Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Kwajalin is not suitable since it is too close to American bases and there are only limited airbases available for defences cap. Truk is the best since it is central, suitable for build up and defendable.

 

I think I've misspoken somewhat. I'd like to see Truk with the capability to do nearly everything short of overhaul or major hull repairs: essentially as our own Pearl Harbor. We want it to as our primary forward base in any war with the Americans. The other bases would be primarily for replenishment and possibly some light repairs. No permanent graving docks or anything that fancy. Possibly some shops and stores. Nothing we'd weep overmuch if we lost it, but enough to improve our forward mobility, so we don't have to come to Truk just to fill the tanks or fix light damage to topsides.

As to Truk: We should have substantial fuel depots there, stocks of structural steel, munitions, small engines, machine shops, steamfitters, carpentry shops, possibly a boiler shop. We should have at least two graving docks capable of handling our largest capital ships and perhaps as many as four total graving docks. All of this is a lot of real estate, and perhaps beyond what can be crammed into Truk.

Here's a rough mockup with two 1000' graving docks and one 600' graving dock:

Truk Expansion - Google Maps

There's not a lot of space for tankage, and the housing is pretty cramped, but I figure everybody's used to that. Also, there are a great many facilities not described: recreation, hospitals, communications, and so forth. I figure they can be crammed into spare bits of land as necessary.

 

most honourable sirs, i have a proposal for the council,which i belive should be acted on immedately, we must begin "recruting" young male koreans between the ages of 17 and 24 for military service. as days,like the petals of a cherry blossom fall to the ground unnoticed, go by,our chances to gain trained personnel slip by. i would like to see around a total of 12 bns. raised (to be honest, most would end up in china, but the best and brightest would be sent for more specialist training endding in assignment to our SNLF).

 

All the resources from PH can be put to good use (since we will not be sending them to attack the U.S.) screening P.I. for the SRA, Singapore, Malaysia and Rangoon ops. The added air assets should help us neutralize Thailand and Malaya days if not weeks earlier so that we can overwhelm Singapore more quickly and harass the supply lines out of Burma more effectively.
We will burn much less fuel than originally planned in the first six months by limiting Indian Ocean raids and by sending lighter patrols to the Sakhalin, Aleutian, Wake and Midway sectors. We will watch these areas closely, just with economical assets unless more are dictated.

Open for my colleagues suggestions on where to deploy this invincible task force.

Air Attack Force
V ADM Nagumo

CV DIV 1
Akagi
Kaga

CV DIV 2
Hiryu
Soryu

CV DIV 3
Zuikaku
Shokaku

Support Force
R ADM Mikawa

BB DIV III
Hiei
Kirishima

And:

CA DIV 8
Tone
Chikuma

Midway Neutralization Unit
CAPT Konishi
DD Akebono
DD Ushio

Ship Lane Patrol
CAPT Imaizumi
SS I-19
SS I-21
SS I-23 Just my opinion but I would add a few additional submarines. A full squadron??

Screen
R ADM Imori
DD SQUADRON 1

Tanikaze, Urikaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Kasumi,
Arare, Kagero, Shiranuhi, Akiguma
AND (Thanks Takao)

R ADM Sentaro
CL Abukuma

Train: 8 Tankers and Supply Ships (We better add a tender or two as well - surface and sub.)

Source: The West Point Military History Series: The Second World War Asia and the Pacific

I reiterate my earlier proposal to assemble, in Oct., a petrochemical engineering team to standby during the seizure of the oilfields. I am talking about crack engineers from DEI, the Middle East, Romania and Mexico. As many as we can assemble; so that they can analyze the situation immediately and begin directing the priority tasks. They will have to carry adequate supplies with them and the means to offload them quickly, especially plugging equipment, explosives and well cap, pipe repair supplies.

Regarding another important matter. I am troubled by the state of our long Lance torpedo training. Our hit rate achieved by Torpedo Destroyers and Cruisers is nowhere near the 15% rate we have planned for. If resources are available I want the Prime Minister to allocate more ordnance and vessels for this important training. Our doctrine regarding firing and reloading patterns may need revision as well.

Rikanaga - over.

 

These are only the submarines that were considered to be part of Nagumo's force.

There were several others that participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor, but were not considered to be directly part of the Japanese attack force. They are: I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, & I-24(each were carrying one midget submarine). As well as, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-8, I-9, I-15, I-17, I-25, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, I-73, I-74, and I-75, which were to for a ring around Oahu and sink any ships that were to enter or leave the area(most were to concentrated around Pearl Harbor to sink US naval vessels that were trying to escape the attack. Oh, and let's not forget about I-10 and I-26 that were sent to take up stations off the US west coast.

