Artillery doctrines

A pretty good summing up: Fire and Fury Games' Battlefront:WWII Artillery Tutorial

 

German Artillery

At the end of World War I, the German military was forcibly dismantled by the Treaty of Versailles. Long-range and heavy artillery was destroyed and the largest artillery piece was limited to the 105mm Field Howitzer. Whereas the emphasis in the final years of WWI had been on centralized control of massed firepower, in the 1920's more weight was put on individual artillery batteries and the authority of the individual battery commander. After Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, heavy artillery reappeared in the inventory, and Bruchmüller's theories were reintroduced. However, the emphasis on battery control was never completely erased. Also, the Field Artillery was definitely a forgotten stepchild when it came to equipment, the Luftwaffe and Panzer forces being favored for modernization, especially in communications equipment. The result was that the Germans entered the war with a system at the divisional artillery regimental-level and below that was little more advanced than in World War I, with radios supplementing field telephones. It could be responsive and highly accurate at the battery level, but had little or no capability of massing fires, especially over short periods of time. German artillery also suffered from a general lack of equipment, which was offset somewhat by the use of heavy mortars and rocket launchers.

The German emphasis was on "destruction of point targets". With true Germanic precision, they would do the calculations intended to drop the initial rounds on top of the intended target. This requires accurate range estimation and incorporation of lots of correction factors for weather conditions, relative heights of the battery and target, barrel wear, etc. In his lecture, David Weseley says that when engaging targets of opportunity, they retained a relative inefficient method of computing range and direction that required them to know the relative range and bearing of the target, observer, and battery instead of the methods used by the British and U.S., who needed only the map positions of the target and battery. His point is that these calculations took time, and the average response time from call-for-fire to mission was on the order of 10-12 minutes. Whether this technique improved during the war is debatable, and unfortunately most sources tend to discuss German equipment rather than doctrine. On defence or for deliberate attack, the emphasis on precision was not problem, as the German observers and survey parties would do the calculations for lots of potential fires. A concentration could then be brought down by means of a code word and a map reference. The artillerymen of Grossdeutschland summed up their defensive technique as "many tubes, few rounds, suddenly, on a single point." and it often slowed up or stopped a Soviet breakthrough.

The Germans liked to fire by battalion, but the batteries could split up to support individual infantry battalions, providing a small volume of relatively responsive fire, especially when the infantry battalion had a separate mission. They would then reform when the battle was concluded. On defence, or in a deliberate attack, the Germans were well drilled on combining the fire of multiple batteries and even battalions. At higher levels of command, the Germans retained great administrative flexibility. They would parcel out artillery from the army reserve into task-oriented forces and reorganize artillery as needed and they still retained the ability to do Bruchmüller-style artillery fire plans. However, this flexibility will generally not be seen in a Battlefront game, because it was part of the preparation for the battle instead of the execution of the battle. They also made one attempt to reorganize their artillery based on a coherent divisional organization, but this was submerged in the Russian flood. Also, as German artillery remained numerically weak throughout the war, and gathering large artillery formations at one point would require stripping other areas of the front of some of their support.

Finally, much of the German artillery (and indeed much of their army), relied on horse-drawn transport. Reducing their pace to that of the horse and meant that they took longer to get into position. As Battlefront games generally begin with forces in place, this will not usually effect things.

German Artillery can be classified:

• Command - Medium-High level. While they Germans often permanently assigned batteries and battalions to support specific units, they kept some of their artillery in reserve and parceled it out to the areas of the front where it was needed. While they were capable of using coordinated strikes in a prepared fireplan, they didn't do this well against targets of opportunity.
• Control - Medium. Forward observers and officers made most of the calls-for-fire for the artillery. They were generally tied to controlling specific elements.
• Communications - Average. Radios were not as prevalent as might be expected for a modern army. Ground-lines were used heavily. When they did use radios, they were used to connect the observer to the individual elements that were under his control. Unlike the British and Americans, the Germans did not fully develop the concept of a radio net that allows the rapid sharing of resources. In Battlefront, this means that the Germans do not have any special multiple-element missions.

 

Russian Artillery (ah well, too gamey)

In Battlefront:WWII, the Russians are severely restricted in the number and type of fire missions they may perform. Many gamers will be surprised by this, as the Russians were famous for the emphasis they placed on artillery and the large amounts of artillery they fielded. However, at the level that we are simulating in BF, the masses of Russian artillery will not appear. By the time a Battlefront scenario begins, the corps and army level artillery will have already done its work. At the tactical level, the Russians were inflexible in their artillery tactics, as they had few troops with the education and experience needed to call artillery, and relatively primitive communications equipment (they relied extensively on ground lines). With the exception of pre-planned barrages, BF artillery fire is simulating on-call fire on targets of "opportunity" and this type of fire was extremely difficult for the Russians to perform.
Russian Artillery can be classified:

• Command - High level. The Russians tended to control their artillery centrally (as they did everything else). This did allow them to share assets and prepare massive strikes, but they were not flexible enough to use this at the tactical level.
• Control - High level. The Russians planned their fire missions centrally as well. You will not see the larger artillery on the Battefront gaming table except as part of a pre-game fire plan. Only a few units are capable of calling-for-fire.
• Communications - Poor. The Russians relied on ground lines extensively. When they are displaced from their prepared positions, their ability to call-for-fire is impaired.

