Performance of British and American armies

And, Dunnigan is wrong.

The vast bulk of the German military in WW 2 fought no better and often worse than their opponets in the West. (Russia is a different story and should be treated seperately. But here I'll just discuss the US and British)

The notion that a German soldier was statistically somehow better than his opponets man for man orginates with Trevor Dupuy in his book Numbers, Predictions, and War and his use of his Quantified Judgment Model, or QJM, that supposedly showed this statistically to be true. The model is nonsense and his results are sophmoric at best and largely irrelevant.

The Germans tactically tended to be as good or better than their opponets at platoon and company levels in most cases. At the battalion and regiment levels they tended to be inferior. At divisional and above they were significantly inferior to horrible by comparison (with Western armies).
There are several clear reasons for this:

1. The Germans were short on everything right from the start of the war. This meant that larger formations either had questionable equipment, inferior equipment, and/or shortages of equipment making them less viable as combat units.

2. The Germans tended to ignore the importance of engineering and logistics throughout their military. This meant there was a lot of wasteage of supplies, poor operational and strategic mobility and, often severe shortages of many types of material. This made larger German units less effective.

3. German military planning was marred badly by a combination of things. There was a tendency to focus on short-term operational goals while leaving grand strategic and strategic planning in a vague and often unrealistic set of generalities. No real thought was put into logistics and engineering in these plans. There were often "too many cooks" involved in making strategic and operational decisions. That is, the OKW also had the SS, Hitler, and his various inner circle all meddling in military operations often independent of each other.

4. The Germans improvised everything. This is a big one. The whole German military became more and more as the war went on one gigantic improvisation. The replacement system broke down by late 1942. March battalions were at that point being formed by simply rounding up all soldiers on leave, in rear areas, and such and sending them to the front to plug a hole. Divisions were committed peicemeal to stop Allied offensives. In the East in particular this was the norm not the exception.
There was no standard division orgainzation. Every division was almost unique in composition. Above battalion level the TO&E of the German army was nothing but an improvised collection of units in most cases.
"Divisions" were frequently thrown together later in the war simply by collecting the requsite number of troops at one location and calling the result a division. These units proved little more than speed bumps for the Allies.

Another thing that masks just how inferior the bulk of the German army was was their propensity to concentrate the best equipment and men into a relative handful of divisions. Thus, the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions got the cream of the manpower and equipment. Infantry divisions were left with the rest. Many of these later formations were no better trained or equipped than any US or British division at their worst. Most got reserve or landswehr officers with hardly more training initially than the infamous US "90 day wonders." These officers and nco's were not professional military men but civilians recalled to duty or draftees.
These units often had little transport, poor equipment often captures, and were generally used as garrison troops in quiet areas of the front. They generally proved marginally capable of combat when actually committed and frequently collapsed rapidly in heavy fighting.

It is interesting to note that against Western (eg., US and British) units no German infantry division proved capable of defeating one of their counterparts in combat with one exception during the war: The 18th VG versus 106th US infantry division in the Ardennes. And, that particular action might be best characterized as a fluke; a chance thing.

Basically, the Germans fought hard but not smart. Tactically, they were as good as their opponets but no better. Operationally, they were marginally inferior. Strategically, they were grossly inferior. It was this inability to carry out large scale warfare at the front and theater level that led to their defeat in WW 2.

 

T.A. Gardner, much of what you say is valid but perhaps some of it applies only to certain times, fronts and instances and not overall? Certainly Hitler's amateurish meddling often over-rode anything the excellent German General staff could do and caused many needless losses of men and territory. But if what you imply were totally true, how did the Germans manage to hold off vastly superior enemies on two fronts for almost a year after D-Day?

 

I have to agree that Hastings conclusions dont seem to be supported by facts. The Germans showed no greater ability to launch successful attacks in Normandy, both during their offensives against the Anglo-Canadian beachheads in the days immediately after D-Day and during their attacks on the US forces, highlighted the disastrous first attack by the Panzer Lehr on the US forces in late June 1944. The fact the Germans could be very effective on the defensive is not an indicator of the superiority of an armed forces, you cant win wars on the defensive.

The simple fact was that Normandy was a defensive mans war. The large concentration of forces combined with the small front meant the defender did have many weak zones, and once an attack began reserves could be quickly brought to bear on the point of attack, reducing any local superiority of enemy forces created through their buildup for the attack. The Germans are often lauded for containing the allies for almost 3 months, the thing most people who laud this aspect forget is the cost, 2 German armies routed with very heavy losses in man and almost complete heavy equipment losses, the loss of the rest of France in less than 2 weeks, and the capture of the largest port in all of europe (Antwerp) totally intact, a fact that heavy contriubted to the fall of Germany in 1945.