Edit: Your list also left out the light cruiser Abukuma, which was the flagship of Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro(Screen Force).

 

But to abandon the Marshall's will leave airbases Japan built in enemy hands, and give them these bases within bomber range of Truk, I submit that this would be a grave miscalculation. The small airfield at Wake Island can be nuetralized long before the US can build it up and station large numbers of bombers.

 

Thank you for that information. Would you be agreeable to using some of these submarines to cordon off the Philippines, especially around Manila and Subic Bay? With additional units being used to gather intelligence on the approaches to Wake, Midway and Pearl?

 

I'm not going to spend too much time on WWI as it doesn't directly affect this scenario, but the fact that Japan was requested to help doesn't mean the same as "Britain was unable to defend it's possessions". Considering that Japan was to get a large chunk of the Far East territory of Germany it isn't unreasonable to expect them to contribute. And while the German raiding forces were a menace, Japan wasn't acting alone, but in concert with Allied forces there. The nature of "raider hunting" is that more assets are always better, but dooesn't mean that they would fail without them. The German forces isolated in China, & Bismarck archipeligo certaily didn't have the means to invade India, Australia or Malaya as mentioned earlier. And while Japanese help was welcome & useful to the Allied war effort in WWI, had the Japanese refused to help the British wouldn't have lost any of their colonies so "unable to defend them" is an oversimplification of the situation.
　
　

　
Well as you mention, British plans did change over time as the situation changed during the 20 years between WWI & WWII. In the late 30's in the lead up to war the British & French made joint naval plans, The French would counter the Italian fleet in the Med, with the Royal Navy blockading the Kriegsmarine in the North Sea, while still allowing for a substantial force to be sent to the Far East in event of hostilities with Japan. joint operation with the US weren't discussed, and the US was passing "Neutrality Laws" at this stage. The fact that Britain (& Empire) spent large sums of money on naval & air facilities in the Far East and based hundreds of aircraft there, were for defence, not "relying on the US"
I think we may just be disagreeing on semantics here, British plans certainly took into account that there were three major forces (or potential forces) in the Pacific, and in the event of conflict with Japan that the Japanese would be facing forces of both American & British Empire. The US also took this fact into account in their planning, so in a sense they were "relying on Britain" as well.
　

The 1929 crash wasn't a significant factor here. You will note that the British did in fact build up to their allowance while the US lagged behind, so the limiting factor wasn't economics but the Naval Treaty

Yes, really, hundreds of British Empire or Allied aircraft, counting those in the Far East & Indian Ocean (as I originally wrote), not just Malaya. Aircraft in the DEI Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Burma & India etc which could all be brought into play.
Far more aircraft than the US had in the Far East. (though they were more modern)

 

No, you are confusing the fleet that the Admiralty proposed sending with the two modern ships that Churchill wanted to send as a show of strength. (which were not really considered a "fleet")
The fleet that the Admiralty proposed sending (and were overruled before the attack) would also include the 4 "R" battleships, 3 aircraft carriers + supporting ships.

Uh, Seventy days, not seven....

You are also not counting the 2 battleships (Revenge, Royal Sovereign) or the cruiser squadron (3 CA, 3 CL) which was in the Indian ocean in Nov 1941.

The fleet was in fact sent to the Indian Ocean in January, which consisted of 5 battleships and 4 CV.

Well no, because the entire Japanese navy does not face only the British, but must leave some part to face the US in the Central Pacific.

Well, no the fact that they did send a fleet immediately following the Japanese attacks disproves that point.

The key point is that just because they didn't do something doesn't prove that they couldn't.

Pound's estimate was based on facing Japan alone, likely made at the end of 1940.
His plan in the fall of 1941 was to send 6 or 7 capital ships, 3 CV's and support. While this would not have been as large as the entire Japanese fleet, it was a substantial force nevertheless, and comparable to the US force in the Pacific.
By July of 1941, the Axis naval forces have suffered a string of serious losses, Tatanto, Bismarck sunk, Calabria, and finally both German battlecruisers at Brest knocked out of action for at least 6 months, leaving no available capital ships in the Atlantic. (Tirpitz still working up) Meanwhile, Britain has 16 capital ships, so leaving by 9 in the Med & Atlantic (4 - Scapa, 2 Gibraltar, 3 Alexandria) so the Royal Navy could send 6 or 7 capital ships to the Far East without too much difficulty (And by Jan 1942 they had done exactly that)

Basically I'm taking issue with what you seem to be saying the British forces in the area "can't do much", as if the only danger is the US forces.
As mentioned earlier, even with Churchill's flawed plan to send just 2 ships, there was a significant danger of the Japanese losing almost the entire 25th army at sea, as it was accompanied by just 1 cruiser.
Not what I'd term an insignificant danger.

