All data for 1943 (the peak of WW2 and before bombing reduced germany's production): Steel: US - 80.6 million tons Germany - 34.5 million tons (42.8% of the US) Britain - 13.1 million tons USSR - 8.5 million tons Japan - ~5 million Pig Iron: US - 55.8 million tons Germany - 27.8 million tons (49.82% of US) Britain - 7.3 million tons USSR - 5.6 million tons Coal: US - 586.2 million tons Germany - 554.6 million tons (94.6% of US) Britain - 202.1 million tons USSR - 93.1 million tons Energy: US - 558.75 million TOE Germany - 347.01 million tons TOE (62.1% of US) Britain - 133.7 million tons TOE USSR - 74.98 million tons TOE Conclusions: 1- As you can see, Germany had about 40-90% of the total raw material production if the US, so its total industrial production in 1943 was way more than 25% of the American capacity as was claimed (more like 50-55%). 2- Germany had more industrial capacity than Britain and the USSR combined. However, Germany produced less munitions than Britain + USSR due to smaller allocation of resources to that end (i.e.: only 14% of working population in munitions, compared to about 20% for the USSR and Britain). 3- Before Barbarossa the USSR had almost twice industrial capacity than in 1943, however, they managed to produce more ground weapons than any other power. An impressive feat of mobilization. I think that was due to the character of the Soviet industrialization: they had an industry build to produce munitions, while Germany, Britain and the US had economies build to produce consumer goods. Sources: World Economic Survey, 1942-1944. Economics, Production and Logistics
Your logic doesn't hold water. Raw materials production (which in Germany's case in 1943, included contributions from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, western USSR, and Norway) doesn't necessarily equate with industrial production capacity; You are mixing and matching numbers again to suite your preconceptions. You have to distinguish between raw materials and finished goods production capacity. If you are speaking of munitions production capacity, Germany's share was indeed only about 25 % of the US capacity. If you look at the Munitions production expenditures for 1943, Germany's was the equivalent of $13.5 Billion, Britain's was $11.0 and the Soviet Union was $14.0 Billion which would indicate that relative industrial capacity was about the same in those countries. As for the USSR's industrial capacity, and particularly that of munitions production; in 1943 it had increased dramatically over that of 1940. HyperWar: The Big 'L'--American Logistics in World War II [Chapter 1]
1- Raw material production and energy consumption are very good data to determine war-making capabilities. The fact that Britain made 75% of munitions as Germany in 1943 only reveals that Germany's war effort was less concentrated in production of munitions then Britain's. In fact, expenditures in personnel made a larger proportion of Germany's military expenditures than any other power, so you must correct for that. 2- The data on Germany refers to the country in its 1941 borders. (i.e.: Greater Germany).
In fact, raw materials production (and energy consumption) is only part of the equation, and not very good guides to a country's war making potential at all. A country can produce a myriad of raw materials in great quantities, but if it has no finished goods production capacity, or little skilled labor, it will have minimal war making potential. In the 1940's, this would describe many South American countries, as well as Australia, which had raw materials, but little manufacturing plant, and a very small population, thus little labor. Expenditures for military personnel may, or may not, be indicative of war making potential depending on geographic (and sometimes demographic) factors. In Germany's case, she had a large and powerful army, but no power projection capability outside of Europe. Therefore, Germany could not effectively engage overseas countries (especially those with large navies) like Britain and the US.