Why was the Chinese Nationalist Army so inferior in combat?

Compared to the Japanese and what were its biggest deficiencies?

 

http://www.ww2f.com/war-pacific/29976-why-chinese-nationalist-army-so-weak-throughout-war.html

Synopsis of shortcomings and why in this thread
http://www.ww2f.com/cbi-theater/29978-chinese-army-wwii.html

http://www.ww2f.com/cbi-theater/21839-chinese-nationalist-armour-world-war-ii.html

http://www.ww2f.com/cbi-theater/263...s-chinese-aviation-war-japan-1940-1945-a.html

 

hmm...also wondering...was the terrain well-suited for tanks? im referring to the northern and coastal areas, which the japanese took early on. im pretty sure the tanks werent all that much use in burma, farther south

 

Northern China was OK, but south-east coast and the Jiang's south-west base was horrible for tanks. It's like an endless Venice city without roads back-stopped by the Himalayas. That was the reason the Japanese could not erradicate Jiang, they could take even the fragmented plains but Sichuan is one of the most unforgiving places on earth.

The Chinese Nationalist Army had no military tradition. Its experience with modern warfare consisted of having its butt kicked by the Japanese. The only good troops they had were trained by Hitler's Wehrmacht in the late twenties and all of them died defending Shanghai; Jiang's army was a patchwork of warlords with basically feudal command relationships, unpaid troops who were gang-pressed into the military, and pretty bad drug abuse problems, too.

The soldiers seem to have turned out fine infantrymen. But their officers were just no good.

 

That is not even remotely true.

Hitler did not control the "Wehrmacht" in the "late twenties".

The two American-trained and equipped Chinese divisions, the 22nd. and 38th., which comprised the Chinese Army in India (CAI) performed quite credibly against fierce Japanese resistance in northern Burma in 1944-45. These divisions were led by Chinese officers; the 38th. by Gen. Sun, a graduate of VMI, and the 38th. by Lt. Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang, a graduate of St. Cyr in France. General Joseph Stilwell commanded the CAI and demanded that the Chinese officers in his command perform to the same standards as US Army officers. Stilwell, who understood the Chinese culture, asserted that Chinese troops, properly led and cared for, were the equal of any troops in any Army. The performance of these two divisions supports that concept.

See; HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Stillwell's Command Problems [Chapter 1]

 

From the http://www.ww2f.com/cbi-theater/29978-chinese-army-wwii.html thread,


More on the German Military Mission.

http://www.feldgrau.com

The origins of the German Military Mission to China in the 1920's and 1930's can be traced back to the early period of Sun Yat Sen, the father of the Chinese Republic and to the selection by Germany of a number well qualified of German military liaison officers, such as von Falkenhausen, von Seeckt, Bauer and a few others, to manage this sensitive account.

Prior to World War One, Sun Yat Sen traveled to Germany on a number of occasions. He admired how Germany unified itself, how its academic, economic and social welfare institutions operated, etc. He often thought that many aspects of German life could also be applied to China to help develop China and to help give China a strong foundation for the future. Of importance here is that Sun Yat Sen was not a Germanophile - but he did have a strong appreciation for German accomplishments. Many influential Kuomintang (KMT) officials, such as Chiang Kai-Shek and Dr. Chu Chia-hua, shared this (pro-German) feeling.

One key persona was Dr. Chu Chia-hua. He had studied engineering at the Berlin Metallurgical Institute during the First World War. In 1926, in his capacity as President of the Sun Yat Sen University in Canton, he contacted Colonel Max Bauer (a former Chief of Staff to Ludendorff in the Strategic Mobilization Department - Bauer was a chief architect of the "Hindenburg Programm", a program to better integrate the needs of the German army with German military goods suppliers), to study business opportunities in China. The offer was accepted and in 1927, Bauer met Chiang Kai-Shek. Bauer possessed great interpersonal skills and the two became fast friends. Chiang Kai-Shek even offered Bauer to be his military advisor (position accepted).

Upon reviewing the situation, Bauer came to the conclusion that German industrial capacities could be mobilized to reconstruct the Chinese economy. In 1928, Bauer returned to Germany and began making the needed contacts with German industrialists. His efforts however were met with mixed results. A big reason for his somewhat "cool" reception in Germany was that working on military issues with any foreign nations was a massive political hot potato for Germany for a post Versailles Treaty era Germany. Although Bauer tried hard, in the end, the German Reichswehr did not provide all of the support to China Bauer had hoped for.

