Operation Blue

Yes the Fuhrer could have taken a leaf out of Uncle Joe's book for that one, I wonder if the order for the scorched earth policy had a factor in this, the futher the Germans went the more they ran out of supplys and the Russian land scape offered them nothing.

 

maybe some nuances and corrections:
1) The Red Army lost heavy in the spring battles against AGS(Kharkov costed 240.000 men)
2)But these battles had cost the Germans valuble time
3)The Red Army had gained experience in anticipating German encircling attacks.
4)The notorious order of 28 july which threatened deserters,cowards and panic-mongers with the harshest punishment,contained also the demand "not one step back"(probably,because there were signs of panic),but,I am convinced that afterwards,the order was cancelled .
From the TDI,the German claims for captured Russia personnell in 1942.
january:44082
february:18428(incomplete)
march:37700
april:29786
may:295915
june:227408
july:not known
august:297825
september:113727
october:52048
november:31907
december:31282
I think that the following not would wrong:
in 1942,the Germans succeeded in taking a lot of POW,but the main Russian forces escaped (one of the reasons being a shortage of mobile forces on German side,an other one being big Russian attacks against AGN and AGC,attacks which were absorping German reserves).On 24 june 1941,the German strength in the east was the following (without security divisins):
AGN:36 2/2 divisions
AGC:61 divisions
AGS:60 1/2 divisions
11Army (Crimea :8 divisions)

 

Here are some rough figures of German monthly losses in 1942(first :AGN +AGC,second AGS)
may:N+C 41000 S:41000
june: 34000 53000
july 38000 57000
august 96000 68000
september64000 68000
I think that these figures explain (for a lot) the failure of Blau .

 

The German objective of Operation Blau was the capture of the Caucasus. The plans did not even called for the capture of Stalingrad, but to be close enough to be subjected to artillery fire. The purpose of Stalingrad was to cut off the main communications center (both of railriad and oil) leading to and from the Caucasus and form a defensive screen there along the Don.
Whether Germany would have been able to hold that front is debatable, but possible. Make a note that if the Germans would have not used so many resources for the capture of Stalingrad, they would have been in a way better shape to face the Russians during the winter. The Germans had already a large part of Stalingrad by September and the offensive in that sector of the front would have ended there.

On the other hand, the Germans would have threatened the British oil fields in the middle east, which meant less troops against Rommel. The Rommel issue is, however, another story, beginning with the capture of Malta.

Cheers Guate4
​

 

Gaute4, First welcome to the forum.

Clearly Germany lacked the means to capture both objectives at the same time. If they chose one the logical choice would be the Volga river as it was closer and offered some advantage defensively. But of course Hitler desired the oil. Had he concentrated on the oil fields,he might possibly have got there, but could he stay? American logistics would find supplying an army that distance over such terrain a challenge. Germany would find it all most impossible. If you cannot fully supply the troops there, how can you push on over similar terrain to reach the Middle-East oil fields?

This line of attack still requires the deployment of the Italian-Hungarian-Rumanian armys over open steppe. They would still be the focus of a soviet winter offensive that would shatter an axis main line of resistance. Perhaps no german army might get encircled and destroyed, but would still be forced into head long retreat, with the loss of men and equipment. By the late summer of 1942 Germany was running out of time.

 

I think the idea of Plan Blue was strategically sound (when formulating it, Hitler and at least some of his generals felt that the war in the East was winnable). If the Germans were able to seize the Caucasus Oil fields, the nothern flank of Army Group South would have been protected by the length of the Don, so they might have expected to be comfortably placed in winter - with more territory then they had in 1941 and with the USSR without oil.
The capture of Stalingrad did not originally feature in the plan - I think it would have been sufficient for the Germans to have controlled the small area between the Don and Volga, on the approaches to Stalingrad and to be able to interdict traffic on the Volga.

The problem with Blue was that there were inadequate resources for the Germans to pursue simultaneous objectives - on diverging axis (Stalingrad and the Caucasus). As a prelude to Blue, they might have tried to shorten the front by withdrawing from the Rzhev salient (which they did in 1943) and not send Manstien's 11th Army to Leningrad. This might have created sufficient reserves behind the Don bend, to prevent the destruction of the Satillite armies (and 6th Army) that later happened.

