The Battle Of Attrition Begins In Normandy!

Surely a joke?
The book is nothing but a long biased attack on Montgomery. The book contains many factual errors. In particular the claim Churchill was 'hiding' Infantry replacements in the UK and the UK manpower shortage was fiction.
D'Este has since written a far more blanced assesment of Monty.

Monty: World War II’s Most Misunderstood General, Part 3 » Armchair General

 

In June 1944 there were slightly more German tanks in The West than in The East, just under 2000. The difference was that there were also 2000 Stug in The East and only 500 in The West.
By September the Western total had shrunk to about 500 tanks/400 Stug but the Eastern Front stayed at 2000/2000.
It would appear the bulk of the replacements were sent East.

 

The Generals name was Lee. He commanded the 'Communications Zone' (ComZ) Established to support the Allied armies, and to rebuild transportation in France.

Lee had his personal defects, he also had a thankless task, made more difficult first by the extremely slow advance in June & July, then by the advance at double then triple the expected rate in August/Sept. Neither did Lee have any control over when the critical ports were captured. Perhaps if Lee had the personality of Eisenhower he'd have had better press. But, instead he failed in salesmanship.

There was theft & black marketing in later 1944. As things settled in France & Belgium it was suppressed in 1945 but never eliminated.

 

No I seldom joke. For an American historian, D'Este is more than fair to Montgomery in his Normandy book. He devotes an entire chapter to "The Manpower Dilemma," and cites his figures diligently culling from the British PRO/WO, 21st Army Group Diary, and Churchill correspondences, just to name a few. D'Este uses the manpower/replacement shortage to argue in favor of Montgomery, as the following sentences illustrate:

"Post war British accounts of the Normandy campaign have not given sufficient emphasis to the seriousness of either the reinforcement problem or the effects it produced on Montgomery's strategy after D-Day. He has been savagely criticized for overcaution and lack of imagination in his direction of the British Army around Caen, yet what has never been understood is the dilemma he faced in using 21st Army Group at maximum fighting strength while still avoiding unnecessary casualties - a paradoxical impossibility! How much of this was really overcaution and how much a commonsense need to employ his dwindling combat strength judiciously is a matter of personal opinion." [D'Este, Decision in Normandy, Harper-Perennial paper back edition, pp. 258-259]

Rather than "fiction," the British/Commonwealth manpower shortage would seem to make perfect sense, based on their population, and seeing that Britain had forces deployed not only in northwest Europe, but also in The Mediterranean, and the far east, as well. Even the seemingly bottomless barrel of American manpower suffered during the winter of 1944/45. All historians have their detractors who will point out factual errors, or sloppiness in methods, buy D'Este's effort in his Normandy book is solid.

Greg C.

 

I think you need to read the last 3 pages (hardback) of the Manpower Chapter. In it D'Este states:
the infantry shortage(s) which plagued Montgomery..................were in fact a myth

He claimed there were 115,000 Infantry sitting idle in the UK.
He was mistaken and his figures and conclusions were comprehensively repudiated by Stephen Hart in 'Colossal Cracks' on page 57.

Montgomery and "colossal cracks ... - Google Books


This 115,000 was in fact 13,000!

 

Thank you all for the Civility on this Thread I read many of your posts and found some assessment quite interesting.

Ok I just saw someone went a little Reckless I saw, Judges Bad boy .

Now this one confused me

I would hate to muddy the waters, I guess I'll have to garbage over 2000 pages of chaos and mayhem that ensued in Normandy, as the shortages of supplies, oil Fuel troops and so forth.

I guess we forgot after the Canadian and British sacrifice for Op Cobra, I think just after Totalise, Note British sources Spell it with a S not a Z. Patton was warned to halt the advance by Bradley, Since they had run out of oil and fuel. Did Patton listen???? I'll give all three guesses the first two don't Count.

When Patton's troops ran out in the middle of a night battle, when day light broke the countryside laid littered with US Troops and equipment.

I guess it was well planed and executed.


To the Mods Sorry I digressed, for those that don't know.

Canadian, British, US, Australian Ingles many words are not spelt the same way, Color=Colour, that goes for the Grammar also. Can't we just reform this language and make it one size fits all?? And change those words that all sound the same but are written in 3-4 different ways. were where We're. It's less complicated for someone that thinks in three Languages when writing one.


And to the Members lets see this brilliant Logic. I quote ok Cite Copp's many times but I probably never read his Books. I see your logic supersedes you. What do the US keep stating about the French?

