Barbarossa aims only for Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic

My hypothesis is that Hitler decides to limit his war with Russia to more realistic goals, annexing significant areas of the soviet union without actually trying to topple the entire regime. I will first argue this was ideologically possible, then that it had practical appeals and then some thoughts.

First and foremost, it must remain totally speculative because Hitler was solely responsible for taking decisions at this level and he rarely shared his specific thoughts. The only real rein on Hitler was the likelihood of his generals and staff to remove him as his schemes became more and more ambitious (was Sealion ever realistic? Yet only one man called the shots on that one and had he given the order, only Hitler's removal from power would have stopped it). We can, however, look at Hitler's ideology to gain a picture of what he could have potentially done. So why did Hitler invade the Soviet Union? Firstly, the desire of Lebensraum, annexing the east to take resources from supposedly subhuman slavs and give it to the supposedly more deserving Aryans. This would also elevate Germany to an elite club of great nations, the requirement being colonies. Mien Kamph clearly outlines this. Crucially though, Hitler only talks of expansion towards the east, not total colonization of Russia. Given that the Ukraine was the breadbasket of Russia, it is unclear why he needed to go further for farm land. I'm uncertain if Hitler also demanded oil from his empire but I suspect any hope for oil from the east would have focused upon the Romanian Ploisti oil fields, not the Baku oil fields under Russian control. Given that Romanian came under German influence pre Barbarossa, this is also compatible with his ideology. Limiting his goals to the Ukraine would have been enough for the Lebensraum and resources his ideology demanded.


He also invaded Russia because of his hatred of Communism. This is somewhat more tricky but I don't see anything within his ideology which suggests the total destruction of Communism. Of course, Hitler hated communism but he also respected it greatly also. He clearly saw that both Communism and Nazism mobilized the people, gave them an identity and a purpose which was completely lacking from the supposedly decadent democracies. Hitler clearly states his methodology borrowed ideas from the Communists in Germany, the rallies, focus on ideology, propaganda, ect. Hitler only hated their goals, to transcend culture and identity, precisely what Hitler valued. So Hitler certainly took action against them in Germany but given that the Russians were supposedly subhuman it is unclear that his ideology demanded complete conquest of Russia. As an simple example, Hitler supposedly remarked that he'd have Churchill and Roosevelt executed but not Stalin. The destruction of Communism was not demanded by his ideology.


A third reason for invading Russia was Hitler's belief that war was intrinsically good and promoted racial health. Something I've always wondered is who'd be the enemies without Russia? If Hitler both wanted a thousand year Reich and continuos warfare, who's the opponent after Russia? Hitler's long term goals were making peace with Britain (or possibly their surrender) and then the showdown with America. These I feel were temporary goals to exert Germany's supremacy, not some long term crusade. Hitler had expressed great admiration of the British with their empire and the belief that some of the best racial stock of Europe had emigrated to America. They certainly were not the supposedly subhuman eastern hordes who Aryan German's history and therefore destiny was intertwined. With Russia also out the picture, who then becomes the eternal enemies? The slavs were not only the supposed historic enemy, communism elite was also supposedly Jewish. This made them the ultimate enemy. If Hitler wanted the German empire to be continually at war, I can think of nothing better than the neighbouring supposedly Jewish ruled, communistic and supposedly subhuman slavs.


So why did Hitler invade Russia? To force Britain out of the war, isolate them into submission. This had to be done quickly before America got involved, especially since Hitler foresaw a showdown with America in the future. Therefore, I believe that full invasion of Russia was contingent upon two factors. Firstly, the preferred means of finishing the war with Britain quickly. However, Hitler had other options open. Someone (Donitz?) suggest a Mediterranean strategy, defeat British interests in the Mediterranean to make their position far more isolated. Hitler could have easily chosen this and then this limited Barbarossa in 1942, or even both in 1941. Neither would be more ambitious than sealion or the actual Barbarossa. Secondly, this entire need for hurrying was determined by Hitler's concern over America. I'm uncertain what drove this. American public opinion was not particularly pro war until Pearl Harbour meanwhile I'm uncertain why Hitler placed so much importance upon a showdown with America. I suspect this is largely the randomness and lack of consistency within Hitler's mind, so I'll also call this purely contingent. Therefore, I've hopefully shown that Hitler's ideology was compatible if not more suited to a limited war with Russia. Secondly, that purely contingent factors determined the actual goals of Barbarossa, firstly in that alternative options were possible to achieve Hitler's goals and those goals themselves depended upon Hitler's vision of the future geopolitical landscape involving a showdown with America, also purely contingent. Therefore, while no direct documentation exist to show that Hitler considered a more limited war with Russia, it certainly fits his ideology and that the reasons for embarking upon the actually full scale Barbarossa were largely Hitler's rather random concerns about Germany's position in the world ten years hence.


