Normandy from the German Side

I'm at p. 609 of ''Germany and the Second World War'', Boog, Krebs and Vogel (Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt) vol vii The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5.'

Having hauled myself through a bocage of tortured syntax and slightly outmoded conclusions about British night bombing effectiveness I'm glad to report that the writer believes that the introduction of 'Window' in the Hamburg Raids was the best time that the British could use it.

Surprisingly for me the writer also gives much more weight to the German belief that Normandy was a diversion for much longer than I expected and that this rather than terrain at the east end of the bridgehead explains the position of Pz Grp West around Caen. Apparently OB West thought that Allied pressure at Caen was the right pincer intended to meet one due to land at the Pas de Calais.

More on that story later . . .

 

This is true, not only the panzers were kept behind the lines for several days but Rommel was in Germany at the worst moment , so there was a lot of confusion among the Germans. I would suggest Paul Carrel's book about the matter. I have the French version, but I know Martin knows the exact title in English which should be something like: "Here they come" (= ils arrivent)

 

There's a footnote on p. 599 of messages; from Army Group B to 15th Army 28th June and OB West 24th June about replacing units moved from 15th Army to Pz Grp West and 7th army. I'd thought the gaff had been blown much sooner.

 

I must say that Paul Carell's effort one of the frist on the German side that I purchased at a younger age was a classic.........at the time, further research and investigation proves that some of the positions and the battles cannot be proven and as an example the ride of the 12th W-SS Panzerjäger abt. with "new" Pz jagr IV's and the death blow they dealt out to the Poles ? In any case the time, date and location does not match up with the Allied units and doing a cross check with Hubert Meyers exhaustive study on the 12th SS I confirm my conclusion(s). Also the battles of the Tiger Abt. 102 SS is a bit misleading ~ Martin has illuded to the fine example from Wilhelm Tieke covering the 9th/10th SS and the Heavy Tigers attached at some points

interesting note made about the RAF and use of Window as the LW had been using Düppel" the equivalent over England during the So-called Blitz air battles, mind you in very little amounts to compared to the overwhelming abundance dumped on the Reich from July 43 onward

 

It's 'Invasion - They're Coming' by 'Paul Carell' ( Harrap, 1962 ). Very interesting for the personal accounts from German soldiers.

As we've discussed on here before, 'Carell' worked for German propaganda in WWII so it's reasonable to expect an element of bias in his writing. However, the very fact of his background meant that he had access to German veterans at a time when their recollection of events was still quite fresh.

 

Thank Marin, I knew you would help me out with this one.

 

I have a copy of this book and it was the first book I ever read about the German side. It was an eye opener for me. I rescued this book from a neighborhood junk shop when I was a kid.

[quote Surprisingly for me the writer also gives much more weight to the German belief that Normandy was a diversion for much longer than I expected and that this rather than terrain at the east end of the bridgehead explains the position of Pz Grp West around Caen. ]

I read an analysis about the Normandy campaign (I can't remember the name of the book) and it claims that had Hitler also ordered the immediate transfer of infantry divisions to the Normandy front, the battle would've turned out quite differently, even with the presence of Allied air power. Despite its scholarly attempt, that book tended to side with Germany and explain how things could've gone Germany's way.

The point of the analysis was that the Panzer divisions burned themselves out because they were on the line too long. If the infantry divisions had been sent from Calais earlier, the going would've been tougher for the Allies.

The basis of the analysis was that infantry was better suited for defense and holding ground. Panzer Divisions weren't really suited for this mission and would've been of better use in a more offensive or more mobile role.

 

I don't think that there's any argument about this - it's now accepted that Normandy ( at least, in the early stages ) was a closer-run thing than was realised for many years after the war. All of which goes to show that the incredible amount of work which was put into the pre-invasion deception plans was worth the efffort - and ultimately, successful.

 

Hmmm, it makes the success of Fortitude all the more impressive. Apparently even when forces were moved from 15th army they had to be replaced first so troops from the south of France and Brittany were used which of course contributed to the delay in reinforcing Normandy. Even when units from FUSAG were identified in France the Germans thought there were plenty more in Britain ready to land in the Pas de Calais.

 

I still find it quite interesting the hold of the British around Caen by 12th SS and a couple of Heer division plus some LW Flak. I surely would not call any of their positions quite prepared, always on the go do to the often quite accurate British artillery.

maybe it's best that we include some of the finer books from the German point of view besides the Carrel offering shall we ?

 

'. . .on 28thJune Panzer Group West had taken over...opposite the British and Canadians with three panzer corps and one army corps.....Hausser had only about 75 tanks, Eberbach still had 400 armoured vehicles to deploy'. DRZW p.600.

