Australia’s OBOE operations

Australia’s OBOE operations
By 1945, the war had bypassed the NEI. The American policy of “island-hopping” towards the Japanese homeland had left the valuable resources of the NEI, as well as the occupying forces there, cut off. Australian troops were excluded from the US operations in the Philippines, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the inactivity of some of the AIF’s most experienced troops. Dutch sentiment was also offended by the lack of apparent urgency in the liberation of the NEI.
Late in 1944 the Supreme Allied Commander in the South-West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, began to plan a series of operations known collectively as “OBOE”, which would successively liberate Tarakan island (OBOE 1), Balikpapan (OBOE 2), Bandjermasin (OBOE 3), and Surabaya (OBOE 4). Further operations (OBOE 5 and 6) would then clear the remainder of the NEI and Borneo. These offensives were to be undertaken by the 7th and 9th Divisions of the AIF, some of them veterans of Kokoda, Tobruk, or Alamein.
The Balikpapan part of the plan was opposed by the Australian Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Thomas Blamey, and only OBOE 1, 2, and 6 were carried out. Oboe 6, the landings at Labuan and Brunei Bay in British North Borneo, had no formal Dutch involvement, but oil engineers were later called in to assist with the extinguishing of well fires set by the retreating Japanese.
On 1 May 1945, the 26th Infantry Brigade (9th Division) landed at Tarakan, accompanied by a company of 140 Dutch KNIL soldiers to act as scouts and interpreters, and by a number of NEFIS intelligence and civil affairs specialists. Two months later, the 7th Division assaulted Balikpapan, again with a KNIL infantry company and Dutch support personnel attached. These operations liberated the local populations from a harsh Japanese occupation and may have saved the lives of some prisoners of war, but the OBOE operations had cost the lives of almost 600 Australians, with many more wounded.
Widely criticised, both at the time and since, as a needless waste of the lives of veterans who had already done more than their share, and against an enemy who posed no threat, the OBOE operations did at least demonstrate a degree of Australian commitment to the restoration of Dutch control in the NEI.

Australia’s OBOE operations

 

NEFIS

The Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) was established in Melbourne soon after the fall of the NEI. Intended to provide the Allies with up-to-date intelligence on what was happening in the occupied territories, it developed into a complex organisation encompassing all types of intelligence gathering and distribution. It was eventually separated into seven subsections as follows:

1. Collecting Agency (CA)
2. Counter Intelligence (CI)
3. Secret Intelligence and Special Operations (SI&SO)
4. Military Intelligence (MI)
5. Civil Affairs Intelligence (CAI)
6. Photo Reproduction Section (PRS)
7. Military Oil and Intelligence Department (MOID)

Some duplication of effort between the subsections was inevitable, but this was avoided as far as possible. An eighth section, dealing with propaganda, developed into such a large entity that it was hived off from NEFIS, becoming the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO).
The service is best remembered for its insertion of reconnaissance patrols into the NEI, a task undertaken by NEFIS III. These operations were at best dangerous, and at worst suicidal. The series of landing parties on Java known as “Tiger I–VI” were captured and executed almost to a man. Similar fates befell the “Walnut” ( Aroe Islands ) and “Whiting” (Dutch New Guinea) groups, and in all, nearly 40 lives were lost.
However, some successful operations were undertaken. In general, however, they tended to be those involving groups already cut off behind enemy lines, reasonably well armed and acting as guerrillas. The “Oaktree” party, in particular, based in the remote country of central Dutch New Guinea, and under the command of the redoubtable Captain J.V. de Bruijn, remained a thorn in the side of the Japanese for more than two years between 1942 and 1944. This group was able to supply valuable intelligence, tie down a superior enemy force, and maintain the prestige of the Dutch among the inhabitants of the area. Sadly, it was the exception rather than the rule.
Late in the war, NEFIS groups took a different approach, increasing both the numbers and the firepower of the landing parties. This meant that, while not equipped to fight pitched battles, groups could at least face Japanese patrols with confidence and command respect from the local populace.
In general, despite the spectacular nature of some NEFIS missions, the organisation’s most valuable contribution was probably its unglamorous cartographic work, its sifting of information, and its interrogation of refugees in Australia. NEFIS grew from 50 to over 350 personnel during the years 1942–45, and served as a constant drain upon the very limited numbers of men available for service with the KNIL.


Some of the survivors of the “Oaktree” party in Dutch New Guinea are interviewed by a KNIL officer after their evacuation in 1944. 017628


The chilling photograph of the execution of Sergeant Len Siffleet, leader of the “Whiting” party in Dutch New Guinea, has been widely circulated. Less well known is this image of his companion Private Reharin, an Indonesian soldier of the KNIL, shown suffering the same brutal fate. 101100


FELO distributed leaflets such as this throughout the NEI, although they were probably not as successful as was hoped. The Japanese also expended considerable effort to win the support of the Indonesian people. The text reads “The end of Japan is a matter of time”. RC03406


FELO also produced these bilingual leaflets, announcing the surrender of Japan, for Allied prisoners of war and the local Dutch populace. RC03413

 

Those Australian troops never lost their anger over this. It was a complete waste of time and manpower.