What his quotes are transmited subliminally while I sleep? And I utter his Cites in the morning.Lmaoooooo

See you all in A Few, God Speed to all and keep-Up the good work.

 

"Now this one confused me
Quote:
I find the campaign to be well planned, well executed and then we decided to pi$$ all over it, and make it a mud slinging match.
Spaniard, as Jaeger indicated in another post after it, he was referring to general comments that have been made over the past 65 years where each country's armchair generals have made a lot of the accomplishments of their own nation's soldiers while negating the accomplishment of the other Allied countries.

I would hate to muddy the waters, I guess I'll have to garbage over 2000 pages of chaos and mayhem that ensued in Normandy, as the shortages of supplies, oil Fuel troops and so forth.

If you have factual references to which others can corroborate your claims, why would you not use it? An opinion was made, which I interpreted to be that it was well planned and executed considering the men and materiels available, the terrain over which it was fought, and as in every endeavour despite the unexpected for which there could be no foreplanning. As always when we analyse something from hindsight we have to put ourselves back in time 65 years to consider the knowledge and types of materiels available to those who were there then.

I guess we forgot after the Canadian and British sacrifice for Op Cobra, I think just after Totalise, Note British sources Spell it with a S not a Z.

The sacrifices of the Canadians and British have been referred to in several posts in regard to the operations which held the majority of the German armour in their sector while the Americans broke out.

When Patton's troops ran out in the middle of a night battle, when day light broke the countryside laid littered with US Troops and equipment. I've unfamiliar with this. Can you direct me to where I would read about it?

I guess it was well planed and executed."

 

The fact that the Allies put 8 divisions on shore within 24 hours, experienced a change of their Schwerpunkt to a different sector, and later supported a massive drive across France at an unanticipated time and place without the benefit of prearranged depots, spoke volumes. No Russian or German operation remotely compared to this logistical effort.

 

Factual Reference of Chaos and Mayhem. Did he and others provide sources for their Comments, NOooooooooooo. Can he provide a Source and ling that proves that, I'm sure he can't. Their thousands of books and articles as documentaries that describe many Normandy Battles and so forth, in that matter

Are you tell me theirs American on this site that don't or ever read what happen to Patton after the advance in Cobra, I'm shocked.

Great now I got do dig info thats gathering dust for 25 years.

I'll Be Back with the Patton story! and sources and links

 

Following the Normandy invasion, Patton was placed in command of the U.S. Third Army, which was on the extreme right (west) of the Allied land forces. His good friend, Gilbert R. Cook, was Deputy Commander, whom Patton had to later relieve due to an illness which "shook him to the core." Beginning at noon on August 1, 1944, he led this army during the late stages of Operation Cobra, the breakout from earlier slow fighting in the Normandy hedgerows. The Third Army simultaneously attacked west (into Brittany), south, east towards the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Chambois pocket, between Falaise and Argentan, Orne.

Patton's units generally took positions by frontal assault with his armor used in the infantry support role. Once the breakthrough was achieved the armor was used for exploitation in the manner of Civil War Cavalry advancing unopposed over vast distances, covering 60 miles (97 km) in just two weeks, from Avranches to Argentan. Patton's forces were part of the Allied forces that freed northern France, bypassing Paris. The city itself was liberated by the French 2nd Armored Division under French General Leclerc, insurgents who were fighting in the city, and the US 4th Infantry Division. The French 2nd Armored Division had recently been transferred from the 3rd Army, and many of the unit's soldiers thought they were still part of 3rd Army. These early 3rd Army offensives showed the characteristic high mobility and aggressiveness of Patton's units, which however was only possible because of the absence of German heavy armor. Patton demonstrated an understanding of the use of combined arms by using the XIX Tactical Air Command of the Ninth Air Force to protect his right (southern) flank during his advance to the Seine.
[edit] Lorraine

Main article: Lorraine Campaign
General Patton's offensive, however, came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of gas near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. One explanation for this was that Patton's ambition was to conquer Germany, and refused to recognize that he was engaged in a secondary line of attack.[27] Others suggest that General John C.H. Lee, commander of the Zone of Communication, chose that time to move his headquarters to the more comfortable environs of Paris. Some 30 truck companies were diverted to that end, rather than providing support to the fighting armies.

Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, believing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch. Still, within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden.[28] The combination of Montgomery being given priority for supplies, and diversion of resources to moving the Communications Zone, resulted in the Third Army running out of gas in Alsace-Lorraine while exploiting German weakness.[29] In late September, a large German panzer counter attack sent expressly to stop the advance of Patton's Third Army was defeated by the 4th Armored Division at the Battle of Arracourt. Despite the victory, the Third Army stayed in place as a result of Eisenhower's order. Ironically, the Germans believed this was because their counterattack had been successful.[30]
Patton's rapid drive through the Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. The major US and Allied advantages were in mobility and air superiority. The U.S. Army had a greater number of trucks, more reliable tanks, and better radio communications, which all contributed to a superior ability to operate at a high tempo. However, probably the key to Patton's success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.[31] Third Army's attached close air support group was XIX Tactical Air Command, commanded by Gen. Otto P. Weyland. Developed originally by Gen. Elwood Quesada of IX TAC for the First Army at Operation Cobra the technique of "armored column cover" whereby close air support was directed by an air traffic controller in one of the attacking tanks was used extensively by the Third Army.[32] In addition, because Patton's rapid drive resulted in a salient that was vulnerable to flanking attacks and getting trapped by the Germans, Weyland and Patton developed the concept of using intensive aerial armed reconnaissance to protect the flanks of this salient. Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar, another technique pioneered by Quesada, was also used by XIX TAC to both cover against Luftwaffe attacks and to vector flights already in the air to new sites as an air traffic control radar. As a result of the close cooperation between Patton and Weyland, XIX TAC would end up providing far more air sorties for ground support for the Third Army than the other attached Tactical Air Commands would for the First and Ninth Armies. Despite their success, however, Eisenhower had faith only in the traditional method of advancing across a broad front to avoid the problem of flanking attacks, which most account for the decision to halt the Third Army.

The halt of the Third Army during the month of September was enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.


George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


YOU can all watch the Move Patton It also shows it. The US Soldiers fought with heroic Gallantry that night even ran out of ammo, and many fougth hand to hand. Patton was devestad by this great lost.

 

Spaniard.

Ref the night engagement

"Try war as I knew it" by Patton.

Also seen in the picture Patton.

And I am describing the CAMPAIGN (operational level in war)as well planned and executed.
What engagements and battles (tactical level in war) look like has got little to do with it.

 

Thank you for the kind help, Please Read Page TWO

With the deepest respect if you see it that way, It's ok by me and I respect your opinion. As for Moi and many others have a different point of View.


Everybody failed to mention Many Men had developed Lic and Tics from not properly washing for days, weeks! Same dirty Clothes on there backs. As for Toilet paper was also a big problem and many Regimental Brothers told me.

 

No worries I saw your post when my reply was submitted.

I fully respect other peoples point of view. The problem was that when we discuss different layers in warfare we don't get our points across, because we are not on the same page as it were.

Another problem is the many cultural/language/education filters that the arguements have to go through.

Have patientce I'm just a daft grunt.

 

I don't Think So You a Daft Grunt Utter Nonsence, your well informed. And a respected member of this Site. Patience is need but more of an understanding, and a respectful manner of discussion, as theres many different views, even by World renowned historians.

I first found the Info many moons ago in the American Archives, then I saw the Move, Patton.

If it's not true it's no big deal to me since I'm always keep an open mind and in search of the truth even if it gives my country a black eye.

 

Spaniard - I'm quite certain most of the Americans and a majority of others are quite familiar with Operation Cobra. I however was asking you for where I could learn more regarding your statement "When Patton's troops ran out in the middle of a night battle, when day light broke the countryside laid littered with US Troops and equipment." as I personally have mostly generalized knowledge about US movement based on documentaries and where American actions impacted the Canadians. Since joining the Forum, I have learned considerably more, but your description was not one with which I was familiar. I could have looked in Wikipedia, but thought you had more than that.

And I'm not busting your chops about sources. I expect them when it is a statement or fact that is not generally known, or I ask for where to find information when I am interested in learning more. As a genealogist, however, or when writing a historical paper - citing sources are a given, even just as a bibliography which is to what I was referring as I expected that your 2000 pages on mayhem and chaos was for a paper or book, not for publishing here.

To others who have posted, please do return to the discussion on the thread - the posts between Spaniard and I is a misdirection of the general subject matter of the thread.

Here is an article from the US Army Center of Military History on Normandy

At the end it lists the following for further reading:

[SIZE=+2]Further Readings[/SIZE]
Those who wish to study the Normandy Campaign in more detail will find a number of volumes in the U.S. Army in World War II series, produced by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, particularly useful. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel-Attack (1951), remains a basic source, but a number of other studies bear heavily upon the operation. They include Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy (1968); Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (1961); Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (1954); Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (1953); and Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations (1992). The Historical Division of the War Department produced three volumes on the event. All have been reprinted by the Center of Military History. Classified as the American Forces in Action series, they are OMAHA Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944) (1989); UTAH Beach to Cherbourg (1990); and St. Lo (7 July-19 July 1944) (1984).