However, Bauer did have two important successes before he died of an illness he picked up in China. He was able to establish a Handelsabteilung (Trade Department) and the Reichswehr cautiously did enter into a more formal working relationship with the clandestine German military advisory group established in Nanking (Nanjing).

Back in China, Bauer advised his now very close friend, Chiang Kai-Shek, to enforce his drafted Military Demobilization and Reorganization plan. In 1928, the Chinese Army had approximately 2.25 million men under arms. Bauer recommended that China retain only a small core army, trained to German standards and place the rest of the soldiers into local militia forces. While the plan was sound, it was not adopted. Another round of the civil war broke out because no one in China could agree on who had to give up what and who would control that which remained.

Despite this setback, Bauer and his German team worked with Chiang Kai-Shek to establish a new Chinese Army based on German standards. A model division was established in Nanking. The Central Military Academy was relocated to Nanking from Whampoa, where it was staffed with German military experts. A key focus was on establishing new military command and communications protocols for the new Chinese Army.

Bauer regretfully passed away suddenly on 06 May 1929 and was buried in China with a funeral, which was the equal of any state funeral.

During this time frame, German aviation companies were also working strongly to establish a presence in China. Lufthansa was one of the leading developers of new aviation routes all over eastern Asia. A number of German-Chinese aviation companies were also established, such as the EURASIA Fluggesellschaft. In the early period, Junkers F-34's were used; later Ju-52's also became available. These companies also few out German military personnel to China and they also helped deliver goods and supplies in both directions as required.

After his death, Colonel Hermann Kriebel succeeded Bauer in his post. Kriebel, as may be known, delivered the final German statement to the Allied surrender commission on 11 November 1918 - "We will see you again in 20 years.".

What Bauer had built in China up with such great hopes for the future, Kriebel, in part, undid very fast. In short, Kriebel was a diplomatic failure - he lacked interpersonal communications skills, especially when dealing with his Chinese hosts. Although Kriebel was replaced quickly, the new man on the job, Georg Wetzell, was also not a good candidate for he too lacked the needed social graces.

Chiang Kai-Shek wanted German trained troops to fight the warlords of Yen His-san and Feng Y FC-hsiang - Wetzell did not deliver. When the Japanese attacked Shanghai in 1932, Wetzell was nowhere to be seen and the Chinese troops suffered greatly. In contrast, during the second battle for Shanghai in 1937, von Falkenhausen and his German colleagues were dressed in Chinese uniforms and directed Chinese troops right up to the Japanese front lines. This did wonders for Chinese morale.

What saved the German mission in China from disaster was the appointment of von Seeckt as the mission chief. Although von Seeckt officially retired from the German Army in 1928, he still wielded enormous amounts of respect and influences in and around Germany. Seeckt did go to China and he did provide the Chinese with many military assistance efforts they were seeking from the Germans. For example, Seeckt believed that Chiang Kai-Shek should place his primary efforts on defeating the communists and then focus on the various rebellious warlords of the southern provinces. However, due to ill health, von Seeckt returned to Germany on 28 December 1936.

By 1933, the Deutsche Beraterschaft in China (German Advisory Mission in China) had grown to over 50 personnel. It contained three branches, one covering administrative, aviation, economic, industrial, police and railroad development issues, a second covering General Staff issues, and a third covering military education and training.

In 1935, the trading organization HARPO (Handelsgesellschaft zur Verwertung industrieller Produkte) was established. Its goal was to funnel German military goods to Chiang Kai-Shek through commercial cover. Within a short period of time, more formally documented military training programs were established between China and Germany. Trade to China not only contained items such as uniforms, guns, munitions, Pz. I-A;s, SdKfz. 221's and 222's, etc., it also included items such as manufacturing know-how, railroad technologies, munitions plants, communications technologies, etc. In return, China delivered a number of strategic raw materials to Germany. Of interest is that two German sources state that Germany, through HARPO, also supplied the Chinese navy with submarines.

An important point must be remembered here. Germany was not the only nation bidding for Chinese contracts and influence. During the 1930's, the United States was strongly focused on aviation issues in China (i.e., The Flying Tigers); the United Kingdom was working with the Chinese navy, France established a small military school in Canton, etc.