Then again, it allowed MacArthur to continue his grandiose plan of self aggrandisement. And ensure that the Americans gained all the plaudits.

 

Labuan, June 15, 1945. Members of a patrol from "A" Company, Australian 2/43rd Infantry Battalion, unload a boat and walk along a large fallen tree, as they move inland to investigate reports of Japanese activity.

 

Borneo 1945 - An Amphibious Success Story

Sixty years ago Australian forces successfully led the Allied liberation of Borneo, the world's third largest island, from Japanese occupation in the OBOE series of operations. These operations culminated in OBOE TWO, the amphibious assault on Balikpapan which was not only the last large scale Allied operation of World War II but remains Australia's largest ever amphibious assault. As the culmination of the RAN's participation in over 20 South West Pacific amphibious landings during World War II, the Balikpapan invasion demonstrated the high level of expertise in amphibious operations that had been achieved, as well as the degree to which joint and combined operations had developed during almost six years of war.
With rich oil resources and functional aerodromes, the strategic worth of Borneo was debated at the highest levels. Borneo's position at the base of the South China Sea meant that it shared coastal waters with Indo-China, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Celebes and the Philippines. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an invasion of Borneo in order to secure oil and rubber supplies, and to interdict Japanese communications with South East Asia. Borneo was also seen as a step towards an advance on Java.
Controversy surrounds the Borneo campaign. For example, the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the need for an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, and General Thomas A. Blamey, the Australian Commander in Chief, saw no justification for attacking Balikpapan.[1] At the time it was argued that capture of the island from the occupying Japanese forces would provide a venue through which the Allies could control the South East Asia region.[2] It has also been suggested that the capture of Borneo would meet postwar strategic objectives. A close reading of the literature suggests that the Australian government desired to make a significant contribution to defeating Japan during 1945, in order to confirm its place at the table during later peace talks. Separately, there was pressure on the government to reinstate the prestige of the British empire by liberating British and Dutch colonies. Both these factors may have contributed to the decision to invade Borneo.
Initial plans called for six OBOE operations, however, as the Allied offensives progressed closer to Japan, OBOE THREE, FOUR and FIVE were cancelled. The remaining three amphibious landings were codenamed: OBOE ONE, the invasion of Tarakan island; OBOE SIX, the invasion of north Borneo at Labuan and Brunei; and OBOE TWO, the invasion of Balikpapan.[3] The sites were selected for the strategic assets and advantages their capture would offer the Allies. Tarakan had an airfield, docking facilities, protected all weather harbourage and relatively good roads. Even without the fleet base option, the liberation of Labuan and Brunei would secure the area's oil and rubber resources. Balikpapan was selected for its oil reserves, two suitable airfields, and deep sheltered harbour.
RAAF troops disembarking from LST703 via pontoons at Balikpapan (AWM OG3035)


