WOW. Even a deception plan could cause diplomatic problems.
The Balkans Deception: "Operation Zeppelin"
The object of "Operation Zeppelin" was to pin German troops in the Balkans so that they would be weaker in France in anticipation of the Normandy landings. This was a very elaborate scheme, involving not merely the U.S. and Britain, but also Russia. The deception actually hinted at several Allied offensives, to be conducted either singly or in concert. In summary, the various operations involved an Allied offensive against:
1. Crete
2. Peloponessus, the southernmost peninsula of mainland Greece.
3. Albania
4. The Dalmatian Coast of Yugoslavia
5. Mainland Greece
6. The Coasts of Romania and Bulgaria (in cooperation with the Russians)
7. Pola and the Istrian Peninsula at the head of the Adriatic, assuming the success of one or more of the earlier operations (items A through E).
The object of the plan was to keep major German formations in the Balkans for as long as possible. The idea was to convince the Germans that a major Allied move in the Balkans could be expected in mid?March of 1944, possibly in conjunction with the a new Soviet offensive. As the Normandy operation drew closer, the details of "Operation Zeppelin" were modified.
As developed in February of 1944, "Zeppelin" suggested an Allied offensive against Crete, the Peloponessus, Albania, and Dalmatia, or some combination of these, around March 23, 1944, around the new moon, to be supported by a Allied?Soviet assault on Romania and Bulgaria, plus an Allied landing on the Greek mainland in late April. As March 23rd neared, "technical difficulties" forced the postponement of the operations against Crete, the Peloponessus Dalmatia, and Albania until late April, with the assaults on mainland Greece and in the Black Sea therefore "necessarily" postponed until late May. But those pesky "technical difficulties," mostly as very real shortage of landing craft (the available landing craft being hoarded in Britain for the main event, D?Day), forced a further "postponement." As a result, going into late April, all assaults were rescheduled for late May. And yet again there were problems, so that finally the operations against Crete, the Peloponessus, and in the Black Sea were "canceled" so that those against mainland Greece, Albania, and Dalmatia were to take place in mid?June. By then, of course, the Normandy landings had taken place.
"Operation Zeppelin" seems to have been a success, keeping the Germans just sufficiently anxious about their situation in the Balkans to prevent the transfer of one or two mobile divisions to France. So the deception was helpful militarily. In fact, politically it was remarkably successful, in an unanticipated way.
One of the formations "committed" to "Zeppelin" was the Polish III Corps, consisting of two Polish divisions, the 2nd Armored and the 7th Infantry. Concentrated in southern Italy, this impressive force was supposed to conduct an amphibious landing against Durazzo, the principal port of Albania, with the intent of driving on the capital, Tirane, while other Allied forces (i.e., the U.S. Seventh Army, whose real objective was southern France as part of "Operation Anvil/Dragoon"), landed in Dalmatia and Istria. In reality, the Polish III Corps did not exist, save for one tank brigade, which was hardly capable of a major amphibious undertaking. The rest of the corps consisted of notional formations created by British specialists in deception. So successful was this bogus threat to Albania, that it had serious repercussions in high diplomatic circles. By early 1944 the Allies had committed themselves to supporting Marshal Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia rather than the Royalist "Chetniks," who seemed as willing to fight Tito as the Germans. And Tito wanted nothing to do with Polish troops in the Balkans. A little elementary geography will explain why. Although not part of the Balkans, an independent Poland would be sufficiently strong to assert its will in that region assuming no interference from even stronger outside powers.
Tito's objections to Polish troops "intruding" into the Balkans created a major problem for "Zeppelin" planners. They could not inform Tito of the deception, since his headquarters was riddled with German sympathizers and spies. Nor could they "replace" the Polish troops in the operation with others, more politically acceptable to the Yugoslavs, since building up the existence of notional units was difficult and time consuming. In the end, the directors of "Zeppelin" decided to carefully continue to deceive the Germans as to the presence of the Polish III Corps, while deceiving Tito as to its absence. Fortunately for inter?Allied unity, they did not have to do so for long, as "Zeppelin" was abandoned after the landings in southern France.
http://www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=ddaydeceit.htm&reader=long
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The Balkans Deception: "Operation Zeppelin"
. I didn't think of posting this there LOL. I wonder if some others here will notice? 
