What if Macarthur's escape from the Philippines failed?

Why would it have to be an American Army general? Why not Australian or British? Particularly if the JCS was determined to stick to the tenets of the old WP Orange, which would have relegated the SWPA an inactive theater after the Japanese offensive there had been contained in 1942? The US suggested a British commander for the CBI theater, the same or an Australian officer, would have been reasonable for the SWPA.

When Mac arrived in Australia in March, 1942, he expected to take command of a combat-ready American Army. But, in fact, there were just a handful of American troops in Australia. There were a number of American Generals who could have been named to command such a small force including Wedemeyer, or Eisenhower (who had been Chief of Staff to MacArthur in the PI), or even an Air Force General, since the SWPA could be expected to become an air theater. Or Roosevelt and the JCS could have reached down the chain of command and picked a promising junior staff officer to command what was essentially an administrative command.

MacArthur only got the bid because he was there, and Roosevelt wanted to keep him there, and out of the US where he feared Mac and his Republican political supporters might create a political problem in the next election. Mac, of course, set about creating a situation where the SWPA became a major focus of the Pacific War in the first year. He was helped immensely by Republican papers in the US which demanded an immediate offensive against the Japanese. Public opinion, inflamed by the Pearl Harbor attack supported this. The decision to keep Mac in command in Australia had more to do with domestic politics than the JCS confidence in Mac.

 

Stillwell or Eisenhower would not necessarily be at the top of the list for command in the SW Pacific. Stillwell at that time was on the list for corps command and one of several recomended for service in Europe. His assignment to China was a abrupt change resulting from inner Army politics.

The senior commanders in early 1942 were Krueger, Lear, DeWitt & Drum, all who had survived Marshalls purge of the previous two years. They each held a Army command in the US from which the had been responsible for the inital mobilization and training of the US Army ground forces. All four were still under consideration for further command.

In mid 1942 Drum was placed at the top of the list for US represetative in China. This should have been considered a plum assignment as it was expected China would constitute a major theatre of operations. Drum however arrived in Washington with some 65 staff officers in tow and the expectation that he would be named commander of US Forces in Europe. When Marshall told him the reality Drum made it clear he was disappointed and did not care for the China assignement. Marshall ordered the company of staff officers back to their jobs and recomended to Roosevelt that Drum remain in the US. Stillwell who had been nominated for command of the US forces in Operation Gymnast (predecessor to Torch) was abruptly ordered to take the China post. This was logical as he had two long tours in China in the 1920s and 1930s and spoke both Madarin and Cantonese dialects.

DeWitt and Lear, remained in the US and were retired for reasons of age and health by the end of the war. Krueger was sent to the Pacific and took command of the 6th Army. He did not retire until 1946. Krueger was one of the most effecient and respected Generals in the army. Like Hodge and a few others he had not attended West Point. Neither had he a university degree or obtained much academic education. Despite this he had handled a number of critcal academic type assignements in the 1920s & 1930s including the writing of the first complete doctrine document of the US Army for operational and stratigic amphibious operations. As 6th Army commander he planned and executed more amphibious operations than any other US Army General.

Aside from those four there were over a dozen other General officers commanding field corps or equivalent administrative commands. Patton, Fredendall, Devers, Stillwell were a few of these. Marshall had a considerable pool of names to draw on for recomending to Rossevelt for command in the South Pacific or anywhere else.

 

This was essentially my point. Far from being bereft of competent commanders in 1942, the US Army had a number of senior generals who could have been tapped to replace MacArthur had he been captured or killed in the Philippines. Most of these men could have been expected to do the job as well, if not better than, MacArthur. Stilwell's story is indicative of what happened to many US Army commanders at the beginning of the war; being summarily ordered from the expected assignment in North Africa to command in China (which was certainly NOT viewed as a "plum assignment" by either Marshall or Stilwell) was just one example of the shuffling of command assignments which took place in the Army hierarchy. No one was guaranteed anything and many officers, hopeful of assignment to a European-bound unit, found themselves in God-awful places like the Aleutians, Burma, Panama, the South Pacific, and the nastier parts of North Africa.

Personally, I think it would have been far more interesting to have sent Mac to China, where he could have put his considerable talent for self-promotion to work in sparring with the equally venal and corrupt Chang Kai-shek and attempting to prod the British into taking action against the Japanese in Burma. Of course, Stilwell, who hated paperwork would have been no happier in Australia than he was in China.

