What if no Operation Citadel

What if Hitler ignores Zeitzler's Operation Citadel and instead sides with Manstein's plan? Ironically, Manstein was the one who proposed a Southern and Northern thrust against the Kursk Salient but wanted it before May of 1943.

Anyway, what if Hitler, instead of attacking, agreed with Manstein and did one of two things:

1) Pull the strength of Army Group South back to Kiev and regroup, AG South’s supply lines would be shortened. Force the Soviets to make a long advance, allowing for their supply lines to become stretched and then attack the Soviet spearheads from the rear. Manstein uses his proposed 'Fluid Tactics' that worked so well in the retreat after Stalingrad and even after Kursk in his retreat to the Dnieper to cut off and crush the Soviet Summer Offensive of 1943.

or

2) Manstein somehow lures the Soviet Southern Front to attack the regrouping 6. Armee in the Eastern Ukraine and force then into the Donets Basin. Manstein then makes a southern thrust from Kharkov, capturing Rostov and encircling the majority of the Soviet strength in the Ukraine, with their back to the Sea of Azov.

Do you think either of these plans could have worked more effectively then Citadel (if, of course, Hitler accepted such tactics on such a large scale, however doubtful that may be)?

 

First of all, welcome aboard, Ernst! Hope you enjoy yourself here!

I think by summer 1943 the Red Army had become too strong and was rapidly developing into a very professional fighting machine; so I don't think it would have been a good idea for the Germans to make big gambles back then, due to the Western Allies' growing air campaign, as well as their imminent invasion of Italy.

There's no doubt that the re-formed and re-equipped units originally used for 'Zitadelle' would have been quite powerful and could have caused severe damages in option number two, but after some weeks of fighting, losses and casualties would have halted the offensive and of course, many Soviet reinforcements would have been brought in or some offensives all over the front would have been launched, forcing the Germans to pull back their forces, exactly as it did happen at Kursk. There, the Germans were not strong enough to break through and after they were bleeded, the Red Army started attacking their flanks and all over the front.

I think there were only two options: 1) end the war; 2) option number one: defence in depth in the Dniéper river and central mobile reserves for strategic counterattacks which could have only delayed the inevitable outcome.

Defence in depth was certainly their best option; attacking the Soviet adavances when they had lost momentum, had a logistic crisis or made the smallest mistake. Manstein was perfect at this, but the German war machine simply could not deploy as many tanks, guns and men to have a defence in depth all over the front and make counterattacks against dozens of Soviet simultaneous offensives. And of course there another thing: the Soviets got a bloody nose at the Third Battle of Khárkov, but they prevented such disasters to happen again in their Dniéper offensives of autumn 1943. Another irrefutable proof that the Red Army was outmatching the Wehrmacht in effeciency and strategic genious…

 

Thanks for the welcome Friedrich, I am sure I well enjoy posting here.

As far as the two choices you have stated, peace or defense, the first interests me the most.

I have heard (sorry, I have no documented sources) that a Soviet Ambassador in Sweden approached a German Ambassador in Stockholm with a peace offering from Stalin to Hitler in September of 1943. My assumption is that the boundaries carved by the Soviets would probable be to the original boundaries in 1941, pre-Barbarossa, with maybe even a stipulation that the Germans were forced to allow the Soviets to 'liberate' the Balkans. I don't know the exact stipulations by the Soviets, by my guess is the land that the Soviets gained from the Germans would be so great that the offering would not be accepted by Hitler.

Maybe even a peace settlement would do along with your second option, defense. In his retreat to the Dnieper, I believe Manstein, even with a lack of manpower, was still able to inflict heavy casualties on the Soviets after Kursk. Maybe, probable doubtful though seeing as Stavka's reserves were much greater then OKH's, he could have forced a stalemate in his retreat to and eventually defense of the Dnieper?

Maybe this stalemate would allow for a peace offering to be more in favour of Germany. This option is probable doubtful, as you have mentioned in your post.

 

What you say seems reasonable, but the timing you quote, September 1943, has to be off for a peace offer by Stalin.

This period is the immediate aftermath of the Kursk battle, where the Soviets were in full swing with the Mius operation, the retaking of Belgorod and Kharkov on the way to Kiev, the Orel Salient, liberation of Smolensk, etc etc.

So if the Russki-Popovs were winning across the front it seems a peace offer would be something entirely out of Stalin's mind, I think

Perhaps you were thinking of an earlier time? Or could this be a destabilization manoeuvre?

 

Yeah, your assumption about the date appears to be justified, it seems rather odd that Stalin would offer such a peace offering after Kursk. It is very possible that I got my date wrong, but the actually peace offering is true, I know that.

 

I believe there were several peace offers. I will have alook and get back to you all...

 

Regarding Freds other point on defense in depth, This has been suggested a few times before and that if it was to be applied, before Kursk was the time. After Kursk (where they lost the equivilant of 6 months production, especially tanks of course) the German army did not have sufficient materials to defend against several Russian armys From the Baltic to the Balkans.

If they had carried out a defense in depth against the Russians, pre Kursk, they had a better chance of delaying the Russians and prolonging the war.

What do people think?

 

Cant see Hitler goin for a retreat and defend order no matter how sensible that was. Shorten the Frontline and let the Russians batter themselves against it for a while...

But those pesky Ivans got pretty good at busting defensive lines...

 

Defence in depth with all troops available for 'Zitadelle' concentrated on mobile reserves for each Army Group would have allowed a much better defence and a master like Von Manstein would have been quite successful, BUT after a while those mobile reserves would have melted into the burning cauldron.

Von Manstein was very good in these situations, but there was Vasilievski to play the game too. The Soviets would have simply applied some 'Maskirovka' along three simultaneous offensives driving this mobile force as firefighter hither and thither all over the front, bleeding it to death… then, after two or three months of fantastic and masterly performed tactical defensive battles, the Germans would have still been facing an Army ever growing in efficiency and experiency with just a thin line of ill-equipped infantry… whether the front is shortened or not, whether the defence in depth strategy is implemented or not…

 

As to what I have read the Russian side tried peace negotioations through Stockholm Sweden after the Kharkov battles in march 1943 ( the last ones?) but never after the Zitadelle. Hitler then again never accepted any peace talks as he believed it was either him or them.So any peace talks by Germans were made without Hitler´s acceptance, I think.