I have been reading about the Fallschirmjager and am surprised to note their waste in combat theatres after the debacle at Crete.
Fair enough, for their losses at Crete, it would be considered to withhold a paratroop drop, but can their failures rest solely on the shoulders of Hitler?
Firstly-the Fallschirmjager were never used as designed. At Crete, Narvik, Oslo and Heraklion airfield, they were dropped into hornet's nests of enemy fire and not deplyed effectively. Later on in the war, the term Fallschirmjager was no longer an honour-it basically meant air-qualified and nothing more. And their deployments in Africa, Russia and Italy was purely "defensive infantry"-why were the Fallschirmjager never used effectively after Crete? Was it merely a fear of repeating horrendous losses? Or was it just another of Hitler's command blunders?

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"GARRY OWEN"-Traditional war-cry of the US 7th Cavalry.
"CURRAHEE"-War-cry of the US 506th PIR.
"Everybody thinks that they are going to get the chance to punch some Nazi in the face at Normandy-and those days are over, they are long gone"-Lt Chris Burnett

I think the Germans were just seeing what was to come. Take todays Paratroopers. They are Paratroopers in name only. Paratroopers in thier true role are an offensive weapon.When on the defensive, there is little use for them.

While it could be said there was oppotunaty to use them after Crete, in Russia or Africa, i think their losses in Crete, and the looses in aircaft, put the Germans off from risking such a thing. And maybe the Germans did not think they would be needed.

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'England confides that every man will do his duty' Nelson
'I'm a Norfolk man, and glory in being so' Nelson

Proud to be a GRUNT

They were not wasted. We used them when we needed the more: Norway and Crete. Were our Blitzkrieg could not be launched properly due to our naval weakness. After Crete, indeed the losses worried not only Hitler, but everybody. It is not a sign of sanity to repeat such operations in that way if you know what can happen. Bernhard Ramcke's paratroopers in Africa were an elite and certainly, when we used the Fallschirmjäger in defensive roles they performed excellently. Just a paratroopers batallion made the job of a conventional infantry division. That says a lot, doesn't it? Take a look on Monte Cassino. We did not have a large number of troops there, but how many Allied casualties were there? They are paratroopers and therefore an elite, but even more important than that, they were infantry, elite infantry. And therefore they were given impossible tasks and they performed awesomelly.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Like mentioned elsewhere in my texts after Crete Hitler was convinced that the "days of paratroopeers was over " and after that kept them strictly on the ground, although there were some plans like dropping them in Baku which never happened. And the unfortunate operation in the Battle of the Bulge where men were dropped too widely and they could not clear the mines ( Peiper lost several tanks due to this as he decided to drive through them as they did not have time to clear them either )

On one book about Crete I read that one of the things that may have lead to the crisis was the fact that as the Ju-52´s were prepared to take off the sand on the ground started flying and prevented the planes from taking off fast enough, as the next plane´s pilot could not see the air field. I don´t remember how much time they lost but it was some 5 minutes per plane to wait till the sand fell down to the ground again...So when the planes headed for Crete according to this they were already an hour or so late??
Anybody else heard of this?

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The following list covers the Fallschirmjäger Knights Cross winners between 1939-1945 totalling 133 recipients.

1 was awarded in Norway
10 in Belgium
13 in Holland, early and late war
1 at Corinth
27 in Kreta
4 in Afrika
40 in Italy
8 on the Eastern Front
2 in the Ardennes
6 within the borders of Germany at the end of the war

Out of the 133 recipients:
69 were also awarded the German Cross in Gold
6 were awarded posthumously
20 recipients were KIA
1 was executed after the war
3 were killed in accidents
3 died from wounds recieved in action after the event
1 was a pilot
3 were doctors in the medical branch

http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/winners.htm

[ 06. December 2002, 02:09 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

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Tthe Fallschirmjager RKT executed after the war-was that Karl Jager who had landed at Fort Eben Emael and was then posted to command of Einsatzkommando 33 in Lithuania, and was responsible for the deaths of 138, 272 people?

