Japanese Night Tactics

Hi All,

The Japanese were well trained for night battle at sea which became very evident at Guadalcanal.

Years ago, I participated in a thread in a newsgroup detailing specifically the night fighting techniqes used by the Japanese. Although well over 20 specific techniques were listed, I only remember 3:

1. Visually looking for the flash from enemy ships firing their guns.
2. Visually following a moving vessel by noting the disappearance and reappearance of stars in the background as the shipped moved through the sky.
3. Using smaller water crafts launched from ships and taken to various parts of the battle area to observe conditions. The motors would be periodically turned off so that the sailors could listen for the engines of enemy war vessels in the area.

So if you guys would like to, please continue this list.

Note that this list should also include methods used to maintain their own knowledge of the disposition of their own warships.

Thank you,

Bob Guercio

 

I don't know many... any at all, actually, instead of looking for the flash of the enemy's cannons and stuff, which is kinda obvious...

 

And a little more, here:
VII: Night Operations - Japanese Warfare: A Summary - WWII Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 16
But mainly tactics on land, didn't see much regarding naval.

 

Using the ships floatplanes to drop flares instead of firing them was another one and kept the enemy unaware of the ship position until it actually opened fire.
One thing that worked a few times was simply using unsophisticated ESM receivers against the allied Radars. As Radar was new the fact that, given similar electronic capability, any active radar can be detected at twice the distance where it will give a valid return image was not well understud by most naval officers and keeping the sets on all the time was common.

 

Hello TOS. I only know of one battle that the Japanese were able to deploy this type of technology to any advantage. However the good old fashion Japanese MK II eyeball outranged American Radar countless times, even at night.

 

tameichi hara in "japanese destroyer captain" recalled how he suddenly saw a brief flicker that looked like someone striking a match or a ronson. he estimated the distance to be slightly more than 10,000 feet and opened fire. when they investigated, they saw a huge oil slick, probably a submarine with one poorly-trained lookout.

 

That's a good lesson for the need for total blackout.

 

It doesn't seem like it would be possible to estimate a distance in such a short time; the strike of a match!!!!

Bob Gercio

 

The point is who's submaine was it? AFAIK ships didn't have anithing like IFF and relied on lamp signals for identification.
Spotting a match a 10.000 feet with a 7x50 WW2 vintage Zeiss binocular is quite a feat, I have no experience of Pacific night visibility but in the Med we failed to spot a bonfire on a rock 6000 feet away built by some friends of mine when their engine broke down, in the end they gave up and rowed home .

 

I've done some research into Japanese naval tactics and have never heard of them using small craft to track enemy vessels; I have some questions.

How did the crew of the small craft communicate their observations to the "mother" vessel? Radio seems to be the obvious answer, but Japanese radios were unreliable for the most part, and all radios of the period were very vulnerable to the salt spray which could be expected in a small boat. Also radio transmissions would be detectable and some USN formations carried Japanese language officers; the messages would have to be sent in plain language since coding and decoding messages would take too long to be practical during a fast moving naval engagement.

During the Solomons campaign the USN tried to use torpedo boats in a similar manner and found it wasn't that useful because the crews couldn't see much and even radar wasn't a reliable substitute for searchlights or star shells.

Using very powerful "night glasses", and special training of lookouts who had been selected for their extraordinary vision seems to have provided most of the advantage the Japanese enjoyed against Allied naval forces.

 

It probably isn't.

Most of Hara's anecdotes have to be taken with a very large grain of salt. It's similar to Fuchida's fabrications in his book.

 

I can't speak to this. It is something that I remember posted from a similar thread several years ago.

I agree that this not a very persuasive argument.

It could even have been ideas that the guys had on what techniques could have been used. It was really a fascinating thread.

I have tried to find it in cyberspace but I can't. I think that WW-II Listserve was involved which no longer seems to be in existence.

Bob

 

The IJN also used aircraft to drop strings of float lights marking the course & position of US ships. In addition, the IJN's starshells were vastly superior to their USN counterparts, being much brighter and having a much longer hang time. The IJN also used "flashless" powder which minimized the USN's ability to range on gunfire flashes at night. Finally, one might consider the reluctance of US commanders to rely on--or to believe in--what radar was telling them until well into the Solomons campaign to be a distinct IJN advantage.

 

A few not mentioned are:

The Japanese used their destroyers by division. That is in 3 or 4 ship groups. These were placed ahead or on the flank of a main body like cruisers or battleships and acted semi-independent of the battleline. Their destroyers were never tied directly to the battleline and were expected to launch torpedo attacks as practical acting on the destroyer squadron commander's descresion.

In night actions the Japanese where they had surprise (eg., the opponet had not yet opened fire) and could identify enemy targets would launch a torpedo attack and wait for this to strike home before opening up with gunfire.
This is the reverse of US practice were gunfire was to be the primary weapon and torpedoes used only to finish off targets afterwards.

A weakness of Japanese tactics was lack of good communications between ships tactically. A night the general means was by use of IR signalling lamps. These were at best slow and not completely reliable as a means of communications. Radio use where tactical surprise was to be maintained generally was not permitted due to the danger of intercept.
This is one area the US excelled in. TBS was virtually line-of-sight and operated on VHF / UHF frequencies the Japanese didn't monitor. This meant the US had a secure and reliable radio communication system in place throughout engagements.

In the Solomons the Japanese generally didn't carry floatplanes aboard their ships if combat was expected. They were off loaded or flown off well before the engagement to prevent their becoming a fire hazard. The US usually simply dumped theirs overboard for the same reasons.

Japanese destroyers when in combination with cruisers or battleships also would often fire a salvo of torpedoes, retire to relative safety, reload and then return for a second salvo. This kept them out of the gun battle and from accidently becoming targets of friendly fire. Their torpedoes were the ship killers and the Japanese knew that.

By late 1942 Allied radar was an overwhelming advantage. There were few naval engagments after that time where the Japanese proved successful in combat day or night.