinations of success in areas like Moscow or Stalingrad may have prolonged the conflict but the Germans did not have the logistical infrastructure to conquer or occupy Russia's vast territory. They held the Russian people in contempt so they even lost the chance to have a puppet government like in France. Russia was too big, too rural, and too old a blood enemy to roll over and play dead. They lost the war on the day the invasion began in my opinion.

chocapic · #4 (**permalink**) February 28th, 2006, 09:27 AM

thks folks

2 votes on number 1 theory so far [img]smile.gif[/img]

Martin Bull · #5 (**permalink**) February 28th, 2006, 09:38 AM

Just my un-connected thinking here....

I think it all comes down to Hitler's famous remark about kicking in the front door and the whole rotten edifice would come down. Of course, it didn't.

As with the Battle of Britain, Hitler's goal was a moral or political collapse ( as happened in France ). When that didn't happen, all was lost. So you could in effect say that the moment the tanks crossed the border was the decisive one.

Now, as to whether there could have been a moment in the Autumn of 1941 when the Soviets could have thrown in the towel, I'm not sure.

Kai-Petri · #6 (**permalink**) February 28th, 2006, 02:51 PM

Naturally if we consider how much Hitler believed that he was only facing a weak opposition and the war would be over in 8 weeks he was totally wrong and starting the war was a major mistake.

But looking at both sides also Stalin had several problems to face. Could the army recruit enough men in time? Would the "Mother Russia" politics work? Would the church after years of terror support him all of a sudden? And biggest of all:Would the people support him?

If you look at the Moscow situation in 1941 in November Stalin was unsure whether he should leave the city or stay. He decided to stay which definitely made the defence of the city more solid and perhaps even saved the war. By leaving Moscow who knows what? Would the troops protect the city that even Stalin had left on its own?

Of course taking Moscow doesn´t mean you´re winning the war but politically what would have happened? Would the Generals take over and make peace with Hitler? Or would there just be a huge trap for German soldiers in Moscow once the Red Army winter attack started?

skunk works · #7 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 06:02 AM

Failure to take Moscow during the initial pushes. This was (in my opinion) the lynch-pin.
First defeat and all. Showed the Germans that they were not super-human, and the Russians that they could stop them/win.
I don't believe there was any stopping Hitler and his quest for Liebesraum, so the start may not be a real option, or I'd have picked it and gone farther and said the start of the whole shooting aspect.
Moral is more important than most consider it to be. It's kinda like "trust", difficult to obtain, simple to lose, and almost impossible to get back.
If Moscow fell, the domino theory may have taken place in Leningrad/Stalingrad.
Connect the dots between the three, and that's all Hitler wanted. Well, not all, but enough for his original ambitions.
Add Stalingrad and it's way over.
Kursk was adding insult to injury.
Foolish pride...perhaps stubborn and vendictive as well.

jpatterson · #8 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 03:54 PM

Take away Hitler's obsession with Stalingrad and things may have been different. Averting that disaster, maybe Moscow would have been possible.

Later

Richard · #9 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 06:47 PM

Moscow showed the Soviets the Germans could be stopped, Stalingrad showed them they could win a major battle. And Kursk showed them they could win the war against the German invader.

Za Rodinu · #10 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 07:40 PM

Holy mackerel, Dicky42, which foruns have you been reading lately? [img]tongue.gif[/img]

Richard · #11 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 07:49 PM

This one Za don’t tell me last post above your one here a bit of goof?

Za Rodinu · #12 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 10:52 PM

No, no, quite the opposite, I was being ironic

You were stating what passes by the "orthodoxy" here in such a succint and clear way that I was caught.

Nice Comet pic, by the way.

Richard · #13 (**permalink**) March 11th, 2006, 11:37 PM

Are right, I am with you thanks [img]smile.gif[/img] [img]smile.gif[/img]

Kai-Petri · #14 (**permalink**) March 12th, 2006, 02:26 PM

BTW, didn´t Zhukov manage to change Stalin´s view so that Kursk should be 1. a defensive battle to wear down the German men and tanks 2. a huge offensive after that to drive Germans far away. Stalin wanted to attack from the beginning. What if Stalin had ordered his troops to attack in the first place? Would the summer 1943 end in a different way or would the Red Army "roll through" the same way as it did?

Za Rodinu · #15 (**permalink**) March 12th, 2006, 08:39 PM

Damn, Kai, this would require some research effort, but I think that at the beginning the Soviets were as badly prepared as the Germans. Off the cuff, hadn't the Soviets just been repulsed from Bielgorod?

Quote:

Originally posted by Kai-Petri:
BTW, didn´t Zhukov manage to change Stalin´s view so that Kursk should be 1. a defensive battle to wear down the German men and tanks 2. a huge offensive after that to drive Germans far away.

After Zhukhov convinced Stalin that yet another precipitate attack was not the brightest idea, the operation was planned from the very start as a stop to the Germans (something that tended to fail bar a few notable exceptions) followed up by a very strong counter-attack by a powerful reserve, a reserve that would lay low and still until the moment came.

The Maskirovka was so good that the Germans never imagined this counter-attack reserve ever existed. Now that's operational security!

The final effect was as intended: instead of having the Germans parading in the Red Square - as as I normally see in numerous more apologist locations gloating over Prokhoroka etc [img]tongue.gif[/img] - two months later we see Kiev being liberated [img]graemlins/salute.gif[/img]

[ 12. March 2006, 03:19 PM: Message edited by: Za Rodinu ]

Jaeger · #16 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 10:12 AM

In my view the maskirivka was probably one that could rival Fortitude South and North.