I will now cover the practical reasons. These have probably been discussed many times before. Most obviously, the logistical advantages. I believe there was about a 500 mile limit to logistical operations before they became extremely difficult (I forget the exact reason why) and Moscow lay significantly beyond that. Secondly, many of the out lying territories were not particularly pro Russian or pro communist (certainly not Ukraine anyway), reducing partizan resistance and making eventual administration far easier. The economic advantages have already been covered, the Ukraine is the primary goal and beyond that is of limited value. Finally, limited operational goals would still allow a substantial increase in operational range of bombers, such as bombing rather than capturing the Baku oil fields.


The general view both on these boards and (from what I understand) amongst Hitler's generals was that defeating Russia was not likely to succeed. What then made the generals agree to a plan seemingly so foolish in retrospect? The winter war I suspect, Russia at first being embarrassingly defeated by Finland. This suggested the Russian military was far weaker than originally suspected. This was also largely contingent. Finland could have agreed to Russian demands or, given that they Russians did eventually win, the war could have easily gone more in Russia's favour. Had Russia not had such a humiliation, a limited war against Russia was probably far more likely. Also, consider that rescuing Mussolini's attack on Greece delayed Barbarossa by six weeks. Given the threat of the Russian winter, having more limited goals was certainly advised for a 1941 attack.


I suggest then that during 1941 Barbarossa is limited to the Ukraine for its resources and also Belorussia and the Baltic states for the obvious strategic reasons of not over extending the flanks. There is no reason to believe the Russian military would have any greater success. Having achieved his goals and destroyed most of the russian armies, Hitler then demands surrender, hoping for a repeat of the generous peace won against the Russian communists in world war one. First question, does Stalin except it? Fearing the destruction of his country, he very well might have, but given his rather extreme personality, I doubt it. I do not know how great a hope he had for Russian military victory though, which is the crucial matter. Second question, if Stalin did accept peace, would Churchill also have to? That probably solely depends upon American involvement, if pearl harbour had happened and they were in the war, even if Germany hadn't declared war on them. Third question, would the Japanese have attacked America with the Soviets out the war? I see no reason why not, but know I little about Japanese long term plans. Fourthly, would Hitler declare war on America if pearl harbour then did still happen? I think so, as he though war against America would happen as so might as well do it with the Japanese as allies. So if Stalin accept peace I suspect war between American and Japan still happens. Churchill then still remains defiant on the hope of America declaring war on Germany, so Hitler does not have the advantage of getting Churchill out the war and may as well declare war on America to fight America with the Japanese as his allies.


What happens if, as I suspect, Stalin fights on? Russian industry was undergoing a modernisation program in 1941, Stalin hoped for a 1942 war. Therefore, Stalin would come closer to his wish than in reality, suggesting to me the Russian position would be strengthened and so they'd still win the war. This is assuming that the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States were not crucial the modernisation efforts, not that he used them in reality anyway given that they fell to the Germans. Otherwise, Russian industry would still keep developing, resulting in greater industrial output than in reality and so the war going more in their favour. That said, had the Germans been less ambitious they would have been more successful. They would have had been generally more efficient due to the better logistical situation, making them a more powerful opponent. Also, no disastrous retreat from Moscow. More importantly, not loosing the 6th army at Stalingrad or wasting so much time and effort at the Baku oil fields for no useful result. Therefore, both Russian and Germany military might and efficiency would be increased. I'm uncertain who would ultimately be victorious between the two. With the western allies involved though, Germany's days were probably still numbered, but I suspect the war would have gone on longer either way.