So to sum up: Japan Imperial Navy = 10 capital ships + 6 fleet carriers
US Pacific fleet = 8 old battleships + 3 fleet carriers
Royal Navy (Pound's plan) 6 capital ships + 3 fleet carriers

Neither the US or the British has as much as the Japanese, but put together they do pose a significant threat to Japanese operations.
Further, the British & Allies could conceivably put together at least 1,200 aircraft in the Far East, far more than the US could manage in the fall of 1941.
(600 malaya, 200 Dutch, 200 Australian, 100 FAA, + 100 in Burma, Fiji, Hong Kong, Ceylon etc)

 

no one is talking about abandoning the Marshals, just that Kwajalin is not suitable for a naval base beyond basic supply and repair. If anything they do need further upgrading. There were just more then the one cruiser in the invasion force, there were also 2 Kongo's and other ships in the area.

 

I don't agree with all your conclusions, but interesting info & references on WWI and the League negotiations, hence the salute.

First off, an important question:

What is the primary goal of Japan in this exercise? Is it to explore the "Attack DEI & Malaya, no attack on the US" option? (even if it isn't the best plan)

Or is the goal for Japan to "win"?

 

N.B. The following is written in the persona of a fictitious Japanese Admiral. As such the purported author assumes that the Empire of Japan and the Japanese People in particular and Asian people in general have been systematically oppressed by the "Western" powers. (Which I believe is essentially correct.) Further, he sees Japan in a generally positive light. Thus do I believe we all see our own countries most of the time.

I for one believe that Japan is indeed a fascinating place with a complex and compelling history. This is not to minimize in any way the very real atrocities that Japan committed before and during the course of the Second World War. But I think most of the members of this "council" would see a more honorable, a more classical, a more idealized Japan emerge from the ashes of our coup: a Japan possessed of the virtues we love but cleansed of the taint of Bushido. Thus we unashamedly advance Japan against Chiang and the Western Powers, each of whom in his turn has committed his own crimes, though these often go largely unexamined. It is, after all, the privilege of the victor to pen the first and most accepted histories.

In the course of this missive I have in one place used the term "white" to characterize the Western powers. This might be seen by some as racially insensitive. I beg your indulgence. This is first and foremost a work of fiction. I do not think less of Admiral Noka or any of the handful of very real Japanese people I have met for his use of this term. However, I do believe that in the heat of discourse such a thing might be said from time to time. It will probably surprise none of you to learn that I am, in fact, a "white" guy. My girlfriend, who as it happens is Vietnamese, sometimes calls me "white." I do not believe she means any offence by this, and I hope you will realize Noka Shijin means none either.

Sincerely,
David
the Symphonic Poet

Here follows a manifesto of sorts on the aims of one Noka Shijin in joining our council:

Mister Freebird,

I do not speak for the entire council, but I for one wish to secure Japanese interests against increasing Western hostility. In short, I fight to protect the honor of the Japanese Empire and to advance the cause of Asian independence from the colonial West. In order to provide for our economic and military security we need access to certain strategic military resources the West is increasingly denying us. We propose liberating the Dutch possessions from colonial oppression firstly to regain access to the strategic oil reserves we have come to rely on, and secondly to insure that these resources will be controlled by Asians for Asians, independent of Europe's ceaseless wars.

We do not wish war with Britain, nor with the United States, but war with our one-time ally in London may be unavoidable now. They have chosen, at American insistence, to support Chinese nationalists and communists that threaten resources we need in Manchuria and Korea. They have pressured the Dutch to curtail their trade with us. While the United States has interfered in our affairs for too long and should really be ejected from the region, their industry is too strong for us to defeat in a long war and they have already agreed to withdraw from the bulk of their possessions here. England is another matter. Their industry is also stronger than ours, true, but much less so. And they are even more remote from us and their routes to East Asia are both longer and more vulnerable. Moreover, since they are actively at war with a power of greater industry than their own the bulk of their materials will be committed to this European war until and unless they can defeat Germany.

Further, their warships and aircraft are noticeably inferior to our own. Their carriers carry few planes, often less than forty. Their principal torpedo attack aircraft, the Swordfish, are slow, delicate, and short legged. They have no precision dive bombing doctrine, nor any aircraft well suited to such attacks. The fighters they use aboard their aircraft carriers are either slow and sluggish, as the Fulmar or Skua, or possessed of truly anemic range and endurance, as the Seafire. They may send three, four, or even five "fleet" aircraft carriers to our waters, but their capabilities are perhaps less even than our light aircraft carriers. They are well built but they have no teeth. Such an encounter will be like a fight between a tortoise and a bear.