In 1936, Hitler assigned Alexander von Falkenhausen to serve in the German military mission in China. Both von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen contributed greatly to the Chinese military efforts. However, while in China, von Seeckt was more focused on making commercial contracts for German companies that focusing on the military aspects of his assignment - von Falkenhausen was however, the opposite. His key focus was on preparing and training China's army on strategy and tactics - German style. As a quick background, in 1900, von Falkenhausen was a young lieutenant in the 91st Oldenburg Infantry Regiment - he volunteered for duty in the German expeditionary force during the Boxer rebellion. From 1900-1914, he was the German military attachee in Tokyo. So von Falkenhausen had a fair amount of area knowledge prior to taking his up his new post. When Falkenhausen celebrated his 75th birthday in the 1950's, Chiang Kai-Shek sent him a cheque for $12,000 (USD) as a birthday present.

Shortly after von Falkenhausen arrived in China in the summer of 1934, he prepared a report to Chiang Kai-Shek as to how best to defend China. This report had three key points, that Chiang Kai-Shek could defeat the communists in Sichuan Province (or at least keep them in check), that Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces could be restrained from taking hostile actions against the Central Chinese Government, and that Japan was the primary enemy now.

Further, von Falkenhausen recommended that China fight a war of attrition with Japan - Japan could never hope to win that type of a conflict. China should hold the Yellow River line, but not attack north of that until much later in the war. China should be prepared to give up a number of regions in northern China, including Shangdong, but the retreats must be made slowly. Japan should pay for every advance it makes. He also recommended a number of fortification construction efforts to take place in China, the mining of coastal, landing and river locations, and so on. Falkenhausen also advised the Chinese to establish a number of guerrilla operations to take effect behind Japanese lines. These efforts would help to weaken an already militarily challenged Japan.

Of interest here is the exact nature of German involvement in the subjugation of Chinese-Communist forces in October 1933 - November 1934. Many credit von Seeckt with being a key tactical advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek as he fought the fifth battle against the communist forces. However, this may not be quite the case. The fifth attack by Chiang Kai-Shek against the communists began months before von Seeckt arrived in China (von Seeckt arrived in April of 1934). It is possible that Wetzell provided some tactical planning to Chiang Kai-Shek in late 1933. One can suspect that the truth may lie somewhere in the middle - it is entirely possible that both Wetzell and von Seeckt provided strategic and tactical contributions to Chiang Kai-Shek.

One need recall that the Chinese communists also had a German military advisor - Otto Braun. In October of 1934, the Chinese communists began their long retreat after being defeated by the Nationalist Chinese forces. During the "Long March", of about 90,000 communist Chinese troops (led in part by Mao Zedong) - only 7,000 or so arrived in Shaanxi Province about a year later 1935. On 13 January 1935, Mao severely criticized Otto Braun for his failures and told him that Chiang's Germans were apparently better than his Germans. This may be a bit unfair as Chiang's Germans had the full backing of the German government while Mao's Germans were more or less free lancing mercenaries supported in part by Moscow.

As of 1936, Japan's Kwangtung Army fought its battles with a primary goal being that to avoid risks. Japan had gotten away with most of its demands on China through the threatened use of force. Von Falkenhausen advised Chiang Kai-Shek that for every day that the Japanese did not attack, that was one extra day China would have available to better defend and prepare itself.

Thanks to von Falkenhausen's strategy and tactics, both Kwangsi and Kwangtung provinces fell to Chiang Kai-Shek in the summer of 1936. This was an important victory for Chiang Kai-Shek. In addition, Berlin was very surprised at the fact that Japan did not intervene militarily to save these two provinces from defeat.

By 1937, the Japanese were beginning to pressure the Germans. German advisors in China were detrimental to the Japanese war efforts. Overtly, Hitler told the Japanese that he would curtail and end the German support efforts to China - but on 16 August 1937, he ordered the German military support efforts in China to continue as scheduled.

At this juncture, political events would soon call a halt to the German program in China. On 04 February 1938, Germany was placed into a position whereby it diplomatically recognized Manchukuo. The Japanese now increased their anti German support in china lobbying efforts in Berlin. On 28 April 1938, Göring officially called a halt to German military export shipments through HARPO to China - regardless of contractual obligations. By the summer of 1938, most of the German military advisors in China were recalled to Germany.

