Hmm yes, even beating, with impunity, enemies in Somalia, Vietnam, and the Gulf..

That army you mean?

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Alles Für Deutschland

Those are political wars and are doomed from the start to fail. Most people know that except in Washington DC. [img]graemlins/no.gif[/img]

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Work Harder ! Millions on welfare are depending on you.

The U.S. military have never lost a war. However, our politicians have never stood up to responsibility in fifty years and have lost several campaigns. And the ones most at fault are the ones that most want to gain control of the country.

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Lord, let me be the person my dog thinks I am.

Seadog,

The U.S. lost the war of 1812 to the Brits......
just to name one

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

What?!?!

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Maskirovka: Show the world one thing...then do another.

http://maskirovka.blogspot.com/

Personally I do not think it was overrated. Yes, there were some deficiencies in its organization but we must remember the Hitler force them to war before they were ready. Given that, they accomplished a whole deal more than the highly motorized Allied armies. No, it was not overrated.

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American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

I agree with PzJgr...

Nothing nore to add really, and I think subconciously people know this, it's reflected in the prices of collectible militaria...

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Alles Für Deutschland

Vietname? Korea? Though i suppose you cant lose a war that you actually dont declare as a war.

The Germany Army during World War II was vastly superior to any other Army. To go from utter defeat during World War II, economic unstability during the Weimar Republic which (along with several other things) allowed the Nazis to take power, combined with the rapid modernisation of the country and all the economic constraints on it, to be able to come from that and conquer all of Europe (which really had never been done before) along with parts of Africa is truly amasing. The French and the British knew the war was coming, part of the reason the British Army was in France during the onset of the war.

The German Soldier proved himself superior to anyone he faced. It was only later in the war, when supply constraints and the capability of only being able to draw on a small population (as opposed to the Untied States and Russia) along with fighting a continous war (the British were pretty much out of it for a long time, so werent suffering the same sort of loss-of-life as the Germans were) all lead to the eventual defeat of the German Army.

In a hypothetical situation, where a German Army is equally supplied as an Allied Army, fighting on terrain then does not offer advantage or disadvantage to either side, i would place all my money on the German Army winning due to its tactics and the skill of the soldiers.

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At the risk of repetition, the historical record does not bear out a superiority of the Wehrmacht in WW 2 over the major opponets it faced outside of the French.
First, the Germans only succeeded strategically against what might be termed "second string" nations with the exception of France. Certainly, they did have successes early on against their major opponets both tactically and operationally, including the British, Soviets,and to a very limited extent the US (eg Kasserine etc.).
The reason for the lack of success strategically for the Germans is simply their doctrinal system relied heavily on tactical and operational superiority (particularly tactical) to disrupt their opponet's strategic initative. Once they were unable to significantly could not disrupt their opponet's strategic initative through tactical or operational success they failed miserably.
Examples abound. Rommel was a master of tactical and operational disruption of British strategy. Yet, Rommel ultimately failed in North Africa through lack of a useful strategic goal and through Montgomery putting in place a strategy that made any tactical or operational success Rommel might have irrelevant. So, no matter how well the Germans fought the small battle they ended up losing the campaign.
By 1944 the US had even succeeded for the most part in being able to fight a better tactical and operational war than the Germans. Look at the several German offensive operations in France from August 1944 through December 1944 and this pattern is true. At Mortain or Averranches / Nancy the Germans used their usual methodology of substituting speed and local action for unity of command only to get their a$$es handed to them in short order.
In Market-Garden it was only a less than agressive British advance that caused failure. The Germans remained largely powerless to prevent this operation from succeeding.
In the Ardennes with what was a tremendous numerical advantage, particularly in the 5th Panzer Army sector, they still failed to succeed.
From 1941 on against the Western Allies with one exception (18th VG versus 106th Infantry) no German infantry division succeeded on the offensive against a similar sized Western division.
The Soviets, likewise, took a different strategy that more and more forewent tactical success everywhere for an overall operational and strategic one. The Germans proved more and more unable to react to simply Soviet offensives as they grew in size and scope. By 1944 the Soviet summer offensive (Bagration) was a near complete strategic surprise that collapsed most of the German front. While the Germans had local tactical successes, some of them quite spectacular, these had absolutely no bearing on the overall Soviet success strategically.
In France in 1940 it was far more a severely flawed French doctrine that permitted the Germans to disrupt the French army and air force casuing their strategic failure. Better equipment was not going to save the French from their disasterously bad operational doctrine.

