Hitler's biggest strategic mistake in WW2?

If judged by results achieved compared with Hitler's original objectives, then it was a heck of a mistake. Ditto men and materiel lost.

But it has always seemed to me rather typically German in its' Gotterdammerung style - rather like the Hindenburg Offensive of 1918. What were the Germans going to do ? Sit tight and fight a sensible defensive battle while negotiating terms ? Not their style, really.

 

Hindenburg offensive, Martin? Was it not Ludendorff offensive? Hindenburg didn't do much, actually (He never did). But I think comparing the Bulge to the Kaiserschlacht is not proper. In 1918 Germany had 'defeated' Russia, Romania and Italy and moved all troops available to the West, along with an enormous ammount of guns and best of all, new tactics. With an exhausted and weakened BEF, with an exhausted and still agitated French Army and with an unexperienced and small AEF, that was the perfect time for an attack. Lundendorff was all but an idiot. He fought the war while there were hopes of victory, when that posibility faded out, he called for an armistice.

Hitler, in December 1944 didn't have new tactics, nor all his forces concentrated in one sector, nor his enemies were exhausted or weakened nor he had any victory posibilities. The General Staff as well as the High Command realised that they needed to launch an offensive and have a little victory in late 1944. The Red Army was too strong, so Hitler cleverly saw in the American Army - tired because of the fighting and with over-extended supply lines - a good spot. His generals agreed, but they wanted a much more modest offensive. Marshal Von Runstedt clearly said it: "It will be a miracle if we reach the Meuse, now Antwerp... ha!" The battle of the Bulge WAS a terrible mistake - though not a very decisive one.

 

I think it's usually referred to here as the Hindenburg Offensive even though, as you quite rightly say, Ludendorff was the man behind it. So there's another similarity, with the Bulge often being called 'L'Offensive von Rundstedt'...

No, I know the circumstances were very different, I was thinking more of the 'offensive spirit' in both cases. Mistake or not, the Ardennes always fascinates me as one of WWII's most dramatic events...great reading for the armchair warrior !

 

Well, that's different! We should open a thread about favourite battles...

Even marshal Von Rusntedt said once, quite offended by it: "Von Runstedt offensive? I only performed it, but I didn't plan it. I was against the plan since the beginning".

 

I think that Hitler's greatest strategic mistake in World War II was sending Rommel to North Africa instead of Russia along with helping the Italians in the first place.

 

Squirrel, how do one man - not a genial strategist - as Rommel could have affected the course of the war in the east?

 

With al due respect, I doubt that Rommel as an Corps or Army Commander would have had a decisive influence in the grand strategy of the Campaign against Russia, changing the outcome of the war.

If the EF-theatre required a leadership skill, it was teamwork, a sense for logistics, the will to step back or take suffering for the bigger cause (frontline cohesion), saving of men ans resources, defensive operations and a sense for the big picture.

I don't say that Rommel wouldn't had performed well in Russia, especially during the initial stages of Barbarossa, but I think the African sideshow sandbox was much better fitting to his character and skills, even though it was a crime to promote this man to a Field Marshal.

And, quite frankly: I fail to see how helping the Italian Axis partner is a strategic mistake. Without this help, the Italians would have fell off / surrendered and the Med Sea area would be under Allied influence.

Cheers,

 

I'd rather say it was a mistake not to send more troops to North Africa, if not in 1941, at least in 1942.

 

Rommel was an excellent tactical leader, one of about a dozen the top-notch german staff colleges produced. Rommel, while very skilled, was not the most skilled german general of the war, he was one of many. A cult of personality seems to have risen about him as though he could catch bullets and walk on water. In fact, several of the leaders who were assigned to barbarossa were as skilled in their element, if not better.

 

Erwin Rommel was an excellent tactician and corps commander. Nothing beyond that. He had a tremendous lack of strategic view, lack of capacity of handling a large ammount of troops and incredibly, not a very flexible mind (when he got to El Alamein and had to attack frontally, instead of doing his southern envelopment he was like a fish out of the water). Rommel is certainly too overrated. And his personality is as well overrated, since he was a very harsh general, who never smiled and yelled all the time. His officers really complained very often about his mistreatments.

 

Erwin Rommel was an excellent tactician and corps commander. Nothing beyond that. He had a tremendous lack of strategic view, lack of capacity of handling a large ammount of troops and incredibly, not a very flexible mind (when he got to El Alamein and had to attack frontally, instead of doing his southern envelopment he was like a fish out of the water). Rommel is certainly too overrated. And his personality is as well overrated, since he was a very harsh general, who never smiled and yelled all the time. His officers really complained very often about his mistreatments.

If there is one man who could have made a difference in the Eastern Front, it was Erich von Manstein. But ONLY if he would have been apointed commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front - and that was posible in 1942, when everything was ruined -, given complete freedom of action by the Führer. But this, as Andy says, is not the change by itself. An independent and powerful Manstein would have been able to coordinate that team work, logistical sense and the things Andy mentioned. Maybe, for start, Hitler should have given Von Brauchitsch and Halder more independence since the beginning.

There are lots of officers in the Wehrmacht, much more capable than Rommel. Starting by almost all the field marshals there - except, of course, by Rommel.

 

What I meant was that Rommel would not replace any of the generals or Feldmarschals in Russia, but instead would command more troops. Also, if the Germans ignored the Italians, they would have had more men available for Operation Barbarossa. Then they could make a line like the Siegfried line along the border with Italy. The Germans did not need the Mediterranean for anyother reason than suppling the troops in Africa. With the Afrika Korps eliminated, the Mediterranean would be useless to the German War Machine.

 

Germany had not the maritime capacity to deploy more men and materiel to Africa, and even those men who were sent suffered from crippling supply problems. More men and equipment, even if they could be deployed, would simply mean a more rapid consumption of resources (especially fuel).

Thing is though, all that relies on senior German figures being prepared to divert resources to a theatre that was never viewed as much more than a sideshow.

 

Threat of invasion in Southern France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Churchill's "soft underbelly" strategy.

Northern Italy as an air base for Strategic bombing of South and East Germany, Southern Italy as an airbase for strategic bombing against Romania.

Common land front beween Allies and Axi...err: Germany at NW-Italy, the Alps and at any landing zone.

Cheers,

 

Good point.