 

I am very glad that Australia's top general, General, later Field Marshall Sir Thomas Blamey, was NOT placed in overall command of the SWPA.

I would be speaking japanese now.


John.

 

One can speculate how 'Vinegar Joe' would have got along with the French and British leaders in Gymnast or Torch, or the invective forthcoming from serving alongside the others of the ABDA Command.

 

Stilwell had a problem getting along with anybody who he perceived as lacking competence or zeal in coming to grips with the enemy. Which means he probably would have had stormy relationships with his fellow officers and putative Allies no matter where he served. But at least the problems of command were a bit more straightforward in the ETO than they were in China. The ABDA Command was so short-lived (It lasted less than 90 days) that Stilwell probably would have seen the problems involved as a passing annoyance. In any case, British General Wavell was in command of ABDA, and Mac never had much to do with it. Presumably, Stilwell, or whoever became Mac's substitute in Australia, would enjoy tghe same situation.

 

Yes DA, Macarthur did commit those errors in his defense for the Philippines. But I would say that these are errors in the sense that we know what happened. We have the benefit of hindsight. He didn't.
At first he wanted to defend the beaches. Later, he changed his mind when he realized he didn't have the airpower to do this. By then, his supplies were scattered in depots throughout Luzon and it became a race to move these supplies into Bataan. Since he opted for a defend the beaches approach, when US forces fell back to Bataan, there was no longer enough time to properly fortify the peninsula properly. What he and the rest of the USAFFE was relying on was the arrival of reinforcements according to that War Plan. When that proved impossible, the days of the US defense in Bataan was numbered.
I disagree, though, that an evaluation of Mac's generalship should exclude Inchon.

Still, DA, well thought out response. Keep it up.

Carl, wasn't Krueger the guy that was ignored by the US commanders in Europe when he was sent by Washington to offer his advice on amphibious operations?

 

I dont know. Next time I look at his biography I will check that. I do know his 1930s work on amphibious doctrine was focused on the stratigic level & to a less extent extending into the operational level. The USN/Marines had already covered a lot of ground concerning tactics.

His direct experince in the South Pacific started in late 1943 and built up to the Phillpines campaign. His experince paralled that of the ETO rather than preceded it. There were other US Army & USN officers who were transfered fro the Pacific to Europe in late 1943 early 1944. Anyone of the them could have been the 'Ignored Officer'. Actually I suspect it was more than one offering advice, and not all were ignored. My own take is that it was not so much ognoring the earlier leassons, but rather drawing the wrong conclusions form some of them. There was also the problem of the details appearing to be different (they usually do) which led to thinking that the earlier leassons would not apply.

So much of this 'Leassons not Learned' question revolves around Operation Neptune, the US First Army, and Bradley. Bradley had some amphib training in the US, tho not in the same depth as several others like Clark. He had also been invloved in Operation Huskey, and had men on his staff who had been involved in the amphibious portion of Torch and the invasion of the Italian penesula. Furthermore he had Adm Hewitt commanding the US part of the amphib fleet for Neptune. Hewitt had been involved with or commanded several divsion and two corps size amphib exercises in 1941-42, and had commanded the amphib fleet that placed Pattons corps ashore in Morroco, placed the 7th Army ashore in Sicilly, and placed Clarks 5th Army ashore in Italy. It is not like the US Army did not have acess to a degree of experience for this for the big event in 1944.

 

Well, we can disagree about Inchon. All I will say is that Inchon was in the future, and really doesn't have any bearing on his performance in 1941-42 which bordered on criminal negligence.

As for his defense of the Philippines, yes, his errors were as you say, but they were definitely not within the exclusive realm of hindsight; many of the senior officers in Mac's command predicted the outcome even as Mac was making his plans. His attempt to defend the beaches was doomed to failure because the Japanese landings were opposed by two divisions of inexperienced, poorly trained, partially equipped Philippine troops whom any general worth his salt would realize had not a chance in hell of stopping the Japanese.