A number of abbreviated summaries have been written. Among the most useful are Charles MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II (1969); and Charles MacDonald and Martin Blumenson, "Recovery of France," in Vincent J. Esposito, ed., A Concise History of World War II (1965).

Memoirs by Allied commanders contain considerable information. Among the best are Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (1951); Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (1983); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948); Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (1948); and Sir Frederick Edgeworth Morgan, Overture to Overlord (1950).

Almost as useful are biographies of leading commanders. Among the most prominent are Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1970), and Eisenhower, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (1983); Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years, 1942-1944 (1983); and Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe, 1943-1945: Success or Failure (1984).

A number of general histories also exist, many centering on the controversies that continue to surround the campaign and its commanders. See, in particular, John Colby, War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War n (1989); Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (1983); Max Hastings, Overlord, D-Day, June 6, 1944 (1984); John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris (1982); Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-45 (1981); and Stephen T. Powers, "Battle of Normandy: The Lingering Controversy," Journal of Military History 56 (1992):455-71.
Journalists were among the foremost observers of the invasion. Two studies of their work that stand out are Barney Oldfield, Never a Shot in Anger (1956); and Richard Collier, Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II (1989). CMH Pub 72-18"

I do note however, that it conspicuously misses histories written by Canadian historians, and that the most recent book mentioned was written in 1992. Since 1992, the information we have available to us is massive both in terms of what is available on the Internet (sometimes entire books in pdf), as well as documents that have been released and posted as various restrictions on them have expired. Modern discussions have so much to add to our understanding of what happened in the past.



Regarding,

 

An article by Terry Copp in the Canadian Legion Magazine in 1998 The Normandy Battle Of Attrition: Army, Part 22 | Legion Magazine

It begins:

"The American military historian Stephen Ambrose has a new bestseller in the bookstores. It’s called Citizen Soldiers and in it he describes the United States Army from the Normandy landings to the surrender of Germany. Ambrose is one of a small, but growing group of American historians who argue that the Allied armies fought with skill and determination in defeating their enemies on the battlefield. He believes that “free men fight better than slaves” and that “the sons of democracy proved to be better soldiers than the sons of Nazi Germany.”I think Ambrose overstates his case, but a re-examination of the conventional wisdom on the campaigns of WW II is badly needed.

Such a re-examination began in Canada in the early 1980s with the publication of the five-volume Maple Leaf Route series. In it, the late Robert Vogel and I rejected the negative view of the Canadian Army’s performance and noted that Canadians had won a series of important tactical and operational victories in 1944—45. However, our argument had little impact on the country’s military historians not to mention those who portrayed our history on television.

This reaction may be explained by the particular role played by historian C.P. Stacey who wrote the official history of the Canadian Army in WW II. His book, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944—1945, remains the outstanding single volume account of operations in Northwest Europe. Its author was too good an historian to ignore some of the obvious achievements of the Canadians, but he attributed our success to “numerical and material superiority”, “the paralysing effects of Allied air power” and the superior generalship of the Allies, especially that of Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Stacey selected the delayed closing of the Falaise Gap “as his major example of failure”. Running a close second, in his view, was the battle for Verrières Ridge.

British and American historians as well as a generation of Canadians accepted Stacey’s view as definitive until John A. English wrote his penetrating study of the Canadian Army’s development and its performance in Normandy. Published in 1991, his book is entitled The Canadians in Normandy: A Study of Failure in High Command.
English accepted Stacey’s judgment that the key question was how to explain the failure of the Canadian Army, especially at Verrières Ridge and in the Falaise Gap, but he insisted that the causes were to be found in the shortcomings of the Canadian high command that “seriously impaired Canadian fighting performance” by failing to develop appropriate leadership, training or doctrine. And so English’s book quickly became the new standard interpretation of the Canadian Army’s experience in WW II.
However, the evidence from the battlefield demonstrates that offensive operations in Normandy, whether carried out by the Allies or their opponents, invariably failed in the sense that combat units were unable to secure the objectives called for in the operational plans. The Battle of Normandy was a battle of attrition and there are no reasonable grounds for believing it could have been otherwise. Historians must develop a reasoned case for counter-factual scenarios if they’re going to suggest that there were alternate operational and tactical methods of winning the battle, more decisively, more quickly and at lesser cost. It is not enough to simply claim that the actions taken were wrong." It goes on from there,

 

Another article addresses the logistics component as a factor in the attrition rates:

HyperWar: The Big 'L'--American Logistics in World War II [Chapter 7]

In part:

"....