So if we must fight, we will fight to win. Our hope is to defeat any forces that either England or the United States might send to attack us and then convince them that it is better to sue for peace than to continue to fight a costly and dangerous war. To do this we will have to fight our opponents one at a time, rather than simultaneously as the Germans are wont to do. You are quite correct that a combined Anglo-American fleet could be a threat to us. We cannot afford to let them combine, thus we may be forced to strike the British preemptively. (Most of our analysis seems to conclude that they will fight to defend the Dutch.) Since the Americans may very well demure for a time to fight on the behalf of the European powers our best course seems to be to leave them alone for now and face them only if and when we must.

But be certain, we aim to win any war that might arise. We do not wish to merely forestall a seemingly inevitable surrender to the white powers. We aim to beat them and disabuse them of their belief in their own superiority. Fortune has thus far been kind to them and they have industrialized more quickly and completely than we. That is all. In every other way we are entirely their equal and it is past time that they should recognize this.

Sincerely,
Admiral Noka Shijin
Imperial Japanese High Council

 

I have to second the speech of Admiral Shijin!
Well said and at point!

Sincerely

Field Marshal Nishio

 

Just found this thread so it's a little late.
A diplomatic idea that might work (for the Foreign Minister to consider)
Break with Germany, declare war on Vichy
attack French interests and Dutch colonies for "safe Keeping" -- til after the war (forever).

 

The goal is for Japan to win, what country ever goes to war expecting to lose? The goal for the participants is to learn more about the Pacific Theater in WWII, and to examine all options. It is to go past merely speculation on if we could have done this, that or the other or Japan would have won if they'd done so and so. It is to force the participants to examine their theories in the light of the real world restrictions and to have to deal with the results good or bad. It is to help understand the enormity of the logistical, manufacturing, planning and other factors that have to be considered if you were placed in the position that you were responsible for making these decisions. Its easy to say Japan should have trained more pilots, its another to figure out how it needs to be done. You have to realize that if you decide today to increase the number of people training to be pilots, its a year before you start getting novice aviators out the other end. Then how to use them and keep them alive until they become proficient enough to become effective. It is to learn how many factors in warfare are closely interrelated. More pilots mean more aircraft and fuel, which means more shipping and escorts, and on and on. It is also to help understand the complexity of the interpersonal relationships that are required to be a commander. You may have a concept of what should be and needs to be done, but you have to merge your vision with those of different viewpoints.
We can settle on any course of action the council decides upon, right now we are just "spit balling" our options.

 

Welcome and its never too late. If you're interested in becoming a full fledged participant conatact our Prime Minister Belasar by PM.

 

Before we go to war with our former ally Britain, I wonder if we might dispatch them an ultimatum? It should have a timeline long enough for them to successfully acceded to our demands (the occupation of Borneo and the Dutch East Indies, at a minimum) but short enough to prevent them from reinforcing or reacting in any substantive way. One or two days, perhaps?

Also, while I have perhaps not said this clearly before, I very much like the plans that have been advanced about the French possessions in New Caledonia. This would be an excellent first move; perhaps better even than a thrust against the oil producing territories.

How long would it take us to complete construction of repair facilities at Truk? My earlier plan could stand some refinement based on whatever existing facilities we have there. It seems I have proposed turning an airstrip into a dock, for instance, which is perhaps not ideal, though there are other airstrips nearby. I will revise that portion of my Truk proposal to reflect existing facilities. I have also put together a rough proposal for Kwajalein which includes some temporary civilian housing. Since Kwajalein is presently less developed we'll need a larger force to develop it. It might also be worth considering some farming on some of these island to decrease their dependence on imported foodstuffs, though space is limited.

Here's an approximate map of Kwajalein (which mostly follows existing lines, since we know those work.)
And here's an improved map of Truk. I'll try to draw up something similar for other facilities we propose to upgrade as we go.

Ideally, I'd like to build similar maps of our facilities in Japan, if I can find sources for it. I would be grateful for Admiral Takao's advice on this matter. This kind of exercise could also be useful for our "red team" work, though it is largely outside my expertise.

 

And lastly here's a conjectural stores depot at Ponape.

 

Due to the embargo we need to secure the resources first. We have enough troops that we can send some basic units down there if the Vichy agree. With out oil we would not be able to do anything with Noumea.

 

SymphonicPoet,

The best maps online of Japanese shipyards(World War II era)that I have found are located here: Japan City Plans - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online

They are Japanese City plans, done by the US Army Map Service 1945-1946. But, they do give a decent layout of the shipyards with slipways and dry docks.

Since they are city maps, it helps to know what cities the shipyards are located, the major shipyards are easy, but the smaller shipyards can be more problematic in finding.

Enjoy!