Further, it was Mac's responsibility, over the preceding five years to make sure that these same Philippine troops were well trained and equipped, a responsibility which he ignored. In addition, it was no secret, and certainly should have been realized by Mac, that the troops defending the beaches would not have any effective air cover, because Mac's dithering and lack of attention to defensive measures was primarily the reason said air cover had largely been wiped out by December 10, almost two weeks before the Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf on December 22.

Finally, Mac has absolutely no excuses whatsoever for his amateurish bumbling of the Philippine defense because he was under direct orders from General Marshall and the JCS to conform his defense of the Philippines to Rainbow 5 (successor to WP Orange) which called for the fortification of the Bataan Peninsula as the main defensive position on Luzon. He had received those orders in July, 1941, and had five months in which to carry them out. He completely ignored those orders; no defensive works were started until the first troops began arriving in late December, and few supplies were gathered at all. Any prudent military leader, attentive to his orders, would have at least begun preparing and stocking a fortified position on Bataan long before he was forced to retreat there.

Yes, Mac expected the US to send reinforcements to the Philippines, but he had specifically been warned by the US Navy that such reinforcements depended on his forces holding out for at least six months, and possibly longer. Mac ignored these warnings. Mac's plans to defend all of Luzon were based on military assets he knew couldn't possibly arrive for at least four months. He completely misjudged the Japanese, and failed to realize that the attack on December 8 presaged an all-out Japanese campaign to capture the Philippines. What is worse, rather than acknowledging these errors, Mac sought to blame them on his subordinates and the US Navy, both of which warned him of the consequences of his folly. MacArthur was so egotistical and so convinced of his own infallibility, that he simply refused to listen to sound advice or even heed his superior's orders.

See: Battle of the Philippines finds MacArthur unprepared

Battle of the Philippines-MacArthur abandons his Troops

Military History Online - MacArthur's Failures in the Philippines

MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines. - book review | Naval War College Review | Find Articles at BNET

 

Thanks for sharing those sites, DA. And yes, we can disagree about Inchon (LOL). The bottom line is, fortunately for the UN troops involved, it worked.
Okay, back to Mac. One thing I can say, Mac is definitely a character with a very big ego, to put it tactfully. Folk just either love him or hate him. As the sites you shared indicated, Doug definitely committed mistakes, which were mostly wrong assumptions.
He made a decision to fight on the beaches, hoping that it would work. Unfortunately, he miscalculated when he thought that he had enough time to execute his plan b, which was the Orange Plan. As stated in one of the sites posted and from other books I have read, Mac had thought that the main Japanese offensive would take place during the hot months, which in the Philippines begins late March.
I certainly enjoy reading your well though out posts even if I may not entirely share your viewpoint. I'll just post below the paragraphs that caught m eye when I read the excellent sites you shared.

"In MacArthur's defense, Morris states that "Despite the losses and the confusion, General MacArthur had masterminded an operation that has rightly entered the gallery of classic fighting retreats." But, as Morris continues, "It is true, however, that the Japanese did not seek a decisive engagement, and it was largely [Japanese General] Homma's tactical misconceptions that allowed MacArthur's forces to have a relatively easy time in the retreat."[86] Nonetheless, had MacArthur instituted the Orange Plan when he was expected to, his forces would not have had to fight a delaying retreat. They could have just waited and been rested and well fed in their fortified positions on Bataan for the Japanese."

"General Douglas MacArthur may have been a good general…he may have even been a great general…but the defense of the Philippines in late 1941 and early 1942 was not his shining moment. Nonetheless, America, in the early part of 1942, badly needed a hero to rally around…and MacArthur was a ripe candidate."

 

That's an extreme understatement! Roosevelt, and probably Marshall, felt Mac should have been court-martialed for his incompetence in the Philippines. Nor was Roosevelt happy about the huge monetary payments, illegal under US law (serving US generals were not supposed to accept monetary gifts from other governments), granted to Roosevelt by Quezon.

But, in order to do that they would have had to relieve him of his command and bring him back to the United States, and this would have opened a huge political can of worms. Mac was unique among US Army generals in that he had a conservative political following that naturally loathed Roosevelt and was looking for some way to wound him politically. This following included a number of people who controlled large newspapers and had the ability shape public opinion in the US. Mac had already begun to use these papers to enhance his personal reputation and spread stories, most completely false, about his heroism in the Philippines.