 

The real problem with the concept of limited objectives in World War II is that limited wars only work if both sides want a limited war. It could be argued that it was the strategy of the Axis countries to achieve their goals with a series of limited operations designed to chip away at the economic superiority of opposing "democracies" until the Axis had been strengthened enough to challenge the rest of the world for all the marbles. This was essentially what happened in Europe with Germany's rearmament and incremental acquisition of territory, and a similar sequence of events of events was involved in Japan's course in Asia.

The problem was that in pursuing this strategy, the rest of the world saw the consequences of allowing it to happen and became alarmed enough to resolve not to let it happen. The turning point was the summer of 1940, when France Fell and Britain withdrew it's army from the European continent. The United States, though still hoping to avoid war, began a serious rearmament program (the Two Ocean Navy Act and the Army Rearmament Act) and entered into a political and military commitment to sustain an independent Britain. After that point, no matter what happened, the US was going to oppose further Axis expansion as a threat to it's continued existence. There was virtually no possibility of a "limited war" after that. Britain came to a similar conclusion about the same time, and I would argue that the Soviets held a fundamental belief, after June 1941, that it could not coexist with Hitler's Germany.

This concept can be demonstrated by comparing the war plans of Japan and the US. Japan's strategy was to acquire territory whenever the opportunity presented itself. A successful war with China gave them the island of Taiwan. Britain's desire for an ally in Asia to block Russia's imperialistic ambitions, allowed Japan to annex Korea. As a result of WW I and Japan's alliance with Britain, the German Pacific possessions fell into Japan's lap. Next, Japan invaded and annexed Manchuria, gambling that no country was sufficiently interested to oppose the move. Then, emboldened by that success, Japan determined to subjugate most of China. China, however, resisted and forced Japan into an unexpectedly difficult struggle which required a more robust economy and access to additional sources of raw materials, most notably oil. This development required Japan to seize territory held by the western "democracies". Japan formulated a plan which, it hoped, would present the West with a fait accompli in a limited war which would be settled at the negotiating table and leave Japan with the raw materials it needed to continue it's policy of forcible territorial acquistion.

The US, on the other hand, recognized the ultimate threat Japan's policy represented to it's own interests and refused to settle for a limited war. The US war plans specifically envisioned a three phase war; the initial phase would be the attack by Japan on the US's western Pacific territories, which, in all probability would be captured. The second phase would be a slow US advance across the Pacific from Hawaii to capture advanced bases from which forces would be launched to destroy the Japanese Navy and retake lost US territory. The final phase would be a blockade and air and naval bombardment of Japan itself which would end in the total defeat of that country.

When Japan joined the Axis in September, 1940, the Roosevelt administration already realized that Germany and Japan represented a significant threat to democracies, in general, and had already resolved that total defeat of the Axis was the only solution to that threat. Contrary to what most people believe, the question of US entry into the war was not "if", but only "when", and the question of how it would end was not "who" would win, but "how long" would it last. Neither Britain, the Soviet Union, nor the US were willing to allow a limited war with the Axis; Axis defeat would be total and surrender unconditional. There would be no question of an Axis country retaining any territory other than it's national heartland. Hitler never had the remotest possibility of fighting a "short" nor "limited" war because his enemies wouldn't allow it.

 

Hitler, according to Speer's book, is said to have referred to the war against the Soviets as "Child's play" in early 1941. He also considered the US to be incapable of true total war because they were a "massive collection of races", rather than a "unit" like the Germans.

 

Well, the title was "

Von Rundstedt argued from the beginning that SU could not be defeated in one year and that all operations had to be paused in October 1941 due to approaching winter and prepare for Russian winter counter offensive. In hindsight this was absolutely correct as Germans would have avoided the biggest losses during November/December 1941 during which they haven't gained much territory anyway.

Because of that Hitler could launch 2 Army Groups in 1942 on Moscow and Stalingrad instead of one on Stalingrad. The attacks would have began during May/June 1942 which would therefore see collapse of Moscow as it was only 200 or so miles away as opposed to Stalingrad which was ... 600 miles ?