The Russian Call For Fire Table


The Russian call-for-fire table has one important feature - Very few units can call-for-fire.

• The Russians have NO General Support artillery.
• Only forward observers, Battalion commanders and above (p.36), and scouts may act as observers for Direct Support Artillery.
• Only forward observers and Battalion commanders may observe for organic support artillery. If a Russian Mortar company FS-01 is attached to a battalion, it will have two potential spotters, the forward observer and the battalion commander.
• Company commanders cannot spot for organic support artillery. Russian company mortars have NO units available to them that can call for indirect fire. They must set up so that they can spot their own targets. This usually isn't a hardship as this is probably the best way to use them anyway.

Another important limitation is that only Russian Forward Observers in an observation post using preregistered fire missions may call concentration missions (p.41).
Introduction

Scenario Setup-How you start is how you operate.

The setup of the scenario will determine the exact fire missions that can be used by the Russians throughout the game. Unlike the other nations, the Russians should not be able to split off and combine off-board fire. Keep the following points in mind:

• Forward Observers should be tied to a specific fire support element. They should not be able to command artillery from other organizations. If the FO is lost, only Battalion Commanders and scouts can command the asset, and it would not be unreasonable to have the ability to contact the asset lost altogether. Scenario rules could also tie scouts to specific assets.
• The scenario must note whether preregistered fire is available, who can use it, and where it can be used.
  On defense or when attacking from static positions, the Russians would have preregistered their fire. You can either have them specify a number of preregistered points for each asset or set their FOs up in observation posts and assume that anything within their Line-of-sight is preregistered (this is easier). The level of preregistration should depend on the scenario context. Defenders on the first day of Kursk should have lots of preregistration, but if the Russians defending an newly captured position, they may only have a few points registered.
  Remember that the Russians can only do preregistered fire from observation posts. If an FO displaces from his OP or becomes a casualty, you should no longer receive the preregistered bonus or use concentrations from his asset.
• Batteries in Russian artillery battalions (FS-04, FS-05, FS-06) should not split off to fire independent missions. The battalion must fire battalion level missions only. Combined with the restrictions on preregistered concentrations, this restriction will cause many fire missions to be shelling missions. The Russians will often encounter the restriction on p.39 that says that battalion shelling missions are limited to a single battery.
• Independent Fire Support Batteries (FS-01, FS-02, FS-03) cannot combine to thicken other fire support missions.

The above rules show how limited the Russian artillery is in a fluid situation. You can understand why they often used their artillery pieces as direct fire weapons instead of off-board support (FS-03, FS-04, FS-05). The scenario designer may give a choice to the Russian player on how to deploy these assets, but this choice cannot be changed during the course of the game.
Introduction

Fire Plan

The Russians can have several turns of preplotted fire plans available when on the attack. You can even use the larger guns (152mm guns +1 vs V/+2 vs T,G, sV) that are not listed on the chart on P.37. Unlike the British, a Russian Fire Plan should be relatively uncreative. Static barrages or concentrations should be the rule. The Russian player should plot any such fire before seeing the German deployment.

You can also give the Russians some on-call concentrations from off-board artillery which could also include the larger guns. Target them against a specific geographic point or terrain feature. Once designated, they cannot be adjusted. To use them, a Russian commander, FO or scout must have a clear LOS to the target position and make a successful call for direct support.
Scouting and set-piece battles

Charles Sharp had an interesting way of simulating the pre-planned barrages that were sometimes available at the start of a Russian attack on German defensive positions. He allowed the Germans to have full-strength organizations to start the game along with lots of dummy counters. The Germans would start with each unit represented by a counter (either dummy or real). The Russians would then receive a certain number of "scouts" that represent the intensive reconnaissance that often preceded Russian offensives. Each scouting attempt is resolved separately by revealing German setup counters one-at-a-time until a real German unit is found (i.e. each scout can reveal a single German real unit). At the end of this process, all revealed German units are eliminated to (no die roll required) reflect the massive artillery concentrations that would precede a Russian attack. You can modify this process to restrict scouting attempts to certain parts of the board, or allow each scout to reveal only a certain number of counters, but the basic idea is that known German positions would be annihilated by massive artillery strikes when the Russians started their attack.

