The story of a Russian bomber

It was also surprising and unexpected for me. I mean - that the among pilots were so many violations. I even asked my father about this. His opinion was important for me because he served in the Air Force from 1959 to 1965, as a NCO. He started his career as an aircraft maintenance technician, and graduated as a parachute instructor. His superior officers were officers who participated in WWII. So, he said that no wonder. It would be for two reasons. The first: long-range bombers had fewer combat missions, fewer jobs. They had time to rest and drink alcohol. In contrast, the fighters were flying without interruption. Sometimes they could not get out of the cab. They haven't any strength. They haven't time for relax. In the second (in the words of my father), pilots always been poorly managed. He said that they had proverb: "Where the Air Force begins, there ends the discipline." Perhaps this is due to their high mortality. Or conversely, they are often killed because of their lack of control. I wonder whether there was such a feature (low discipline, a kind of exclusivity) in the Luftwaffe? Although the Germans, I think in general as people are more disciplined.
In a city where I was born, was a military school fighter pilots. I know that the training of pilots required a lot of money and resources. Perhaps this is why the pilots allowed themselves some liberties. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that to be a pilot even in peacetime - is a big risk, and time of war - this is already heroism.

 

One of my favorite books, is Hurricanes Over Murmansk by John Golley. The story of RAF Sqdn 151 that brough lend lease Hurricane's to Russia. Excellent book, and the RAF squadron overall, had a very high opinion of their (then Soviet) counterparts. They saw in them, the same feelings that RAF pilots had during the Battle of Britain, defending their homeland. Fight hard, party hard.

Your father was in the Air Force during a very interesting time, to say the least! I was also what we used to call a "Cold Warrior," when the US and USSR weren't behaving well, lol. About ten after your dad though.

 

I apologize for the silence in this thread. I'm going to continue searching in the Archives next week.
And more. Earlier I wrote that after studying some archives documents I was clear reason for such large losses of weapons of the Red Army in the early months of the war.
I mean the following. June 22, 1941, each Aviation Regiment of the 40th Division has 50-60 aircraft.
Further I quoting from the documents.
"On August 15, 1941:
- in the 53rd Regiment has serviceable aircraft - 0.
- in the 200th Regiment has serviceable aircraft - 4."
The 40th Division was stationed away from the front line. It could not suffer from the bombing of the Luftwaffe. Number of crew lost less than the number of lost aircraft. Where are the other planes?
I can only give the following explanation.
Since the USSR was due to the rush of the approaching war (and for other reasons - I wrote above) - any equipment, weapons were low quality. A part of aircraft in military units were faulty. In peace time (before the war), the regimental or division commander intentionally reduced the quantity of defective aircraft. For example, he reported that there were only two defective plans (and really there were 10). If he had told the truth, he could be shot for sabotage. Because the Soviet machinery - the most advanced! Bla-bla-bla...
While the planes were on the ground - this fact could be hide. But when the war broke out and the planes had to be raised into the air, keep them against the enemy, it has become impossible to cheat. Therefore, since July 1941 the number of reports, which lists the defective planes is becoming more and more. They require replacement motors, spars, some other part of the aircraft. They write that from three planes have been collected one plane, but it also broke down after the first flight and so.
I would not be surprised if the same situation was in another units, like panzer units.
And recently I have read the next: "Fully one-half of all Red Army tank losses resulted from poor maintenance, supply, driving and other non-combat causes." This is from Robert Kirchubel book`s "Operation Barbarossa".
I think that if we just compare the numbers: how many tanks / aircraft was the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941, we will see a distorted picture. Unfortunately, the mere indication of the number of arms does not give the reason the first defeats of the Red Army.

 

I am really enjoying this thrilling thread. Thanks for your dedication Iru. I'm quite impressed by the identification plate of that Russian aircraft. It is quite artistic to say the least.

