We all know that the Allies enjoyed complete air supremacy in Europe. Both tactical and strategic, the latter having modest results at best, with appalling loss of civilian life.
So my question to you is. With all this air superiority why did the war in Europe last so long?

Just trying to pick some or you brains to see your thougths on this topic.

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Facta non verba. "Deeds, not words"

The war started in 1939 and was over in 1945. The allies did not have air superiority until 1944. Even in the 44-45 period your life as a bomber crewman was limited.

Someone I can't think of said airpower can take ground from the enemy but you need ground soldiers to hold it. The Russians and allies did not get into Germany until late 44 or early 45.

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T.A. What I was trying to get at is, why in 1944 once we had air superiority, why did it take so long to finnish the Germans off. Many allies leaders were saying that they would be home for Christmas of that year (1944). Air supremacy seemed to work in other campains such as North African campaign, where Rommel and Von Arnim were crushed by tactical air support. I'm also aware of the numerical superiority the allies had in land units and tanks in NA (north africa).

It seems to me that air power didn't work as well in Europe(1944) as did in NA. Is there a reason? Maybe the allies focused on the strategic side to much in Europe, where in Africa they focused on tactical.

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Facta non verba. "Deeds, not words"

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"It seems to me that air power didn't work as well in Europe(1944) as did in NA. Is there a reason? Maybe the allies focused on the strategic side to much in Europe, where in Africa they focused on tactical."

Thats clearer. It wasnt that the airforce fellows werent trying to focus on the tactical, vs the stratigic in Africa. But, they didnt have as much in the way of heavy bombers there. Bomber Harris thought he should base the heavies in Britian, and the Yanks did not get their heavy bombers to Africa en mass until late 43. Still one wonders if the Axis supply thru Tripoli might not have been disrupted by a series of heavy bombing raids.

My own take is tactical air power worked better in Europe in 44 - 45 than in Africa. By August 44 the internal US fight over CAS/interdiction/stratigic allocation was settled. The tactical airforces & wings of the US & Britian were coherent independant entities, and both the US & Brits had refined their CAS doctrine into something usefull. Conversely the winter months greatly reduced effective operations. My father was a ordinance officer in a medium B26 squadron & recalled franticly rebasing forward to eastern France in September 44

Late in the game in Tunisia the Allied airmen developed some extremely effective operations. But, they were situational & the techniques not always applicable to other battles.

The realative sucess of Allied stratigic airpower late in the war is another question I'll leave for others.

You cannot win with airpower alone, just as you cannot win with sea power alone. We had complete control of the seas, and it did not change the need to go in with soldiers. Saturation bombing that was used is not an effective means of stopping an enemy. Eventually, they will find means of achieving goals despite the bombs. Civilians killed are only less people to feed. And the bombing usually establishs a public resolve to resist more.

War is a multi-faceted act. First, deny the enemy progress, then deny resupply, and then counter-attack. If you do not march into the the leadership of the opposition and remove their power, the outcome is not assured.

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With the technology back then you couldn't get everything with just airpower. You needed the infantry to come in afterwards and mop up the resistance or to radio in specific targets for a plane to hit. You can't always see a camouflaged bunker from the air. It's just like the original models of the Elefant at Kursk that were essentially a failure because they werent armed with machine guns. You can't have one without the other; in this case airpower without infantry.

Not to mention the Luftwaffe had some pretty good pilots themselves to give our boys trouble.

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Germany is a big country and due to the inaccuracy of the bombs it took a long time to bomb enough of Germany to seriously affect it. The strategic bombing did have a major effect on Germany but the Germans, being resourceful, found ways to rebuild their factories and by the end of the war a lot of production was going on underground. In addition, while tactical air superiority can decimate your foes large, mechanized forces in open terrain it is not as decisive in wooded and urban terrain. There are far more places for the infantry (and even some tanks and artillery) to hide in Europe than in North Africa. This is why the wars against Iraq were so successful; the terrain was perfect to maximize the US' complete air supremacy.

The allies thought the Luftwaffe was exhausted by mid 1944. They were too optimistic. In a way it was, but the Luftwaffe reorganised, at least partly and caused several surprises up to the end (Battle of the Bulge airfield attacks , Operation Gisela etc...).

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boy what can I add ? mostly nothing. True Germany was good sized the 8th AF, 9th and 15th AF's could not be everywhere at once. The RAF tried to silence German production, but as with the US AF it bolstered German populace-moral even more so, and German pilots would take more chances even with Allied air superiority in fighters to bring down "heavies". the Luftwaffe night fighter arm had the pilots/crews the machines but no fuel, so if anything the bombing campaign terminated the internal resources on a slow basis for which the Luftwaffe could run their missions.

Remember in the daylight campaign with the size of Germany, Allied fighters pounded more than fighters trying to attack bombers, industry through dive-bombing, railways/Locos, barges, flak positions, rocket sites, anything that moved in late war - MT, armor, troop columns/horse drawn euipment, etc. that is literally alot of ground to cover over months and months of time to try to bring Germany to a standstill

E ~

The allies did not have total air superiority until they had bases on continental Europe itself. The bombing campaign against German industry could not win the war alone because the Germans just moved their industry underground. Air superiority only affected the "tools" of war but not the soldier themselves. The ground pounder still had to go in.

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American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

Because contrary to the opinion of many an air force general or visionary air power does not win wars. It is an adjunct, an extension, of either land or sea power. On land armies win wars. At sea navies do. Airpower is simply and extension of these. So, the war in Europe required that the armies of the Allies actually defeat the Germans.
All air power did was give them an additional advantage. It won nothing.