How we come to know what we know

Using some of the information in this thread or linked from it:
Roughly 50% of Allied tanks "knocked out" were attributed to gunfire (AT guns, TD's, Self Propelled AT guns, Tanks).
So...126/2 = 63 penetrations
63 x 2.25 = 141.75 casualties from penetrations from gunfire.

Is that correct? Or does the report count shaped charge weapons and indirect artillery at "penetrations". I seem to recall the thread on survivability you had some statistics on casualties inside/outside the tank.

A bit of a tangent, but still pretty interesting.

 

Goodwood is an extreme example and as such most of the casualties were due to AP penetration. The tank casualty figure is not the final tank loss figure. roughly 66% were repairable and put back into action. I will post 2 documents a little later.
There is no 'Goodwood' report. I just happen to have very detailed figures for 23rd Hussars that day and thus can join everything up.

 

Black6,

A very good post and a very good perspective to approach the subject from. I don't have the answers, but I do know a number of the questions that need to be answered.

Agreed the Sherman wasn't perfect, but did we have a better alternative? The new tank would have to be developed and selected in time for factories to tool up, the vehicle to have entered production, quantities produced to allow it to be fielded in sufficient numbers, allowing for crew and maintenance training, shipment to the war zone and integration into overseas units. D-Day was 6 June 1944 so all this should have been accomplished prior to this date. The T-20E3 and T-23E3 were standardized as the M27 and M27B1 in July 1943, this was our potential replacement tank. One of the most common complaints against the Panther was that it was placed in combat without sufficient time to work the bugs out, would this have been true of our M27 also? The Sherman was at least proven and availible in sufficient quantities.
T23E3 Medium Tank

We did the research and development but didn't field the tank. Was it sufficiently better than the Sherman to have done so?
The main gun was the 76mm M1A1 the same gun mounted on the 76mm Sherman. The 76mm gun was less effective firing the HE round than the 75mm but approximately 30% better AP capabilities. Both tanks used the same T23 turret. There was work done to install the T26 turret mounting the 90mm gun to the Sherman but it was realized that it couldn't enter production prior to the T-26 Pershing tank and would likely delay that vehicle so the project was dropped. So we can rule out the T-26 turret and since the 76mm Sherman used the same turret as the M27 this issue is a wash.
What we must determine is if the degradation in HE capability was outweighed by the increased AP capability.
The Sherman was a very reliable tank mechanically. Would the new tank be as reliable?
The Sherman had good mobility and was easily maintained, how would the new tank stack up?
Did the new hull offer significant additional protection? The Sherman M4A3 had 2"(50.80mm) 47 degree sloped armor, the 76mm and M4A3E8 2.5"(63.50), the M47 3"(76.20mm) sloped (not sure of angle) on the fronatal plate. Hull sides 1.5"(38.10mm) for the M4A3, 2"(50.80) for the M27. Now the 75mm KwK42 L/70 gun on the Panther could penetrate the following thicknesses of verticle armor at the specified ranges:
500meters=168mm
1000meters=149mm
1500meters=132mm
2000meters=116mm
While the new tank did offer better protection it was still insufficient to defeat the Panthers main gun.
Where the new tank was superior was in overall height being close to three feet shorter.
Now for another question, why do we keep comparing the Sherman to the Panther and Tiger when the most likely tank it would encounter was the PzIV?

Is the proper perspective, could we have fielded a better tank? or had we fielded the tanks we were developing, would they have provided significant improvements over the Sherman? I'm not convinced they would have, but I'm reserving judgement till other, more knowledgeable posters show me otherwise.

 

The US could, and did to an extent, do other things too. For example the M4A3E2 Jumbo. This Sherman variant had more armor than a Panther or a Tiger I by a pretty wide margin. There is nothing to say that the US simply couldn't have ordered the manufacturers to start putting thicker armor on all production Shermans if they wanted to. A Sherman with a 3" versus 2.5" glacis might be an example.

In the field a number of units did the expedient of welding one to two inches of armor on the glacis of their Shermans giving them the equivalent of a Panther's frontal hull armor.

The reason the T 23 and 25 were not adopted was the M 26 was a bigger improvement over the other two. The T 23 also suffered from having an electric drive system that added cost and complexity while not adding sufficent improvemen in other areas to warrant switching production.

Also in the works were the truly heavy tanks T 29 to T 34. The T29 was in most ways an M 60 with poorer fire control. It was all but imprevious to any German antitank gun from the front and could easily have drilled German AFV at battle ranges using HVAP ammuniton in its 105mm gun. The problem was the US development cycle was about 2 to 3 years long and that put these tanks in production at the earliest in late 1945 and more realistically sometime into 1946.

As it was, it was really only in the ETO that the US was having a major issue with their AFV and German tanks. Yes, there were some issues in Italy but that was largely an infantry war due to the terrain. For that sort of combat the M4 was perfectly adequite.

 

It is my personal opinion that the Sherman tank was by far the best thing that happened to the allies on the ground and that any comparison saying otherwise is simply uninformed. Unfortunately I can not afford the many good books I would like to own on armor of WWII so I am open to anyone with good information that can change this opinion.

