Battle of Midway

Hello all. I am new to the forum and am very happy to come across a site like this, filled with loads of people that are interested in the same things as me. I love to research about WW2, and am seriously considering a career involving such topics.

I was assigned a history project for my school, Villanova, and of course i jumped at the idea of doing something with world war 2. I chose to do Midway, because i believe it was a very critical battle, that is sometimes forgotten about. I am trying to make the connection that the battle of midway affected the european theater, but am having trouble coming up with evidence and proof of how it did. Can any of you historians help me with this? I love the topic, but it really killing me, becuauce information like this is hard to come by. Thank you for your help, and i look foward to discussing and debating about ww2 while on this site!

 

Welcome. Is your thesis along the line of thinking that since the Battle of Midway took the initative away from the Japanese in the Pacific, it would therefore require more logistal support of American forces in the Pacific, and place a logistics burden on the "Germany first" strategy? For example, we have learned that landing crafts of all sizes from the small Higgin's boats to bigger LCI's and LCT's were in short supply for the June 1944 invasion of Europe because of the attrition of the island hopping campaigns in the Pacific. Was the turning point of the Battle of Midway the start of this juggling of logistics between Europe and the Pacific, and basically spreading the logistical resources too thin? I would start with the History of the US Army in World War II volumes: Logistical Support of the Armies and the Army Historical Series volume The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 by James A. Huston for primary reading. Good luck!

Greg C.

 

i had not really though abou that, but it makes sense. My thinking was more along the lines of Japan is weak after Midway, and therefore the united states needs less resources to fight them, therefore can send some resources to Europe. Do you think this could be argued?

 

Not really. Midway was more of an equalizer, than the turning point that is often claimed. Japan hurt the USN badly in battles such as Tassafaronga, Savo Island, Etc. The US was much stronger at carrier operations, pulling of what I would say is a couple draws, and a couple big wins, but none of them really hurt us to badly in the grand scheme of things. It was all those cruiser and destroyer battles around the Soomon islands where things got really hairy. In my opinion that is the true turning point in the war.

 

I cannot agree that the skirmishes in the Solomons islands "hurt the USN badly". These were really minor tactical clashes, involving, for the most part, light forces, which hurt the IJN more than the USN , although they "won" many of them. Savo, for example, was a clear Japanese victory, but didn't stop the Guadalcanal landings, as was intended. In fact, the USN not only gained much needed experience, but wore down the offensive and defensive power of the IJN. The naval losses over the six-month Guadalcanal campaign were pretty even with a slight edge in combatants going to the Japanese, but an overwhelming advantage in logistical losses to the US. The losses on the US side were quickly replaced, with the USN being much stronger at the end of the campaign than at the beginning; The IJN, on the other hand was markedly weaker at the end of the campaign, and no longer held much of an edge in night fighting ability.

Of the five true carrier battles of the Pacific War (Leyte Gulf being discounted as a "carrier" battle), Japan "won" only one (Santa Cruz Islands), and then only tactically. The others were either clear victories for the USN, or tactical draws. In no significant naval battle after March, 1942, involving the USN, was the IJN able to accomplish it's strategic objective. Even in a much reduced state (due to the American "Europe First" policy), the USN proved to be more than a match for the IJN, and by December, 1942, Pacific Fleet, comprised mostly of pre-war ships, had defeated the IJN. Although the Japanese Navy refused to admit that defeat, and still boasted considerable defensive powers, it would never again fight a battle on it's own terms, nor experience even a tactical success.

Yamamoto's famous prediction of being able to "run wild" in the Pacific for six months to a year proved to be wrong. While Yamamoto's forces were away attending to the British Far East Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the USN bombed the Home Islands and returned without a scratch. Then, at Coral Sea Japanese ambitions to lock up New Guinea were frustrated; a month later, at Midway, Yamamoto personally experienced a crushing defeat, losing four of his most powerful carriers in the process. After licking it's wounds for more than two years, the IJN again emerged to face the USN at the Philippine Sea in the "Decisive Battle" it had been seeking ever since Pearl Harbor. It was decisive alright, only the Japanese didn't like the decision. Except for a couple of near suicidal battles in late 1944, and early 1945, the IJN was finished as a fighting force after Philippine Sea.

The decision at Midway did not immediately have much effect on the European war. This was partially because the Japanese did not, even to themselves, admit the true extent of their defeat and the US was circumspect in announcing it's victory. It was only later in the year, after the US had taken the offensive at Guadalcanal, and the Japanese had proven incapable of stopping that offensive, did the Axis powers come to realize that Midway had been a turning point in the Pacific War, and would have consequences far beyond the PTO.

The Allies came to that conclusion much sooner, but for the British, who probably realized on some level that Midway would lead to heightened demand for more aggressive US action in the Pacific, the idea was a double edged sword. On the one hand, it brought closer the day that the British would be able to return to the Pacific and try to salvage something of it's Asian empire, but it also meant that the US would send an increasing amount of material and troops to the Pacific rather than to Europe.

The Soviets, of course, rejoiced at any setback their traditional enemies, the Japanese, suffered, but they also worried that the US might turn their attention to the Japanese, and thus delay the "Second Front" Stalin so desperately wanted in Europe. However, Stalin almost certainly would feel that anything that weakened the Japanese would also lessen the Japanese threat to his Eastern frontier. These, however, would be peripheral thoughts, since Stalin would begin the critical Battle of Stalingrad within days of the Battle of Midway.

The Germans had little affinity for naval matters and probably didn't clearly understand the implications of a carrier battle in the distant Pacific. Their contact with their Japanese allies was tenuous and grew more so as the war progressed. An American victory, however, would not be welcome in any sphere. Hitler, as well as Stalin, was about to become immersed in the Battle of Stalingrad so Midway probably didn't stay on his radar screen for long in any event.

 

Ok i am getting alot of good information from you guys that books and other websites have not been able to give me. Is their any other impacts the midway had ont eh european theater that have not been discussed?

 

Welcome to the forums

Why did you choose Midway? and what do you know about the battle... your response in addressing these two topics can develop a new direction for your research. As you've realized this is hard work, before myself or any other rogue can further assist you, effort on your end will need to be made.

all the best,

Jem