Why The M26 pershing come late into the war

thank you-good call ....it's called reality--real life...a lot of people don't think in realistic terms

 

Sorry, but there is simply no indication whatsoever that was the case.

Really" He did? What is the evidence for that.

 

With all due respect, Fritz Langanke had zero idea what he was talking about.

German government spending on the military proportional to non-military spending was 20% in FY (March-April) 1932/1933. It average 55.7% FY 1932-1938 and was 80% in FY 1938. In the US in FY 1940 (June-July), it was 21%. During the 1930s in the US it was typically under 4%, rising to 5% in 1938 and by FT 1940, it was 21%.

"In 1937, the War Department hoped to procure 235 light tanks, but in the end, Congress funded barely a third, just 104 tanks. The situation with medium tanks was worse, the Army expected to have no more than 36 completed by 1940. By 1938, with war clouds developing over Europe and the Japanese rampaging through China, the War Department decided to equip the 66th Infantry (Light Tanks), the 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks), and the 18 National Guard tank companies fully. However, it proved impossible to procure all 306 light and 162 medium tanks required.

The Cavalry was not much better off either. The 113 production combat cars available by the end of 1938 were just sufficient to equip the two regiments of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. However, they were not enough to expand the brigade into a division or create a combat car squadron for the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, which were General Herr’s major objectives in developing mechanization in the cavalry.

...It is illuminating to look at a comparison of this American experience with the then contemporary German and Soviet experience. Between 1 February 1934 and 1 September 1939 the Germans had built approximately 1,800 Panzer I and 1,223 Panzer II. Manufacture of heavier tanks included 176 Panzer III and 270 Panzer IV, as well as 368 Panzer 35 (t) and Panzer 38 (t) tanks acquired through the annexation of Czechoslovakia. German manufacturers also completed another 245 command tanks and other specialized armored vehicles, which made 4,082 in total. In roughly the same period the U.S. had completed 463 tanks and combat cars, less than 12 percent of the German total.

Furthermore, in comparison to the single small Federal arsenal at Rock Island and one private plant, American Car & Foundry, manufacturing tanks in 1939 in the U.S. there were six German and two German-controlled Czech plants producing tanks for the Reich. Even more telling, in the first nine months of 1939, U.S. Army Ordnance—beset by indecision about which tank designs should be produced—manufactured only five tanks, while German production averaged nearly 69 per month. The American record after Roosevelt’s declaration of emergency was not substantially better. Rock Island and American Car & Foundry built just 95 new tanks in the nine months before the fall of France."

In effect, the U.S. was effectively about five years behind the development curve in 1940.

 

I think that probably fits into 'not ready'.
The reasons for readiness or otherwise can become rather meta unless willing to write a book. Sometimes I feel like discussions about what tank was designed when and WHY should all begin with 'The Roman Testudo was developed in...' & flow from there.

Don't listen to me, though! Since it is, however, great to see some proper tank chat on here. Feels like it's been a while.

Back on theme:
Germany was actively planning a war.
The rest of the world was cautiously eyeing one & hoping it wouldn't come.
Always worth factoring in when considering relative armaments progress.

 

That is the problem with analyzing by impression rather than facts...it usually leads to false conclusions.

For many reasons, the Armored Force did not develop a specific requirement for a heavy tank after the Chief of Infantry initiated its development, but the primary reasons were the difficulties encountered in its development. Nor was the T26 developed as a heavy tank. It was a medium tank with heavier armor and was referred to frequently as a "medium-heavy" tank and was officially a medium tank until it was redesignated as a "heavy tank"in OCM 24277 on 29 June 1944. It was also deployed and used as a medium tank.

 

To be truly fair, you need to include the Henschel Durchbruchwagen development beginning in January 1937 as the starting point for a tank that began production in August 1942. It was between 3 2/3 to 5 2/3 years development to get to the Tiger I. It was 4 years and 6 months from the development order for the Heavy Tank T1 to production of the Heavy Tank T26E3. It was 5 years and 8 months from the development order for the Durchbruchwagen to production of the Tiger I.

 

If we are being truly fair...In January, 1937, it was BegleitWagen(escort tank). In March, 1937 it was InfanterieWagen, and in April, 1937, it became the Durchbruchswagen - like the US, the Germans were not initially sure what to do with heavy beasties either. Since we are being completely fair, the were experimental 30-ton chassis never intended for production.