On the whole, the Germans were quite adept tactically and better or equal to any of their opponets. Operationally, they barely maintained equality. Strategically, the Germans were by and large a failure at virtually every turn.
But, tactical success does not ensure strategic success on its own. Thus, the flawed myopia of the German doctrinal development made them a mediocre military force in the end assessment.

I see a lot of flaws in your points. As previously stated, the Western Front conisted on non-German troops (Ost Division etc) or young boys/old men who werent suited to fighting. They were also relatively unable to move around due to Allied Air Superioty.

Rommel and his troops were far superior to their opponents. They were outgunned and outmanned the entire campaign, yet still managed to march all the way to the outskirts of Cairo (well, Al Alamein, but that was the last line of defense before Cairo).

You seem to be overlooking the fact that Rommel only saw defeat due to the lack of supplies. You cant win victories if your tanks run out of gas mid-battle. As talked about elsewhere on the Forums, he was getting 1/4 - 1/3 the amount of supplies needed. Hitler saw the North African theatre as inferior to that of the Russian, and concerntrated the German and Best Troops and Supplies against the Russians.

I also think that the fact that they managed to conquer europe in such a modern day and age despite the lack of raw materials and supplies is rather impressive. The Allies generally had superior numbers and supplies against these worn-down units or foreign units that they were fighting against.

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Yep, Rommel was outhardwared.

"After the fall of France German infantry divisions on their own never succeeded in offensive operations above the tactical level (company and down) against the Western Allies with one exception...the 18th VG versus 106th US Inf Div in the Ardennes."


Well, if Germans weren't so busy on eastern front & outnumbered in men tanks & aircraft, this might've been a bit different.

"On a man for man basis, the German ground soldier consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES."


'Brigadier Williams said: "The Germans adjusted much better to new conditions that we did. By and large they were better soldiers than we were. The Germans liked soldiering. We didn't". (p. 212).



Here is another:
'The American Colonel Trevor Dupuy has conducted a detailed statistical study of German actions in the Second World War. Some of his explanations as to why Hitler's armies performed so much more impressively than their enemies seem fanciful. But no critic has challenged his essential finding that on every battlefield of the war, including Normandy, the German soldier performed more impressively than his opponents:

On a man for man basis, the German ground soldier consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. [emphasis in original] This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost. (Col. T.N Dupuy, A Genius For War, London 1977)

It is undoubtedly true that the Germans were much more efficient than the Americans in making use of available manpower. An American army corps staff contained 55 per cent more officers and 44 per cent fewer other ranks than its German equivalent. In a panzergrenadier division in 1944-45, 89.4 per cent of the men were fighting soldiers, against only 65.56 per cent in an American division. In June 1944, 54.35 per cent of the German army consisted of fighting soldiers, against 38 per cent of the American army. 44.9 per cent of the German army was employed in combat divisions, against 20.8 per cent of the American. While the U.S. army became a huge industrial organization, whose purpose sometimes seemed to be forgotten by those who administered it, the German army was designed solely as a machine for waging war. Even the British, who possessed nothing like the reserves of manpower of the Americans, traditionally employed officers on a far more lavish scale than the German army, which laid particular emphasis upon NCO leadership.

Events on the Normandy battlefield demonstrated that most British or American troops continued a given operation for as long as reasonable men could. Then - when they had fought for many hours, suffered many casualties, or were running low on fuel or ammunition - they disengaged. The story of German operations, however, is landmarked with repeated examples of what could be achieved by soldiers prepared to attempt more than reasonable men could. German troops did not fight uniformly well. But Corporal Hohenstein's assertion that they were trained always to try to do more than had been asked of them is borne out by history. Again and again, a single tank, a handful of infantry with an 88 mm gun, a hastily mounted counter-attack,stopped a thoroughly-organized Allied advance dead in its tracks.

German leadership at corps level and above was often little better than that of the Allies, and sometimes markedly worse. But at regimental level and below, it was superb. The .German army appeared to have access to a bottomless reservoir of brave, able and quick-thinking colonels commanding battle- groups, and of NCOs capable of directing the defence of an entire sector of the front. The fanatical performance of the SS may partly explain the stubborn German defence of Europe in 1944--45. But it cannot wholly do so, any more than the quality of the Allied armies can be measured by the achievements of their airborne forces. The defence of Normandy was sustained for 10 weeks in the face of overwhelming odds by the professionalism and stubborn skills of the entire Wehrmacht, from General of Pioneers Meise, who somehow kept just sufficient
road and rail links operational to maintain a thin stream of supplies to the front, to Corporal Hohenstein and his admittedly half.,hearted comrades of 276th Infantry.