A court-martial of MacArthur would have opened political wounds, and called into question the military leadership qualities of both Roosevelt and Marshall, at a critical time for the US. Rather than risk such problems which might conceivably have damaged the US war effort, Roosevelt took the easy way out and awarded Mac the MoH as a genuine war hero. In my opinion, this was a slap in the face to every MoH holder in history, and an insult to the fighting men, Filipino and American, who valiantly defended the Philippines. But that was the course chosen, and it led to the divided command structure in the Pacific that was to have such far-reaching consequences in the conduct of the war.

In my opinion, the best thing that could have happened in those early days of WW II in the Pacific, would have been for MacArthur to have been killed in the fighting on Corregidor. This would have avoided the political issues, and Pacific command issues, and still have given the US a war hero (though an incompetent one) in the eyes of the American public.

 

My question is not about world war II, but who would be in his place in the Korean war?

 

DA, again a very thought out and passionate post from you.
As for the monetary gifts to Macarthur, Philippine history books we read in college said those financial compensation was paid when Macarthur had retired from active service. After retiring from the US Army, Quezon had tapped him to organize the Philippine Army. It was only on the onset of the Pacific War that Macarthur was recalled into active service to command the newly formed United States Armed Forces in the Far East or USAFFE, which was based in the Philippines.

You are right in saying that Roosevelt, Marshal, Macarthur and other top leaders were caught in the web that US propaganda spun.
I agree that putting Macarthur to task for what happened in the Philippines would embarrass the US. I would add that such an event would have been used as ammunition to bolster the Japanese propaganda campaign.
However, I disagree that awarding the MoH to Mac was a "slap in the face of every MoH holder in history, and an insult to the fighting men, Filipino and American, who valiantly defended the Philippines." Mac did what he could with what little he had. When other places in the Pacific which were better defended and supplied fell, the Philippines held out, thus forcing the Japanese to allocate troops and supplies that could have bolstered the Japanese campaign in other areas of the Pacific. The valiant but doomed stand of the troops in Bataan and Corregidor upset the Japanese timetable of conquest in the Pacific, thus giving the Allies time to consolidate their remaining forces.
What more could you demand from a man who's caught in such dire straits? Besides, he didn't leave Corregidor on his own. He was ordered to leave.
You wrote that "the best thing that could have happened in those early days of WW II in the Pacific, would have been for MacArthur to have been killed in the fighting on Corregidor. This would have avoided the political issues, and Pacific command issues, and still have given the US a war hero (though an incompetent one) in the eyes of the American public."
Part of me agrees with your sentiment about Mac dying in the Philippines but I don't think Mac was really an incompetent general.
One thing sure, Mac escaped the fate of Kimmel for what happened on Dec. 7 (Dec. 8 in the Philippines).

 

Good question. I think we can discuss that matter in another thread on military history. I'll open one up once I finish up with my chores.

 

The problem I see with the Quezon Executive Order #1 was that it was awarded WHILE MacArthur was once again an officer in the US Army, he had been recalled to active duty and was no longer simply in the employ of the Philippines while retired.

And pay attention to this part of this article; "The roots of the story go back to 1935, when MacArthur accepted the offer of Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon to become his country's top military advisor. Before he left, MacArthur convinced the War Department to make an exception to the rule forbidding U.S. officers from receiving compensation from the countries they advised. Quezon then promised MacArthur a bonus of 46/100 of 1 percent of Philippine defense spending up to 1942. When MacArthur retired from the U.S. Army in 1937 (but remained as advisor in the Philippines), Chief of Staff Malin Craig suggested to Franklin Roosevelt that he renounce the exception, but the President declined to do so."

The American Experience | MacArthur | People & Events | The Secret Payment (January - February, 1942)

The half a million in 1942 dollars was paid while "Big Mac" was back in active service, not while he was retired from active duty.

 

MacArthur was recalled to active duty in July, 1941, and remained on active duty with the US Army until April, 1951. The monetary award was made in early 1942 and, despite what Philippine history books might say on the matter, violated standing US War Department policy. If I recall correctly, Roosevelt, submitted the matter to Congress which approved an exception in MacArthur's case. But the whole episode left a sour taste in Roosevelt's mouth and did not enhance MacArthur's reputation.