 

"Due to it's tremendous weight and limited tactical use, there is no requirement in the Armored Force for the heavy tank. The increase in the power of the armament of the heavy tank does not compensate for the heavier armor."
General Jacob Devers, 7 December, 1942. Seems straightforward enough. Of course, he is talking about the T1E1/M6/M6A1, not the M-26. But, the point remains, that a more powerful tank could have been had, had it been wanted. Around this time, the T1E1 had been fitted with a 90mm gun that proved satisfactory. Albeit, the turret needed redesigned for efficiency.

I look forward to the education that I am sure I have coming...So, thank you in advance.

 

I may make you wait for the book.

What Devers didn't mention it also failed every service test after two and a half years development.

I'll see what more context I can give when I get home.

 

I've been waiting for the book since first reading about it. Don't worry, I will buy a copy regardless, as I am sure there is far more in there than is contained in your posts.

Neither does Hunnicutt in his "Firepower - A History of the American Heavy Tank." He does mention what appear to be many minor problems on the December 8, 1941 demonstrations, going so far as to say it made an "impressive show." He then goes on to list some of the modifications made to correct the problems. Although, later on he does state that test reports from 16 January - 26 April were highly critical and considered the tanks unsatisfactory without complete redesign. But, does not go into much detail on the particulars - gunner only being able to sight using left eye because direct sight telescope to close to main gun, replacing 37mm with coaxial .30 caliber mg, 3-inch gun considered inadequate(although it was replaced with a 90mm T7 in the T1E1.)
None of the problems mentioned seem particularly "game breaking", but sound more like "We don't want it, so we will list every little particular fault there is with it."

Thank you, I look forward any response on the matter.

 

The U.S. combined arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component supplemented by tank destroyers formed into independent tank destroyer battalions. The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces, Lesley J. McNair. Having studied the early German successes McNair came under the belief that U.S. forces would be faced with fast moving enemy forces who would seek to bypass, isolate and reduce U.S. forces in a replay of the Fall of France.[citation needed] To stem the flood of marauding panzers, fast moving powerfully armed tank destroyer battalions were created to be held back and used in the counter-attack.

It was also calculated that U.S. interests would be better served by large numbers of reliable (battle-worthiness) medium tanks rather than a smaller number of unreliable[28] heavy tanks.[citation needed] It was decided therefore to slow the production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as the M26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing the M4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as the M18 Hellcat.[citation needed]

Armoured warfare - Wikipedia

 

This would be from his remarks at the Antitank Conference, Army War College, on July 14, 1941.

He also emphasised cost. Using a $35,000 dollar tank to destroy another tank of similar value is questionable when it can be done by an AT gun costing a fraction of the amount.

Yes, AT guns had to be just as mobile as tanks, or else the tanks will avoid them. However, he did not have a preference for mobile AT towed guns or SPGs, as he concludes with
"You gentlemen must find the correct answer to the questions involved."
Tanks were to be saved for use against profitable targets to which they are invulnerable.

This is probably less attributable to McNair. Also, it is based on shipping capacity. Heavy tanks will require greater shipping capacity to move a similar number of mediums, greater shipping capacity to move more fuel & ammunition(consumables), more spare parts, etc. This went all the way up to Eisenhower and possibly Marshall, and lasted, at least, into mid-March 1945.

Just skimming through "General Lesley J. McNair - Unsung Architect of the US Army" by Mark T. Calhoun.

 

It may have to be multi-volume. It is c. 750 pages in draft with about 500 photos selected...I may have subconsciously been competing with my old boss Chris Lawrence's Kursk book. Of course, some of the "meat" is in the 119 data tables...

T1E2, the first pilot completed c. 15 August 1941, was also the first to start the crash and burn process. It was authorized as a backup to the T1 with Hydramatic transmission, because that transmission took so long to develop (that project was cancelled two years into the project), but its Twin Disc T-16001 torque converter never worked well. It was "demonstrated" in a nearly static display on 8 December 1941, but was then immediately torn apart to rebuild to correct more problems. Those problems were not resolved until 28 May 1942, when it was standardized as the M6 and its welded hull cousin, the T1E3 was standardized as the M6A1...two years after development was approved.

The T1E1 pilot with the electric drive, was completed 26 March 1942 and its initial demonstration met with enthusiastic approval...except waiting in the wings was a major problem, GE was overstretched producing electric motors and it was unclear if the priority and funding would be made available to expand production, or how long that would take. The alternate supplier, Westinghouse, was equally taxed. Gladeon Barnes basically kept glossing over this major issue throughout the lifetime of the project and then with the T23.