Ultimately what Hastings seems to ignore is the fact that numbers were proved in WWI to mean nothing in an attack as many of the slaughters showed. Numbers wont win a battle, but they can greatly assist the a side if they have competent and gifted leaders, as well as effective tactics and doctrine. The allies would not have won without competent leaders and effective tactics and doctrine. Numbers allowed them to overcome the difficulty in being an attacker fighting in a terrain that favored the defender at a time when the power of technology favored a defense, and as the liberating force the onus was on the allies to attack.

The German army was certainly a very lethal adversary and in several areas were probably better than allied armies (while in others were inferior), but I don't see how anyone can draw a conclusion from Normandy about the superiority of the German armed forces. They failed to throw the allies back into the sea when the bridgehead was at its weakest, and while they had many well known defensive victories, the allied forces had many of their own defensive victories to pin up next to the Germans.

 

The Germans really held nothing after D-Day......By December they were all but kicked out of France and Belgium. After Bastone/ Ardennes/ Bulge the German presented a delaying action at best. By February the German was defending Germany from well within the confines of the Rhine and by April they were fighting in the streets of Berlin.

SO I think it is safe to say that the German offensive capabilities had collapsed in the wake of D-Day.

Brad

 

Because of limitations the ALLIES had. The Germans did nothing to hold them up. All the Wehrmacht was after 6 June 1944 in the West was target practice.

The Allies landed in June. It took them approxmately 60 days to build up their forces and supplies for a breakout (August). They then launched their attack and began to form what became the Falaise pocket. The Germans in a desperate attempt to foil this launched their hasty Mortain counter attack. It failed miserably and was crushed in short order.
The Germans then lost the Falaise pocket and fell back a defeated army. The Allies rolled across France to the doorstep of Germany by November. There, they had to halt as they had completely out run their supplies. A second major amphibious landing in Southern France advanced just as far virtually unopposed.

At that point the Allies had to once again build up their supplies for another push. The British were busy clearing Antwerp and the Scheldt while the US was building railroads and pipelines across France.

The Germans in a desperate attempt to counter the Allies scrapped up the last of everything they had and launched the Ardennes offensive into a weakly screened portion of the US lines. 6th Panzer Army tried to attack into the relatively heavily held Eisenborn Ridge area only to find itself crushed in short order. 5th Panzer did better against the weakly held sector they attacked into. However, determined pockets of resistance and counter attacks into their front and flanks had all but destroyed this Army by Christmas just 2 or so weeks after the offensive started.
By January the US had recovered their losses. The Germans never would.

Hitler thought the Rhine would be a major barrier to the Allies and stop their advance for months. US engineering units, of which a battalion had more engineering equipment than a whole German Army's worth of construction troops, bridged it in a day. In one case, the 291st Engineer Battalion managed to bridge the Rhine three times in 24 hours!


In the East in June 1944 the Russians launched Bagration. They destroyed an entire Army Group representing about a quarter of the entire German army in the East in under a month. Advancing about 350 miles, they too ran out of supplies and halted. It took them another three months (November roughly) to advance again; this time to the doorstep of Berlin.

The Germans fougth hard on both fronts but their efforts were futile. They stopped nothing. At best they slowed things down in minor ways.

In the Mediterrainian, they did no better from October 1942 on. Yes, they scored some tactical victories like Kasserine Pass or the Rapido River in Italy but these were short-lived and largely meaningless victories much like most of Rommel's had been up to Alamein.
The Germans failed completely on Sicily. They failed miserably at Salerno. They failed at Anzio.
Each time it was the shortages in amphibious and merchant ships, landing craft, and the means to move armys over vast oceans that slowed the Western Allies more than anything. They simply could not place the majority of their land power when and where they needed it quickly.
But, their efforts were beyond German comprehension completely. Remember that German officer in The Longest Day? "Those five thousand ships you say the Allies don't have?!! They have them!!" as his bunker is pummelled by naval gunfire.

Just think: The US spent the equivalent of a year of Germany's GDP (the entire production of everything in Germany for a year) on just the battle of the Atlantic in escort ships. The US Navy had more engineering troops (SeeBees) than the Wehrmacht. The US gave the French the equivalent of 12 divisions worth of material by 1945.

Think about what if the Allies were not fighting the Pacific War. How much more "stuff" would be available to deal with the Germans? Thousands more aircraft. Dozens more mechanized divisions.
Could you imagine for a moment the USMC making the D-Day landings in LVT and LVT(A)? They would have overrun the German defenses in a few hours even on Ohama beach. Coming ashore in amphibious armored personnel carriers that could take the troops right up to the sea wall and armed with many times the machineguns and cannon.