To make matters worse, the compensation was supposedly paid for outstanding service in organizing and training the Philippine Armed Forces. However, despite almost five years of Mac's tutelage, those same forces proved woefully untrained and ill-equipped. MacArthur supplied rosy reports to Marshall and Roosevelt in 1941 about how he would be able to field 200,000 well-trained and equipped Philippine fighting troops, when, in fact, he had none except the 12,000-strong Philippine Scouts which were actually part of the US Army from the beginning. The Philippine Army troops MacArthur did throw into battle against the Japanese, fought bravely and well, but, without air cover and organic supporting arms, had very little chance against the better-trained Japanese troops.

Mac's contribution to the very courageous stand of the Philippine and American troops on Bataan and Corregidor was nil. He did absolutely nothing to deserve the MoH, and his personal conduct during the siege was questionable, at best. In fact, had MacArthur conducted the defense of the Philippines, as ordered by Marshall and the JCS, it would have been possible for the defenders to hold out months longer and tie down even more Japanese troops. As such, the unwarranted award of the medal to MacArthur demeaned and devalued the bravery and courage of every other holder of the MoH.

I can understand your feeling the way you do about MacArthur. He did have the Philippines foremost in his mind in many of his decisions. However, his egotism, lack of judgment, and inability to accept advice or comply with orders unsuited him to be a senior commander. He had, by virtue of seniority, come to cammand beyond his competence level and this was disasterously demonstrated in the Philippines.

 

Hey DA, don't mix my quote in with the other fellow's, please. Mine supports your postion while his disputes it. I am NOT a particular fan of "Big Mac", I recognize his worth, but also recognize a self-serving egotist.

Mac is the only person to have lobbied for his own MoH during the Punitive Expedionary Force action in the hunt for Pancho Villa.

 

Clint,

My apologies for mixing the quotes, I was trying to figure out how to get your name attached to it, got sidetracked, and never got the quote properly attributed. I realize your data supports my position and thank you for it.

I didn't know Mac lobbied for his an MoH in the Punitive Expedition, but from what I have read, he might as well have lobbied for one after the debacle in the Philippines; he went out of his way to blame all the errors on his subordinates and shamelessly promoted his own role.

 

here is a little of the stuff I have accumulated over time concerning Captain MacArthur in 1914. In young MacArthur’s case, he was sent to Vera Cruz by General Leonard Wood with the instructions to "observe and report", MacArthur took it upon himself to steal a hand-cart (along with two Mexican railroad helpers) and try to liberate a steam engine. This was against orders, not observed by other Americans, and only reported by the young Captain himself. Clearly NOT MoH actions. He pestered General Wood for a recommendation (there is where he lobbied for it), but the "citation" sent by Wood was less than glowing and the War Department rejected the claim. Basically it didn’t meet the requirements in a number of ways, and the Department didn't want to be seen rewarding officers for exceeding orders.

"The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his or her comrades and must have involved risk of life. Incontestable proof of the performance of the service and there must be no margin of doubt or possibility of error in awarding this medal. To justify the decoration, the individual's service must clearly be rendered conspicuous above his or her comrades by an act so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes his or her gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of bravery; and it must be the type of deed which if not done would not subject the individual to any justified criticism."

 

It seems I'm developing a reputation of being a Mac fan (LOL). You guys did a wonderful job of pointing out Mac's shortcomings and I have to admit that I may have been conditioned to think in the matter that I have shown here because of what I've heard and read about Mac as I was growing up in the Philippines. Well, keep up with the teaching, DA, Brndrt1.
Brndrt1, though I dispute some of the viewpoints of DA, I still recognize Mac as a guy who had a very very strong ego, to put it mildly.

Now, one of the things pointed out earlier in this thread is that the SWPA would've been a backwater. That implies, at least for me, that the Japanese would be allowed to consolidate what they captured. That I think would be the best case scenario for the Japanese. In effect, what the Japanese gained is time.
Australia won't be strong enough on its own to drive the Japanese back but the Australians would certainly be able to hold on to what they have left.
Personally, I think the Navy brass (either British or American) would have taken the lead in this theater with Army guys being relegated as their subordinate commanders.
And without Mac, I think there would have been less infighting within the theater's command structure. Now, a question. Aside from American generals or admirals, is there among the British brass whose temperament and style would've fit in the SWPA?