Focus on the Pacific

On December 8th, 1941, Roosevelt was in a dilema. He thought it was essential for the United States to get involved in the war against Germany. To this end, he had slowly accelerated the undeclared naval war in the Atlantic against the Germans, hoping for an incident that would spark such a war. To him, the war against the Japanese was just a distraction. His main problem was that the isolationist attitude in the United States was still strong. They were outraged against Japan; there was no problem there. However, there was still not support in Congress or among the populace for an outright war against Germany.

On December 13th, Hitler made perhaps the most stupendous blunder in his career: he declared war on the United States. Roosevelt's dilema solved.

What I'd like to speculate about: What would have happened if Hitler had not declared war on the U.S.? How would the war have gone there if the United States had been able to concentrate - at least for the first year - on the destruction of Japan?

One significant item I can contribute right away - 90+% of the production of landing craft in the U.S. went to the Atlantic in preparation for Operation Torch. The U.S. Navy wanted to drive through the central Pacific and cut off all the Japanese bases in the southern Pacific. Due to a shortage of landing craft, this project did not start until basically 1944. What if it could have taken place starting in November of 1942?

 

Care to cite a source as to that fact?

You can have ALL the landing craft you want, a major offensive through the Central Pacific won't start until sometime around the beginning of 1944. Why? Because all of your landing craft do not contribute one iota to the amount of aircraft you can put into the sky. The Central Pacific Island chains lie mostly outside the cover of land-based fighters, so you will need aircraft carriers to provide aircover for you invasion forces. When did Operation Galvanic take place - November, 1943. Tasked to defend this force were 3 Essex class carriers, USS Essex, USS Yorktown, and USS Lexington, and 3 Independence class light carriers, USS Independence, USS Belleau Wood, and USS Cowpens. These carriers would not be around for your proposed invasions of 1942, nor would they be there for the better half of 1943.

Also, don't forget that Macarthur's forces were also driving up through the South-west Pacific area at the same time, and his forces would also need naval and logistical support. Where there enough supplies in the Pacific during late 1942 to support two drives, I don't think so, but am not certain.

So, no I don't see a Central Pacific campaign happening any earlier than it did.

 

LouisXIV is correct about the landing craft. Many had been stockpiled on the east coast ports in preparation for the invasion of North Africa. So with that operation not going to happen, they would be available for use in the Pacific.

But Takao is also right that the invasion of the Central Pacific wasn't going to happen till late 1943.

So all these additional resources being made available would only help the allies on the periphery, in the Solomon's, New Guinea, Aleutians and CBI. But it wouldn't be decisive until the full weight of allied airpower is brought to bare. And that wouldn't be until the later part of 1943.

 

Sorry, I seem to have "lucky" 13th stuck in my head.

I remember reading that May 1942 was the true turning point of the naval war in the Pacific, not because of the beginning of the battle of Midway, but because the first US carrier came off the ways: U.S.S. Essex. After that, there was supposed to be approximately one carrier a month completed. Give them one year to work up and you have six carriers by Oct. 43. Which means that they couldn't have hurried their timetable for Betio much at all.

However, would it be worth considering how the various ships left in the Atlantic might have influenced the earlier battles? If nothing else, there were usually one or two aircraft carriers working in the Altantic. If the U.S. Navy had even one more carrier to deploy at the Coral Sea, Midway, 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, Eastern Solomons, etc., how much could that extra air power have influenced the outcome?

But then again, how well would the British have done against the German U-boats without the help of the U.S. Navy?

 

Check your date, the USS Essex was launched on July 31, 1942.
Aircraft Carrier Photo Index: USS ESSEX (CV-9)

The two carriers left in the Atlantic were the USS Ranger(CV-4) and the USS Wasp(CV-7). The Ranger was not considered "fit" to see action in the Pacific, so was kept in the Atlantic. The Ranger would eventually make it to the Pacific, but not until July, 1944, and then only as a training carrier operating out of Pearl Harbor.

The Wasp would deliver two deckloads of Spitfires to Malta, thus helping to keep Malta out of German hands. The Wasp would miss out on the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, but would make it to the Pacific in time for Guadalcanal. However, the USS Wasp would miss the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, as she was sent away to resupply. The USS Wasp would be sunk on September 15, 1942.

The CVEs were starting to be commissioned in 1942, and by late '42, four would be in the Pacific. Those numbers would be substantially increased by late 1943.

 

The Central Pacific did indeed depend on carriers; our first landing, in the Gilberts, involved no fewer than 18, besides those already mentioned, Bunker Hill, Enterprise, Saratoga, Princeton, Monterey, and seven CVEs.

One more carrier, or just one more dive bomber squadron, could have made a difference at Midway, assuming it located the enemy about the same time as Enterprise and Yorktown's aircraft. The likely target would have been Hiryu, which in turn would have spared Yorktown coming under attack. Another carrier at Santa Cruz might have been able to provide air cover for the damaged Hornet; she was under tow and her engineers had just restarted a boiler when a small Japanese group - 6-9 planes - scored one more torpedo hit in the engineering spaces.

The Pacific would also have more CVEs, especially if non-involvement in Europe kept us from giving so many to the British. There were seven American-built CVEs in Torch in November 1942 and at least nine more in combat by September 1943; several others were used for training or aircraft transport.

Nonetheless the Central Pacific offensive could not get underway much earlier than it did. The new CVs and CVLs first entered combat in August 1943, and ironically the sheer number of carriers necessitated some "makee learn" raids on various Japanese islands to develop and test tactics.

