IMO I think one of the reasons that the Germans were successful in so many instances was the "Einheit" system they used. It eased the problem of a mission by tailor making a task force to the needs of the mission. One unit could be added to another till it was thought suited to the forms and dimensions needed for the mission. The Germans used alot of "Kampgruppen" in the war. Though alot were adhoc formations towards the end.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Yes, the speed the Germans were reacting and also the fact these kampfgruppen consisted of all possible to use ( artillery, Flak, tanks etc ) made them very poweful and useful. Also the possibility that German NCO´s were capable of taking officer positions and lead troops did not leave the troops standing there if the officers were killed/lost.

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It's noted in That Buckley book that the 'kampfgruppe and counter-attack' philosophy may actually have worked against them in Normandy.
As the majority of casualties are always in the attack, many of the 'successful' counter-attacks engendered by their doctrine achieved small tactical gains while wasting men out of all proportion to those gains.
Perhaps an instance where esprit de corps, experience, & deeply ingrained doctrine can actually work against an army?

Cheers,
Adam.

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Yes, especially for Waffen-SS the proportion of losses was huge throughout the war, but it was also considered that intention for fast success/breakthough would in the end result in smaller losses altogether.

In Normandy 1944 already for German Army the best soldiers were dead and even for Waffen-SS units the men material was getting a bit low. But however I consider the German effort for keeping the Allied in Normandy for so long a sort of "miracle".

And all in all the only way for Germans to win was to get the Allied out of France, otherwise they would definitely lose. So no choice there really in my opinion.

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The US Army had a paralle development in its use of flexible Combat Commands and Task Forces in the Armored divsions, and the Regimental/Battalion Combat teams in the Infantry divisions. The concepts of 'Mission Orders', Speed/Manuver, focus on the 'Schwerpunckt' or critical point were know to the US Army via officers who had attended the German military schools. Where the US Army differed was in the influence of French doctrine. The concept of the Methodical Battle, the 'Fire Power Rules' doctrine, and a emphasis on detailed planning from the French had a effect on US Army doctrines.

The result was the US Army fell somewhere between the hyperactive Wehrmacht and stodgy British or French practices.

Of course the US Army had its own traditions for doctrine from the frontier days, and the Phillipines insurrection, but European influences overlaid those. And, the concepts for fighting Geronimo or Tecumseh were not easy to translate into the 20th Century. The older US practices were probablly best preserved in the cavalry, or revived in the artillery in the 1930s.

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