 

I was thinking we might tune historical references and then work from there.

Okay, Barbarossa. First, Stalin fully expected the German attack to be centred on the "Breadbasket" and concentrated the bulk of his reserves in the Ukraine.
Under Hitler's direct instruction, Gen.Halder took the Wehrmacht strategic doctrine (ie. tactical emphasis on siege breaking technique for strategic objectives) to new heights, the attack into the Ukraine was postponed for two weeks whilst the bulk of the Panzerdivisonen moved ahead with the main attack north of the Pripet marshes.
Part of the initial success of Barbarossa was this strategy and even to the surprise of the oberkommando, it snowballed into a winning streak of unfathomable proportion.

Now, Hitler. Oh boy I've been spending a life time studying this man who had such impact on my family, the wholly destructive force that he was. Put me in a time machine please God, I'd like to take him apart with my bare hands. When I told my grandmother as a child I thought he was insane I almost got a slap across the face and never heard the end of that for a few years...yet I am conflicted, she really was a good German.

Lebensraum was Hitler's take on Versailles. The Treaty took all the pan-German imperial territories to the east, divided them up and cast them haphazardly between indigenous cultures without any recognition. Serbs in with Croats, Bohemians with Pomeranians, Protestants under Catholic government. The first thing they did was start fighting over the new borders. In Hitler's mediaeval fantasy related to the defunct Holy Roman Empire, Germanic territories were absconded and the peasants were revolting.
From the point of view of central Germania the Treaty took territory and imposed political ideology and economic vacuum so that the German felt less "head space" in cultural terms to what existed before, even though the authoritarian Prussian rulership was strictly a dictatorship. Lebensraum was an allegory for "cultural head space," it is an ideological term far more than a physical descriptor.

His racial views weren't really tied to race at all, but to political culturing or folk movements. He identified the evils of Marxism and industrialism were at the core a result of the Jewish religion, hence his almost schizophrenic aversion to communists and capitalists alike, parliamentarianism another pet hate. All Jewish conspiracies in his mind.

So firstly, Hitler's real enemy within the League of Nations was Jewry as he put it. His objectives for greater Germany were the reinvigorated establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. He only wanted Prussia back, and the original German and Austrian Empires handed over as far as territory went. But the war was fought against Jewry who were the enemy to be defeated, whatever it took. You might say his political ideology would be satisfied by the sacking of Moscow, destruction of communist government in the USSR and no further territorial gains than existed in early 1941, given that a series of satellite states remained at the eastern border. Of course British Parliament would also require a good killing but the Brits themselves were a-okay.

Now it gets interesting. Real life governments are run by economic necessity and Germany's was somewhat more than presently available. Now we get to the point. Hitler got the support of the military.
My steadfast contention is the military leadership was the driving force behind Barbarossa, not Hitler. It was the price of their support and close enough to his ideals to be almost synonymous. But it was economic need which drove the Barbarossa invasion and not Nazi policy. That the Nazis used this as a forum for ideological warfare is academic, though heart rending and shocking in the extreme.

Nazi purpose in the USSR was a severe blow towards the destruction of Jewish conspiracy in Europe. Wehrmacht purpose was industrial pragmatism, plain and simple. They virtually ignored the politics and acted just like a professional military would.
But I dare say the Prussian General Staff indeed only had the Ukraine and Belarus in mind for actual achievements. Hitler just wouldn't stop, the monster unleashed. I think OKH would've wanted to sue for peace like the Japanese intended, after achieving significant gains.

 

It doesn't matter what Hitler, or the Wehrmacht, intended or wanted to do in Russia, neither the Soviets nor the Western Allies were going to allow the Germans to dictate the course, length, or scale of the war. The Soviets, the British, and the Americans all realized that the Axis was a threat to peaceful countries and had to be thoroughly destroyed, it's member countries reduced abject surrender. The same applied to Japan. No matter what Hirohito and the Japanese militarists intended in terms of a "limited" war, it had always been the intent of the United States to crush Japan once and for all. That much can be seen in the versions of the famous "War Plan Orange", all of which ended in the destruction of the Japanese navy and a blockade and bombardment of the Home Islands leading to a Japanese surrender.

