The A6M Zero and the early Pacific War

Was the A6M Zero really the killer fighter it has often been made out to be in the early Pacific War? The more I study the details of the early war the more I am convienced that it was not nearly as effective a fighter as it is often depicted.
Against the F4F Wildcat its score in fighter on fighter actions was virtually a draw with essentially equal losses to kills through November 1942. Against the USAAC / USAAF in the SWPA the same appears to hold true.
The P-39 looks by all accounts to have held its own most of the time as did the P-40. Both proved capable of taking on the Zero successfully at most alititudes below 20,000 feet where it appears most combat took place.
The British Hurricane and early Spitfires also appear to have broken even in kills to losses.
It is only with some of the more obsolesent Allied fighters that the Zero really had a big advantage. Aircraft like the P-35 or F2A Buffalo suffered at the hands of the Japanese.
If anything, it appears that equally well piloted Zeros versus first line early war Allied fighters like the F4F, P-40, or P-39 the odds were roughly even.
This certainly goes against conventional historical wisdom but the most accurate accounts of aerial combat now appear to show this was actually the case. If true, it argues that the Zero was the wrong plane right from the start of the war.

 

<If true, it argues that the Zero was the wrong plane right from the start of the war. >

I don't know about that. It was a fairly good compromise for flying both off land and carriers, something the P40 or P39 could'nt.
If the Zero was such a "clunker", why did'nt the US Navy just stick with the F4 Wildcat
instead of up-grading to the Hellcat?

 

The idea is not to hold your own, but to take out as many as possible and come home. The Japanese were working on their improved models, but we had the advantage in that we had the better pilots and better training program as the war progressed.

 

i suppose the air campaign over new guinea was a fluke. i mean, 26 p-40s and p-39s shot down in one day as against only 3 zeros? or 5 b-17s shot down in 7 firing passes by 9 zeros?

 

It's always seemed to me, based upon what I've read, that you couldn't try and fight the Zero's battle - it was probably the most aerobatic plane available for most of the war - I remember reading that, I beleive it was the battle for Malaya/Singapore, some Spitfires and Hurricanes were brought in and the Zero's chewed them up - again, they were trying to dogfight the Zero.

But when the tactics were evolved (and utilized) - (such as Chennault's 'Dive and Run Away, Live to Fight Another Day', the later 'Thach Weave' and the diving turn) that took advantage of the strengths of the Allied fighters (wieght, firepower, ruggedness, diving speed, etc) and negated the Zero's strengths (aerobatics, maneuverablitly, turning radius, climbing speed), then the victories over the Zero started mounting.


just my 2 cents
(...which, together with a 5-dollar bill, will buy you a coffee at Starbucks!)

-whatever

-Lou

 

Could you give some dates and details?

 

saburo sakai's personal account("Samurai.") in the months from april to august 1942, the lae wing was consistently downing enemy fighters over port moresby. most battles were faught with americans defending the city. the two engagements i mentioned, nearly two dozen american fighters shot down with considerably less zeros lost, and the 5 b-17s downed by 9 zeros (plus 3 p-39s that answered the distress call) were described by sakai in detail.

the one involving the b-17s was acknowledged by US war records. they tested their theory of head-on firing passes since the b-17s they were fighting still lacked the bendix chin turrets. a flight of 5 bombers were shot down in seven firing passes in a slightly right-upwards rake from the front. sakai himself had to take a second pass because he failed to release his safety switch (didn't know fighter guns had that.)

time and again, i get to see updates on the exploits of sakai and his buddies on the net. some of them have been debunked while others are confirmed.

what mystified sakai was, with so many american planes shot down as against an insignificant number of zeros lost, why did they keep encountering determined fighter opposition over moresby? why did their own lae wing come under continuous attack by b-26s at night and b-17s by day? the number of planes downed was self-confirmed, so to speak.

 

As you read more about the Pacific air war you will begain to see a pattern in tactics and training, similar to that in Europe from 1937 thru 1942.