 

The best thing that happened to the US Army Ground Forces during WWII was its field artillery. Even Patton said it was the field artillery that won the war.

Duckbill

 

JBark writes:

I posted earlier about a request by Eisenhower to Maj. Gen. Isaac White, commander 2nd Armored Division to compare German equipment to U.S equipment. White wrote on the subject of the U.S. medium tank: The M4A3E8 has comparable speed and manueverability to any German tank. The 76mm gun is reasonably satisfactory, provided sufficient HVAP ammunition were available. If it were possible to design and substitute a long barrel piece with muzzle brake and approx. 3400-3500fps muzzle velocity, similar to the German 75mm HV tank gun, this tank would be equal to anything our enemies have to offer.


I like the weasle words used by White regarding the 76mm gun. It would be reasonably satisfactory, provided with sufficient HVAP were available. Now that's "political." Of course there was the small problem that HVAP ammunition was as scarce as hen's teeth.

Not exactly a two thumbs up commendation for the M4 medium tank and its 76mm gun. I like Rose's assessment better. At least he didn't use words like reasonably satisfactory.

Thought this might be of interest considering White's comments about the M4 medium tank. Following the war a group of form commanders from the 2d AD prepared a group report for an advanced class at the Armored School. In describing the severe difficulties experienced by the division at Puffendorf on 17 November, this group of 2d AD said it was -- "the biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience" and the reason for the set back there was "the inferiority of our tanks in guns, armor, and maneuverability." (Mayo, Ordnance Department: On Beachead and Battlefront, p. 326.)

Duckbill

 

That's a lot of numbers. Can you tell us how they were collected?

Duckbill

 

What is your source, and what is your source's source?

Duckbill

 

Black6 wrote: People who are "fans" of the Sherman and sing its praises are basically accepting the loss of all of those who died because of its shortcomings.

In reply, JBark wrote: I'm not sure I understand this nor appreciate it. There are people on forums that resort to the tactic in debate of simply qualifying their opponent, discussing what might be in his or her head and ignoring the arguement/issue itself. What is the point of this? Making statements like this does nothing but demean you for suggesting such a thing. Leave this tactic to others that don't know better.

JBark,

Evidently Black6 is not the only person to express concerns about the poor tankers who died because of the M4 medium tank's shortcomings.

But it was in dependability that the American tank clearly outclassed the German; its powerful cold always be counted on to run without a breakdown. This advantage together with our superiority in numbers enabled us to surround the enemy in battle and knock out his tanks from their flanks. But, this willingness to expend Shermans offered little comfort to the crews who were force to expend themselves as well. [bold added for emphasis] (Gen. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 41.)

Duckbill

 

What is your source?

What was the size of this group?
Did they all agree on every conclusion or were there any dissenters?
What steps were taken to ensure they were a random sample from all units in 2nd AD and not just one part that was roughly handled?
Have you got the figures that show it was the biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience"?
'Following the war' is a rather loose description. Was it years months or decades after WW2 or the Korean War?

 

The quotation of General Patton is as follows: I do not have to tell you who won the war. You know our artillery did. (McKenny, The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775-2003, p.187)

Although poorly structured, your questions are, for the most part, appropriate. There is, however, an apparent gap in your understanding of qualitative vs quantitative studies. Recently you have presented small bits lifted from one or more quantitative studies, without any information about their sampling techniques utilized by the authors, or for that matter, their conclusions. This opens said studies, or more accurately your representations of them, to question regarding what they actually say, and how the authors arrived at their conclusions.

The 2d AD report prepared with the assistance of veteran officers from that division would need to be examined directly to determine, in so far as possible, the answers to your questions. However, the statement that the fighting around Puffendorf was the biggest tank battle in 2d AD experience is supported by Donald E. Houston in his book, Hell On Wheels: The 2d Armored Division, pp. 306-308 and 310-314.

On a related note, in my experience Armored School reports are sometimes bound/filed without the supporting documentation, in which case, it is next to impossible to verify every single detail. That is what makes research so much fun,….. the search, the hunt, so to speak.

This said, I wish to make it clear that I am more than willing to respond to these sort of questions as long as they are relevant and intelligently structured.

Duckbill

 

You posted a statement you had no way of verifying? Seems a bit odd to criticise others for it and then use a suspect sources to bolster your case.

Could you repost the tabulation (if any) from the book used to reach the conclusion you profer? A summation would do if you consider a full reposting of individual tank numbers too onerous a task.


If possible I would like to know the number of tanks involved at Puffendorf v the next 'biggest' engagement where 2nd AD were involved. Obviously you would not make any claims if you were not in full possesion of data on a number of engagements by 2nd AD. Was it way out in front or simply a case of say 20 more tanks than before?
Were any estimates made on the number of German tanks involved?

I note you made no mention of these difficulties until I asked about the data. I presume you simply forgot about it at the time and no doubt were going to privide a caution at a later date. I am sorry I jumped the gun and intervened before you were able to correct your oversight. There was no intention on my part to suggest you did this deliberately and I do hope it will not be seen as such by other posters in this thread. It was never my intention to cast aspersions on such a learned 'National Historian' as yourself.