"The Best Laid Plans . . ."

The intricate logistical plans for delivering the many thousands of troops, vehicles, and tons of supplies to the beaches were among the first casualties on D-Day. The planned system did not long survive the stresses of battle, falling behind almost at once. The actual system--the one which evolved on the beaches--was quite different. The success of O[SIZE=-1]VERLORD[/SIZE] logistics was due to the ingenuity and dedication of the logistics personnel on the scene who did a remarkable job in adapting to battlefield circumstances, especially the Engineer Special Brigades who overcame innumerable difficulties in moving supplies ashore and supporting the combat forces.

On both O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] and U[SIZE=-1]TAH[/SIZE] beaches, ESB personnel landed in the first waves to begin the vital work of organizing the beaches. On U[SIZE=-1]TAH[/SIZE] beach, the opposition was moderate and the conditions favorable. The engineers were able to set to work immediately despite persistent shelling. On O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] beach, the story was much different. Fierce German opposition and the inability to clear beach obstacles resulted in high casualties. The landings soon degenerated into confusion. The engineers' valiant efforts to remove obstacles, clear minefields, and open the beach exits--all under withering fire--were critical to salvaging the grave initial situation. In this effort, the O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] beach engineers suffered 40 percent casualties.[SIZE=-1]42[/SIZE] As the hectic first day drew to a close, some semblance of order returned. Most

--375--

of the troops had made it ashore but only a paltry few tons of supplies were landed on both beaches.

As the combat forces moved off the beaches, the service forces were close behind. During the 7 weeks from assault to breakout, the logisticians faced and overcame innumerable obstacles and complications in moving the supplies ashore and setting up the support base. Their primary short-term concern was to ensure adequate delivery over the beaches. Once the assault troops had moved off the beaches, full-scale unloading operations commenced on D+3. Achieving planned buildup rates were hampered by a host of initial problems. Primary among these problems was an insufficiency of ship-to-shore transports, such as the 2.5 ton DUKW ("Duck") amphibious truck and the "Rhino Ferry."[SIZE=-1]43[/SIZE] The limited number of ferry craft were routinely overloaded and overworked, but still could not keep up with the cargo to be moved.
The entire offload process quickly degenerated into chaos. As offloading slowed, ships that should have been offloaded were forced to wait, delaying their return to port in England for reloading. The cargo and troops scheduled for embarkation, however, continued to arrive in the port. The result was congestion and an ever increasing backlog. The embarkation ports became hopelessly snarled and port personnel resorted to indiscriminate loading as an expedient to clear the ports. The system of transmitting ship's manifests and sailing instructions was abandoned. Therefore, ships arrived off the far shore unexpected, improperly loaded and unmanifested. This presented First Army with a conundrum: an orderly offload in accordance with the established priority scheme necessitated offshore storage in scarce ships while immediate offload resulted in confusion ashore as supplies were piled up. First Army initially tried to maintain the priority system, but relented on D+4 and began to allow offload without delay. The Navy also acceded to Army requests to let LSTs unload by "drying out," i.e., beaching on a falling tide and offloading until the rising tide refloated them. This expedient contributed greatly to the ability to offload these valuable ships quickly.
​

--376--

In the press to move supplies ashore as fast as possible, order and accuracy were sacrificed, presenting ESB personnel with the monumental task of sorting a growing mountain of supplies dumped on the beaches. The breakdown in inventory control is clearly shown in the desperate search for 81mm mortar rounds. Despite the fact that records showed that the ammunition was available on ships offshore, it could not be located. Even when emergency shipments were made from England, the mortar rounds could not be found.[SIZE=-1]44[/SIZE] Gradually, the situation stabilized.
After D+18, deliveries over the beaches exceeded forecast tonnages. By the end of June, over 452,000 troops, 70,000 vehicles, and 289,000 tons of cargo had arrived over the beaches (respectively these were 71.8, 64.5, and 80.5 percent of the planned movements).[SIZE=-1]45[/SIZE]