 

Leningrad was virtually empty of strong troop concentrations in 1941 and could have been captured easily. German intelligence failed, as it had so many other times, and the Germans decided to lay siege to it instead (costly and ineffective). German intelligence did not realize the Red Army had so many reserves, such mighty industry, and such good tanks. I would say the failure of the war rests on the German intelligence, the Abwehr. Wilhelm Canaris was a traitor to his country during the war, and was likely holding on to information or engaging in disinformation that benefited the allied side.
Blue was doomed from the start because 1) there were no enough trucks, and transport for motorized divisions, needed for capitalizing on breakthroughs and such, and 2) Hitler's new position as head of the OKW and minister of war allowed him unfettered power to meddle in military affairs he knew nothing about, andhad no accountability for. He abused this power, and destroyed any chance of success because of a lack of clear strategic objectives for the Wehrmacht, insufficiently planned logistics for supplies, etc. for the troops, and no increased production at home. Only during 1943 was German industry increasing its output thanks to Albert Speer. Hitler blamed his generals for his own failures, and subsequently weeded out most of the talent that could've won him the war. Also, as mentioned above, the German intelligence services the SD and the Abwehr were sorely lacking in quality.

 

Ah,the good (sarcasm) old theory(better :myth) that Germany was defeated by the incompetence of Hitler and by treason .
1) The theory that Canaris was a traitor,is BS,unless you have reliable proofs
2) the intelligence gathering on the east front was no business of Canaris,but of Fremde Heere Ost
3) That only in 1943 the German industry was increasing its output thanks to Speer is the same BS as point 1
4)That the Germans could have won the war without Hitler,is an invention of the goose-stepping fanboys to excuse the German defeat .
I have the impression to reread "the German Generals talk" or "Panzerleader"

 

First of all the Germans did not have enough infantry to get to the south Caucausus, especially with the mountains. The amount of troops the Germans would need to take the Caucausus would mean little for the Volga. The distance from Rostov to Baku is about the same as the distance from Rostov to the Romanian border. The area The further south the Germans went the more they would need infantry and this means the Volga would have to be covered by the German allies. A critical weakness of the German tank armies is that they can defend, but not hold territory, which requires infantry. So if the German had not tried to take Stalingrad the Soviets could have ended up encircling the troops in the Caucausus when they launched their offence.

 

There is an endless debate on this topic, and for good reason.
Some very obviously bad decisions were made by Hitler. Mostly the all costs capture of a ruined city with little strategic value.
Capturing the oil was Hitler's plan from the beginning. Adaptable he was not.
But the next best thing to capturing is destroying, and denying its use.
There is an interesting article by Joel Hayward, Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production

The theme is that Baku(and Grozny) was within range of German bombers. It would have been a major under taking, but there had been a similar Luftwaffe operation mounted in Kharkov.
There was a period in July/August 1942 where the Red Air Force's presence in the region was minimal. And just as importantly, it was known to the Germans it was minimal.
At that time, 80% of the Soviet Union's oil was channeled through Baku. Luftwaffe assets were instead mostly squandered on Stalingrad.

As has been previously discussed, the Caucasus oil wasn't really all that useful to the Germans. They had limited means of transporting it. Now the damage would have been temporary, but it still could have been a devastating blow. Major shock to the Soviet economy.
Hitler did eventually order an attack in October, but the window had closed. Too few German planes by that time, and the Red Air Force did figure out the danger that was present.

 

The one air unit that was capable of naval interdiction was sent to the Med to support Rommel not long after the capture of the crimea. As shown in the BOB, Germany did not have strategic bombing capacity. The bombers would be without escort, have limited load capacity and even from the Crimea the range is quite far for Baku.