 

Hello all. I remind you that I know the number of aircraft (and engines), which lies 200 kilometers from Moscow, in a swampy area. But I do not have any information about its crew and the circumstances of this crash. I have only memories of witnesses - the village people, who lives near which it lies. This aircraft, the DB-3F, belongs to the long-range bombers. In autumn 1941,units of long-range bombers had the following levels: Regiment - Division - Headquarters Air Force - the General Staff. In January, I checked the documents of all Divisions of long-range aircraft. Information about the number of aircraft and engines were not in each Division. I thought that the general information of all aircraft must be in a higher level. That is, in the documents of the Air Staff.
So this week I searching for documents that are stored in the Fund of Headquarter of the Air Force . I received the documents, which have dates about the distribution of aircraft, manufactured by military factories. This is a big mountain of documents (daily updates, reports, correspondence, instructions, regulations, orders, letters). There are a lot of numbers on the production of aircraft: how many aircraft, what type, in which the plant must be carried out (the plan). There are actual numbers of production aircraft. Typically, these figures are lower than plan. There are many explanations for why the plan is not implemented. And so on. There are numbers: how many planes sent on each front (or military units).
I also received the documents, which contain dates about aircraft losses, from June to December 1941. This mountain of numbers describes the loss. How many planes were shot down by enemy planes, how many were shot down as a mistake by their own planes and antiaircraft guns. How many accidents, breakdowns, malfunctions, and their investigations. These dates are repeated for each military unit.
But in each document deals only with quantity. Nowhere mentioned individual numbers of planes and engines. This is very disappointing news to me. I thought I chose the wrong way and asked for other documents, which contain a list (inventory) individual numbers of aircraft. I was given these documents. But they contained data only from 1943. I just could not believe his eyes. I began to think that the archive staff simply do not want help me, but they argued that the documents with the individual numbers of aircraft before 1943 year does not exist.
Then I went home and started studying the Internet experience of others who have made similar investigations. (My fault that I have not done this before - I was too self-confident.) And I learned the bad news. It would be better if I quote from memory of Air Force General Shishkov:
"Unfortunately, we must note that before the war, the Air Force was not a general effective system for monitoring the presence and state of health of the fleet. Each service from the troops received their reports, which are not fully reflect the real situation and were not identical. This is especially evident in the first period of war. Reports from the western areas of battles, sent in the service of the Air Force, contained different data of the availability of aircraft and their loss. These dates differed among themselves in several times. In order to identify the true situation in July 1941 special group of officers from the CA Air Force were sent to military units and in August 1941 an order on the People's Commissar of Defense issued rediscount all aircraft at the front and rear and on the establishment of the Office of Procurement Logistics Division Air Force Accounting aircraft and engines. But a hastily entered the accounting system had several shortcomings and do not fully meet the requirements of military time.
At the initiative of the Party Central Committee member of the Military Council of the Air Force Gen. Shimanov (While he was head of the Aviation Department of the Communist Party) has been developed accounting system of individual records aircraft and engines.
By order of the People's Commissar of Defense, in July 1943, this system was put into practice and has since been operating to date. "
In other words, before 1943, individual accounting system of plans and engines in the Air Force of the Red Army was absent.
To be continued ...

 

Another great installment!

 

View attachment 15859

It is interesting, that I could understand this problem before. The fact that there is an important and well-known document I read several time. I mean, the war with Finland in 1939/1940-m showed all disadvantages of the Red Army. As a result, Stalin decided to replace Minister of Defense Voroshilov on Tymoshenko. In the spring of 1940 Marshal Timoshenko finished to get responsibility from Voroshilov. The result of it has been issued as a special document, which described all the shortcomings of the Red Army. Document was signed on 8th of May 1940. Now this document is declassified. I don`t know whether it is published in English, but you can see the Russian version of it here:
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/akt-vor-tim.shtml
This is a very long list of problems the Red Army. I read it before, but I did not pay attention to the words of the section that describes the problem of the Air Force. Problem number two reads: "The state of registration of aircraft and engines is not satisfactory, and the qualitative account completely don`t organized and underway."
It was written in the spring of 1940. Now I have to admit that this problem was solved only in 1943. And now, this problem really prevents me to determine the fate of the crew.
Experts (people who have already done a similar search), with whom I contacted through the Internet, told me that to find the right number of aircraft in 1941 - a great success. They confirmed that these documents are not systematic and it should be checked all the folders in a row.
So, then I will search these data among the documents of aircraft aviation regiments. Aviation Regiment - is the smallest independent military unit of Air Force of Red Army. Throughout beginning the war, they constantly reshape, as they suffered heavy losses. Aviation Regiments - this is the last area of the documents where I can find anything.
At the same time, I am negotiating with a public search organization "Trizna." This organization is engaged in excavations on the fighting places . They revive the names of dead soldiers and reburial them. They also engaged in excavations of military equipment. You can see photos of his work, as an example, here: http://www.trizna.ru/index.php?opti...--2007-&catid=5:2011-04-19-08-49-48&Itemid=11
Now we have agreed that in the spring we will visit the place where the aircraft lied, for intelligence. The excavation would be done in August, when the water level will be very minimal.
In the end of today's message I would like to write about an interesting document that I saw this week. It describes the testing of "new Russian secret weapon", held in the autumn of 1941. This is the secret weapon manufactured as follows. The huge but obsolete TB-3 aircraft was loaded with explosives phosphate or so. The crew flew on this plane. Then this crew jumped with a parachute. The plane flew on without crew. This aircraft is controlled by radio from the second aircraft (DB-3), which flew behind him. Then the second plane gave the command to go into a dive and the plane without the crew fell to the target and exploded. It has been used several of these aircraft bombers. Their use is quickly ended. Firstly because of outdated aircraft were few. Secondly, the second plane had to fly close to the first plane (power transmitter was small) and at low speed. Luftwaffe could easily bring down the second plane. Such was the attempt to use "new technologies" to save the lives of soldiers of Red Army.
To be continued ...