 

British Artillery

As with all participants in World War I, the British had considerable experience with the calculations necessary to deliver effective indirect fire. In addition, they came up with a really simple system that used map grid references, brought about by the hyper-accurate mapping of the Ordnance Survey. Previous calculations had required that you know the position of the observer relative to the guns and the position of the target relative to the observer. Then you could use trigonometric functions to figure out where to point the guns. The map grid reference system required that you know the position of the target and the guns relative to a map and did not require the position of the observer. This decreased the time needed to deliver fire on a target to approximately 2-3 minutes from the call-for-fire to the arrival of the shells. The British sacrificed some accuracy for speed, and their larger patterns tend to be somewhat wider than those of their American cousins. This was acceptable because the aim of British artillery was often not to destroy the enemy with fire but to neutralize him to make the job of other units easier.

Although their tactics up to regimental level were established in the pre-war period and did not change much during the war, in 1941 Brig HJ Parham, the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) of 38 Division, invented and tested new procedures for coordinating fire from higher echelon assets. These culminated in demonstrating a 144 gun concentration (approximately 6 regiments) against an opportunity target within 5 minutes of the target being called. In mid-1942 XIII Corps conducted further trials and new doctrine was issued late that year. Under the new doctrine, each Corps had an AGRA (Army Group Royal Artillery) directly attached to it, which was a brigade-sized formation comprised entirely of artillery and designed to provide swift and devastating fire support to all Allied units within its range. An AGRA in NW Europe typically consisted of one Field Regiment, four Medium Regiments and a Heavy Regiment. By 1945 these were supplemented by a Super Heavy Regiment and Land Mattress rocket launchers. AGRAs were also formed in the Mediterranean and the Far East, though composition varied.

The standardized concentrations of this new doctrine were known as Mike (regiment), Uncle (division), Victor (corps), William (army) and Yoke (army group) targets and always initiated by the radio call "Mike Target, Mike Target, Mike Target" (or Uncle, etc) that galvanized Command Posts and guns to action. This system allowed them to put vast amounts of firepower in the hands of a single Observer, combining fire from diverse missions into an overwhelming single strike (although usually in Battlefront you will not see the largest missions). This system gave them one of the two most effective artillery systems used in World War 2 (the other being that of the U.S.-partisans of both systems can conduct a theological argument about which was "best"-the Germans didn't appreciate being on the receiving end of either of them).

The British were also very skilled at preparatory barrages, and preplanned fire, and many scenarios can start with several turns of pre-planned barrages or concentrations.

British Artillery was never "in reserve", even if the combat formation it was supporting was not in contact with the enemy. It was available for use on targets within range. There were two basic command and control relationships:

• 'Under Command'; and
• 'In Support', which made firepower available, normally all guns within range, and enabled firing across divisional and higher formation boundaries. In this respect the British Artillery system was more flexible than the American, as American commanders occasionally felt proprietary towards the artillery formations assigned to them.

The consequence of these simple arrangements was highly flexible mobile firepower that could be provided where and when it was needed. 'Under Command' meant that control was centralized under the commander, while 'In Support' meant decentralization. Typically a regiment 'under command' of a division would be 'in support' to a particular brigade, but this did not prevent it firing in support of formations to its flanks.

British Artillery can be classified:

• Command - High level. The British commanded their artillery from a high level. This allowed them to share assets and prepare massive strikes.
• Control - Low-medium level. Battery Forward observers were able to order strikes from their own batteries and request strikes from almost any level in their hierarchy. Even though the ability to call for fire was limited to trained observers and officers, the British generally deployed many observers and they worked closely with the formations they were supporting.
• Communications - Good. Forward observers utilized both radios and ground lines and this allowed them to rapidly place calls-for-fire.

 

U.S Artillery

American artillery fire control and doctrine made it among the most flexible in the war.

One major difference between U.S. artillery and that of other nations is found in the Call-for-Fire table, which shows that U.S. troop units are capable of calling General Support artillery. In Closing with the Enemy, Michael C. Doubler says: "Artillery FOs with infantry battalions often became casualties or were not in a good location to call for fires. To solve these problems, infantry regiments in Sicily and Italy began to train all personnel, down to and including platoon sergeants, in FO procedures. At the same time, artillery units began to train all members of FO teams in call for fire techniques. By having more people qualified as FOs in the front lines, infantry regiments helped ensure the availability of constant, responsive fire support." In Battlefront, every U.S. troop unit a potential spotter. Most other nations followed the doctrine developed in World War I, where only the trained observers and officers were expected to control fire missions.

The Americans independently developed the "map reference" technique developed by the British, but went a step further by developing precomputed visual and mechanical aids that automated most of the calculations needed to conduct fire missions. This allowed them to bring down fire with the speed of the British (about 3 minutes from request to firing) and the precision of the Germans. One of the factors computed by these aids was the time-of-flight of the shells. By timing when the batteries fired, the U.S. fire direction centers were able to have the fire from all of the assets in a mission arrive at the same time in a single deadly strike known as a "Time-on-Target" mission. It should be noted that all nations were able to do these computations, but the American advantage was that they were pre-computed. This allowed the U.S. artillery to use the computations without having to actually do the computations, greatly speeding the task.