From WWI interceptor or fighter tactics revolved around tight squadrom formations and even massed wings. Once battle was started these were difficult to control and the air fight usuall converted into a furball of individual encounters. This melee scattered across the sky favored pilots with the fastest reflexes and uncommon situational awareness.

In the Spanish Civil war and over China from 1937 thru 1939 the German and Japanese discovered the value of the lead/wing man and the related finger four tactics. Pilots were paired with one attacking the enemy aircraft and a second covering his rear. Just following close behind and watching for enemy aircraft was enoumously valuable as the attacking pilot could focus on his manuver and shot and the wing man could focus on watching for danger. Creating a pair of pairs further increased situational awarenss and combat effciency.

Over Poland, France, Britian, and the South Pacific the inferior massed squadron and single plane tactics of the Allied pilots caused higher loss ratios. The Brits were the first to figure out better tactics, but the concept did not spread quickly. Over the Pacific in 1941-42 the fighter pilots started out not fully understanding the better tactics. A aggravating factor was the lower average experince of the Allied pilots. Most US pilots had less than 18 months service, with perhaps ten months of flight time in a squadron. They had entered the military after June 1940. The average Japanese pilot had a years more service, and combat experince fighting Chinese and Russian pilots, and triple the number of training flight hours a US, Dutch, or British pilot had over New Guniea, Java or Maylasia. It took the USAAF and USN about year to catch up in understanding good tactics.

Similarly the British had sent a high portion of newly trained pilots to the Far East. Their fight against the Japanese was in many ways the massacre of the innocents.

 

the zero was 2,000 pounds lighter than the p-40. that alone would have made japanese pilots worried.

but just as american pilots developed tactics to disadvantage the zeros, it did not result in a massacre for the zekes. there were zero techniques to counter diving passes from up high, underbelly sneaks, sudden diving attacks from the direction of the sun, even attacks from behind by faster planes like the hellcat or the mustang. pilot skill and experience was too big a factor then.

 

From extensive reading on the early SWPA aerial combat, it appears that most Allied first line fighters like the Hurricane, Spitfire V (or earlier marks), P-40, and P-39 were able to just hold their own with the Zero. That is, in fighter on fighter combat neither side held any great advantage. The Zero could out maneuver the Allied fighters but they proved difficult for a Zero to kill and extremely dangerous if they got a shot in return.
The earlier pre-war and obsolesent types that were in service early in the Pacific War like the Buffalo, CW 21, P-36 or P-35 were simply outclassed by the Zero.
Interestingly, none of these types was outclassed by IJAAF fighters in operation early in the war. Neither the Ki 27 Nate nor the Ki 43 Oscar proved in a class equal to the Zero. While the Oscar was even more maneuverable than a Zero its armament of just one 7.7 mm and one 12.7 mm, or 2 12.7mm machineguns proved virtually worthless against Allied fighters.

On the matter of pilot training, this varies somewhat. The USAAC was a mixed bag of highly qualified pilots that originally were trained prewar and more hastily trained ones that were in expansion classes from about 1939 on and had fewer hours. The pre-war pilots often had several hundred to well over 1000 hours flying time and were generally very skilled. This is the sort of pilot that volunteered for the AVG for instance.
The newer pilots usually had just a couple hundred hours time mostly in training with limited operational experiance.
The USN both by the nature of their flying operations (carriers) and smaller service requirements generally had pilots of very high skill level who were comparable to the USAAC pre-war pilots. Many had close to or over 1000 hours flying time. They were also schooled in a set of tactics that were exceptionally good for the time.
The Japanese pilots were much like their USN and pre-war USAAF pilots; highly skilled with large numbers of hours flying operationally. Their tactics were somewhat unique and did not follow what had become standard practice in Europe. The Japanese fighter formation was a three ship flight following in a loose trailing formation staggered right and left. Tactics were much like early war RAF ones but the loose three formation gave much more room to maneuver than the tight "vic" that the RAF initially was using. Diving passes with a climb away from the target was a prefered method of attack.
The Commonwealth in the Pacific initially suffered from poor pilot training levels as well as equipment. Many of their pilots were hastily trained in the mass production system that Britain had set up early in the war to get alot of replacement pilots in the field.
Many of their pilots had very limited operational time on the aircraft they were flying. Most had barely 100 or so hours flying time in many cases having only recently completed flight training.