 

So, my search of way of the aircraft with number 5605 did not bring any result. Unfortunately, in the near future, I will have not free time to visit the Archives. However, in the Archives, I met other researchers who work there permanently. They agreed to help me continue the search (in addition to his main work). In general, I spent four weeks in the archives (two - in January and two - in February). The main reason for my lack of success - is the lack of ordering document storage. These documents are too much. And they kept a bit chaotic.
For example, a folder named "Control orders aircraft and engines." I was hoping to see where the data on numbers of aircraft. But inside, I saw a document called the "military-geographical description of the Bialystok salient." (This is a very interesting document for those who study the initial period of the invasion of Russia. Fact that many of the Red Army units was concentrated in this silent).
The other folder is called - "Correspondence for secret matters." And there were valuable search information: a list of the DB-3 aircraft, with their numbers and distribution of military units. But the date of this document has been - June 17, 1941. And I was looking for such data for July - August 1941.
In short, it's like looking for needles in a haystack. But I do not any regret the time spent on this. I read a lot of interesting documents, by which I learned a lot. Most of them relate to long-bomber aircraft. Some news sounds fantastic. For example, I read the document, which described the test for refueling aircraft, the DB-3 during flight in the air. The main problem was that it was difficult to catch the hose from the airplane - tanker. Because the pilot caught it with his hands (during flight). These tests were conducted in 1941. Another document describes the testing of DB-3 aircraft, which was used as a scout. It was an unusual aircraft. A special separate cabin was attached to bottom of it. During the flight, one of the crew moved to this cabin. The cabin detach from the aircraft and fell down on the rope. The rope length can be 500 meters. Thus the plane could be in the clouds (not available for fighter aircraft), and a cabin with a scout on a rope hanging down. The scout watched and recorded the data. Then this separate cabin rose and clings to the plane. After that, the plane sat on the ground. Thus, Air Force try to solve his problems without high-tech.
Some documents have changed my opinion on the whole period of the war. These documents are not amenable to logic. For example, in January 1941, Russia was not sure - it will be at war with Japan or not. Nevertheless, I read the paper (January 1941), which states that we have to finish all building of defensive structures in the Far East and all building units should be transported to the West for for the construction of fortifications there. And vice-versa. In October of 1941 in Russia was a difficult time. Nevertheless, I found a document that tells that 40 pilots was sent to the Far East. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the pilots on the Eastern Front was more than airplanes. And these pilots were sent to the Far East, where the planes are still preserved.
Separately I would like to write about another fact. There is much debate about what Hitler started a preventive war. Allegedly, the Soviet Union, too, was preparing for war. As evidence, historians discussed about a declassified document from Navy. This document is often cited. I also brought him to this forum. This document was written in peacetime. But it describes the consumption of ammunition "for the first month of the war." Even Suvorov mentions this document as a proof: "War had not, but the admiral said about consumption of ammunition" for the first month of the war". So. I ought to say that I have seen many of these documents are written in peacetime, but contain the phrase "In the first month of the war." For example, there is the document "Calculation of expenditure of money for the construction of airfields in the first month of the war." I think it's normal planning documents of any staff of any country. And it may not be proof that Stalin was preparing attack Germany in 1941.
So, next Monday and Tuesday is my last days of work in the Archive. Further in this topic I will write several posts about another archival documents, which seemed to me as interesting. After that, I'll wait for the results of searches of my new friends, or the results of digging on the site of the crash.
To be continued ....