Ironically, China had up until this time been a leading source of Tungsten (Wolfram) for Germany. When the German Military Mission left China, Japan promised to continue delivering the needed metal - deliveries were never made. In 1943, Speer commented that either Germany find an alternate source to the vital metal or give up right now. Germany's available stocks of Tungsten could only be used two ways - to help build the jigs and tools necessary for industrial manufacturing or in the weapons themselves. Even Hitler saw the correct decision.

During the last years of the German Military Mission to China, an agreement was reached whereby Germany was obliged to train 20 infantry divisions by 1937/1938; the whole Chinese army, navy and air force by the early 1940's. However, by the time of the Japanese invasion of 1937, only eight divisions were fully trained by the Germans. Among those trained were the 83rd, 87th and 88th Infantry Divisions. Allegedly, Chiang Kai-Shek's favorite was the 83rd.

In 1933, the Chinese Army consisted of (according to German sources) 134 Infantry Divisions 9 Cavalry Divisions, 17 Cavalry Brigades, 36 Infantry Brigades, 5 Artillery Brigades, 20 Artillery Regiments, 600 aircraft (approximately), some railway artillery, limited armored forces, a small navy, for a total of 37 million main line troops and 600,000 provincial troops.

 

Not having read all the posts, nor the links to other posts I might be simply regurgitating what has already been covered. But that said it goes back further than just this WW2 period of time.

In 1894, China was sliding into national chaos as the Manchu dynasty lost control of the hinterlands, and then the "upstart" nation of Japan defeated China in a brief and humiliating war. When the Manchu dynasty finally collapsed into anarchy completely, Sun Yet-Sen returned in 1911 to China from his second exile and attempted to unite the nation in a democratic model. Sadly Sun couldn’t make it work went into a third exile, and China again fell into territorial warlord rule. During this short period, Japan was engaged in WW1 as an Allied Force fighting the Central Powers, so the Japanese left China to its own resources. In another twist of fate, Hirohito became the Japanese Emperor on the death of his father in December of 1926, and shortly thereafter the reasonably moderate and democratic Diet (Japanese Parliament) lost influence to the militarists with the new Emperor.

Back in China, it wasn’t until 1923 that Sun could get any cohesion in the nation, and he was supported by the warlords ironically. Unfortunately Sun Yet-Sen died less than two years later on March 12th, 1925 in Beijing, and then thing got even more divided for China. There were two factions vying for power; as Sun himself had sought and received support from the Communist International in Moscow, and their number one representative in China (Mao) was included in a formula by which a number of individual communists could enter the Kuomintang as members. In return, the new Soviet Union provided Sun with military advisers, arms, ammunition and technical help in strengthening his political organization.

This didn’t sit very well with the many of the "upper class" Chinese, especially a man who was an up and coming military leader, and who would marry Sun’s sister-in-law (one of the Soong sisters), one Chiang Kai-shek. The warlords didn’t like the idea of giving any power to the peasant workers, and the militaristic Chaing was equally displeased with the idea. But he also didn’t want any warlord bandits around, so first he led a combined army of Nationalists and Communists against the warlords and defeated them by late 1927 and recruited their troops into his army. Then Chiang turned on the Communists with a vicious purge that sent Mao and his colleagues into the shelter of diverse remote base areas.

This situation remained an on-again, off-again guerrilla affair until 1934 when Chiang decided that destroying the domestic "enemy of the heart" was more important than confronting the "enemy of the skin" (Japanese) who had begun their aggressions against China itself in 1931.

By 1934 the Chinese Communist forces, having been soundly defeated in Kiangsi, retreated north and west 2,500 to 3,000 miles through mountainous country to the Shensi area. They remained in constant battle with Chiang’s Nationalist Komintang forces as they retreated.

As a consequence the Communists suffered between 150,000 to 170,000 casualties and defections of the approximately 200,000 who originally started the Long March from Kiangsi. Still largely ignoring the Japanese aggressions, Chiang began to mass another army for a fresh attack on Mao and the Communists in ’36, but his own generals became so distressed at his lack of concern for the Chinese nation’s defense from the Japanese, they KIDNAPPED him and forced him to confront the Japanese while accepting aid from the Communists to fight a "common foe".