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"GARRY OWEN"-Traditional war-cry of the US 7th Cavalry.
"CURRAHEE"-War-cry of the US 506th PIR.
"Everybody thinks that they are going to get the chance to punch some Nazi in the face at Normandy-and those days are over, they are long gone"-Lt Chris Burnett

Crete was a mess for sure. many Ju 52 pilots flew to low for the Fallshirm truppen to even bail out. Add to the fact that Allied AA was absolutely intense and you can see why many of the transport a/c and crews never made it. Even on the strips the Ju's could not take off adquetely as the a/c kept ramming into one another on landing, engines failing and the fuselages holed, with fuel draing out everywhere.
Notice the amount of RK's given for Italien theater experience, just showing where the troops were really used. I think of Cassino and the gustav line as the ultimate in defence and sacrifice of these grounded fly boys. Without them the Cassino monestary and town would not have been held.

E

The Seizure of the Isthmus of Corinth

An airborne operation against the Isthmus of Corinth was undertaken by two battalions of the German 2d Parachute Regiment, reinforced by one parachute engineer platoon and one parachute medical company. On 25 April more than 400 three-engine transport and tow planes as well as numerous troop and cargo-carrying gliders were transferred from the Plovdiv area in Bulgaria to the former British airfield at Larisa. H-hour for the airdrop over the objective was 07:00 on 26 April.

After leaving Larisa according to plan, the heavily loaded, slow planes took two hours for the approach flight, covering the distance at an average speed of approximately 110 miles per hour. The planes flew over the Pindus Mountains and then dropped to about 150 feet altitude above the Gulf of Corinth, heading toward their objective in column formation. They took advantage of the haze that covered the gulf and succeeded in reaching the isthmus without being observed. The pilots pulled up to 400 feet altitude, reduced speed, and dropped their loads above the designated objectives.

The first to land were the gliders, which touched ground on both sides of the isthmus. The parachute troops jumped at the same time and seized the bridge, capturing a large number of British troops.

The primary mission of seizing the bridge intact with a minimum of delay seemed to have been achieved, when an accidental hit by a British antiaircraft shell exploded the demolition charge after German engineers had succeeded in cutting the detonating cord. The bridge blew up and numerous German soldiers were buried under the debris. On the same day engineer troops constructed a temporary span next to the one that had been destroyed so that the traffic between the mainland and the Peloponnesus was interrupted for only a short time.

During the airborne operation one transport plane was forced down by squalls and crashed in the Pindus Mountains, and two gliders were wrecked while landing. Several planes suffered minor damages from antiaircraft and machine gun fire.

Had this airborne operation been executed a few days earlier in the form of a vertical envelopment, its success would have been far greater since large numbers of British troops would have been trapped and thus prevented from reaching the ports of embarkation at the southern tip of the Peloponnesus. By the time the isthmus was seized, most of the British had escaped from the Greek mainland.

http://www.feldgrau.com/greecewar.html

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Kos and Leros - Capture of the Dodecanese islands