 

Do not be discouraged IRu, you have a following here and much has been revealed for us concerning the conditions of the Russian Air Force in those days. This is information we do not have any other way to regularly view. Keep in mind that if you were to write about all that you have so far collected plus described what is known from history you would very much have the makings of a book for your efforts. This would be of value in your country and world wide as well. Eventually, knowledge spreads, eventually someone who knows something about what you search for may surface as a result. Do not give up hope on your original goal but be assured that there has been a great by-product of the effort many of us have enjoyed.

 

I can only pay for your efforts with votes, salutes and likes... Your stuff has been some of the most original information I've had the pleasure of reading in many moons. Excellent.

 

As I understand, in aviation it was adopted the system of recognition: "friend or stranger." However, I have seen cases when Air Force planes were killed by the fire of their friend aircraft very often. Especially, in 1941. Even information about the losses, which were submitted to the headquarters of the Air Force, were divided into two parts: the "downed by enemy" or "shot down by Air Force." I think that this was happening for several reasons. At first, it was a poor training of pilots. Not all pilots were aware of and able to distinguish between the profiles of the Air Force aircraft. Especially there were a lot of different kinds of aircraft in the Red Army aviation. In the second, suspicion. In the early days of the war the Wehrmacht troops captured many Air Force aircraft, and could use them against the Red Army. Therefore, the fighters prefer to shoot down unknown planes. And of course, the weak interaction, communication between the military units.
I was unpleasantly surprised one document. It describes the following incident, which occurred in September 1941, south of Moscow, near the town of Tula. Two Fighter, I-16, were on duty in the air in the vicinity of their airfield. They noticed two heavy bombers TB-3. The fighters were not informed that the bombers will fly in this area. So they tried to force them to land. One fighter was attached behind bomber and began to fire along its wings. Bomber continued to fly toward the rear of the Red Army. Then the fighter fired on it, a bomber crashed and destroyed. The second bomber immediately went on the decline and landed directly in the field. It turned out that these two bombers were evacuated pilots families (women and children) from a nearby airfield. That's such a tragedy occurred.
I ought to say that this suspicion was in the Luftwaffe too. The fact that the Russian-language Internet began to appear copies and translation of reports by pilots of the Luftwaffe. For example here: http://www.solonin.org/doc_razvedsvodki-4-go-avikorpusa It is reported that there are facts, when the "Russian faked markings on their aircraft. They make them the same as the German planes."
I think this is an exaggeration, as well as special use Air Force planes by Luftwaffe.
By the way, in the same Luftwaffe report consists a funny phrase about the DB-3 bomber. It says:
"Our fighter pilots passed about the DB-3 the following information: it burning badly, probably has a armoring. Top gun has a strong defense behind, but weakly in the bottom rear of airborne. Some-times we can see protective measures such as spraying of the oil veil (shroud), which is why a lot of our attacking fighters had to postpone the attack. "
The Germans even had not imagined, that the veil of oil - this is not a protective measure, and this is the poor quality of the assembly of engines. As I understand, a lack of quality engines - it was one of the main problems of Red Army Air Force.
Below you can see a cartoon made by the British during the WWII. This IL-4 (DB-3) with a mustache, pipe and cap (like Stalin). This picture I found in a military magazine about aviation.
To be continued....
View attachment 15916

 