In many ways the landings in Borneo were different from those in Europe and the rest of the Pacific. By early 1945 Japanese naval forces were confined to waters east and north of Singapore-Cam Ranh Bay and Japanese air power was greatly reduced, with less than 70 Japanese aircraft operating in the whole Netherlands East Indies.[4] The Allies had effectively achieved sea and air control over much of the South West Pacific and therefore needed to plan only for opposition from smaller independent Japanese air and naval elements. In fact, no effective air or seaborne resistance was offered.
The amphibious assault on Tarakan (OBOE ONE) commenced, as planned, on 1 May 1945, and despite difficult coastal approaches, extensive minefields and strongly fortified defences, the landing was accomplished with marked success. A heavy concentration of naval and air bombardment prior to the landing, as well as effective naval gunfire support (NGS) to ground forces once ashore effectively neutralised most of the Japanese resistance: 'had the Japanese elected to remain in these positions and fight, our casualties would have been extremely heavy'.[5] Hard fighting by 9th Australian Division troops secured the area. Capture of Tarakan ensured that fighter control was achieved past Balikpapan, which would prevent Japanese shipping from entering the area. For the first time, all land and sea areas within the South West Pacific command came under Allied air superiority.
The landings at Labuan and Brunei (OBOE SIX) proceeded to plan on 10 June 1945. After preliminary naval bombardment, hydrographic and mine clearance operations, Australian troops met little Japanese opposition and moved rapidly to their first objectives. NGS helped reduce pockets of resistance on Labuan, while the 9th Australian Division secured much of Brunei and British Borneo. The Australian forces were able to release some Allied prisoners of war as well as provide humanitarian assistance to the Chinese, Malay and indigenous populations of north Borneo.
By July 1945, Balikpapan was defended by some 2000 regular Japanese troops and approximately 3000 locally conscripted residents, with a few Japanese air units capable of launching sporadic raids, but no effective naval support. The OBOE TWO plan required the landing of over 33,000 personnel, their supplies and heavy equipment in the assault, including over 21,000 men of the 7th Australian Division, 2000 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel, as well as 2000 men from United States and Netherlands East Indies units.
The naval forces allocated to OBOE TWO, under Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, USN, Commander Balikpapan Attack Force, included an Amphibious Task Group, a Cruiser Covering Group, and an Escort Carrier Group. The Amphibious Task Group consisted of over 120 ships, including the RAN Infantry Landing Ships (LSIs), Manoora (Flagship of the Transport Unit), Westralia and Kanimbla. Overall there were some 98 landing craft and miscellaneous vessels, with a screen of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts and the Australian frigate Gascoyne. Another frigate, Warrego, operated in a specialised hydrographic unit within this Amphibious Task Group. The Cruiser Covering Group consisted of 10 cruisers and 14 destroyers organised into three separate commands, including HMA Ships Shropshire (heavy cruiser), Hobart, (light cruiser), Arunta (destroyer) and 2 USN destroyers under Commodore Harold B. Farncomb, RAN. The Escort Carrier Group included 3 carriers with approximately 90 aircraft in total, and a screen of 1 destroyer and 5 destroyer escorts.
Air support for OBOE TWO was supplied by the RAAF, US 13th and 5th Air Forces, and naval air units from the US 3rd and 7th Fleets. The RAAF, under Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock, acted as coordinating agency for all pre-invasion strikes and close support. The Balikpapan air operations began on 11 June 1945. Altogether, Bostock had 40 squadrons at his disposal for the period just before and during the landing, and of these, 25 were of heavy bombers, totalling 300 aircraft.[6]
The naval bombardment of Balikpapan commenced on 27 June 1945, with Shropshire and Hobart firing at Japanese targets along the coast. NGS from all three commands within the Cruiser Covering Group was made available throughout the OBOE TWO operations. Over 46,800 rounds of 4.7-inch to 8-inch munitions were fired by the naval forces in support of the Balikpapan operations, beating all records for ammunition delivered in support of a division size landing - 'and how those Aussies loved it![7]
Warrego and the hydrographic unit carried out surveys and placed marker buoys off the landing beaches and also surveyed the inner harbour. The mine clearance activities at Balikpapan were some of the most difficult of the war. Sweeping began on 15 June 1945, with 16 minesweepers and a covering force operating in shallow water and uncleared minefields, often under Japanese gunfire. The work took its toll; 3 minesweepers were sunk, 4 were damaged by mines and gunfire, 15 sets of magnetic gear were lost, 7 personnel were killed and 43 were wounded. In total, 50 mines were swept. Underwater demolition teams of US Army engineers cleared two gaps through the beach obstacles while under fire. The hydrographic, mine clearance and underwater demolition activities were most successful.[8]
On 1 July 1945, the first two amphibious waves hit the beaches in 91 amphibious vehicles and despite a choppy sea the ship to shore transfer had the troops landing 5 minutes early at 8.55 a.m. The Australian LSIs provided parts of the 3rd and subsequent waves. The last of the organised waves, the 17th, landed at 10.55 a.m. The beaches of Balikpapan were taken with little opposition, and by noon that day 10,500 troops, 700 vehicles and 1950 tons of stores had been landed.
Gascoyne escorted a convoy that arrived at Balikpapan on 5 July 1945 with supplies essential for the maintenance of land and air forces ashore. The Australian LSIs, having departed as soon as they had unloaded the assault troops, returned with reinforcements from Morotai on 7 July 1945. As the Australian 7th Division advanced inland they encountered strong pockets of Japanese resistance. A total of 229 Australians died and 634 were wounded in the Balikpapan operations.[9]
HMAS Brunei offloading vehicles on a beach, East Timor


The RAN currently operates six Heavy Landing Craft (LCH). Although they were commissioned during 1973-74, the LCH still contribute to the Australian Defence Force's amphibious capability and four of the six - Balikpapan, Brunei, Labuan, and Tarakan - commemorate the amphibious campaign in Borneo during 1945.
The amphibious landings in Borneo were professionally planned and executed operations that achieved their strategic objectives. They demonstrated Australia's ability to successfully project power ashore in our region, through efficient use of joint and combined forces. Today we should look back at Borneo 1945 with pride, as it remains a classic example of how Australian strategic interests have been successfully pursued through maritime power projection.

Publication:Semaphore - Issue 10, 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

 

My Grandfather was involved in Oboe 6 with the landing on Labuan as a Sapper in the Engineers. Before he passed away I got a copy of his unit war diary and went through it with him and he expanded quite a bit on the events written there. Like anything theres the official history and then the personal accounts that flesh it out. His wife nor any of his 10 children had heard any of his stories from WWII previously but he opened up to me because I was in the Army and could relate.
One of the last desperate acts of the Japanese on Labuan was a night suicide attack on the port area. The Japanese broke out of the Pocket, didn't do very much damage and most were killed. He that some raided the Salvation Army tent during this attack. They know this as one was found dead with the Salvation Army biscuits in his stomach after holding a grenade and commited suicide. The attached photo is one of the soldiers which attacked the port in this attack and was found dead near the Salvation Army tent. I only came across this photo some years later in archives.

 

A short anecdote,

Back in '83 I was on an all-day bus tour of the city of San Francisco. At one point I was talking to the tour guide, and he related that he was in charge of one of the landing craft used by the Australians at Balikpapan. He seemed to have got on well with the Australians.


John.