 

I knew I was going to get knocked if I did not have adequate references in front of me..........ok now

karte 4, 3rd attack on Caen 25-3 Juli 44 as an example, I only see the 12th W-SS to the west and slightly to the SW toward Fonteray le Pesnel.

karte 5, 4th attack on Caen 3 to 10 Juli 44, 12 th SS is at the western edge of Caen and SW to Maltot along with Schwere SS Abt Pz 101 near Feuguerolles-sur-Orne

Hubert Meyers two volumes on the 12th W-SS division. My assumption before pulling out the German Normandie ORB's is that other German div.s had to be in the vicinity. the W-SS 9th and 10th were to the south of course and later on the terrible Hill 112 and the 2-3 others in the neighborhood along with the associated Schwere Ss Abt Pz 102

 

p.606 [On the eve of 'Cobra' 24th July] ...most were in the Panzer group West area (seven infantry divisions, eight panzer divisions and two rocket launcher brigades)...

 

well if you are confirming as to what I just said then so be it. what a fine mess the 12th W-SS got itself into of course with terribly casualties in trying to stem the tide. why it wasn't just run over by hordes of Churchills and Shermans is anyones guess

 

Er...eh? PGW was in the east end of the bridgehead.

I found [URL]http://www.amazon.co.uk/Colos...9181530?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1192743300&sr=1-1[/url] interesting in its analysis of Monty's technique. The short version is that Monty tried to limit casualties by breaking attacks off when the effect of firepower (heavy bombers and mass artillery) on the German defence had diminished. The German 'instant counter-attack' practice arrived at positions where the attackers had dug in rather than still being deployed for attack.

It is noticeable that German counter-attacks were cut to pieces even more comprehensively than Allied ones.

 

I think there is some confusion here. yes I understand the dispositions of Panzer and Pz Gr. elements of Pz Gr. "W" being to the east // in my case I was trying to ask why if anyone knows and you have answered it in part about Monty's early goings of attack and advance but why on earth did almost 1 W-SS division tie up the British lot that was facing them ? why was it such a struggle ? yes some well dug positions but I think we give to much credit to this and those onry little pip sqeek kids

 

Terrain had a lot to do with it. In the first couple of weeks after D-day the British unit commanders realised that they needed much closer cooperation between tanks and infantry. The relatively puny mv75mm gun on most Allied tanks didn't help. One drawback of the firepower method was that it created obstacles to manoeuvre on ground which was not conducive to cross-country movement by smashing up roads and that the bombers and artillery were not as accurate as expected so much was wasted.

You're quite right that the German defenders showed more tenacity than Allied troops but this has much to do with the brutalisation they received from their own army.

 

A few comments:

The Allies did make an incredibly comprehensive effort to mislead the Germans about the location and timing of the invasion. Look at operations Tinsel and Glimmer aimed at the Pas de Calais area. Athough there is not a good German description of their reaction to these spoofing operations it is very likely that during the first day or so of the invasion there was alot of confusion in the German chain of command about what was happening in that portion of the coast.
The Allies also made a concerted effort to jam German tactical communications in the Normandy area. Heavy bombardment, the air drops, and partisan activity would have made telephone communications very difficult. With radio traffic largely jammed this would have only added to the confusion up the chain of command slowing a response.

In the longer run, the Germans had several problems that most of their units in Normandy had had no experiance with. These stemmed from having been primarily fighting on the Eastern Front up to that point and most German veterans (officer and NCO) were steeped in tactics and methods that worked well against the Russians.
These included:

* Immediate action by a small mobile unit was often effective in stopping an attack. The same sort of "flying column" could also regularly be effective on its own in a local attack. Against the Western Allies this sort of unit was ground up and spit out in nothing flat.

* Reconnissance and planning were minimal. The Germans frequently planned and executed attacks and mobile defenses on-the-fly. Against the Russians this could work in view of the slow rwsponse the Russians were very likely to make due to their low level of communications network. In the West such tactics only met increasing orgainzed resistance coming from unexpected directions and units.

* A comfortability with using little combined arms in operations. In the East the Germans frequently had little artillery support, often had units that lacked either armor or infantry (eg., they had one or the other but not both in strength). When they operated this way in the West they opened themselves up to destruction in detail and found they had an inability to hold ground.

* Static infantry (eg., leg with no motorization) units were basically a waste of effort in the West. In the East such units were on par with their Soviet infantry counterparts. In the West such units were facing essentially nothing but the equivalent of Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions in the US and British armies. Static infantry units simply could not be expected to hold positions for any length of time against such units. They had no way to orgainze a useful defense in the face of such firepower and mobility.

 

The book I'm ploughing through has much detail on German assumptions and the way that the Allies were able to convince them that the Pas de Calais was the main area of invasion. The footnotes are full of references by OB West, Army Group B and 15th army to the need to maintain the garrison there even when sending forces to Normandy. It occurs that this may explain why 15th army was able to deny the Allies the Channel and North Sea ports for so long.


Hence the inability of the Germans to pull their mobile divisions out of the Caen cauldron as long as the British-Canadian forces kept attacking.

 

Where would they pull the mobile divisions? Caen was an important key city if you wanted to get out of Normandy and Germans were definitely going to keep it as long as they could. At least that is how I understand it...