 

I understand this, Slip. I was trying to stick with the original post. <Was the A6M Zero really the killer fighter it has often been made out to be in the early Pacific War? >
If Japan wanted to "sit on it's laurels", they would'nt have developed the Ki-84 Frank or the Ki-100 Tony.
Was the Zero the best killer fighter in the early Pacific war? Maybe not. But I certainly don't think it was 'the wrong plane right from the start.' It needed development just like
any other new weapon.

 

Do you have any sources for this?

 

hohum, a few seconds of googling. i know, i know, burden of proof and all that crap.

"{8} Until the end of July 1942, the naval air units based at Rabaul and Lae became intensely involved in flying missions over the Owen Stanley Range to attack Port Moresby, or other Allied bases on the New Guinea mainland. Such operations consisted of either bombing missions with fighter escort, or sweeps by fighters alone. The Japanese fighter units at this time were also kept extremely busy intercepting Allied air attacks on the Japanese bases. This phase of the air war was characterized by the lack of clear superiority by either side. Although the Australians and Americans often lost more aircraft in individual air battles, Allied air strength did not diminish significantly. On the other hand, the Japanese, although suffering fewer losses, saw a slow decline in the quality of their forces as highly-trained and experienced pilots were lost and replaced by less and less experienced ones. This period was, therefore, somewhat of a stalemate, as the Japanese could not batter the Allied air forces enough to drive them out of New Guinea."

Journal

from saburo sakai's journal:

FW: Timeline - Lae

 

Anymore information from Official or more reliable resources other then a diary?

 

sorry, dead allied and japanese pilots would rather let the living use google.

 

Hi guys. With all due respect I'm curious as to why T.A. is questioning historical statistics that have pretty well been distilled out by now to their net results accepted after 65+ years. I have been hearing folks question the Zero as a weapon on an off since the 60s. It is certainly unfair to compare it in any way to American fighters' style for instance because the IJN had desire for a different type weapon.

The pilots used the Zero as they would a sword in combat. Even the radio was stripped out for a tiny boost in performance. It was a superb fighter for the time with performance excelling that of any American fighter in use at the commencement of hostilities.

IJN pilots were brutally trained and their skills honed to a degree that exceeded their counterparts around the world. Many saw combat in China and were savvy as to how to apply their training knowledge. Initially there was no plane or pilot that could best a hungry squadron of Zekes swarming in. They were disciplined and used already proven tactics that savaged enemy formations or single craft.

Allied pilots had yet to even know what energy tactics were in 1941. In any 2 dimensional engagement it became a well known and repeated warning not to turn with a Zero. The American pilot dictum was that a Zero in front of you would be on your tail within 3 turns. Early on the generally inferior American planes in maneuverability were slaughtered because they simply didn't get it yet. They tried to fight the Zeros' fight and lost.

And look at the Zero's performance. The A6M2 could actually provide escort for bombers over the vast Pacific with its 1,930 mile range- a distance no single engined American fighter could match untill the P-51 in 1944. P-38Fs maxed out at 1,750 miles, the F4F-3 went 845 miles, the P-40B/C could hit 945 miles and the P-39D 1,100.

These ranges were with external tankage which was not even always available early on due to lack of supplies and spares. The Japanese certainly had plenty of drop tanks manufactured before it put the Zero in service.

With a speed of about 336 MPH it wasa roughly equal with it's American counterparts but its astounding 4,517 FPM climb rate completely eclipsed the F4F, P-39, P40 and P-38 of the era by huge margins.

The IJN, Army and Air Force pilots were taught to shoot, something American pilots had little or no actual realistic training in. Firing a burst at a towed target sock and becoming "qualified" was a dubious distinction of the times and no doubt did nothing to insure a edge in combat.