In April 1942, even though M6 and M6A1 were standardized, the Armored Force expressed a requirement for only 115, enough to equip two battalions for service testing. Nevertheless, on 15 June 1942, General Devers expressed some interest in the electric drive of the T1E1, stating it "is the finest job I have ever seen – that is just remarkable” and recommended “putting somebody to work and put it [the electric drive] in the light or medium tank”. Your quote from Devers above was the Armored Force expressing disinterest in the heavy tank again.

The service testing of the three pilots (T1E1, M6, and M6A1) at Fort Knox continued through 26 April 1943, when the M6 and M6A1 were sent to Baldwin for complete rebuilds. Neither the M6 nor M6A1 performed well in the tests, even though fewer than 307 miles were put on their odometers over the course of three months, mostly because they kept breaking down. The final analysis was basically "try a complete redesign, because we can't keep them running long enough to actually test them". The service test of the T1E1 kept getting delayed because GE couldn't get the second drive system completed, which left Aberdeen with the sole functioning pilot undergoing engineering tests until Knox got a complete pilot in July 1943. It suffered many of the same problems as the M6 and M6A1, plus the brushes on the electric motor displayed excessive wear and they kept losing the track because of excessive movement in the bogies. In the end, the T1E1 was reported to have "many deficiencies affecting its life, efficiency, and reliability.” It was recommended testing terminate in October 1943, again partly because the continuous breakdowns made completin the testing almost impossible.

BTW, the 90mm was mounted experimentally in the T1E1 in March 1943 during the engineering tests (the 3-inch was not mounted in the pilot). When they completed the testing in August, they recommended going with the 90mm...but with the caveat that the center of balance was so far forward in the turret as designed that it was problematic traversing on anything greater than a 20 degree slope.

Of course, by this time the T23 project was well advanced...but had its own issues. Among other things if the electric motor was run at low speeds to keep an under 3 MPH pace infantry could keep up with, it tended to overheat and burn out. The big deal with AGF was the additional electrical maintenance personnel that would need to be added to the battalion service company, but the real problem was the inability of GE and Westinghouse to produce the electric drive in sufficient quantities...

No problem. It's a pretty complex matter.

 

Yep, this usually gets top billing as exhibit 1 for the prosecution against McNair...albeit with the date carefully clipped off.

Notice the Wiki notes requesting citations... The armored division and tank battalions were designed around light and medium tanks, which was not a functional description, but, most critically, a bridging classification. Heavy tanks were always problematic, especially when they were potentially not better armed or significantly better armored than medium tanks, which was the real Achilles Heel of the T1-series.

I would really love to see a citation for the production of the "M26" being "slowed down".

Good. He is actually a much more interesting character than the cardboard cutout the crowd from WoT likes to take potshots at.

 

Begleitwagen was the 1934 designation for what became the Panzer IV, not the Panzer VI series. See Panzer Tracts No. 23.

 

Sorry, my fault. It was B.W.(verstaerkt) (escort stregthened).
Jentz & Doyle - Germany's Tiger Tanks: DW to Tiger I. Design Production & Modifications. Pg. 10
Also in Panzer Tracts #6 Pg. 2

Been trying to complete the Panzer Tracts series for a while, 23 is one of the few I am missing - Will keep an eye out for it.

 

Thank you Rich, that material is what I was hoping to find out. A lot more problematic than Hunnicutt let's on.

 

Oh, okay, yes, the paper predeccesor in January 1936 to the Durchbruchwagen designation.

It is well worth it, since it incorporates a lot of the end-40 year analysis that Jentz did.

 

Hunnicutt went through the design sequence, but I do not think he was that interested in the politics behind it. Ordnance compiled histories of each major type, some of which are hundreds of pages long, which detail the interactions on a daily basis...he summarized them in favor of the design details. I tried to take the opposite tack, emphasizing the interdepartmental back and forth instead of the design nitty gritty.

 

Book?!
What Book?
I liked your RE book.
Nerdy. Solid.

Hunnicutt's brilliant, essential even on some areas, but a tad old-fashioned now. Patchy.
Each subject he covered would make a splendid series by a more 'modern' author.
Nudge nudge. Wink wink.

Sodding Panzer Tracts...
I love 'em, but that £20+ for a pamphlet still hurts!