Guderian Goes into Plastics

The premise is Guderian accepts his brothers offer to get him in on the ground floor of the plastics industry in 1922. So he leaves the Reichswehr and has a sucessfull career as a manager in a I G Farben affiliate.

Without Guderian Does:

A. ...the Reichswehr develop research into tracked vehicals, motorization, and armor as far as it did by 1932?

B. ...the Wehrmacht develop a tank corps, the Panzerwaffe, as it did under Guderians guidance?

C. ...if no armored branch then what other differences might develop in the army?

D. ... any abscence of a armored branch, or other changes in the armys weapons, organization or doctrines affect the campaigns of WWII?

E. ...the possible absence of a German armored force affect armor doctrine and development in other armys?

My take is the Polish campaign would have had much the same result, perhaps taking a few weeks longer. The rapid destruction of the Polish airforce, the delayed mobilization of the reserves, the decision to defend the frontiers with the main strength, and the entry of the Soviet Army all were just as important to the outcome as the presence of the several powerfull German armored corps.

How would the remainder of the war played out with the possible varibles from the above questions?

 

Short answer: Yes. Guderian's role is really overstated in most histories.

 

I remember reading upon a tidbit that Guderian's appointment as inspector Armored forces was crucial in keeping the Panzer Mark IV in production throughout the duration of the war. A lot of Nazi executives foolishly wanted to divert production capacity completely to the Panther series tanks.

Not sure if his role was exaggerated on this issue.

 

If Guderian's position is not held by another innovator and the German Panzer arm follows the original "infantry support role":

I agree with the Polish campaign playing out the same way. It was primarily an infantry affair with the Panzer Arm still in an experimental phase. It may have taken a little longer, maybe weeks. German ground losses would have been higher, but not by that much.

The French campaign may have taken much longer though and with much bloodier losses. This may be a deciding factor to not pursue the assault against the Soviet Union.

 

I've not read those, can you elaborate?

 

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Short answer: Yes. Guderian's role is really overstated in most histories.

B.H. Liddell Hart, who is a source for a lot of more recent writers, and his own's Panzer Leader book sometimes exagerate the role of Guderian and the panzers.... Also blitzkrieg (IIRC the term was invented by some journalist or propagandist not the military) was often used by the loosing side to justify defeat and eventually developed into a sort of myth. The truth is a lot more complex but the short version is the main reason for allied early defeats was bad leadership and plans not German wonder weapons or doctrine.

But nonetheless IMO Guderian is one of the few single individuals that actually made a difference, he was a key factor in the initial German successes and possibly also in why they managed to hold on for years after Stalingad.

Germany did not have a big numerical advantage in the early campaigns, actually in 1939 it was weaker than the combined Polish, French and British forces though interior comunications offset that. So the reason for the German victories should be looked for in equipment, doctrine, tactics and leadership and Guderian had a big role in that.

Without Guderian it's likely the Panzer division combined arms concept would never have been developed to the point it was. This was important in the Polish campaign, the mobile role played there by 2nd Panzer is impressive. Even more so in France, without Panzer divisions the Germans would not be able to attempt the Meuse crossings before May 15 and by then the French defenders would in place and well dug in, it was the tempo of operations of the panzers that put the French command "off balance" and ultimately made them collapse and Guderian, both as organizer and visionary before the war and as corps commander during the actual battle had a lot to do with it.
If you read his pre-war Achtung Panzer book you can find the blueprint for subsequent tactics, while he did build on the works of others he is the most prominent and critical figure in making the panzer divisions what they were.

 

I know what you mean here. Back in the 1980s we were susposed to read up on Wehrmacht doctrine & methods. We had to learn what Schwerpunkt, Vernichtungsgedanken, Auftragstaktik, meant and get our heads around the concept of commanders intent. These days when I see the term Blitzkrieg used a yellow warning flag goes up.

I read Achtung Panzer, & Panzer Leader. My question, which I ask in all seriousness as I dont know the answer, is did Achtung Panzer reflect Guderian as a key originator of this thought in the Reichswehr, and the post 1933 army? Or did it reflect similar thinking on the part of many other officers in the Reichswehr motorization dept and later in the Wehrmacht?

If the latter case who were the other thinkers in the German army that pushed the same comcepts as Guderian? In Panzer Leader Guderian mentions some who were supportive, but it is not clear hw similar their thoughts were. Conceptually there is a clear link between Guderians ideas and previous concepts in German military doctrine. The general principles of speed and combined arms had been favored in German practice previously, so its not like the text of Achtung Panzer was a break with the past. So, can other German officers be identified as carrying forward the same ideas as Guderian in the 1930s?

 

Guderian's role in the escape of the BEF is often overlooked. He was one of those who was against using the Panzer divisions against the Dunkirk pocket, a major factor in the BEF's escape.

 

Can you elabrate on this, in his book Guderian tells a quite different story.