Saburo Sakai details many of his kills. With 60RPG X 2 of 20MM and 500 RPG X 2 of 7.7MM Conserving ammo was the norm. But trained pilots found no problem with dispatching 2,3 or even 4 enemy aircraft in a mission. The early, slower Type 99 20MM provided sufficient potency to split a P-39 in half when 2 rounds hit its undersides from just a 4 round burst! The fact that IJN pilots could actually aim their weapons to specific parts of the enemy planes insured that even with 7.7 they could pour a stream into a canopy and make kills.

I know more than one American pilot who scored kills over armored Luftwaffe aircraft while just one of their .50s was in operation. This weapon is roughly equal to the Japanese 12.7MM so why is it doubtful that an experienced Oscar pilot could not down a P-39 or P-40?

Sakai was the first to devise the head on firing pass tactic against the B-17. You can bet that by the next day the entire fleet was versed on what to do when encountering B-17s. So why would we not imagine other B-17 would not fall? Besides there was no massed formation of bomber wings with 500 planes in defensives boxes. Over the Pacific the heavies were far fewer and defensively poor compared to later in the conflict.

While Sakai excelled over others pilots there were many lesser aces who contributed to the total score. The American planes were lost and the New Guinea-Rabaul Zero pilots's scores rose. I am unable to wonder why that is questionable after all this time.

How come "26 p-40s and p-39s shot down in one day as against only 3 zeros?" is unbelievable when accomplished by one of the greatest groups of aces assembled up to that time but if the figures were reversed during the Marianas Turkey Shoot by US Navy aces it's unquestioned?

Anyhow I was simply wondering after reading the initial post why folks are doubting the ability of the Zero's pilots. The A6M2 and 3 were like UFOs when first encountered. There was no defense just panic and the cool hands at the Zekes' sticks took full advantage of their plane and their training.

From its 1st flight in April 1939 to roughly the end of 1942 is a pretty good run for a crate that wasn't really improved until later models. We have the testimony of American pilots as to how good the IJN and the early Zero was but the true proof of its potency is stilled forever with its victims who never saw them coming or tried to outmanever one.

 

Usually called a master arming switch. On older types each individual gun might have a safety. There is also the matter of cocking handles, particularly for clearing jams.


One should remember that when the Zero appeared in 1940 few other fighters had pilot armour and self sealing tanks, except the Messerschmitt. Even British fighters added this gear after entering production, along with variable pitch propellers. The P-40 didn't have these features until requested for the 1941 P-40B by the British. The self sealing tanks were improved in the P-40C.

In terms of reliable engineering the Zero set a new standard and its engine was more reliable and serviceable than even the American radials. Its airframe was constructed using new thin sheet duralum and its alloy frame making it tremendously light, one of the pilot requests was manoeuvrability beyond all other considerations. The Navy wanted range, armament and manoeuvrability. Most about the Zero was designed to achieve extreme performance in these areas with the sacrifice of others. It was not intended that the Zero would form the mainstay for the next 5 years.

When Spitfires were finally equipped to RAAF squadrons in 43 it was found even these stood little chance in a turning fight with the Japanese fighters (the Oscar was even more manoeuvrable but poorly armed). During 1943 efforts were made to restore captured Oscars to flying condition in New Guinea, from which RAAF pilots developed new tactics to combat these aircraft with.

Prior to this period it was not uncommon for the elite Lae fighter wing to overfly Port Moresby and taunt the Allied pilots with aerobatic displays in their Zeroes. Even Oscar pilots consistently took extra time to perform aerobatics following each kill or attacking pass. The feeling among Allied pilots was the Japanese were literally flaunting their aerobatic superiority.

Unfortunately for the Allies the Pacific region was a home for second echelon fighters, all the best were needed in Europe and the US was only beginning to swing into genuine wartime technological industry. Aircraft were P-35 and P-36 types in good numbers, with some Buffalos (F2A) operated by Commonwealth forces and the F2A-3 and the like by the Marines. The British had a handful of Hurricanes in places like Singapore, whilst the US had been going about a general re-equipment (P-40 models and F4F-3's), when war in the Pacific struck.
But keep in mind the Japanese Army almost exclusively operated the terribly obsolete Ki-27 at this stage, Oscars weren't available in numbers until 1942. The air war for Japan was carried by the Zero up until then.