I want to write about a one more document that I saw in the Archive. I thought it would be interesting not only for me. I even copied it into my notebook. This is a letter from the Commander of the Red Army Air Force Gen. Rychagov to Minister of Defense Marshal Timoshenko, and Stalin. It was written in March 1941. General Rychagov wrote that the Red Army has any normative on the production of a reserve of aircrafts. These standards were approved by Stalin in 1936. This was a certain percentage of total number of aircrafts. The reserve was intended to compensate losses for the 1st month of the war. According to these standards, in the Air Force`s reserve at the beginning of 1941 should be 4100 aircraft and at the end of 1941 - 6300 aircraft.
Then he wrote that, for various reasons (the war in Mongolia, Finland, failure to plan production, a high percentage of defects), this reserve has only 294 aircraft. That is the order of Stalin was not performed. General Rychagov requested to reduce standards (reduce the amount of reserves) approximately in 2,5 times.
There is a resolution in this paper. It was written on June 1, 1941, in red pencil. Perhaps it was written by Stalin. It said: "Refuse".
This document is interesting because it included the calculation of the amount of reserve for each type of aircraft (how it should be at the beginning of 1941 and the plan at the end of 1941). There was also the normative (per cent for each type).
That is, you can calculate how much and what type of aircraft was in the Red Army at the beginning of 1941 and how it was planned to have at the end of 1941. So, I have done it (see a table below).
I know that various sources indicate different numbers of this. Here's another source.
You can also understand what types of aircraft have been prioritized for production in 1941.
View attachment 16006

 

very good...just a few slight corrections
TB is Heavy Bomber
DB is long range bomber (dalnyi bombardirovshik)
SB is fast bomber (Skorosti bombardirivshik)
Pe-2 was sometimes listed as dive bomber-it had dive brakes (can't remember the Russian name for it)
Su-2 is usually listed as BB-Blizny bombardirovshik-short-range bomber
there is only one G in MiG-3
the Il-2 was originally known as BSh-2 (Bronirovanyi Shturmovik) Armored Ground-Attack
**I have typed the Russian names from memory and my Cyrillic-enabled keyboard does not work with this computer.
so my apologies if anything is mis-spelled ,that is why I listed them in English and Russian.

 

Thank you very much for the correction, PFlint))
The fact that the document included the normative for categories and the quantity of aircraft by type - separately. I did the distribution of types of aircraft in their category myself and it was difficult for me.
And one more thing. Aircraft TB series (TB-3 and TB-7) are called as ships or cruisers (as in the Navy) in all the archival documents . For example, the senior commander on DB-3 is called - the pilot. And on TB-3 aircraft he is called - the commander of the ship. Several TB-3 is not called - the squadron, it is the squad of ships (as in the Navy too). I do not know why. Perhaps because the crew of aircraft TB series was too big (from 8 to 12 people).

 

I'm not much into the TB-3 or -7 so I do not know why they were referred to in Naval terminology.???
again typed from memory TB is Heavy Bomber- Thalzhi Bombardirovshik. (forget that before)
oh...and the Yak-2/4 are sometimes called Legki Bombardirovshik -easy bomber -light bomber?

 

About TB-3 - perhaps it is not "Naval terminology." These normative were approved in 1936. At that time in the USSR was interest to everything huge, enormous. There were built large buildings, large panzers and large planes. Apparently these giant structures (TB-3) was no longer perceived as a "plane". In Russian, the vehicle is used for travel on water and for space flight has the same name - the ship. Apparently so in the Air Force for large aircraft appeared category of "cruisers" or "ships".
And Yak - 4, yes - a light bomber.
Most importantly that you can change the distribution of types of aircraft by category by several way - all the same turns out that in early 1941, the Air Force had approximately 19 000 aircraft. And they lost the aircraft quite quickly. When I was searching for data on the bomber, I read the documents of September - October 1941. I saw that at this time air regiments consisted only from 1 to 5 aircraft (must be at list 30). Russian military leader of 18-th century, Suvorov, said: "You should fight by ability (skills), not by quantity." Unfortunately, Stalin used this principle is the opposite. It was hard to read the raports of aviation regiment. Every day, new pilots flew on a combat mission, and every day they died. The next day the other pilots took off and died, too. And they died not only from the enemy. Low skills and poor quality of aircraft - it was also a common cause. Sometimes some of the pilots jumped with a parachute and saved. Then they returned to their military unit. In one of my last work days in the Archive, I saw a report of a pilot, where he described his return to the military unit after he was shot down. This document was more interested than any adventure book story. I even broke the rules of the Archives and took photo of this report (you can see it below). The pilot describes as on October 22, 1941 he was shot down over enemy lines, he jumped with a parachute. At the time, while he was landing by parachute, he was shot too, the parachute was full of holes. He landed close to the Germans, escaped from them and hid in the woods. Then he came under fire of our artillery. He slept in the grass, then in the village, where he was fed. Then he crossed the river, riding a horse, which had caught in the field. Then he met the Russian soldiers who came out of the environment. Together with them he came to the area of the city of Podolsk (a city where the Archive is located and where I sat and read this report). Then he went to Moscow by passing car and returned to his military unit, where he wrote this report for his superiors. So, it was like movie))
View attachment 16066