 

naval interdiction? That seems closer to another thread I started which did involve the Black Sea.
This was about hitting ground targets, i.e the Baku oil terminus.
The Germans did have strategic bombing capacity, if they stripped other areas of bombing assets. This is what had been done previously for Kharkov.
The Moscow region was pretty quiet, this is detailed in the paper mentioned.
But the bombers would have been without escort for part of the route, not a free lunch. Losses would have happened.
The originating airbases would have beenFliegerkorps IVs forward airfields around Voroshilovsk and in the region between the Kuma and Terek Rivers.

 

Personally I think summer 1942 operation was no more " a war winning operation ". Hitler could only achieve a major offensive in one Army Group Area, which could win land area but not the war. The other two AG`s were stripped of troops,armor,vehicles,men as much as possible and more. Also Stalin had gathered his troops to protect Moscow, so it took some time for the Red Army to make the arrangements to move troops south. The tide had already turned.

If you talk about the Generals winning the war in the east without Hitler, you must remember that almost all rejected the idea of Barbarossa, incl Rundstedt and Guderian.

 

I think one must be cautious in how winning/losing is defined here.
Certainly Hitler's intentions were to carve out a large section of USSR territory, and keep it, especially the oil regions.
But if you have a situation where Hitler isn't quite so self destructive, and reason takes hold, then some other scenarios are possible.
If 6th Army isn't thrown on the funeral pyre of Stalingrad, the sides are more evenly matched.
Stalemate at/in the Caucasus? Black Sea Fleet driven off? If the Germans had waged a defensive battle, forcing them out could have been a daunting task.
Eventually, combined Allied forces would seem to have the advantage. But new potential German allies muddy the water, i.e. Turkey/Georgia/and various Caucasus groups.

 

Is that so? Care to elaborate?

A for blue, yes the Germans had some mishaps but curious if you can name some Red army short comings...

 

German production in 1943 was increased, and by 1944 it had produced more aircraft and tanks than at any other time in the war. How an you say it is BS that albert speer was responsible for this? Of course he was! Haven't you seen the series "World at War", when Speer and the German finance minister were interviewed? Just look at the numbers. Josef Goebbels' total war campaign also spurred on production by increasing initiative of manufacturers and concentrating their resources, but it was Speer who was responsible for the logistics. He had an amount of power unique in the Third Reich, and he used it to its maximum poetential.

 

There is considerable debate these days as to whether or not Speer was responsible for the increases in production. Read Wages of Destruction for an alternate view and a lot of information on the Nazi economy.

 

There are threads on Speer if one wishes to discuss the meaning of Speer for the production of armaments. However here´s a little part from Wages of destruction:

From " Wages of destruction " some interesting parts...

" Responsibility for the Committees within the Armaments Ministry lay within the so-called Technishces Amt. Head of the Amt was Karl Otto Saur. Any idea that the Speer Ministry was a haven of "Unideological efficiency" is rendered absurd by the central position occupied within it by Saur.Saur was the living embodiment of the "political engineer". After Todt´s death , Saur rapidly developed a close working relationship with Speer. And he continued in his role as the Rottweiler of the Armaments Ministry until the very last days of war."

" In early autumn 1943, the Air Ministry had drafted its own plan to bolster Germany´s fighter defences ( remember Milch was leading the Luftwaffe production ). But rather than assisting Milch in the implementation of this crucial production drive, Speer had conspired with Willy Messerschmitt to unseat the priority of the Me 262.

The Autumn 1943 was filled with acrimonious meetings, in which Speer launched a dramatic personal attack on Willian Werner, the same man who two years earlier had been universally acclaimed as the leading expert on mass-production.

It was only in February 1944, once control over aircraft production had passed to the Speer Ministry, that everything suddenly changed. Not only did Speer´s Jaegerstab take credit for the resources accumulated by the Air Ministry in 1943. Saur and his cohorts were also free to adopt a programme in the summer of 1944 that was virtually identical to the "impractical" Air Ministry proposal of nine months earlier."


" To ensure that the figures for July 1944 really were the highest on record, Speer added the prospective output of August to the July totals."

 

Of course,in an interview,Speer would claim all the merits for him.

 

Excellent book. Speer was not the only one who claims that if only we had blank we would have won.