The obvious candidates would be General Oswald Lutz, Guderian's commander and the man who pushed him to publish Achtung Panzer, and Von Weichs, the commander of the German experimental force and first commander of 1st panzer division (Guderian got 2nd panzer). But my impression is that Guderian was the leading thinker/brains of the group, without him the others would not do as well.

 

Anyothers? I wonder if there was some sort of Reichswehr professional magazine, like the Marine Corps Gazette, or the US Army Journals of that era where discussions could be publsihed in print?

 

I believe there was, Guderian refers to "specialist military press" and an article in the journal of the National Union of German Officers (Oct 1937) where he published at the same time as he was writing Achtung Panzer for a wider audience.

 

I wonder what the odds of a acessable collection of those being available are? I've been slowiy picking my way through the old US Army Journals. Between those and the biographys of the the WWII leaders you can get a fair take on what was really going on in the military back then.

Anyway, Guderian still seems to be the stand out for the Wehrmachts operational sucess in 1940-41. Primarily through his arguments for massing the mechanized corps, and thru his emphaisis on speed. Several of the alternate plans for Case Yellow proposed either seperating the tank and motorized divsions across all the armys of Army groups A & B. Another proposed leading with the infantry and holding back the mechanized forces until the battle developed. Absent Guderian would Halder, Rundsteadt, Kliest, & the others have committed to a massed tank force making a high risk attack five to eight days ahead of normal practice?

Are there any other Wehrmacht officers of that era known to have pushed the idea of massed armored formations manuvering and attacking with extreme speed?

 

It was on the 28th May, after the halt order was lifted, Guderian was one of the officers who argued that the Dunkirk pocket should be attacked by infantry units only.

 

Might be, but by then the British had put their antitank defenses in order inside the perimeter, what would have changed his perspective of using panzers successfully. The damage had already been done and Guderian still had to think about finishing France (thus sparing his tanks).

 

The bolds are not inventions of Guderian.

The Doctrinal aspect of the germans was unchanged. Combining the new technology and 'new' arms was done in other countries aswell, so I don't see Guderian as the Messiah of the Wehrmacht.

To be honest I don't see how any of the campaigns would end differently without Guderian.

 

I don't think anybody wanted to attribute the tactical concepts to Guderian, AFAIK he had little to do with the development of those concepts. And the concepts applied to all the German Army not just the panzers.
His role was in creating a tool, the panzer division, that was ideally suited to putting those concepts in practice and sufficiently well designed that a commander like Rommel, with very little previous experience in mechanized warfare, could acheive brilliant results with it.
The idea of a "mecanized division" capable of deep operations was implemented first in Germany and the USSR (IMO the USSR version was even more "modern" than German one though before the T34 their tanks were not well suited to putting the theory in practice), the French divisions were either tank heavy "breakthrough" units (DCR) or armoured cavalry (DCR), the early British division was tank heavy and had the Germans followed the British approach they would have ended up with half a dozen panzer units and a similar number of short legged "independent tank brigades", not enough to implement the Manstein plan. And this is assuming they still had avoided the trap of building "specialized tanks" for each formation as the French, and to a lesser measure the British did.
While the Germans were not commited to the Panzer division concept in 1939, after the Polish campaign they realized they had a winning idea and converted the light divisions as fast as sufficient vehicles could be found to do it, and this was ingreat part due to the spectatular performance of the "Guderian tuned" 2nd panzer and his own's XIX corps.
As a battlefield commander he certainly seems to have a very good understanding of what a panzer unit can and cannot do, Von Kleist without Guderian as subordinate will probably get stuck waiting for the horse drawn infantry after crossing the Meuse while Guderian in place of Kleist may well mean no Dunkirk.

 

If the British had continnued with the AEF they'd have the balanced armd division, but budget cuts left that option high and dry. It was the same shoestring budget that spewed forth the defunct cruiser/infatry tank concept.

The Germans had the means and will to make the armd div. Guderian or not, they would have had it.

 

Yes, we learned how most of those dated back into the 19th Century.

A couple years ago I reviewed everything I had at hand on the development of 'Case Yellow' from October 1939 to may 1940. What jumped out at me is how the mechanized corps were spread across both Army Groups in most versions of the proposed offensive. It was not until March that a true concentration appears in the plans or wargames. Exactly why this occured I dont have suffcient detail to judge, tho several historians refer to Guderian making a nusance of himself over this issue. Particularly during Febuary/March. It is not clear if Halder and Rundsteadt were responding to Guderians arguments, or drew their own conclusions from the map exercises and field training they supervised.

A second observation is that extreme speed was not emphaisised in all the plans tested. Again it was not until March 1940 the plan or exercises placed the priority on high speed execution. And, again it is not clear if the others were figuring this out for themselves from the results of the wargames, or picking up on Guderians point of view.