 

I used to live very near the field (in San Jacinto, California) where a Russian ANT-25 landed in 1937 after a claimed non-stop trans polar flight. There was (at least there was a few years ago) a plaque and monument there, but lately there has been much speculation about whether or not the flight over the pole was actually made. Still it is a tribute to early Russian (Soviet ?) airmanship to attempt such a fete in a single engine aircraft.

 

In the mid-30s in the Soviet Union was a series of flights at a distance. Stalin wanted to show the world the advantage of the social structure of new society. In 1935 a pilot Levanevsky made the first attempt to fly from the USSR to the USA via the North Pole. But he was forced to stop the fly because his plane broke down. In 1936 (before flying back to the U.S.) there were tested at a distanceover the territory of Russia. The crew of the pilot Chkalov flew from Moscow to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (12,000 kilometers). A second attempt to fly from Moscow to the U.S. via the North Pole took place in 1937. There were two planes. Both took off from Moscow. Crew of Chkalov lended in Vancouver. Gromov's crew flew to San Jacinto. There is a short documentary about it.
Here is the link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJUOrk6YetY In the 22nd minute, you can see this place - San Jacinto. They said, that there was not enough space in airfield, so they landed in the meadow.
As for the pilot Levanevsky, in August 1937, he wanted to break this record on the plane DB-A, but he and his plane went missing near the North Pole.

 

As the main theme of this branch, then, until there are no news from the Archives, I would like to tell one more story that I have known while I have been working in the Archives.
I have already said that in 1941 the pilots of long-range aviation were like kamikazes. They flew on a combat mission only once and then died. When I looked through the combat reports of the 22nd Aviation Regiment, it was only a few names that are repeated several times (on different days). I remembered one name - Alexander Vavilov. I remembered him because it was repeated throughout September and October 1941. More over, several times in different documents were written: "The plane of Vavilov was shot down, the pilot jumped with parachute." And after 1-2 days Vavilov went on the mission again. He dropped leaflets over Warsaw, about which I wrote above. He delivered military supplies to units of the Red Army, were surrounded in the Luga (between Moscow and Leningrad). In October 22, he had the same mission, with the pilot from the previous post. His crew was the only one which done his job and came from this mission. Then I thought, Vavilov or very lucky, or he is a pilot of high qualification (or both). At the end of October 1941, in the 22nd Aviation Regiment left only one serviceable aircraft and one crew - Vavilov`s . There were days when he flew on a mission twice in one day. With such intensity, he just could not stay alive. At home, for my interesting, I decided to check over the Internet - when he died: in 1941 or 1942? To my surprise I did not found him in the lists of the dead. They are not complete (lists on the Internet), I thought, and went to look for. It turned out that Vavilov managed to survive during the war. He became the Commander of the Air Regiment. After the war he continued service in the Air Force. Most interestingly, in 1950 he had a son - Alexander, who also became a pilot of long-range aircraft. Now his son 62 years and he lives in south of Russia. I found it online through a Russian social network (thank you, the 21 th century!). His son served in the same Regiment. Then even more interesting - the grandson of the Vavilov - also Alexander. He is also a military pilot of long-range aircraft. In the photo below you can see three generations of Vavilov - long-range aviation pilots. And then there are the great-grandson, Alexander too. He is still quite small, but I guess what he will be when he grows up.
So, here is an interesting example where the thread of life had not been torn by war. And how many of these threads was broken forever.
And yet, I learned that Sr.Vavilov had left his written memoirs, which were not published as a book. I'll try to get them. Perhaps it will help in my search.
View attachment 16089

 

Thanks IRu... Well done. (applause) Encore! Encore!