The primary long-term concern for the logisticians was the capture and exploitation of deep-water ports for the high-volume cargo operations.[SIZE=-1]46[/SIZE] The direct offload of deep-draft transports was essential for the full development of the lodgment and preparations for further operations. The prompt capture of Cherbourg was, therefore, the first major objective of the American forces. The Germans, however, refused to cooperate and resisted stoutly. The capture, scheduled for June 14, did not occur until June 27.[SIZE=-1]47[/SIZE] Furthermore, the Germans had wrecked the port facilities so thoroughly that 3 full weeks were required for reconstruction. Cherbourg finally received its first cargo on July 16; but by the end of July only 17,656 tons of the 150,000 tons planned for the month had been discharged through its installations.[SIZE=-1]48[/SIZE] Throughout June and July, the majority of supplies were received across the beaches.
The failure to open Cherbourg on schedule had a serious "ripple" effect on subsequent support plans. Hundreds of ships had
​

--377--

been scheduled to offload in Cherbourg in July and August, most sailing directly from the United States. Schedule slippage resulted in a backlog of ships awaiting unloading, forcing some ships into British ports for time-consuming transloading into shallow-draft coastal freighters. The O[SIZE=-1]VERLORD[/SIZE] logistics planners were overly optimistic in their schedule for deliveries through Cherbourg, especially considering that wholesale destruction of port facilities by the Germans was fully expected. The opening of deep-water seaports would have a pronounced effect on Allied operational plans in the months ahead, since the high throughput capacity of established ports was essential for the support of the drive across Europe. M[SIZE=-1]ULBERRY[/SIZE] A, the artificial harbor on O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] beach, was a hedge against any delay in opening Cherbourg. Its construction began on D-Day with the scuttling of the first of the blockships to begin forming the protected anchorage. Assembly of the piers and causeways began on D+1. The protection the artificial anchorage afforded began to improve cargo operations immediately. By June 16, the pierheads were in place and the first LST discharged vehicles onto the causeway. Just as this ingenious facility became fully operational, however, it was wrecked by a powerful 3-day storm. The damage was so extensive it could not be rebuilt. Serviceable sections were salvaged and used to repair M[SIZE=-1]ULBERRY[/SIZE] B in the British sector. The loss of the artificial port did force the Americans into greater reliance on deliveries over the beaches, but the transfer rates for O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] and U[SIZE=-1]TAH[/SIZE] beaches far exceeded expectations.

O[SIZE=-1]VERLORD[/SIZE] plans included elaborate provisions for POL (Petroleum-Oil-Lubricant) distribution. The distribution system would provide fuel both packaged and in bulk. The immediate needs of the forces ashore were to be met by packaged fuel in thousands of the ubiquitous 5-gallon "jerrycans."[SIZE=-1]49[/SIZE] These cans were the most common way in which fuel was delivered to the end users. As such, they

--378--

were a critical link in the chain of fuel supply. However, empty cans quickly became a problem. Until decanting stations could be opened, there was no way to refill empty cans. The standing policy of requiring the turn-in of an empty can to get a full one was soon forsaken. The result was disregard for the importance of recycling these valuable containers with serious repercussions in later campaigning. To meet the long-range demand for high-volume delivery, a bulk delivery system was planned with two pipeline networks in the lodgment area. First was the "Major System" of 6-, 8-, and 12-inch pipelines running south from Cherbourg. This was to serve as the principle source of bulk fuel for the advance from the lodgment. The second network was the "Minor System," a short network of pipelines and storage facilities in the O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] beach area. The decanting of bulk fuel began on 26 June in the O[SIZE=-1]MAHA[/SIZE] beach area and a month later in the Cherbourg area. The arrival of tank truck companies greatly expedited the movement of fuel forward. Meeting fuel demands prior to the breakout was relatively easy, since the slow progress kept consumption low and the lines of communication short.[SIZE=-1]50[/SIZE] POL plans for future operations called for pipelines to be laid along the expected line of advance. This, however, fallaciously assumed that the line of advance could be accurately predicted. O[SIZE=-1]VERLORD[/SIZE] was the climactic act of the European war--both the culmination of all that came before and the foundation of all that would come after. It was fulfillment of the original Allied strategy to build a base of operations in the United Kingdom to support a return to the Continent. Simply getting the armies into France accomplished the strategic aim of opening a second front with profound implications for the Germans. The logistics of the operation were monumental, an undertaking unprecedented in history; in the end, they did work--albeit neither easily nor efficiently. In their specificity and inflexibility, the logistics plans had contained the seeds of their own destruction. The robustness and flexibility that the plans lacked, however, were found in the soldiers and sailors who did whatever was necessary at the time. As July drew to a close, the armies were finally able to break out of the lodgment. As they began their pursuit of the retreating Germans, the final act of the drama began. This
​

--379--

final act would bring a new set of challenges for the logisticians; as the armies raced to the east, the logisticians would be hard pressed to keep pace. ......"