It then goes on to discuss the operational, if not numerical superiority of German equipment from the Tiger and Panther (versus Cromwell and Sherman) tanks down to the simple but deadly Panzerfaust and the higher frequency of distribution of machine guns that made German units far more effective than their numbers would suggest.

I have every reason to agree with you that during World War 2, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS were probably the finest ground forces in the world. From years of study, I have come to believe that the cream of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots were the best in the world, and just maybe the best the world will ever see, given the increasing use of remote and automated pilotage. They were all wasted.

Interestingly, nothing in the above changes anything I previously mentioned.

And, Chrome brings up Dupuy! Let's just say, you don't even want to go there. Dupuy's conclusions are based on seriously flawed assumptions, poor statistics, and a unreproducable set of results from his Quantitative Judgement Model as given in Numbers, Predictions, and War. If you really want to push this position feel free. But be forewarned, I've already successfully rebutted Dupuy's model vis-a-vie the Dupuy Institute elsewhere. It is a losing position to try.
Feel free to cite any of his other works where he repeats these useless results like Understanding War, Understanding Defeat, Hitler's Last Gamble and the like.
I would like you to show evidence of the 50% greater rate of casualties. Based on losses in the West from April 44 on the Germans suffered the greater losses and did little better in Italy even though they had a far superior defensive position there.
It is also irrefutable that the Germans lost from 1943 on in the West operationally and strategically virtually every battle they engaged in; even when they had numerical superiority. The same is true in the East where the Soviets proved strategically far more competent even while remaining largely tactically poor.
I would point out Mussolini, that even in infantry divisions in the West that were not second or third string my point prevails. In the Vosgenes Campaign for example the Germans actually held a slight numerical superiority, had substancial advantage in terrain, were not faced with any appreciable airpower, and they still lost to the US. The bottom line here is that with the exception of a handful of top notch divisions the German army almost from 1939 was primarily composed of marginally useful divisions capable of little more than garrison duty. And, yes, these divisions count in any assessment of the capacity of the German army as a whole. One cannot assess the whole army based on a handful of "glamor" divisions given the best of everything.
As for Rommel's supply problems: Let's go further. The Wehrmacht and German military system gave short shrift to both logistics and engineering as applied to modern warfare. This is a shortcoming largely of their own making. Supply and engineering count. The Germans were poor at both. In many cases their ineptness in these fields cost them dearly. This was not the fault of their enemies but rather something they did to themselves.

Here's a short discussion on Dupuy's QJM outcomes modelling:

Well, in my case, is that analytically and mathematically it makes no sense. Unlike many, I have taken alot of time going through the mass of linear equations used in Dupuy's QJM. I will not discuss here the merits of his weapons values assessment in the TLI/OLI system, but rather the outcomes of the model as these are the most important part of the system as a whole.

With the QJM Dupuy offers several different measures of outcomes:

Frist, there is the direct outcomes from the QJM where the calculated OLI combat potential is compared (see equations 12 & 13 in NP&W) given as P/P.
Next, Dupuy gives two stand-alone equations for "Spacial Effectiveness" (eq 14) and "Casualty Effectiveness" (eq 15). These are then combined, additively, to a chosen "Mission Accomplishment Factor" with a value of 0 - 10. Note, that this last subjective value often dominates the equation of mission effectiveness.
The results for each side, R, are then compared by subtraction of the defender's value from that of the attacker.
The two results above are then further compared using the equations:

(R-R)/5 = P/P-1 or P/P = (R-R)/6

Note, that neither of these equations is actually such. P/P and R-R are vastly different values which the constants do not balance.
Dupuy also uses a graphical presentation of these values in figure 5-1 introducing the concept of "The Normal Battle Line." By Substitution of x for P/P and y for R-R we find:

y = 5x - 5 and y = 6x from the above equations.