That was so contentious an alliance that by the end of 1940 the Nationalist Komintang launched attacks on the Communists instead of the Japanese! America wasn’t aiding either Chiang or Mao at this time, and war with Japan or not, that feud between the Nationalists and the Communists was to remain the central struggle in China until 1949. Weapons or no, supplies or no, training or no, advisors or no, the Chinese were too busy fighting each other to mount a concerted defense against the Imperial Japanese.

I put this together from old papers I had written for one of my Senior level courses back in 1993, and oddly enough I still had the thesis in the house. It wasn’t on this particularly, but related to it as it focused on the little known American Homer Lea, who was the hunchbacked dwarf, military advisor, and author who donated the royalties to Sun Yet-Sen from his first book so that Sun could finance his revolution. Look him up someday, interesting fellow Mr. Lea. His diagnosis of global power struggles and how they would play out is spooky. Valor of Ignorance is the most striking, Day of the Saxon is excellent, although unpublished the basis of Swarming of the Slav isn’t too bad either. Remember, Homer Lea died in 1912 two years before WW1 even started.

 

Interesting Clint that you gave me such an excellent segue! As I read the posts I was thinking of Homer Lea. The October 2004 issue of Military History Magazine has an article about him by Simon Rees.

The article begins:

"On December 7, 1941, Japan unleashed the might of its seaborne air arm on the unsuspecting U.S. Pacific Fleet docked at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.Within 24 hours Japanese air raids had crippled American airfields and naval bases in the Philippines. On December 10, Japanese infantry stormed ashore at Luzon. The United States, which Japanese Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto had portentously described as a ‘sleeping giant,” had finally been awakened to war.

Millions of Americans were shocked by their sudden, bloody entry into World War II. But there were some, including the commander of American forces in the Philippine, Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who had long expected it. They had read a little-known book, The Valor of Ignorance, first published in 1909. Despite its having been written 32 years beforehand, the small volume carried an amazingly accurate warning of Japan’s surprise attack and its follow-up moves. In fact, the work seemed so prescient that members of MacArthur’s staff later went on to label its American author, who had acquired his own share of experience fighting in the Far East, a clairvoyant.

And yet, when The Valor of Ignorance was first published, mainstream military thinkers and planners had not only rejected the work, they had actively derided it. The book had also predicted the fall of Manchuria, Hong Kong, Indochina, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and parts of the West Coat – and to most Western officers, the whole idea was absurd. The Japanese officer class, however, did not think so. They had bought the book from the outset and, having studied it avidly, put its deadly lessons into practice in 1941.

Who was this 20th century Cassandra whose advice and warnings had been dismissed by his countrymen but recognized by his enemies? Born in 1876, Homer Lea was never considered normal by his contemporaries. A hunchback, he weighed less than 100 pounds and stood a diminutive 4 feet 11 inches. Nevertheless, even from an early age he was filled with a burning desire to become a military colossus. He managed to get an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., but was soon dismissed because of his frail health. “Little Scrunchneck,” as his classmates affectionately called him, then settled for study at Stanford University before again declaring his intention to jioin the U.S. Army. He was turned down. Frustrated but undaunted by these setbacks, Lea, like several military adventurers before him turned his attention eastward to China….”

Homer Lea: Author of The Valor of Ignorance » HistoryNet

http://www.homerleasite.com/Site/Welcome.html

 

Moderators may want to merge these two threads

http://www.ww2f.com/war-pacific/29976-why-chinese-nationalist-army-so-weak-throughout-war.html

 

being of chinese ancestry, my parents have seen many chinese dramas that of course would not be well-known to the non-Chinese population.

There is a fictional, possibly inaccurate, but very interesting depiction of Chinese military service.

One thing they got right, the main character, a house doctor turned battlefield medic, who is with the frontline troops, sees equipment from just about everywhere. German Mausers, the old Great War tin hats, Tommy guns, and all of them grouped in units without any real organization.

Multiple scenes depict Japanese banzai charges (not sure about the actual frequency of those), but the gist is that the Chinese soldiers, with hundreds of them all in a line, start firing, and some, after their first shot, don't actually know how to work the bolt-action rifles. Others are firing from the hip, and the rest just can't aim. Only when the Japanese get close do the Chinese start doing anything at all, employing bayonets and rifle butts, as well as Lugers and Nambus and Colts, but still, the Japanese are the samurai race. The medic has his hands full for the next week.