​

 

Another point:

Montgomery and "colossal cracks ... - Google Books

Montgomery and "colossal cracks": the 21st Army Group in northwest Europe ...

 

TO J.W.Yes thats me you've been reading Source Spaniard, Heads-up when I write something I have to read over 30+ times to edit corrections, to get the grammar as words I was Diagnosed at 26 with Dyslexia, plus from grade one through High School I went to French Immersion French Classes in the morning Complete French courses in French Like history French G & S the after lunch all English Classes, then 3 days a week I went to Spanish School after regular School that lasted till 9.30.

When I write Ingles I think in 3 Languages, and French is Back wards English is forward in Grammar. I work mainly in French sometimes English

Does that explain.

Plus the Fact that English is Fronde-on with you speak to some French and even demand that you speak to them In French, that to me is You can Kiss My Grits, and many English are discriminated on, By a good percentage of French Quebec.

I live in Montreal and know many Americans also, and I Never seen a cultural difference when it comes to Civility, In both countries you do have your, Wankers, Right Tomcat.


So Now you all Know. Not Just J.W. Clint I sent him the MSG when I wrote his Name Wrong.

Quote Clint, Spaniard I'm not the Efen Col. From Hogan Hero's. spell my name properly. LMaooooooo

Now that was funny.

 

It's not problem with me Mechelle, all is good. You know I think I can Equal Copps Aka El Matador.

So it went quite well in Normandy? Some one mentioned Carpiquet, I think I read Jul 4th? Why was that place so Important? and why was Verrieres so important?

Now Source; Canada At War and Operation Atlantic & Verrieres,Canadian National Archive, The Bill Greaves Story, BWORWD, Interviews With My Regimental Brothers.

Please Note a Mistake the Majority of all Historians Made as the Black Watch war Diary. NOT Hill 67 But Point 67.

Operation Spring Who's To Blame for the Horrific Carnage? - Page 3 - Canada at War Forums

WWII: Verrieres Ridge - Canada at War

WWII: Operation Spring - Canada at War


Injoy Remember Not finished yet.

The Black Watch O.R. War Diary; IFS, HILL 67, 21st. Mon:
Weather - Very heavy rain. Shelling and mortaring against our positions continued. During the night the 6th Bde had taken quite a knocking but no ground was lost. In the late afternoon we were told that we would have to attack HILL 61 to relieve the ESSEX SCOTTISH who where having a bad time. At 1800 hrs, the Bn, under cover of a creeping barrage attacked successfully and consolidated, while the CAMERONS of CANADA attacked ST. ANDRE-sur-ORNE. During the night we were attacked by planes, but we suffered no casualties. Maj. FRASER commanding D Coy was wounded by a shell fragment while digging his slit trench and died a few hours later”. End.

On July 21 they managed to hold Dietrich's armoured formations, when operation Atlantic was called off, Canadian Forces held several positions on the ridge, including a now secured position on Point 67. As the Battle progressed on the 21st fighting off Jerry counterattacks from midnight, the Sasks passing through, two lead companies of The Essex Scottish who’re already taking heavy casualties from mortar bombs, snipers and heavy machinegun fire. “Dog Coy”, led by Capt. Cy Steele, overwhelmed by superior numbers of Jerries, with the immense fire power zeroing in, on their location, vigorously fought back Jerry counterattacks with heroics and gallantry, as small-arms fire thickened with overwhelming intensity, all-around them bodies lay scattered in a horrific surreal seen, as they already battled for two days. The wounded were mixed with the dead screaming and yelling in despaired sheer agony from their wounds. As “Pvt. Bill Greaves” of the Essex describes it, “I had to step around and over the bodies of The South Saskatchewans carpeting the slope”. They only had moments to contemplate what had accrued, as all went quite for a few seconds when in an instance, they’re hit by a hail of 88 mm shells fired at them by “Jerry” tanks. Machinegun fire laced into their ranks from several directions with no mercy, as they went to ground mortars zeroed in on them, this offered both companies no protection which still exposed them to Jerry. An order for an immediate withdraw was issued, as the vestige trace of the two Essex companies pulled back badly battered, in surreal disarray. The remnants of the South Saskatchewan had been withdrawn to reorganize. The enemy broke into the positions of the Essex Scottish, who suffered further heavy casualties, as the Camerons and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, penetrated deep into the position of the enemy. The fragmented remnants of the Essex in the forward area were also ordered to withdraw by afternoon. Their lines were very unstable and ready to be overrund by the Germans.