Hitler and Hirohito might have sued for peace once their objectives had been met, but after the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and the German atrocities in European Russia, neither the Soviets nor the Americans were going to negotiate or grant any peace short of unconditional surrender.

 

This scenario only works if the the new nazi overlords of the conquered lands avoid mass murder, rape, deportation, asset stripping etc in their new domains.While they might behave in the Baltics, I cannot see this happening in Belorussia and Ukraine eventhought it makes perfect sense. The ethos of the nazi underlings does not allow this to happen and instead they would just alienated the population and drive the into the Soviet camp. Also from a purely military point of view the Baltic states are too shallow to defend, a determined Soviet attack would easily cut them off.

 

Even if Hitler did accomplish his goal of taking those 3 areas, the Russians were not about to just let that go. In war, it is a fight to the death. Look at the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf conflicts. Each had limited objectives and each had recurring conflicts. Stalin was not about to just sit back just because the Germans stopped their advance. The Germans would have a life long enemy staring them down. This strategy is something that would not work.

 

Exactly!

While the objectives from a military standpoint are achievable, holding them is another story.

 

I'm in agreement with the general theme on this board but I'd be interested in looking at some of the specific instances. Axis strategy was building economic power through limited territorial gains. After Czechoslovakia this became clear to the British and hence war over Poland, the allies realizing they ultimately had the greater economic forces and so would prevail given a lengthy enough war.

I think Churchill certainly advocated that policy no matter what happened. However, how much political power would he have had though, if the Soviet Union did make peace with Germany? Would the cabinet and the country still have supported his desire to continue the war, especially if the Germans offered a reasonable truce? And if they didn't could he still have convinced them to fight on?

America is also an interesting question. Roosevelt certainly was quietly moving weight upon war with Germany. I see no reason why he still wouldn't have done so even had peace occurred between Stalin and Hitler. My concern is American public opinion. It was also moving towards favouring war with Germany but still had some distance to go before declaring war became viable. Would peace in Europe (given that it's largely now under Nazis rule in this What If) have derailed that progression? Crucially, would Hitler still have declared war on America if the Soviet Union was out the war? And would have Pearl Habour have actually happened without the Soviet Union in the war? Without either or both these events, would America still have ultimately declared war on Germany?

The most interesting candidate is Stalin. Given the continual disasters for Russia throughout the majority of Barbarossa, would Stalin have accepted peace? Tactically speaking, it might have been sound if he believed Moscow or Leningrad would fall that winter, but I've no idea how confident he was. Secondly, does anyone know how great a role he played in settling peace with the Germans after world war one, given that the conditions of the peace treaty really were very extreme? If you accept that Stalin wished to put his revolution first then I could see substantial compromises on his part.


My own thoughts are that Churchill and Roosevelt certainly wanted nothing short of complete liberation of Europe and would do so through greater economic strength. In reality, Stalin also joined this plan heavily. However, this might be slightly coincidental. Consider that he (well, Molotov) signed the Nazis Soviet non aggression pact. He only saw the western allies as tools to further his own aims of preserving his country. However, he though that actually they were using him, trying to force war between Germany and Russia to avoid fighting Germany themselves. He joined the allies and their plan to completely liberate Europe because it suited his aims at that moment, he was not an integral player in the way Churchill and Roosevelt were. If, in October or November, when America was still out the war and Britain was only fighting in North Africa, accepting peace if it preserved his power, Communism, Leningrad and Moscow seems realistic to me. But this he'd only do if he thought he'd lose the war at that point, which I simply don't know about.


If Stalin and Hitler did make peace, what happens next depends upon America I think. If Roosevelt and Churchill convince their countrys to follow their long term strategy then Russia will eventually re-enter the war with new forces and the war goes against German, much as it did. However, if peace between Hitler and Stalin somehow stops America entering the war, then even Churchill and Stalin combined surely no longer have the long term economic advantage, hence the long term strategy favoured by the allies simply would no longer work.

