Allied Air Superiority and Omaha Beach landings

As an aviator I have to ask the following question:

I understand there was naval bombardment of the target area, although not as thorough as should've been, however I wonder, since we had complete air superiority why didn't we take more advantage of allied fighters strafing German positions and or bombing them before the 1st wave landed on the beach, instead of relying on Naval Guns further distance away from the action.

 

Also consider a battleship can deliver 16-20 ~ 1 ton projectiles a minute for a considerable length of time (most BBs carried over 100 rounds/gun. That means it's the equivalant of 800+ bomber sorties with 2,000 lb bombs. Then there's the 5" guns and the cruisers and destroyers. While a naval shell may not have the accuracy of a dive bomber it will beat level bombers. The aircaft were better used beyond the range of the guns keeping reinforcements from reaching the beaches.

 

We did bomb the German positions and command thought they got most of the enemy. However, where the bombs fell did little or no damage at all. The bombs landed away from the areas that needed to be hit. As for the strafing, that would've done very little. The Germans were in fortified bunkers and trenches and were hard to get at.

 

Did some reading on this the previous two years and NY320Capt has a point. Although as always the reality is not simple. Here are two aspects of this I've found.

1. There was a massive airstrike scheduled for Omaha Beach, to be executed at the end of the naval gunfire preperation, roughly fifteen minutes before the first wave crossed the water line. The bombers did fly and dropped. Several hundred B24 & a few other types released over 1000 tons of light bombs and some larger demolition bombs. The problem was these were heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force which were trained for high altitude bombing. They had been doing long range missions over France, Belgium, and Germany. and bombing from altitudes of over 20,000 feet. For this attack they flew at their usual altitude and found the overcast obscured the aimpoints. They did have radar, but had been warned to confirm the radar with visual landmarks lest they drop short and hit the first wave. Visual confirmation failed and the lead bombardier decided to delay release by a few seconds to ensure they did not hit in the water where the landing craft were. That caused the entire bomb strike to fall approx two kilometers inland, killing a lot of cows and a few French and Germans. Post battle examination confirmed that few to none of the 9th AF bombs hist the aimpoints or anywhere else on the German beach defenses.

Utah beach had a simlar airstrike aimed at it. That strike was assigned to the 9th Air Force, using mostly B26 medium bombers. Those bomber wings had spent the previosu year attacking point targets in France & Belgium like bridges. Their usual operating altitude was down around 10,000 feet or less. When they came in on their bomb run on the Utah beach targets it was second nature for the leaders to drop below the overcast, down between 5,000 & 10,000 feet. They were able to clearly ID their aimpoints. Secondly they came in paralle to the beach, so any bombs that dropped short or over hit something else along the beach defenses. The attack run on Omaha beach was perpendicular to the target line, so anything that missed - missed.

Balkowski in his books 'Omaha Beach' & 'Utah Beach' has the most detailed descriptions of the US airstrikes.

2. The communications of the early waves on Omaha beach failed miserablly. The majority of the radio operators and Naval Gunfire or Air Liasion teams that came ashore in the first few assualt waves, between 06:30 & 08:30 were shot down. I've found very little evidence that any of the fire support spotting teams survived or functioned in the first two hours. Its not until 09:00 that any control of fire support occured between the men ashore and the naval gunfire ships. It so far appears to me the same problem occured with the tactical or close air support. Any air units assigned to that role received no direction from the assualt force on the beach until late morning or the afternoon of 6th June.

A second problem was that the air liasion teams assigned to the ground combat forces in June 1944 do not seem to have had their own radios. I've not confirmed this, but appears they depended on the communications sections of the infantry or tank units to provide them with radios. It seems the air liasion teams did have their own radios until Gen Quesada took over the command of the close air support forces in July 1944. Conversely the British begain providing radios to their air liasion as early as 1942, as did the US Marines in the Pacific.

 

After touring the beaches of Normandy, what I saw confirmed the above. the airstrikes had minimal effect, while after proper communications were established the direct fire, especially from the destroyers was very effective against the fortified defenses. I saw concrete emplacements that had evidence that some of the destroyer rounds were fired right into gun ports and exploded on the rear walls of the concrete bunkers. Aircraft could not have had that kind of accuracy and effect even with rockets, unless they were flying at the level of the destroyers guns 20'-30' off the deck.

 

Thanks. Very interesting.

That confirms every other inspection of the German positions I've found. While the air strike would not have had the same destructive effect, especially with the lighter 110kg (250lb) bombs that predominated they could have 'stunned' a portion of the defenders for a critical few minutes.

My father was a ordinance officer in a medium bomber group of the 9th Air Force. In late 1944 the mediums were used to supplement the single engine planes in close air support strikes. The intelligence section passed along interviews with German PoW that showed how these attacks had very short lived effects. A strike group of 24 mediums would drop between 48 & 72 tons of 250 & 500 lb bombs. During the first few minutes after the defenses would be largely ineffective, but 45 minutes later the survivors would be recovered and combat effective again

On Utah Beach the actual destruction of the trenches and bunkers from the airstrike was not large, but the intial assualt wave came in soon enough afterwards that the majority of the Germans were still demoralized & ineffective.

 

NY320Capt...whats your flying background? As a artillery FO I often sat beside the FAC coordinating air/artillery strikes in training exercises. It was always interesting to see which techniques worked and which did not.

 

The close air support could stun the defenders and give the attackers the opportunity to move up out of the water toward the seawall, but the destroyers put the ammo where it killed or wounded men and knocked out equipment. As is obvious, if your own men are moving too close to the enemy the blasts from the bombs can be just as debilitating to the attackers as to the defenders. Ultimately the air support would have to be directed as the seaborne fire support to move away from the attackers farther inland while the destroyers were litterally wacking the stew out of the gun placements in a direct fire roll. Overall it was amazing to see the accuracy acheived by these destroyers.