On the 12th september 1943 British forces seized several islands in the Dodecanese, including Samos, Kos and Leros.
The occupation of these small islands directly threatened the shipping lanes between the German occupied island of Rhodes and the mainland of Greece. The RAF immediately began bombing enemy objectives in Rhodes, the seat of Axis power in the Dodecanese; they also carried out attacks on targets in Crete.
The German high command also feared that these islands may well be used as a forward base by the Allies to invade the Balkans region.
Plans were immediately put together to recapture these islands from the British.
The first of a series of assaults was to take place on the island of Kos (Operation Eisbär, Polar Bear), on 5th October 1943. Kos was only 28 miles long and covered 115 square miles but was chosen as the first objective because it was the only island with an airfield, which could be used as a forward base for the Luftwaffe in future operations in the Dodecanese. It also prevented the RAF from providing air cover to the other islands, especially Leros which would be next on the list of German objectives.
The operation on Kos was carried out successfully by the Fallschirm company of the Brandenburg Regiment who landed in gliders. Additional forces were supplied from the 22nd Airlanding Division.
The assault on Leros would be the biggest operation in the Dodecanese and the most important due to its harbour facilities. The island was being used by the British as a naval base, a squadron of sea planes were also being operated from Leros, a serious threat to German shipping.
The operation was Codenamed Leopard and would consist of a combined air and sea borne assault.
The overall commander of the operation was Generalleutnant Mueller and the forces at his disposal were the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment under the command of Captain Kuehne, the Fallschirm Kompanie of the Brandenburg Regiment and men of his own 22nd Airlanding Division.
The seaborne assault was to take place upon the west and east coast of the island by men of a Brandenburg Battalion. The whole operation was to be backed up by Luftwaffe bombers.
Geographically the island was only 8 miles long, had a mountainous area in the north and south and was divided into two parts by an isthmus a mile wide stretching from Gurna Bay in the west to Alinda Bay in the east. The British forces on the island were holding areas in the north and south of the island with an Italian Battalion operating guns on the coast. The main objectives would be to seize the high ground, which would provide all round observation of the island, the Luftwaffe would bombard the harbours and artillery positions in preparation for the amphibious assault to come ashore in the bays and capture the capital, Leros town.

The day for the start of Operation Leopard was the 12th November, the Luftwaffe had softened up the islands defences for several days before in preparation for the assault. The amphibious convoy set off from ports on the east coast of Greece while the airborne forces waited for their H-hour.
At dawn on the 12th the JU-52’s took off from an airfield outside Athens for their one hour flight to Leros. At the last minute the mission was aborted due to some elements of the seaborne force coming under fire from the coastal batteries on Leros.
The JU-52’s returned to the airfield, only to takeoff again at midday. The other amphibious force had successfully managed to get a foothold on the island.
The aircraft approached the island at 600 feet and the paratroops jumped onto the planned landing zone, the flat area of land between the bays, the neck of the island.
Before the defenders could react to the landing the paras had gone to ground. The companies were split up and given individual objectives, cutting roads, reconnaisance and providing defensive screens.
Numbers 2 and 4 company and the Brandenburg company raced to secure one of the dominant heights on the island and met only slight resistance due to the defenders being engaged in repulsing the seaborne landings on the eastern side of the island.
These landings were partially successful and they gained a foothold when they captured some of the Italian held coastal guns.
On the 13th November the German forces succeeded in cutting off the British forces in the north and south and German re-inforcements successfully parachuted in to back up the 2nd Regiment.
In the next few days the British mounted several unsuccessful counter attacks on the German positions, the Germans were being constantly reinforced and were becoming too strong for the British.
On the 14th november, Captain Kuehne’s number 2 & 4 companies backed up by Luftwaffe stukas attempted to seize Monte Meroviglia situated in the northwest of the island. It was being used as the headquarters for the British forces. The attack was repulsed and the Germans retreated back to their starting point on Monte Rachi.
The British started to regroup and at one stage the German position did not look very good. The decision was made to withdraw from positions on Monte Rachi and using reinforcements make another assault on the British HQ on Monte Meroviglia.
The defenders of Monte Meroviglia could not hold out against this second assault and the battle for the island was over by the evening of the 16th November with the capture of 3200 British and 5350 Italian troops.

