Doctrine and use of Light Tanks in WWII

Figured I would make a seperate thread on the use of Light Tanks by all forces in WWII.



[SIZE=-1]Report on German reconnaissance methods of the light tank platoons of the regimental and battalion headquarters companies, from the Intelligence Bulletin, May 1943. [/SIZE]
[SIZE=-1][Editor's Note: The following article is wartime information on enemy tactics and equipment published for Allied soldiers. In most cases, more accurate data is available in postwar publications.] [/SIZE]

[SIZE=+1]RECONNAISSANCE BY LIGHT TANK PLATOONS (German)[/SIZE]​

1. INTRODUCTION
In German tank organizations, a light tank platoon consisting of seven Pz. Kw. 2's is an organic part both of the regimental headquarters company and the battalion headquarters company. The regimental light tank platoon is normally used for reconnaissance purposes. German doctrine covering the reconnaissance duties of patrols drawn from these platoons is summarized below. (It assumes that superior German forces are conducting an advance.)
2. THE DOCTRINE
a. Teamwork
Teamwork, the Germans point out, is the secret of successful reconnaissance. They believe that haphazardly formed reconnaissance patrols, made up of men who have never worked together before, are of little value.
b. Reconnaissance Before H-Hour
(1) Orders.—Orders given to light tank patrols which are to perform reconnaissance before H-hour include:
(a) Information about hostile forces and the terrain.
(b) German intentions (especially those of a patrol's own and flanking units).
(c) Composition of the patrol.
(d) Time of departure.
(e) Line of advance and objectives.
(f) Method and procedure of reporting (radio or motorcycle).
(g) Position of the patrol commander, and of the commander to whom he will report.
(h) Action to be taken on completion of task, or on meeting superior opposing forces.
It is prohibited to take written orders and situation maps on reconnaissance. Special precautions are insisted upon when markings of any kind are made on maps used on reconnaissance; these markings are required to be of a kind which will not reveal German dispositions if the maps are captured.
(2) Information Needed Beforehand.—For its disposition and method of work, the German patrol depends on knowing:
(a) Up to what point contact with the opposition is unlikely. (Until reaching this point, the patrol saves time by advancing rapidly and avoiding elaborate protective measures.)
(b) At what point contact is probable. (After this, increased alertness is maintained.)
(c) At what point contact is certain. (Here the patrol is ready for action.)
The patrol commander is also given necessary particulars regarding air support and information as to the attitude of the civil population.
(3) Method of Advance.—The light tank patrol advances rapidly from one observation point to the next, making use at first of roads and paths, but later, as it approaches hostile forces, using all available cover. When approaching villages, woods, or defiles, the patrol leaves the road in sufficient time to upset the opposition's aimed antitank-fire calculations.
(4) Command.—The German patrol commander makes a rapid estimate of our position, and tries to attack and overrun us if he thinks that we are weak. If such a move does not seem advisable, he attempts to discover the type and strength of the opposition encountered, without becoming involved in combat.
"Keen, capable, and well-trained officers or noncoms must be selected to command the light tank patrol," the Germans state. "These must be constituted of quick-thinking, resourceful troops who have functioned as a unit long enough to know and have confidence in their leader."
c. Reconnaissance after H-Hour
(1) Mission.—The mission of reconnaissance after H-hour is to explore the hostile position in detail, to protect German deployment, and to discover hostile gun positions, as well as natural and artificial obstacles in the line of advance.
(2) How Performed.—The mission is carried out by light tank patrols (which may be reinforced) operating ahead or on the flanks, as in reconnaissance before H-hour. The reconnaissance tanks employed immediately ahead or to a forward flank are detailed automatically by the first wave of the attacking force. (Normally, one light tank per platoon of heavier tanks in the first wave, and always the same light tank. The remaining light tanks work behind the first wave, performing other duties.) The reconnaissance tanks advance rapidly, making for suitable high ground. They keep 300 to 500 yards ahead of the first wave, and maintain visual contact with it. The reconnaissance tanks observe from open turrets or, if fired on, through their telescopes, with turrets closed. They advance by bounds, from cover to cover, keeping the terrain ahead under continuous observation.
The tanks in the first wave, especially the Pz. Kw. 4's, cover the reconnaissance tanks as they advance.
When the reconnaissance tanks contact our infantry, they attempt to overrun us and, if they are successful, they report and continue their mission. A reconnaissance tank discovering hostile antitank weapons and artillery reports them, takes up a position, and waits for the rest of its company. While waiting, it fires on hostile antitank weapons.
Tanks are avoided, but are observed from concealed positions. The reconnaissance tanks report suitable terrain for meeting an attack by hostile tanks. As under the circumstances described in the previous paragraph, each reconnaissance tank waits for the rest of its company.
Opposition which begins to retreat is promptly attacked, the reconnaissance tanks reporting the development and continuing the pursuit. In the event of an attack by the opposition, the reconnaissance tanks take up a position, meet the attack, report, and wait for the rest of their companies to come up. In all these instances, the reconnaissance tanks avoid obstructing the field of fire of the heavier tanks following them. Throughout, the light tanks report by radio if it is available, by prearranged flag or smoke signals, or by significant firing or maneuvering.

Lone Sentry: Reconnaissance By Light Tank Platoons (WWII U.S. Intelligence Bulletin, May 1943)

 

US Army in World War II
Cavalry and Infantry
by Rich Anderson

Cavalry

Reconnaissance in the armored divisions was performed by the armored reconnaissance battalion -- in the heavy division -- or by the cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mechanized -- in the light division. These units were identical, except that the battalion was organized as companies, the squadron as troops (although the light tank unit was a company in both organizations). In addition, each armored regiment had a reconnaissance company and each infantry division a reconnaissance troop (organized the same as below), while each tank battalion had a reconnaissance platoon.

