When Did The Germans Realize They Were Defeated? There was a book we were to read when I was back in graduate school that claimed the Nazi leadership realized the war was lost after Barbarossa failed. Utter poppycock, but it made me think. We all see Stalingrad as the turning point of the war in Europe. But when did the Germans realize that they had lost the war? This isn’t as simplistic a question as it first appears. Hitler (and Goebbels) didn’t admit defeat until late April 1945, but what about other people? Surely some officials must have seen the writing on the wall after Kursk? The July 1944 plot was done out of desperation: the plotters realized the war was lost. But what about other people? When was their realization, what events finally made them come to the conclusion that it was all over? What about Himmler or Goering? How about individual generals and admirals? Ordinary soldiers, sailors and airmen? Civilians?
I believe that the failure of Operation Barbarossa to invade both Moscow and Novgorod was when a few officers believed the end would be at a loss inevitably. However for most intelligent generals, like Rommel and Kesselring, when the Germans were finally put on their heels after the 2nd Battle of Alamein, which in turn lead to a quicker invasion of "Fortress Europe" in '43 than Hitler had expected. Also: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_were_the_major_turning_points_of_World_War_2
Hindsight tells us many things, so it´s easier for us to say when the war was lost really etc. I am sure the civilians were not really sure how the war was going as Göbbels was busy with his propaganda keeping the comvinced that they would win. Of course the bombers destroying cities tells a different story but probably Göbbels told that the V weapons did the same to the other side. Also one thing that seems to have mattered is that by Jan 1945 the frontline was actually almost the same as in Sept 1939 and many were still convinced that a trench warfare could be fought like 1915. In the OKW/OKH level: one must remember that Hitler was the only one who was briefed on matter on all fronts. So the total number of reserves, tanks, planes etc was not known by different commanders to separate fronts. They could not require properly for support as they did not know what was truly available. So the people did not know the facts, the generals did know the facts, only Hitler and his yes-men who kept telling lies. One nice example is Hitler´s desire to create new units instead of putting the new men to replace the dead and wounded in the old units. I recall someone calculated that according to the units in central Germany if in full men power, therw would have been up to 10 million men in Wehrmacht. So no surprise Hitler was "convinced" he could turn the tide... My two cents...
Kai is right, we have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight - and 'Germans' is very broad ( eg Hitler and his entourage, the OKW, the footsoldier, Joe Public etc). A tiny number obviously believed in victory until very near the end ( 'the Fuhrer's new wonder-weapons' etc...). Various Germans probably had doubts after many points such as the declaration of war on the USA, Alamein, and even the commencement of Barbarossa. But overall, my opinion is that the total disaster of Stalingrad really did make many in the armed forces, and many senior military and Nazi figures, realize that they were in very serious trouble and that Germany wouldn't just 'lose', but would suffer terrible retribution.
Agreed, Stalingrad seems to have been a turning point for many. I recall reading about the Finnish High Command that the Generals really started tallking that " Germany has lost the war now!".
I actually watched personal accounts of the common joes thinking they could still win the war when the Soviets were in Berlin. I'm sure the upper chain of command knew they were finished after Kursk.
"Luftwaffe boss Herman Goering admitted that when he saw the American bombers over Berlin in March, 1944, escorted by fighters he knew the war was lost." I am sure Herman kept his mouth shut at the time!
It depends to whom you are referring to. The intelligent ones would say when Hitler declared war on the US. That widened the Second Front. I think the general population would choose after the Stalingrad debacle.
I think you have hit the nail on the head here Ike. I too would imagine it "dawned" on different groups at differnt times. All the way to the very last there were some fanatics who fervently believed that Der Fuehrer could pull another "rabbit out of the hat". Some saw the war as being lost very early on, some never did. There were differnent times for different groups. On one of those Nazi Newsreel films I have been watching, Hitler claimed publically that the Stalingrad operation had been a resounding success! And with the strangle-hold Goebbels had on the media a great many of the German public probably believed it.
I remember seeing a quote from a German (officer I beleive) that said he knew they were in deep trouble in the aftermath of the battle at Kasserine pass. Had something to do with letters from home or supplies. I can't seam to find the quote.
It's the one where Hitler starts off saying some bs economic statistics, then he talks about "I'd rather fight in Stalingrad with small combat patrols because I don't want a second Verdun, time is not a factor, what matters is, "We have cut off the Volga!!!!" *obligatory grand applause*" There's also a battle of the bulge one where the newscaster claims after the first week that "1,600 US tanks have been destroyed by German firepower". LOL.
I forget which General said this, I believe it was Manstein ( correct me if im wrong here ). But after the loss at Stalingrad, he told Hitler that the war in the east could not be won.
That is exactly right, different groups at different times came to the realization that resources and time were not on Germany's side any more. A large part of the will to fight to the end was sured up from early 1944 to the very last day of battle by propaganda units dispersed through out the front lines. I saw an interview with one of the military propogandists who visited front line troops for that 13 month period and he described the process. He said that his group would usually address company size front line units and would start with a sing along of drinking tunes and army durges. Then he would address the troops and be brutal in his assesment of the current situation, he had to, to gain the trust of an army that has been in retreat for over a year you can not tell them things are stable or on the improve. Then he would introduce the light at the end of the tunnel. He would talk about the super weapon that had been whispered about in military ranks for the past two years and for all they knew was nearly complete and once unleashed would bring the allies to the negotiation table. But we have to hang on for that little bit longer and we have already sacrifised so much that to let it fall away when victory was possibly a few months away would be a tragedy. He said that he would also introduce the fear factor of Russian soldiers murdereing and raping their family back home. All in all a well conceived plan from Goebels office that wrenched the last drop of blood from the faithfull Vermacht plodder.
Correct. When Hitler took control of the Ost Front in 1942 and planned that crazy operation, case blue. Over all he spread his troops to far to fast over Europe.
Dusky just as a side line about the axis powers. When Mussolini was deposed and the Italians joined the ally's, Hittler was quoted as saying of the Italians "In two world wars they have started out on one side and ended up on the other, that shows their regard for honour". The fact that he sent paras to rescue Mussolini was a statement to the world that Hittler wanted to make about honour and commitment.
According to US intellegence reports the spirit of average German soldiers remained high well into the Battle of the Bulge, but after the Ardennes operation failed German morale cracked visibly. Verious troops fighting at different fronts and battles saw the inevitable at different times, but those at higher levels of command realized the impossibility of victory very early on. Different German generals came to the conclusion at 1942, 1943, 1944 and some at 1945 depending on how fanatical they were.
I don't think you'll find anyone prouder than I of the RAF's achievement in September 1940, but I'd be reluctant to say that losing the Battle of Britain made Germany as a whole realize that the war was lost. It was their first real setback and that was very important at the time ; but my opinion is that Germany saw it as more of a setback - that Britain could be 'marginalized' and dealt with later by blockade and aerial bombardment.