For a true (and extremely readable) account of American artillery in action, we would like to recommend Robert Weiss's excellent book "Enemy, North, South, East, West". He and another U.S. FO, their radios, and massive artillery support kept elements of two German S.S. Divisions from mounting an effective attack on a single surrounded U.S. infantry battalion for almost 5 days during the Mortain counterattack in early August 1944.

We also recommend David Weseley's lecture on artillery that can be purchased at Europa 2000 Tapes

U.S. Artillery can be classified:

• Command - High level/Diffused. The U.S. was able to allocate artillery as needed, even from different organizations.
• Control - Lowest level. Although Battalion Fire Direction Centers (FDC) made the actual decision on which missions to fire, and trained Forward Observers were the favored artillery spotters, the ability to request missions was given to most front-line troops. If the FO becomes a casualty, the ability to contact the artillery is not lost.
• Communications - Excellent. Almost everyone had a radio and ground lines were also used when available. This allowed calls-for-fire not only to be easily placed, but also heard and possibly responded to by anyone on the "net".

 

I'll have to go back & review Wesleys lecture. When I read through the text four years ago a number of errors jumped out at me. But, I did not take notes or otherwise investigate his remarks.

In the last three years my research has been largely confined to the US artillery. Sifting through the eyewitness accounts, of the artillerymen and infantry leaders I've found the ability of the latter to control fires to be overstated by many second hand comentators. The most acessable source is McDonalds book 'Company Commander' decribing his command of two different rifle companys in the 1st US Divsion. He mentions many artillery attacks & is fairly clear that the targets he or his company staff are directing fire on are preplanned targets already set up by artillery Obs teams. I can recall one unplanned target controled by a member of his rifle company & it went slowly. In almost all the missions the call for fire was routed through a FO, or via the artillery liasion team at McDonalds battalion CP, not directly to the artillery battalion CP or a battery.

Elsewhere I've run across infantry leaders, or others communicating directly to the artillery on a emergency basis. Usually using the dead FO teams equipment. In the 1980s we still drew a distinction between trained and untrained observers. Trained being defined as someone who had been thorugh everal months of school & or field training in observing fires and someone who had a few hours or days of training. Where the call for fire went beyond immeadiate or emergency needs the difference was clear.

From the Journal of Royal Artillery (British) I have a paragraph describing a 1941 or 42 attempt, sucessfull, at having a tank squadron commander direct artillery fires on targets of opportunity after a 'breakthorough' in Lybia or Egypt. The jist of the artical was 'Hey this proves it can work, we need to have everyone get on board with it.'

 

Sure, Carl. This was taken from a wargames site, and we wargamers like to have things clear and simple, not fuzzy round the edges.

An untrained observer (the most common thing) must have been a creature from hell. My French infantry manual says, speaking of the organic battalion mortar battery, states you shouldn't expect fires you requested in less than half an hour, so figure out the rest.

 

Yep. Sometimes we gamers can be more attentive to detail then regular people LOL

 

The Soviet one is the easiest.

The norm for non specialist artillery in artillery divisions and breakthrough artillery units was as follows:

In an infantry division the artillery regiment broken up and given by battalion (2 x 76mm batteries and 1 x 122mm battery) to each infantry regiment. The 76 batteries are normally deployed forward and assigned a fire plan for an assault. One supports each assaulting battalion (ie two 'up' one back).
In all cases, these batteries are spotted for by their battery commander who leads a forward observation group normally using field telephone with a radio backup (the later is not always available). The 122 battery is in general support of the regiment and likewise has a forward observaton group with the battery commander. There is limited intercommunication between batteries but this can be arranged.
The infantry regiment itself has very limited ability to interact with the artillery. The norm on the offensive is that they are aware of the fire plan and interact with it in a pre-determined manner.
The infantry regiment commander has at his disposal mortars and a battery of 76mm infantry guns (direct fire). The mortars are also normally spotted for by their battery commanders.
Massed fire at this level is difficult to accomplish.
The 76mm are also considered a primary antitank system as well.

Specialist artillery divisions and units have a bit more flexibility. They have trained forward observation units assigned to them for the purpose of directing their fire.

Basically, there is little or no means for anyone outside the artillery chain of command in the Soviet system to call for or direct artillery fire.

 

Not sure how revalent this is, but I thought I'd ask. Read this in the book Armageddon this morning.
<Even when German artillery was registering on Captain Vasily Krylov's katyusha battery, it was unthinkable for him to shift position without a direct order.>
If true, were the Allies given any free way to move if coming under counter artillery fire?