And, dy/dx is 5 and 6 respectively for the above. This means, as figure 5-1 shows, that the Normal Battle Line is linear with a slope of 5 or 6 depending on the equation used. Figure 5-1 shows this as a slope of 5 by simple plotting of the line. Therefore the second equation gives erronious values of this line by observed caluclation as shown.
In Equation 23 Dupuy introduces the "Score of Effectiveness." THis is another stand-alone evaluation. He follows this up with the "Combat Effectiveness Value" (CEV) defined as PR/PR and R/R for the CEV average. He then refines these equations into the "Effective Power Ratio" using the equation PR/PR = (R-R)/6. This is a refinement of the above Normal Battle Line equation above, obviously. It also by extension is erronious. Setting any of these equations equal to zero also results in a false answer, as none are equalities.
Basically, Dupuy's QJM is flawed mathematically to a point where the results are largely, if not completely, irrelevant. That is my objection to his system, not that it makes some allusion to the German Wehrmacht having some "quantified" superiority.

Being "non-German troops or young boys/old men" and "relatively unable to move around due to Allied Air Superioty" is not exactly a mark of German prowess, quite the contrary, it's the result of having painted themselves into a strategic corner.

I still have to see a demonstration of British genius in the Desert warfare, except perhaps for O'Connor, therefore no big deal there. Rommel is/was reknowned for his aggressiveness and his ability to impose a quick tempo of operations, but... (see below)

... but again he was operating within a very unfavourable strategic framework within which the guile of 10 Rommels would be needed to prevail. It is not a mark of superiority to have a high command that put the Afrika Korps (or allowed Rommel to) into such a situation where he was impossible to keep his force adequately supplied.

Now here you are talking about two entirely different things.In the first period I grant you that the German armed forces enjoyed a spectacular victory spell, but against whom? The immobile French, the puny Belgians and Dutch, the thoroughly disorganised Russians, the wishywashy Brits until Alamein, etc. etc.

After the tide turned, that is at Alamein and especially when their last victory eluded them at Stalingrad, there would be no more easy victories, no more victory proclamations on the radio. And what's more, the seasoned troops would be wearing thin (heroes die too) and what was left had to learn on the job and pay the corresponding price.

That was then that the "Allies generally had superior numbers and supplies" as you say, but again we see the painted in a strategic corner syndrome, which does not exactly identify the Wehrmacht as a big thing.

This kind of discussions are somewhat sterile and tend to end in threads closed by the moderator. The base question is too vague and discussion can go in any direction. The fact is we are looking at a mobile target as the quality of the Wehrmacht in 1945 was not the same as 1940, say, and also we have to see whether we are talking in tactical, operational or strategic terms. So I think we should split this discussion in years and the three layers I mentioned above.

For instance, can anybody spot the difference in 1940 between the German and French at Operational level?

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If I may quote from Hart: "Adjust your end to your means"
The beginning of the end is the Russian campaign. The Germans could have beaten the Rus in 1941 in a single-dimension operation, but not a super-dimension operation. Hitler wanted Ukraine, Leningrad, and Moscow; there is simply not enough means to support such operation. I personally think a super-dimension operation is the best choice when you have the means for it. I think Hitler’s brain was washed away by victory parades before he made such arrogant and fatal decisions.
Sun Tzu once said: “Know your enemy and know yourself”, only if Hitler considered that before he invaded Russia.
But the men, WOMEN, and children of Germany paid for Hitler's arrogance.

[ 23. January 2007, 01:34 PM: Message edited by: Ironcross ]

Ironcross, break out the champagne, I agree with you

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Well T.A. Dupuy's got a tad more credibility me thinks. Like any human he can be wrong, but based on his accomplishements, I'll go with him.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndupuy.htm

Trevor has been characterized as a genius and a prophet. His contributions to the store of human knowledge in terms of the derivation of a theory of combat and philosophy of war are of outstanding value. He is the author or co–author of more than 80 books and more than 100 articles published in professional and military journals in many countries.


During WWII he commanded a US artillery battalion, a Chinese artillery group, and artillery from the British 36th Division. He was always proud of the fact that he had more combat time in Burma than any other American, and received decorations for service or valor from the US, British, and Chinese governments. After the war Trevor served on the War Department General Staff, OPD from 1945 to 1947, and as military assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army from 1947 to 1948. He was a member of the original SHAPE staff in Paris under Generals Eisenhower and Ridgway from 1950 to 1952. Between 1952 and 1956 Trevor was a member of the founding faculty of the Harvard Defense Studies Program. In 1956 he became Director of the Ohio State Military Studies Program. In 1958, after retiring from active military duty, he served as a visiting professor in the International Relations Program at Rangoon University in Burma.