Operation Leopard was over with the loss to 1st Battalion, 2nd Parachute Regiment of 68 killed and 100 wounded. It was a great success for the Germans, another successful airborne operation by the men of the 2nd Parachute Division. They had overcome superior numbers who were backed up by heavy artillery and coastal guns in only four days and once again they had gained control in the Dodecanese.

http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/leros.htm

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The Italian capitulation and the airdrop onto Monte Rotondo

II/FJR6 September 9. 1943
Kommandeur - Major Walter Gericke
Adjutant - Leutnant Bruno Christiansen
Bttl.Doctor - StArzt Helmut Zänker
Chef 5.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Nitzschke
Chef 6.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Knaus
Chef 7.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Thomsen
Chef 8.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Engelhardt

Battalion strength - 665 men
KIA - 52
MIA - 4
WIA - 79
Prisoners - 100 Officers, 2400 Men

Capture the High Command
On september 8th 1943 the newly formed Italian government under Marshal Pietro Badoglio announced their capitulation to the Allies.
In late July after Mussolini's arrest and in expectation of an Italian surrender, the recently raised 2nd Parachute Division was moved from its base in southern France where it was completing its formation, to a coastal area between the Tiber estuary and Tarquinia in preparation for any unrest in Rome. It had now been subordinated to XI Fliegerkorps.
The 2nd Parachute Division under the command of General Bernhard Ramcke was made up of the 2nd Regiment and a battalion of Artillery. Remnants of Ramcke’s brigade that were not lost in the general surrender of German forces in North Africa in early May 1943 as well as the 4th battalion of the Luftlande Sturm Regiment and the Fallschirmjäger Lehr Battalion were formed into the new 6th and 7th Regiments.
When the capitulation was announced, gun battles broke out in the city between German troops and pro-Badoglio Italian soldiers.
On the 9th september the 2nd Parachute Division was ordered into the city to carry out Operation Student, restore order, disarm the Italian troops of the Rome garrison and occupy the whole of the city.
By the 10th september they had achieved the objective, the Italians only put up light resistance and they were quickly overcome and disarmed, the streets became quiet once again.
This was not the case at Monte Rotondo situated 30km north east of Rome, which was the headquarters of the Italian army and general staff.
A plan for an airdrop on the headquarters was quickly put into action, utilising men of Major Walter Gericke’s 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment.
At 0630 on September 9th, 50 JU-52's took off from Manfredonia, 25km NE of Foggia
At 0825, the first of the Fallschirmjäger jumped over their landing zones. The aircraft carrying the 6th & 7th Kompanies came under heavy AA fire and the men were dropped 4km to the NW of Monte Rotondo, straddling the River Tiber. The 5th Kompanie landed 1km NE of Monte Rotondo near the sports stadium. The 8th Kompanie landed less than 1km to the SE, their LZ straddling the Monte Rotondo-Mantana road.
The Fallschirmjäger came up against sometimes stiff resistance but managed to battle there way to the fortress being used as the HQ (although the Commander in Chief of the Italian armed forces had escaped from Monte Rotondo a couple of days before). Although numerically superior, the Italian troops were no match for the Paras and the battle was soon over. Major Gericke managed to persuade the Italian General Staff to immediately cease all hostilities against German forces. Operation Student had been a great success.

http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/monterotondo.htm

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Just to *bumb* that I put three different German Fallschirmjäger missions on this thread- I enjoyed the stories!

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Enjoyed them as well Kai ! doesn't Greg have some great materials. I'm going to purchase his vet mag this summer and I notice the Fallschirm missions u put up that my friend Jack Mahrohl somehow fits in there between the fighting in Afrika and his transfer to Sicily and finally to southern France/Normandy and capture. if the guy was ever home I would continue my interview with him. I better hurry as the vets ain't gettin a younger.....

~E

Awesome information!

And as I said before, they were not wasted. Partroopers before everything are infantry soldiers, and excellent ones. The fact that they were used as average infantry troops was not a waste since they couldn't be dropped because it was too risky. Dropping them in 1943 would have been a waste... But some few of these guys could hold divisions... as they DID in Monte Cassino.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

But remember that in 1943 onward there were not enough experienced Ju 52 pilots to drop Fallshirm. They had been wiped out at Crete and what few of them survived, re-organized and transferred to the Med to perform other transport tasks and still go wiped out by attacking P-38's over water......

