Normandy from the German Side

The interesting thing for me is that I have underestimated the 'threat' further east around Calais and considered the latent threat in the west which was the real danger as we know but the Germans didn't. On several occasions (like Bluecoat) the timing of the British attack was to forestall substitution of Panzer divisions by infantry so as to release them for a counter-stroke.

 

There was no true replacements arriving so the Germans practically had to do with what they got originally when it comes to men and tank strength. The early operations were probably the best they managed to do and after that it was more or less holding the line and keeping the allied from reaching Caen.

Any major German counter strike after late June would have been a foolish thing to do, facing the naval cannons and the newly arrived Shermans etc. They would have been shot to pieces in the first 100 yards.

However keeping the allied in Normandy area for over a month is a one big success for the German forces available, I think.

 

I'm inclined to agree. Once the Germans were pushed out of the favourable defensive terrain in Normandy they were in the same boat as the Germans on the Somme in late 1916. The preoccupation with Calais I think speeded up the decline of the German defence at Normandy. Bearing in mind that The US was more sensitive to losses than Germany and the USSR and the British exhausted their replacements in a few weeks, their preference for 'casualty conservation' assisted the German defence as well.

 

I have always wondered what the end result of the Allied forces would have been in getting out of Normandy IF Caen had been taken on day 1....

Anyone seen any calculations or what if´s on this?

 

I can't answer Kai's question - but I have today added another German POV to my library - Guderian ( son of... ) 'From Normandy To The Ruhr With The 116th Panzer Division'.....

 

Pretty much what happened after Caen was captured only earlier.