ITALIAN RAID AT MANAMA (1940)
Introduction
On October 19, 1940, four Savoia Marchetti SM82 special bombers of the Regia Aeronautica Italiana hit the English oil refineries in the Persian Gulf carrying out a long, hard and brilliant war mission.
During World War Two, the Regia Aereonautica Italiana, although lacking in a consistent numbers of strategic bombers, managed to transform several SM82 and SM75 three-engined transport planes into aircrafts able to hit enemy target (airports and industrial plants) which were too far away to be reached by the normal bombers generally employed by the Italian Air Force, such as the Savoia Marchetti SM79, Fiat Br20 and CantZ 1007. Thanks to their first rate reliability and long range, a handful of the modified SM82 and SM75 succeeded in carrying out several missions.
These missions were remarkable, not only because of the damage caused to the enemy, but especially for their strictly technical importance.
From June 1940 to July 1943, the SM82 and SM75 bombers delivered attacks on Gibraltar, Suez, Port Sudan and Bahrain. This also gave an effective propagandistic value. They replaced the four-engine Piaggio P108s, which although were more suitable, were not always available due to their scant numbers.
The SM82 Bomber
Among the brilliant actions carried out by the three-engine Savoia-Marchetti was in late spring 1942, when a special SM75 established a new link with a non-stop flight from Rome to Tokyo. But also the successful raid in mid-October 1940 on the oil refinery of Manama holds a particular interest and meaning.
The English refineries in the Persian Gulf were chosen as the first strategic target at the beginning of summer 1940 when the first models of Savoia-Marchetti were produced by the assembly line. They were transport planes converted into bombers.
The craft belonging to this series were provided with forward/ventral laying devices, a bomb release gear and three Breda-Safat machine-guns. The first SM82 bombers started their activity on July 17, when three aircrafts took off from Rome-Guidonia to raid the English stronghold of Gibraltar (100 and 250 kilogram bombs were dropped during this action). Similar attacks were carried out again on Gibraltar on July 25 (this time the planes took off from the base of Alghero in Sardinia) and on August 20. The results were good (the target was hit, although with a small quantity of explosives and some of the planes were lost or damaged during the mission). At the beginning of October 1940, the command of the Regia Aeronautica decided that five SM82 bombers belonging to the 41st Group led by lieutenant-colonel Ettore Muti should be transferred from Rome-Ciampino to the airport of Gadurrà (Isle of Rhodes).
The passage took place on October 13. The Italian Command intended to employ the special SM82s to bomb the English oil plants of Manama, in the Persian Gulf, in order to show the potential ability of the Italian air force. It was a long and difficult mission involving a 4,000 kilometre flight. Ettore Muti and his comrades spent four days working on a complete revision of the plans and established a complex flight plan.
The Italians decided against the highly dangerous manoeuvre of returning to Rhodes on the same route, as they might have been intercepted by the Royal Air Force based in Cyprus, Palestine and Iraq, and chose another option. After bombing the refineries, the planes would head for the southwest, flying over the immense and scarcely inhabited Arabian desert in order to reach the Red Sea and the Italian colony of Eritrea.
On December 18, at 5.10 pm, after filling both the normal and the supplementary tanks, they loaded three out of four SM82s with 1.5 tons of incendiary and explosive bombs weighing 15, 20 or 50 kilograms. Then the four three-engine bombers took off.
In command of the first aircraft, which gained height with difficulty from the Rhodes- Gadurrà runway because it was overloaded with 19,500 kilograms, was Lieutenant Colonel Muti. He was assisted by Major Giovanni Raina and by Captain Paolo Moci, who had previous experience in flying planes overloaded up to 21 tons.
Lieutenant Colonel Fortunato Federici, Captain Aldo Buzzaca and Lieutenant Emanuele Francesco Ruspoli were on the second aircraft, while Captain Giorgio Meyer, Lieutenant Adolf Rebex and Warrant Officer Aldo Carrera were on the third one. The fourth plane was piloted by Captain Antonio Zanetti assisted by Lieutenant Vittorio Cecconi and Warrant Officer Mario Badii.
The SM82s, after gaining height (a manoeuvre which took remarkable efforts because of the enormous weight of the aircrafts) headed east, flying over Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria, bending to the southeast as they went past Jordan and Iraq until they reached the Persian Gulf. During the very long outward flight, the role of Muti's SM82 pathfinder proved its essential function in leading the squadron. Two huge white rhombuses had been painted purposefully on the upper side of its wings and lighted by two lamps so that the pilots of the other planes could easily see them and follow Muti's craft in the dark.
For security reasons, the commander had decided that all radio communications should be cut off. This measure was rather uncomfortable for the crew but allowed the Italians to keep the precious advantage of surprise.
Regarding the role played by the pathfinder plane, we must point out that its duty was to spot the target and release its bombs so that the others could do the same. Thanks to the help of a rudimentary device, the only bombardier (Major Giovanni Raina) was expected to find the difficult target. At 2.20 am, just before reaching the Bahrain Islands, Lieutenant Colonel Federici's aircraft suddenly lost sight contact with Muti's SM82 and had to drop its bombs on different targets in the vicinity of Manama, while the other planes hit the fixed target.
As bombardier Raina later told "the operation of spotting the target was easy thanks to the total illumination of the extractive and refinery plants" which were partially damaged by the bombs (half a dozen wells and some oil deposits were set on fire). As soon as they perceived the glares of the first explosions, the Italian planes made off along the escape route landing to the Zula runway (Eritrea) at 8 8:40.
The whole Italian formation had flown 2,400 kilometres in 15.30 hours. At the Eritrean airport, along with a small crowd of Italian aviators, the brave pilots found the fourth SM82 squadron which, in the meantime, had come from Rhodes as a support plane on the way back, should one of the crafts make an emergency landing in the desert.
A few days later, the five SM82s of Colonel Muti took off from Zula and with no further problems, arrived at the Rome-Urbe airport. From a strict military point of view, the raid on the oil refineries of Manama was not able (especially because of the few planes employed) to cause severe damages to the enemy. The enterprise led by Muti had, however, a great importance in the technical and propagandistic side. In fact, after the raid, the RAF was compelled to place a squadron of fighters near the refineries and protect the plants with a couple of battalions and some batteries of antiaircraft guns.
Written by: Alberto Rosselli
http://www.comandosupremo.com/Manama.html
Daring Raids