Eh, historical accuracy? definitely not guaranteed. Interesting to watch? yes.

 

With all due respect,

That was a bad slip. However, my issue is what you have said following that paragraph which completely misses my point.

The unit I spoke of were the Chinese 36th, 87th and 88th Divisions which were trained by the Wehrmacht circa 1934, following a pact between Jiang's Nationalist Party and the NSDAP. Those were the elites of the Nationalist Army under Jiang's direct leadership and were largely sacreficed in the early battles with Japan.

When I speak of the Nationalist Army, I am using two terms very loosely: 1. Nationalists as broadly defined as those who are not communists and allied to the nationalist government, or narrowly, those who were Huangpu Military Academy cadets, i.e. the Nationalist Praetorian Guard.

Gen. Sun and his American friends sat badly with Jiang precisely because he was not regarded as "Jiang's own men". He was put under housearrest after the war and the Secret Police recieved orders to execute him on notice if any treachery was suspected.

The same case with General Lao; again, he was not graduated from the Huangpu Academy and therefore did not belong to Jiang's inner circle.

Without doubt those men fought well. But my comments were directed at Jiang's troops and those generals whom he trusted.

 

I do not dispute the fact that German advisers trained about eight Chinese divisions in the early 1930's, and that these units later performed well in the defensive against Japanese forces.

What I object to is the implication that these German-trained units were the only "good" troops ever fielded by the Chinese during WW II. That is completely wrong.

By any reasonable definition of the term "Nationalist Chinese Army", the 22nd. and 38th. Chinese Divisions were part of that formation, regardless of how Chiang viewed the loyalty of the division commanders. And there is no disputing that these divisions fought well against the Japanese.

My point is that the supposed inferiority of Chinese troops had more to do with training, leadership, and most particularly, the political agenda of the high command, than any cultural or racial attributes of the private Chinese soldier. Furthermore, the German Army was not the only military capable of training effective Chinese Army units in the WW II period.

 

In simple mans terms, the Chinese Army was poorly equipped and lacked training. They basically took farmers, handed them a bunch of outdated weapons, and provided little to not training before sending them into combat. This doesnt touch on all the supply issues and what not.

Of course, there were several units that were well equipped and well trained and led by competent officers, but generally this was not the case.

 

This is an ancient thread but I thought I would add to this since I know quite a bit about actual KMT training "standards" back then.

Aside from what has already been mentioned (the patchwork equipment etc..) the discipline issues were serious. There were constant internal feuds between officers, provincial attitudes, corruption, and behavioral problems. There were a lot of young forced conscript soldiers (like my father) who were taken from destroyed cities, towns, villages, etc.. and handed a rifle and told to fight for one side. The Communists did the same mass recruitment but they enforced a system of rigid discipline, indoctrination, and esprit that was lacking in the KMT forces. It's no surprise that the biggest turncoats to the Japanese or some independent warlord faction came from the KMT side.

You also have to consider the environment they were in. There was barely any sort of organized boot camp or military training facility when the war was in full swing during the 30's. This means when they were confronted with the reality of war they were dreadfully unprepared.

Generals like Stilwell understood this and this is why he also didn't get along with Chiang Kai Shek because he viewed Chiang as a self interested politician and not much better than the warlords he was trying to unite. Stilwell was usually correct in his assessment but a lot of the problems were even beyond Chiang's personal faults.

 

Welcome to the forum "Cinematic", I missed your joining the other day so my welcome is a bit tardy. I hope you continue to add the Chinese perspective to our group.

 

I wouldn't quote Stillwell too much. Too many Americans studying the Chinese involvement during WWII read on his opinions and believe to be fact. Remember, these are just opinions.

 

The Japanese didn't use tanks the same way they were used in Europe. The British had problems in Malaya because they deemed the terrain unusable by tanks and so didn't have proper antitank.

The jungle was indeed almost impossible for tanks, but a favorite tactic of the Japanese was to send their tanks up along the road, break through the defence, and then set up a roadblock a mile or two behind the Allied position, and then surrounding the defenders by enveloping them with infantry moving through the jungle. The Allies couldn't retreat or support the defending troops due to the Japanese tanks blocking the road.