The mistake made by US Intelligence speculators was that the Zero was futuristic, therefore had all the relevent safety equipment and much more engine horsepower than the Sakae was really capable of. It struck from virtually nowhere, since the carrier fleet could remain well outside detection range using it and this was also a major factor, as radar was still in a prelimenary development stage, had a limited range and required expert operators to interpret correctly.

The hint was in tactics. Allied pilots increasingly found they could escape Zeros by diving, and use high speed diving passes when attacking them. The mistake made early on was in playing their game and getting into turning fights, where the little Zeroes would simply turn inside you and cut you apart with 20mm cannon.

This was to play a tremendous factor in their terrific expansion throughout the Pacific. Attacks were unexpected, the Philippines was bombed and strafed by a force including Zeroes which had departed Formosa, an impossible journey for other fighters.
In one dogfight in the Dutch East Indies a force of P-36 and P-40 fighters engaged Zeroes 50:23 and lost more than half for three of the Japanese fighters. Hurricanes and Buffalos suffered similarly. Even at Guadalcanal there is footage of unchallenged Zeros happily doing aerobatics right over Henderson field, one of the GI's capturing the images.

What happened was as the Japanese tried to consolodate their territory production and implementation of new designs like the J2M, Ki-44 and Ki-84 were too slow in coming but already needed for island defence. The A7M should've been developed and produced.
But this was part of the strategic plan of Allied forces in the Pacific. The entire air war of 1942-44 concentrated on the distruction of Japanese merchant shipping and force support. When the fantastic Ki-61 Hien appeared in New Guinea in 1943 it was thankfully only available in very small numbers, whilst the new Frank, Shiden/George and Raiden could only be equipped along the final line of Japanese defence at the Marianas and Philippines, since the Japanese merchant fleet was all but destroyed by the time they entered production in 44.

The Wildcat held up well against the Zero because people like Jimmy Thach developed clear headed tactics against them and the F4F was a tank. One thing about the Navy is they really look after their pilots and the Wildcat is also beautifully equipped with everything from a fully amoured layout to a dinghy. The original F4U had to be redesigned to achieve the same standards (fuel tank placement and strong armament).
The funny part was how the tactic worked: you let one feller get shot at whilst you came around and shot up the Zeros on his tail with a side pass. The way it worked was the Zeroes came off worse every time (but Wildcats were sometimes landed and then scrapped).

A second major factor of the air war, and in fact pre-eminent to the aircraft types was the experience of Japanese pilots and the attrition they faced by 1943. American pilots had a much better survivability as new aircraft types like the Lightning, Hellcat and Corsair were introduced the cream of the Japanese Navy was promptly killed. Particularly around New Britain, the veterans faced the latest American fighters armed with now obsolete models (A6M3), it was called the "Black Day of the Pacific War" by the Japanese Navy, as the bulk of their experienced pilots were killed in one huge series of aerial battles launched from Guadalcanal and New Guinea.

The next generation of Japanese Naval pilots were encountered at the Marianas and Philippine Sea, equipped mostly with the A6M5 which had been improved (to about a 1943 standard) but had yet to receive pilot armour and self sealing tanks. In the defensive role such as this it was terrible policy but wasn't corrected until the final A6M5a/b/c were encountered during 1945.

So the Zeroes lack of protection wasn't so much of an issue during the initial invasion, but began to tell during the Coral Sea engagement and just spelled disaster in 1943. Japanese Army fighters actually began to outshine the Zero by then, mostly seen in China/Burma and New Guinea. But any Japanese pilot in a Zero was still a very dangerous opponent.

Speed comparison
Zero A6M2 (1941) 330mph
P-40C (1941) 344mph
F4F-4 (1941) 318mph

Zero A6M5 (1944) 355mph
F4U-1b Corsair (1944) 417mph
F6F-5 Hellcat (1944) 386mph