And the opportunity to talk down to the presumptuous souls who think they know as much as you?

Why not give a direct link, page 326 as you say:

Chapter 17: Lessons of the Roer and the Ardennes

 

What seems missing from this debate is the dimension of time. In September 1939 Germany was on its 4th generation of tank (Pzkw I, II, III, and IV), perhaps 5th if you give 1/2 credit each to Pzkw35t/38t and Stug. III. The US at this time on the other hand possessed nothing better than a panzer II in its inventory, and not a great many of those in any event.

US designers began with a stop-gap in the form of the M-5 Stuart light tank which was better than the German light tanks (Pzkw I & II) and at least equal to the medium Pzkw 35t/38t. The M-3 Lee/Grant was better than the Pzkw III, at least equal to the Stug III, but inferior to the Pzkw IV. As a stop-gap it was a decent start.

The US real responce to German armor of 1939-41 was of course the M-4 Sherman. When compared to existing German types it was vastly superior to all types save the Pzkw IV for which it was at least equal to. The M-4 had the added benifit of being able to preform all the tasks done by the various German types.

The Germans were using the same types for its invasion of Russia so the presence of nearly 1,000 T-34/KV-1 tanks was something of a shock. The Pzkw VI Tiger had been under developement prior to start of the invasion and was greenlit for production. It would be until late 1942 before the first Tigers were deployed in Russia, and early 1943 before they were seen in North Africa. Roughly a year and a half after Germany concluded that such a tank would be needed. The early Tigers were in very small numbers, and suffered significant mechanical problems. The Pzkw V Panther would take longer (mid 1943) to deploy, and would suffer the same reliability issues as the early Tigers.

The US would not encounter these new types until early/mid 1943. The US did respond with the M-26 Pershing, which entered service in late 1944/early 1945. Remarkably about 2 years after first encountering the Tiger/Panther tanks. American development time seems to be in line with German development time.

How is it that the US is fautled for not deploying a tank design superior to an enemy tank design it has not even seen yet. Through out the war the US tankers were still more likely to encounter German armor inferior or equal to the Sherman. AFAIK there was no superior design left on the drawing boards when the Sherman was selected for production.

 

Well then, I certainly understand your pique at having the numbers on which so many of your posts rely being closely questioned, as well as the natural tendency to try and turn the tables so to speak (get it?). However, you have confused historical narrative as reported by respected military historians with tabular reports such as your ORO surveys. In this particular instance the former (historical narrative) falls squarely within the framework of what is generally considered common knowledge. The latter, which in this case consists of numerical reports sans methodology and conclusions, does not constitute common knowledge, and is, therefore open to all sorts of questioning. (not that the former is immune to interrogation.)

We are talking about very basic historical method here, and what you describe as “talking down” is in reality nothing, but rather simple observations regarding the perceived flaws in the few bits of data you have presented here. As mentioned previously, a brief description of the methodologies and conclusions of the authors of your surveys would do much to put to rest these questions about the validity and reliability of your data.

In an effort to get past this impasse I urge you to spend some time reading a little about historiography and historical method. You will no doubt benefit greatly from it, as I have and continue to do. There is no shortage of works on these twin subjects, and I would be more than happy to suggest a couple that I have found useful in my own education. Of course, we would have to move over to another sub-forum to accomplish this, but I am more than willing to devote the time to this joint endeavor if you are.

Bringing you up to speed on statistical analysis is an entirely different thing entirely, and due to its complexities I rather doubt that any amount of dialogue on the subject would serve as an adequate substitute for formal academic studies. Still, with the great mass of data you seem to have at your disposal, it would be seem to your advantage to invest the time in learning how to use it properly.

I hope this helps.

Duckbill

 

Exactly. Well said indeed. And as you point out, production of the T26 was delayed until it became available too late to have any real impact on armor operations.

Duckbill

 

Yes I get it. The rules you try and impose on others do not apply to you.
Would this be the same 'common knowledge' that caused you to claim the destruction of non-existent Tigers in Southern France?

I leave the viewer to draw their own conclusions on your protestations of innocence.

Like you provided the methodology used in the report you used as a reference for the 2nd AD at Puffendorf?

I urge you do more reading on the subject of anger management. So far you have shown a complete inability to deal rationaly with anyone daring to question your conclusions.

I also note your complete inability to answer a single point I put to you in my last post.
I take that as confirmation you have nothing to back any of the claims I questioned.

Here they are again:

Could you repost the tabulation (if any) from the book used to reach the conclusion you profer?
A summation would do if you consider a full reposting of individual tank numbers too onerous a task.


If possible I would like to know the number of tanks involved at Puffendorf v the next 'biggest' engagement where 2nd AD were involved. Obviously you would not make any claims if you were not in full possesion of data on a number of engagements by 2nd AD. Was it way out in front or simply a case of say 20 more tanks than before?
Were any estimates made on the number of German tanks involved?