The Fallshirm could and still was a viable para force through 1944 but alas was not used in the role.

two cents or maybe quarter

~E

The Fallschirmjager were deployed as they should have been in all actions either in relation to the Luftwaffe 'drops of oil' strategy or the Schwerpunkt strategy favoured by the army. They performed far higher than expected as at eben emael and were only stopped from air operations due to the losses in transport aircraft and more importantly transport pilots.

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Did the Brittish used paratroopers to capture Athens and Piraieus?

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Erwin,

I don´t remember that they had used other than the ships.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwi...n/20_260_3.htm

British and Imperial Forces
From 7 through 31 March the headquarters of I Australian Corps with corps troops, the 6th Australian and 2d New Zealand Divisions, and the 1st Tank Brigade of the 2d British Armored Division, as well as service troops, disembarked at the ports of Piraeus and Volos. These forces Ad been assembled near Alexandria, Egypt, and shipped across the Mediterranean at the beginning of March. Immediately upon arrival, the tank brigade moved to the lower Vardar west of Salonika, the New Zealand division took up positions north of Mount Olympus in the bend of the Aliakmon River, and the Australian division blocked the Aliakmon Valley up to the Vermion Range. General Wilson established his headquarters northwest of Larisa. The Royal Air Force continued to operate from airfields in central and southern Greece.

The British forces were almost fully motorized, but their equipment was suitable for desert warfare, not for the steep mountain roads in Greece. There was a shortage of tanks and antiaircraft guns. The lines of communication across the Mediterranean were very vulnerable


Some interesting data from a site:

http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-...ww2/greece.htm

The Luftwaffe delivered a heavy blow to the British expedition on the night of 6/7 April when German bombers seriously damaged Piraeus, the port of Athens sinking seven merchant ships, sixty lighters and 25 caiques. The port was closed for 2 days and when it reopened, it was with a much reduced capacity to handle the ships needed to reinforce and maintain the British expedition.

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AS well some data on the Fallschirmjäger parachutes:

http://www.eliteforces.freewire.co.u...Parachutes.htm

Fallschirmjäger
Parachutes

By Greg Way and Ciaran Byrne


In the thirties General Student had achieved a great organisational feat by laying the foundations of the German Fallschirmtruppe, but they were still without their most basic piece of equipment, the Parachute.
Tests were carried out in the late thirties at the Luftwaffe test centre at Stendal and the result was the RZ1 parachute, which was loosely based on a civil aviation design. This parachute was first used at the beginning of the war and was an automatically deployed parachute by means of a static line which was attached to a wire cable on the inside of the transport aircraft.

The RZ1 had a half globe canopy made from white silk and consisted of 28 sections with a surface area of 56 square metres. It tended to swing badly in windy conditions and it had a high drop rate, there were no shroud lines fitted which made it difficult to control and increased scattering on the ground, early tests also showed that the static line sometimes fouled the canopy on opening. The static line problem was solved with the improved version of the RZ1, called the RZ16, which replaced it in early 1940.
The parachute harness was another problem. The early versions although safe for the wearer were difficult to remove on landing. The four early release fasteners were replaced by a central harness buckle which enabled the parachutist to clamber free of his chute quickly and more easily than before, most welcome when landing under fire or caught in a ground wind. Men trying to struggle free of parachute harnesses became easy targets.

Also no solid equipment could be carried on the front of the chest as the arrangement of the harness caused a terrible jerk as the chute opened, but the problem of the jerking effect from the static line opening the canopy was overcome by the adoption of the crucifix jump position where the parachutist would launch himself spread-eagled, horizontally out of the aircraft by means of two handles either side of the exit. This reduced the swinging motion when the canopy opening and thus reduced the risk of the parachutist getting tangled up in his straps and lines. On jumping the nine metre static line which was attached to a cable in the aircr