When you really think about it, the only thing holding the Allies back is their own limitations in getting to the battlefield. The Germans are just target practice.

 

In my opinion the Allied armies did splendidly. They managed to defeat the germans with a low cost in human lives.

The Germans were supersoldiers and kicked Limey and Yank butt movement is not a result of a long study.

At the lower levels Coy and Bn. The Germans had a distinct advantage in the ammount of firepower, (and number of men.) (UK Rifle Platoon 3 Brens, 5 Stens 29 Lee Enfield, US Platoon 41 men with 3 BAR's and the rest with semi automatic weapons, German Platoon Originally 49 men but reduced to trangular formations of 33 men. But with 6 LMGs (9 for mech infantry) the firepower was larger than both UK and US.)

This was countered by having support units to aid the advancing units. The Allies fought asymetrically and it worked. 200,000+ men surrendered in Tunis. And in Normandy the same haul was done over. That is TWO Stalingrads. And people call this poor soldiering...?

The tales about the massive artillery strikes in Normandy also encompass the many nebelwerfer batteries. However this is conveniently forgotten by some.

Another issue is the numerical superiority in Normandy. 1.25 for the Canadian and British, Polish forces in the eastern sector. I am not sure about the US sector.

If you look at the autumn campaign into the lowcountries and later in the winter into germany, there are many references in unit diaries that counter the preachings of Hasting.

 

The German infantry divisions in mid-1944 didn't even have full motorization or attached tank destroyer/tank battalions for support. Their artillery and infantry were often resupplied by horses and hand carts.

The German Panzer divisions had only part of their artillery self-propelled. The Panzer regiments and infantry regiments rarely got significant material or personnel reinforcements after heavy action while Allied units often would.

They weren't even playing the same game.

 

Here's one example, from The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 5:

This refers to the early September period. One should consider that many German divisions were in a shaky state at this time. However, I believe the Allied divisional total did not exceed that of the Germans until some time in 1945, for what that is worth.

As far as Hastings goes, his works have passages where he has done his homework well and, unfortunately, other passages where he has no idea of what he is writing about. His comments about the French Army of Liberation in Armageddon are rent with false statements and a complete misunderstanding of the different components of the French Army during the campaign in NW Europe, although I don't doubt that he believed what he wrote.

Cheers

BW

 

abuot the germans being supersoldiers that kick british and americans butts!

thee british and americans were never prepared like thee german soldiers were.
thee germans had years of preparing for ww2 while briton was trying to avoid a conflict,therefore when germany did sarte thee war off,the british soldiers were not ready like thee germans soldiers was.
for thee yanks,it was this,america was not expecting to join ww2,so thee american soldiers was never trained to full compasity like thee german soldiers were,but,if briton and america thought differtly and wanted to fight this war frome thee very start 1933 and prepared like germany was doing,i think thee brits and americans cuold have matche thee super german soilders.

 

By 1944 the Allied soldiers had absorbed most of the lessons learned of earlier campaigning. The tight planning of the Normandy campaign is a clearcut example of good soldiering. The outrageous claims of Hasting can be easily denounced by the following.

All of the examples supporting "up the germans" are from Pz, Pz grenadere or SS formations against regular allied formations. That means that the regular allied formations are battling fully equipped formations with a much better TOE than a regular Heer formation.

The Villers Bocage is portraid as a regular occurance. And the 5,6,7-1 ratio of Shermans to knock out a tiger or panther cannot be backed up.


The notion of super soldier in the Heer is as much a myth as the French beeing useless.

 

i cant remember the site,but i recall reading an article concening the brit.8th ind armd bde.it said that the bde lost approx 120 tanks over a certain period.the bde claimd approx 80 german tanks assault guns destroyed during the same period.draw your own conclusions,cheers.

 

British tanks not having strong armor plus having the onus of being the attacker. Pretty obviously conclusion except for those who need to wank themselves unconscious over k/ds to determine superiority. The simple fact is the allies were always going to lose more tanks given the Germans had the first shot advantage from being on the defensive, men tool. The fact the allies came out of Normandy inflicting twice the casualties on the German army (including the 200,000 POWs) says much about how successful the campaign was for the Western Allies.

 

I think Allied personnel losses were actually higher until the German front collapsed in Normandy. But you have to weigh all factors enjoyed by the Allies- total air supremacy, a consistently clear picture of the battlefield thanks to air recon, artillery and armor numerical superiority. Not to mention, besides the 11-12 or so motorized or armored German divisions, the majority of the German units were second or third rate troops with inadequate armament and were either poorly trained and/or recently shattered on the Eastern front. As I stated before, these grenadier, static, etc. units had low mobility and lower combat value due to their light equipment.