Simonds ordered The Camarons of Canada and The Black Watch placed under Brigadier Young's command, as the Regiments were sent to restore the Front Line, with support from the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. The barrage began at 18:00hrs as it rained heavily, The Camarons headed down Route d’Harcourt which leads from Point 67 to St Martin through May, attacking St. Andre-sur-Orne the first village from Point 67. They suffered 81 casualties, 29 dead. Since it was expected from the Generals, The Watch uphold their fitting spirit reputation. The Black Watch hastily moved parallel fallowing the train tracks which The Saska’s and The Essex moved down a day earlier and withdrew from in the afternoon that day, a few hundred meters away on their right flank the “Ladies” leaned into it with grit, moving up the gentale sloped ridge in small scattered groups with determination, in a Second World War “text-book operation”. Tanks remained on the road until the battalions antitank guns were deployed, with an effective tank and artillery support they recovered some ground that had been lost earlier that day, and were able to halt the aggressive counterattacks by the two SS Panzer divisions and 272 infantry with Air Support, the Watch Galantly stood its ground. That late night the forward positions were stabilized, on the lower slopes of the north end of the Ridge between the train tracks and Beauvior Farms situated on their left flank were the F.M.R with 7th armoured division held ground on the 20th. “The Ladies from Hell!” Lead by Cantlie, who was never in the rear with the gear, a soldiers soldier front line Officer with hart and guts, always in the lead as his men fallowed from behind, participating in Recce patrols assessing and seizing up the enemy for the next battle to come, always insuring the well being and safety of his men came First before Regimental Pride and Honour. Under the command of Lt.-Col. Cantlie a well seasoned respected Leader. You couldn’t deny the “Gameness,” the wiliness and the ability to conquer above all odds, that fitting spirit of “The Ladies” that resembled the “Dead Game” of 13th Batt! The honoured Gallantry and heroics of the Regiment, undeniably ever be questioned or at stack!

By days end, and despite these setbacks, Lt. –Gen. Simonds arrogant and opinionated attitude, in spite of all the appeals from many High ranking Officers, he forcefully urged on “that Verrières Ridge should be taken no matter the cost”. Jerries 272nd Infantry Div., reduced by casualties in Operation Goodwood, and Atlantic held Verrières Ridge with four battalions estimated at 600 men each. Battle groups of 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Div. were known to be in support. East of the Caen-Falaise highway, 1st SS Panzer Div. held Tilly-la-Campagne. 10th SS Panzer Div. was in reserve and 116th Panzer Div. on its way to the battlefront from north of the Seine. “Jerry” by midnight still held the ridge itself. The Operation declared a success which in fact was a disasters shame of needles carnage, 2nd Division in Op Atlantic had resulted in casualties estimated lost 1,349 men, including 249 killed and 200 evacuated for battle exhaustion, with no ground gain.

It's to be noted, the Casualty Numbers are estimates and believed to be much higher, and only God Know's.

For the 2nd Division the comparable figures were 1149 casualties, with 254 men losing their lives.

2nd Division casualties:
The South Saskatchewans with 215 casualties 62 dead.
The Essex Scottish with 244 casualties 37 dead.
The Camerons 81 casualties, 29 dead.
The Black Wacth numbers I'll add later

During the whole four days the nine infantry battalions of the 3rd Division suffered a total of 386 casualties, of which 89 were fatal.

3rd Division Casualties:
The Queens Own Rifles 100 casualties 77 wounded 23 dead.
Le Régiment de la Chaudière 92 casualties 72 wounded 20 dead.

The total casualties for all Canadian units in the theatre of operations, for the four days' fighting, were 1965 in all categories; 441 men were killed or died of wounds. It was an unimaginable defeat. Monty in total lost over 500 tanks and 5,537 Casualties.

From its horrific ordeals and misfortunes they suffered, 2nd Division recovered quickly. After the war Gen. Charles Foulkes, stated that “when we bumped into battle-experienced German troops we were no match for them.” However, Foulkes never explained why some Regiments were highly effective in their first battles with Jerry. Clear evidence shows the Essex & Saska. in the morning and afternoon on July 20, were successful in reaching their objectives and in the process of Kicking some serious Jerry Derrière on the gentled slopes of Verrières! That late afternoon when the torrential rains rumbled in, The Air Support was called of, with meager artillery support that inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as a well executed German counterattack devastated the South Saskatchewans and Essex Scottish, the infantry Regiments and armour, battled with Heroic Gallantry and held their own in the face of a well motivated determined, powerful opponent, and thats a fact that can never be debunked.