 

United States entry into the war against the Axis did not, after June, 1940, depend on the Soviet Union being in the war against Germany. Roosevelt had enough domestic political support for war against the Axis, as shown by the massive military spending programs that Congress approved in the summer of 1940. The Two Ocean Navy Act was the turning point in Roosevelt's crusade to convince the American public that the US was going to have to fight, and possibly alone, at that. Not only was the US Navy launching a massive construction program, but the US Army and Army Air Force were also spending similar amounts to rearm. This was a year before Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and two months before Japan joined the Axis.

It's a common error to think that American isolationists would have prevented Roosevelt from going to war against the Axis; this is NOT the case. Isolationists were against getting involved in a war ONLY if there was no threat to the US; By mid-1940, it was becoming obvious that Germany and the Axis WERE a long term threat to the US. Japan's signing the Tripartite Pact in September, 1940, reinforced that feeling. So it made no difference whether the Soviet Union made an independent peace or even if it had never been invaded; either event simply would have increased US anxiety over Axis intentions.

As for Pearl Harbor, it had nothing to do with whether the Soviets were at war with Germany; it's roots were in the Japan-China conflict, and US determination to thwart Japanese military expansion in Southwest Asia and the Pacific. Japan still badly needed oil to continue it's policy of military aggression in China. It tried negotiating with the NEI for access to it's oil, but German occupation of the Netherlands and Japan's joining the Axis were instrumental in scuttling that approach; the NEI refused to sell oil to any country which might resell it to Germany. The only other options were to withdraw from China, which Japan was not about to do, or use military force to seize the oil. Use of force to seize the oil involved the risk that the US would use it's position in the Philippines to block transit of the oil to Japan, so the Philippines had to be taken. too. That caused the Japanese planners to think the Pacific Fleet had to be neutralized because they did not realize that the US had agreed that Germany was to be defeated first and that the strategy in the Pacific was to stand on the defensive until that had been accomplished.

So the US was spending the money and preparing to fight a two-front world war from mid-1940 on. The Soviets making a hypothetical peace with the Germans would simply reinforce Roosevelt's hand domestically, just as the fall of France did in 1940. Neither the American public, nor the Roosevelt administration was dumb enough to think that Hitler was going to change his ways simply because he declared a temporary peace, or that Japan would renounce military aggression short of being totally crushed.

 

Again, good points raised, DA. To add a little perspective, I'll add a little on the isolationists based from the perspective of that era. This is from a book I have compiling past issues of Time magazine.

This is entitled "Objection" and written on May 27, 1940.

Up from the midst of the current rose the voice of Colonel Charles Augustus Lindbergh.
"We are in danger of war today not because European people have attempted to interfere with the internal affairs of America, but because we American people have attempted to interfere with the internal affairs of Europe. Our danger in America is an internal danger. We need not fear a foreign invasion unless American peoples bring it on through their own quarreling and meddling with affairs abroad.
"Above all, let us stop this hysterical chatter of calamity and invasion that has been running rife these last few days. The only reason that we are in danger of becoming involved in this war is because there are powerful elements in America who desire us to take part. They seize every opportunity to push us closer to the edge."
As Lindbergh's voice died away, the New York Times retorted:
Colonel Lindbergh is a blind young man if he really believes that we can live on terms of equal peace and happiness 'regardless of which side wins this war' in Europe. Colonel Lindbergh remains a great flier."

Here's another, dated Dec. 23, 1940 on the creation of the America First Committee.
According to the article, the group concluded in a meeting with the National Association of Manufacturer in Manhattan that:
1. Germany cannot invade America even if Britain falls.
2. The US can and will do business with the Nazis even if necessary to cartelize the trade.
3. If the US convoys British shipping, that act "is sure to put us in the conflict."

To go back to the topic, I'll add my voice to the view that it was highly unlikely that Germany could remain focused on limited war aims for long once it invaded the Soviet Union. Stalin and Hitler distrusted each other and once blood is shed, their massive egos would induce them to a game of one-upmanship. And that means an escalation of the war. Well, that's what I think. How about you guys?

 

I think you mean Lenin here not Stalin.


In regards to Leningrad, the Germans first try to storm the city, then shell it into submission and then ultimately starve in out, nothing worked. Leningrad simply wasn't falling. What else could the Germans have done?

 

if barbarossa went that way germany would have had total control over oil in that area