I think Hasting's comment is about the Allies "punching below" their weight class. I do not know if his observations are accurate or not, I did not read his writing in detail.

 

If you count in German POW's following D-Day up through say, November, the German losses were more on the order of 5 to 1. That ratio does not reflect well on German military prowess at all.

 

Quality of the German soldier doesn't apply as much when you consider the roll of indirect fire in the battle. British reports credited german mortars and rocket fire as the single largest casualty causer in the Normandy campaign for their troops, I had read at lowest estimate 50% of casualties caused by shrapnel, and even to an astounding 80% of all casualties caused by shrapnel. The quality of many German formations is not necessarily important when a man simply needs to call into a radio to drop mortar rounds on a predesignated mortar zone as allied troops cross into it. As well you dont need a particularily well trained and fit young man to sit in a hole or position and shoot at advancing troops. Quality of the German troops is a better explinator for the lack of success the Germans had when they went on the offensive both during larger operations (Bridgehead counter attacks, Mortain, local counter attacks on recently captured objectives etc) if it tells anything about Normandy.

 

Of course the attackers would take heavier casualties than the defenders! War isn't a game of foot ball with rules and well-matched numbers. Historically this was true of every real war!

I can understand in certain situations the Germans could be said to have better combat infantrymen then the allies--this many soldiers and historians at the time acknowledged. But this isn't classical Greek and Roman warfare. We're talking about tanks, artillery, airplanes. When those factors are considered, the German infantry and panzer divisions were without a doubt inferior to their allied counterparts in combat power. Allied veteran and elite divisions were far more dangerous than their green comrades, of course, and had proved themselves time after time in combat. Mind to explain how did the 2d AD blast through the 2d SS Pz Div in mobile battle and ripped the latter to bloody ribbons?

And, as T. A. Gardner noted, the Germans had never successfully broke an American infantry division in ETO--not with panzers, not with grenadiers. The 106th ID was an exception, but put a German formation in their boots and I expect them to be exterminated in the first day.

 

It's hard to say. The French, Poles and Soviets generally suffered higher human and material losses during the German offensive victories of 1939-1942. For instance, more Soviet troops were KIA/WIA during the German assault on Fortress Sevestapol- and this was no battle of maneuver but a hard effort against fixed emplacements and defenders with pre-orchestrated kill zones. In fact, the Germans, for the exception of places like Stalingrad, seemed to suffer heavier losses in the defensive rather than on the attack.

Another example is Kursk- the Germans inflicted disproportionate losses on the Soviets when they attacked pre-conceived defense zones but suffered far greater losses when their advance halted and were forced on the defensive by the inevitable Soviet counterattack.

 

But it still takes tactical skill to fix the enemy into a particular kill zone and maximize their losses. And it takes good mobility to get out of danger areas or be inserted into critical areas, etc.

I think it is important to stress that the German formations were mostly unmotorized formations with limited equipment, training, and counterattack capability. These troops would simply do less damage per capita and generally be capable of less.

There was a big difference in the defensive capabilities of German parachute and armored infantry compared to the other units. This is partially of course, due to their higher TOE, mobility, and training levels but these units tended to not melt away in the defense like the unmotorized formations did. 3. FG division, a light infantry outfit, was noted by the Americans for its high defensive and offensive skills not to mention stronger artillery supported by a double concentration of mortars & machineguns.

 

wokelly,watch your language,i dont think WANK is an appropriate word to use in threads.

 

But every example that show the "fearsome" fighting capabilities of the german army is from Mech/Pz/Fallschirm units fighting ordinary allied units/fluke encounters.

It would be the same as saying that the US army was the best in defence and point to the AB divisons during the Bulge.

There was nothing superiour about the germans. Nothing. During the early days of the war they fought nations that were not mobilised, and/or had not a modern concept of war. ALL nations in europe bar USSR and Germany had low priority on their armed forces before the war. The various nations were coping with the effects of the great depression and the contempt for politicians that followed.

Anyone can win the Indy 500 if they start the day before everyone else.

By 1942 the British were reaching germanys 1939 level in training conscrips, (this was a 'forgotten' technique since they had a regular army) the progress throughout the army, much due to the sterling work at schools such as at Bernards castle, was starting to pay dividends. The useless officers had been given other assignments and younger, fitter men was given the chance.

The British army of 1944 was a splendid weapon. Blanced all arms formations that could dish out and take heavy punishment, working tightly with the other branches.

Some of the equipment was not good enough, but they got down to it and knocked the Germans right of their f***ing perch.

Side by side with the US army, that had expanded enormously, they marched into the heart of germany and brought freedom to half of europe.