The mechanized cavalry squadrons were organized with three Cavalry Troops, lettered A to C, each equipped with 13 M8 armored cars and jeeps; an Assault Gun Troop, E, with six M8 HMC; a Light Tank Company, F, with 17 M5 Stuart, or later M24, tanks; a Service Company; and an H&H Company. The armored divisions reconnaissance squadron was identical except that it had a fourth Cavalry Troop, D, and the Assault Gun Troop had eight M8 HMC. Infantry divisions each had a single cavalry reconnaissance troop.

Cavalry groups were usually assigned to corps, but were occasionally attached -- by squadron -- to divisions. Cavalry was primarily intended for reconnaissance missions. However, during the war they were usually employed in defensive, economy of force, security, or screening missions. Armored field artillery, engineer, and tank destroyer units reinforced the cavalry groups for most missions.

Interestingly, the cavalry groups were almost never called to perform their primary duty: Later analysis showed that pure reconnaissance missions accounted for only 3 percent of their activities. The remaining 97 percent of missions assigned included: defensive operations (33 percent); special operations "including acting as mobile reserve, providing for security and control of rear areas, and operating as an army information service" (29 percent); security missions "blocking, screening, protecting flanks, maintaining contact between units, and filling gaps" (25 percent); and offensive operations (10 percent).

Thirteen mechanized cavalry groups fought in Europe. They were the 2nd (2nd and 42nd Squadrons); 3rd (3rd and 43rd Squadrons); 4th (4th and 24th Squadrons); 6th (6th and 28th Squadrons); 11th (36th and 44th Squadrons); 14th (18th and 32nd Squadrons); 15th (15th and 17th Squadrons); 16th (16th and 19th Squadrons); 101st (101st and 116th Squadrons); 102nd (38th and 102nd Squadrons); 106th (106th and 121st Squadrons); 113th (113th and 125th Squadrons); and 115th (104th and 107th Squadrons). In addition, the 117th Squadron served with the Seventh Army in Southern France and the 91st Squadron served with the Fifth Army in Italy.
Finally, a number of separate mechanized cavalry troops existed, among them the 56th (which remained in the U.S.) and the 302nd assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division in the Pacific.

Military History Online - US Army in World War II

 

I presume that armored artillery was deoployed as an insurence policy just in case the recon troop found something too hot to handle?

 

I remember reading that the PzKw IIIs that were attached to each heavy tank battalion were removed under one od the reorganizations. But that they were soarly missed for recon and other light duty jobs.

I would assume that the artillery would be in its support position at and after H hour but that before it would not be used as it might give away the intentions of the attack.

With the above in mind (not my post) what was the reason for the recon vehicles? Where these for infantry divisions?

 

The first post seems to deal with Light Tanks for recon in German armored units and the second post in regards to the US states that "Reconnaissance in the armored divisions was performed by the armored reconnaissance battalion -- in the heavy division -- or by the cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mechanized -- in the light division." and "Infantry divisions each had a single cavalry reconnaissance troop.". So Im not sure why the German ones were removed and why.

 

"Interestingly, the cavalry groups were almost never called to perform their primary duty: Later analysis showed that pure reconnaissance missions accounted for only 3 percent of their activities. The remaining 97 percent of missions assigned included: defensive operations (33 percent); special operations "including acting as mobile reserve, providing for security and control of rear areas, and operating as an army information service" (29 percent); security missions "blocking, screening, protecting flanks, maintaining contact between units, and filling gaps" (25 percent); and offensive operations (10 percent)."

I don't see alot of these duties consisting as acting as "assualt guns".

 

At least in the US Army they were used quite a bit more then what some here think too. For many different reasons other then Recon.

 

The assault guns bit is a mistake, Tank Destroyers (M10, M18, M36) were assigned that task as they "looked like tanks".

 

Well, M18s had the advantage of being very fast. Both the 4th and 6th AD put M18s in the van with the light tanks and armored cars to give the mechanized cavalry more punch against armor.

 

Ah yes. And still no reponse LOL.

 

Was I supposed to provide a response?

By punch do you mean speed? Because the M18's might hit hard but they also go POP when someone looks at them. The light tanks couldn't even hit hard so I am confused by the punch you are talking about.

 

No. That wasn't directed towards you LOL . It was towards another poster.

 

Ah well too bad as I am sure I had something profound to add but now I will not!

 

LOL. Thats ok. Feel free whenever you want .

 

Now it looks like the US used their Light Tanks for a longer period of time, not to mention after the war, and for a few more purposes then other countries both Allied and Axis.

 

And another question. How was the use of Light tanks by the US different from the British or Soviets?

 

Dead thread resurrection! Because I didn't see it the last time around.

Hey, don't knock the M18! Do you want to drive in no man's land to contact with lightly armored tracks armed with 37mm guns, or lightly armored tracked armed with 76mm? Give recon anything slower & heavier and they stopped being recon forces. There are quite a few battles in which the M18 and M5 in the vanguard were able to blitz through.

 

I think most would prefer a 76mm gun on a very fast manuverable TD as opposed to the 37mm on a slower TD LOL .

 

You wouldn't be talking about the terrible M6 Fargo would you?! The horror, the horror!

 

do you think the armd recce regts in british armd divs were used effectively in the n/w europe theatre?,cheers.