By default our main effort in 1942-43 would fall in the South and Southwest Pacific, supported primarily by land-based air although the carriers would certainly contribute as they did historically. Rather than being "Operation Shoestring" it would be the main focus of the American war effort, including the equivalents of Operation Torch, 8th Air Force*, etc. The main limiting factor would probably be establishing the necessary bases and logistic infrastruture in places like the Solomons or northern Australia. Nonetheless we could expect the campaigns to progress much more rapidly; MacArthur might be well on his way to the Philippines before the Navy was ready to open its Central Pacific drive.

* one curious item, the S/SW Pacific were the last theaters to get the P-38 fighter, which ended up playing such a prominent role there. Not only Europe but Iceland and the Aleutians had P-38s before Halsey or MacArthur did.

One note, the only landing craft used in Torch were those like LCVPs which were carried aboard transport ships. American LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs were first employed in the Sicily landings in July 1943.

 

Well said Carronade, and if I'm not mistaken the "Higgins" boats used at torch were still lacking the front ramp debarking feature weren't they? For some reason that sticks in my mind, or maybe a few were lacking the front ramp and some had it?

 

Thanks, Clint. Not sure about the Higgins boats, but I think you're right. I know many of the Higgins boats at Guadalcanal a few months earlier were rampless. There was also an intermediate model with a narrow ramp for troops only, between two machine gun tubs, looked more like a "normal" boat.

 

Guadalcanal would be far different if the US fast battleships in the Atlantic would have been released to the Pacific immediatly after Pearl Harbor.

Imagine having four or five BB's for use to patrol the waters off of that island.

 

MMMMM, curious here. Which "fast BB's" were available in 1942?

 

In the first place most of the new BBs didn't start showing up till late summer of '42. North Carolina took part in the invasion of Guadalcanal in August as an escort to the carriers. Washington was sent from the ETO to the Pacific in September and became Lee's flagship. South Dakota came to the Pacific in September, and I believe Indiana came directly to the Pacific after shakedown in November. Alabama and Massachusetts, I believed stayed in ETO till later in the war.

Regardless, it was against naval doctrine at the time to have battleships operate in confined waters like Iron Bottom against surface ships. When they were sent, it was against that doctrine-showing the desperation facing the Marines, a good move by Halsey and completely unexpected by the enemy.

 

USS North Carolina - Spent the opening months of WW2 in the Atlantic and arrived in the Pacific shortly after the Battle of Midway. She spent her time during the Guadalcanal campaign escorting the carriers.
USS Washington - Her time in the Atlantic and then in overhaul, would cause her to miss the opening of the Guadalcanal campaign, she arrived in the Pacific and became an active participant in the Guadalcanal campaign by September, 1942.
USS South Dakota - left for the Pacific shortly after completing her shakedown cruise.
USS Indiana - Left for the Pacific shortly after completing her shakedown cruise.
USS Massachusetts - Spent her time in the Atlantic and did not arrive in the Pacific until 1943. Given that she was completed at roughly the same time as the Indiana, it is unlikely that she would have seen action prior to November, 1942.
USS Alabama - while commissioned in late 1942, was not ready for combat until mid-January, 1943.

That only leaves you with the USS Washington and USS Massachusetts missing action in the Guadalcanal campaign because of time in the Atlantic. Both ships probably would have been with the carriers, but that may have just been enough to save the carrier Hornet.

 

Washington was actually nearby at Santa Cruz, when Hornet was lost. For some reason she was leading a force called IIRC TF64 which also included one CA, CL Helena, an Atlanta class CL, and six DDs; but they were nowhere near the carriers. TF64 had about the same AA firepower as the Enterprise or Hornet formations, or to put it another way, there would have been 50% more firepower if these ships had been included in the carriers' screens or at least stationed within supporting distance.

November 1942 is exactly right for Massachusetts; she was in Torch and engaged French vessels including the stationary, incomplete battleship Jean Bart.

 

Task Force 64 had been detached to patrol the area to the south of Guadalcanal between Rennell Island and San Cristobal, where the were to engage any Japanese reinforcements or bombardment groups.

 

Speaking only of the USS Washington here. She went to Scapa Flow, so the Royal Navy could spare ships to secure Madagascar from the Japanese. As soon as that was done, the W was released to the Pacific.

 

The original Higgins boat was the LCP.. no ramp. Bureau of Construction & Repair designed the narrow-ramped LCPR and wanted Higgins to build it, but A.J. Higgins hated the design, saying it made the boat too bow heavy (a couple of soldiers had been drowned during testing when one grounded further out and they leapt into water over their heads) and refused to build it.

C&R awarded the contract to Chris Craft and even went as far as to divert engines from the Higgins factory to ensure their design saw service first, but Higgins LCPR design was the better one and eventually won the production battle anyway as Higgins operation was leagues more effective than Chris Craft's.

So, while the LCPR might have been colloquially called a Higgins boat during the war, it really wasn't.

 

Higgins LCPR design was the better one - is that what eventually became the LCVP? Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel - the full-width ramp allowed it to carry small vehicles like jeeps although it continued to be best known as an infantry assault craft.

 

No, it would be better to call it parallel development as opposed to the LCPR leading to the LCVP.

A good book to read is Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats That Won World War II which is what I'm basing most of my statements on. You can find snippets of it on google books if you can't afford the book, inter-library loan, etc.