Fire support employment in the Rhine River crossing at Remagen, Germany.

This study is an historical analysis of the procedures and doctrine used by the III Corps Artillery during the First US Army's crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen, Germany. This study examines the actions of III Corps Artillery in the employment, organization for combat, and command and control of artillery units at Remagen. The fire support procedures employed by the field artillery are compared with those prescribed by published doctrine and unit standing operating procedures. This comparison is used to evaluate the adequacy of doctrine and the need for standing operating procedures to supplement the published doctrine. The development of standing operating procedures from lessons learned during earlier combat is examined to show how the doctrine allowed flexibility and standardization that was evident throughout the army. This standardization continues to serve as a model for fire support operations in today's emerging combined arms doctrine. The study concludes with lessons learned: (1) Centralized command and control of field artillery should be under the headquarters that is best organized to control a large number of units, (2) doctrine and standing operating procedures are useless unless leaders develop and execute plans that are in accordance with the principles established and practiced, (3) the tendency to establish standing operating procedures that violate or contradict doctrine should be avoided, (4) a need for more liaison officers was evident at Remagen as well as through the war and continues to exist today even with improved technology, (5) the redundancy of tasks outlined in doctrine provides the flexibility needed to accomplish the fire support mission during a fast moving battle, and (6) field artillery units should practice several tactical missions and not just the standard mission associated with peace time organizations. This study concludes that the standardization evident throughout III Corps Artillery was accomplished by prudent use of published doctrine and standard operating procedures. While these procedures were ignored in some instances at Remagen the flexibility necessary for the employment of the field artillery during the battle was provided by this doctrine.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...ename=1543.pdf

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Field artillery doctrine development 1917-1945.

This thesis examines the development of U.S. Army field artillery doctrine from 1917 to 1945. It compares field artillery organization, liaison methods, target acquisition methods, missions, command and control principles, and fire direction techniques employed in World War I, the interwar period, and World War II. The study reveals the remarkable continuity of the artillery doctrine developed in World War I. In spite of tremendous technological change from 1917 to 1945, World War II artillery doctrine remained very similar to the doctrine of 1918. The study concludes that the basic principles of artillery doctrine established in World War I were the basis for artillery doctrine in World War II, and will probably remain the basis for future artillery doctrine.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...ename=1356.pdf

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Evolution of artillery tactics in General J. Lawton Collins' US VII Corps in World War II.

This thesis examines the evolution of artillery tactics in World War II using General J. Lawton Collins' US VII Corps as a case study. This study first reviews artillery doctrine and tactics during World War I and during the 1920s and 1930s, in which time future leaders like General Collins were military students. In 1943, General Collins commanded an infantry division on Guadalcanal where he was one of the first American generals to implement the Army's new doctrine of fire direction centers (FDCs) and massed fires using time on targets (TOTs). Collins then was selected to command the US VII Corps for the invasion of Normandy and the subsequent breakout during OPERATION COBRA. From Normandy to the end of the war, Collins continued to hone his use of artillery based on his experience during the eleven month campaign in Northwest Europe, contributing to his reputation as the best corps commander in World War II. This study looks at Army doctrine in 1944 to judge Collins' artillery tactics and concludes that he used established doctrine and that his tactics are the foundation for today's artillery tactics.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...lename=950.pdf

3.08 Mb pdf

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This is artillery related too

Development of organic light aviation in the Army Ground Forces in World War II.

This study addresses how the Army Ground Forces (AGF) developed and incorporated organic light aviation into the force structure during World War II. The work includes a brief background on the reasons the AGF developed this capability and how it employed this organic aviation in the field artillery. The study also addresses the parallel development and limited employment of Army Air Forces liaison squadrons designed to support the AGF. This thesis concludes that the AGF developed a responsive capability to support the aerial adjustment of artillery that quickly expanded to fill a multitude of tasks to support the ground commander. The thesis also concludes that the Army Air Forces did not develop a liaison organization capable of meeting the needs of the AGF. Understanding the problems that led to the development of organic light aviation will perhaps assist future Army leaders in developing and resourcing organizations, material, and force structure that is responsive to the maneuver commander.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...lename=499.pdf

2.09 Mb pdf

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Someone has been busy. Or are you just sitting there laughing knowing that I am going to get almost nothing done at work today because you put all these links up... beautifully devious.

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The Muslim Brotherhood “must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands..." — Mohamed Akram. http://jihadwatch.org/

There's more where these came from

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Interesting ...... my Dad was in the 99th Infantry Division, one of the first, if not the first, units across the bridge.

He was wounded there, and evacuated to a field hospital for recuperation.

He was wounded by shrapnel (still has a piece or two in his arm)....



......He always assumed it was German shrapnel

But, quoting from BG P.V. Kane, the Corps Artillery commander...

...his loss of observation, occasioned by the advance of the 99th infantry Division to the southeast, had made accurate firing impossible.'30

Now I'm not so sure!

He's gonna be ALL pissed off when I tell him!


-whatever

-Lou

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5 out of 4 people have difficulty with fractions.