Digging an amasing 22000 miles of trench systems and AT ditches without the Germans catching it..

I also think that the Kursk battle was the climax of the OMG doctrine.

Za Rodinu · #17 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 12:08 PM

No, you can't camouflage all those trench lines, these were in plain sight to any reconnaissance plane. What was out of sight was the reserves of the two Fronts - Central and Voronezh, plus the entire Koniev's Steppe Front, way behind the main lines!

Can you expand on your OMG idea? I was under the impression this was a post-war development of the Deep Battle doctrine...

Jaeger · #18 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 05:03 PM

I beleive that the Soviet generals created the OMG concept in the early 30ies.

At any rate the very fronts you speak of acted in the intention of the OMG concept. Beeing sprung on the enemy and racing through into the rear to tear up the defencive structure. To put it in context to the rivaling concepts in it's time. The Blitzkrieg aimed at destroying the will to fight on, by using speed and agression to keep the initiative. Constantly making the enemys situation more unatainable. Encirclement of pocets and pushing on. The Blitzkrieg ended as soon as the Allies started to defend deep.
Monty's balancing tactic aimed at applying pressure to the front, drawing enemy reserves into the battle. At the same time it was important to keep a sizable reserve on his own to smash through the enemy lines. This force would then drive deep, thus threatening to encircle the remainder of the front, or taking the assembly areas. The enemy would have the option to die in their trenches or retreat. The OMG fits in the latter category, but this force was on a scale Monty could only dream of.

The Red Army proved another thing after Kursk. Two great battles had been fought in two very different manners. The double encirclement at Stalingrad, and the colossal crack at Kursk. For the remainder of the war the Germans would be outgunned, outmaneouvered and outfought.

[ 13. March 2006, 11:13 AM: Message edited by: Jaeger ]

Kai-Petri · #19 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 06:45 PM

Going back to the period straight after Stalingrad. Perhaps Stalin did not press on fast enough? If he could have got the German troops in the Caucasus trapped ( Army group A ) after the destruction of the 6th Army in Stalingrad it probably would have meant perhaps as many as 300-400,000 more German POW´s...

Za Rodinu · #20 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 08:50 PM

Kai, who swallowed the Azov sea?

Za Rodinu · #21 (**permalink**) March 13th, 2006, 09:40 PM

Jaeger, I'm away from my books, but IIRC an Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) is a self-contained task force of any size (up to corps) from the second echelon that does not take part in the penetration and is inserted after breakthrough at the appropriate moment to race past the frontline, avoid contact with the enemy and head to a select objective of strategic importance behind the lines, such as a depot, bridgehead, etc, to seize and hold it until relieved.

This is different from the normal exploitation force, intended to operate in the tactical or logistical rear of the enemy.

Friedrich · #22 (**permalink**) March 14th, 2006, 12:18 AM

I agree with the others… the turning point was June 22nd 1941…

Jaeger · #23 (**permalink**) March 14th, 2006, 10:14 AM

Za Rodinu

Thanks for putting it straight. I did not want to place the OMG in the same booth as a Explotation force. But the similarities are there in the operation in the enemys rear.
The difference is in the fixed objective of the OMG.

chocapic · #24 (**permalink**) March 17th, 2006, 11:39 AM

Thanks for all your answers [img]smile.gif[/img]

so far we've got

4 votes for 1 (USSR won from the start)

1 vote for 2 (well, more or less) : Moscow was not taken over

1 vote for 3 (Stalingrad)

Za Rodinu · #25 (**permalink**) March 17th, 2006, 02:17 PM

Jaeger, if I can throw David Isby's Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army at you...

"The operational manoeuvre group is one answer to the problems posed by the need for a quick victory in Europe under either conventional or nuclear conditions. Used in the Second World War, when they were termed "mobile groups," OMGs are independent formations which may be as small as an independent brigade or as large as several divisions. Division-sized OMGs are likely to be part of each front or even army. Their re-emergence in the early 1980s apparently stemmed from exercise experience rather than a continued application of wartime lessons. Indeed, in the early 1980s OMGs had become so operationally significant that there was criticism within the Warsaw Pact that they were being included in exercises whether they were needed or not.

OMGs are intended to achieve objectives in the operational depths of the enemy's defences. They are by no means solely exploitation forces, and frequently serve as an advance guard in mobile combat. They can be used with the army or front deployed in either one or two echelons. A deployment of one echelon and an OMG has been suggested as probable in a future conflict in Europe. The OMG may be committed once the first echelon has gained its objectives — the first echelon making the penetration and the OMG exploiting - or before a penetration is achieved.

Once committed, the OMG penetrates the defences, seizing key political and military objectives and defeating reserves. Much as tactical units use their forward detachments and reydy as "keys" to unlock the defence, operational formations will use their OMGs. The army-level OMG appears to be based usually on a tank division. It may be reinforced by units which include an air assault brigade, a helicopter regiment, an army artillery group, reconnaissance and intelligence units, air defence units, engineer units, command and control elements, one or more motorised rifle regiments, and a number of fixed-wing aircraft.

Generally, an OMG will initially deploy about 40—60km behind the FEBA. It can be used to reinforce the first echelon, become or join the second echelon, be placed in reserve, or be employed as an OMG. It can be as much as 20-30% the size of the parent organisation, further increasing its flexibility of employment."