Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

It seems the question about a cruiser is what is its primary purpose AA or ship to ship, With the CV's in the line they will need AA ships and one question is how many CA or CLAA will we want per group. Since the current group of CA's has some that are not suitable for AA we can use them for surface. For the scouting I would like to rebroach the idea of one CVL for a group dedicated to scouting.

 

Very sorry Col. Bobimoto. I apparently either failed to note or forgot that you had already entered the merchant shipping data. I've been working on the spreadsheet for quite a long time now and I keep refining it. As of present I have not proposed a merchant production program, because I recalled you had done so once before. In light of what I've learned about our slipways and graving docks I begin to see why our predecessors built so many types of different ships: we don't have the capacity to build that many large ones, thus we are perhaps forced to build them in several different sizes. (We have quite a lot of small merchant docks.)

As it happens I eventually found the copy I had downloaded before and decided to try out the new version anyway. I had previously worked on an escort and I have been working on a possible cruiser design. I am as yet not completely satisfied. I think 15,000 tons is about the right displacement, but I'm having a devil of a time making her steady and seaworthy. (It is a rather arcane business and cruisers are, if I recall, particularly tricky.) I have a design that will work in a pinch, but it still needs refinement. It's a decent gun platform, but it tends to be wet and the hull is somewhat weak. (Both of these are, alas, consistent with Japanese cruisers.) On the other hand, it's relatively well protected. I've posted a copy of the characteristics to the war room along with those of a 12" alternative and an escort.

I think it's not a bad time to consider building programs as we have relatively little laid down right now and we will need replacements. You're quite right that material shortages will affect us for a while, but we should be able to make some of those up once we begin our war effort and we should decide what we want laid down in advance so that once the materials are available there's no delay getting things started. I think we can all agree that the previous building program was unsatisfactory and did not contain remotely enough ASW escorts and that it was probably also unsatisfactory in regard to aircraft carriers. If there are two things we will need to do to protect our strategic shipping I believe they are to control the seas in our area of operations and prevent allied submarines from doing us significant injury. No time like the present to plan for that.

I'm sorry to duplicate effort, but perhaps there are still usable things in what I have done and I have learned much from the work. I surely appreciate the patience and care of all on our council and I feel that we can prevail in all that we attempt.

Sincerely,
Noka Shijin

 

I believe that we have a general understanding that we must seek our economic needs in the south Pacific, so allow me to formally poll our council member's,

Are we prepared to accept the risks of war with the United States to seize the Southern Resource Area?

Prime Minister

 

most honourable sirs, i have a suggestion ,perhaps instead of having our flag operations run off of a combat ship which is fairly cramped, perhaps we could convert some of our less used destroyers or cruisers into command and control vessels.

 

As stated the BB's and some of the heavy CA have plenty of room and suitable communication equipment. We can copy the US in converting a ship into a C and C for landing ops.

 

Members Of The Imperial Council

​

I now ask all members of the Imperial Council to endorse or reject the following course of Action:

Resolved, to employ the Military Forces of the Empire of Japan to seize or otherwise take possession of those areas generally known as the Southern Resource Area (SRA) under the control of British, Dutch and/or other minor European nations to alieve the acute economic distress now imperiling our Empire.

Prior to the commitment of combat forces we shall present the powers in the region a final offer of peace that ends the Embargo against Japan. This must ensure our continued access to the resources that we need to survive. A preceise limit of time will be in effect. After which if no aggreement is reached, we shall act unilaterally.

In doing so our forces will not target or attack any possesion, colony, territory or military force of the government of the United States of America. Further we will do all in our power to prevent or delay any rupture of peace for as long as is possible between the United States and the Empire of Japan.

Once engaged, the Military Forces of the Empire of Japan will at all times act in compliance with the Geneva Accords, even though the Empire has nor formally endorsed them at this time.

I repectully request we suspend debate in any other areas until we have either endorsed or rejected this course of action

Prime Minister Belasar Tekisasu

 

Thank you Mr. Prime Minister. I fully support the course of action you have laid out.

Once, we have a concensus on the subject, and if we adopt it, I respectfully suggest we set a firm deadline for an end to negotiations and commencement of our seizure. This will allow us to decide how much of a reserve of fuel and oil we have to maintain. Then we can figure out how much we can expand our manufacturing to reach maximum output. Once, we have determined what that output will be, then we can parcel it out to the different areas of military need.

 

Mr. Prime Minister,

you will have the full support of the Imperial Japanese Army!

Field Marshal Nishio

 

Mr. Prime Minister,

I cannot support military action against the European Powers in the Southern Resource Area until we have delivered a diplomatic alternative to them with a clear statement that it's rejection will mean war. So long as we deliver such an alternative first, and allow them at least 24 hours to accept our alternative, I fully support the use of military force to secure the resources that we need. I believe we have sufficient casus belli, but I also believe we will need to declare that war first in order to protect our diplomacy with the United States.

Rear Admiral Noka Shikin

 

Dear honorable Admiral Noka Shikin,

i support our Prime Minister and i´m sure that he and his diplomats will do all the neccessary political steps to reach our target. And to me this includes the alternative you´ve mentioned as well as the correct declaration of war according to the rules of the Geneva Convention.

Sincerely,

Field Marshal Nishio

 

Admiral Noka,

We will make such an offer and give them the 24 hour notice to accept, however in realistic terms it is most unlikely they will accept such an offer. As per our intent to honor the Geneva Conventions we will declare war prior to our forces actually engaging the enemy, but it would be impossible to allow for the actions of those in opposition to us.

The Prime Minister

 

most honourable sirs, while this humble officer belives that the European Powers in the Southern Reasorce Area will not accept any alternative to war that we offer them,i agree that we make one last formal attempt. After that has been made, I fully endorse the plan. acting adm.Kano Matsudaira

 

Mr. Belasar,

With that caveat I support your motion. Yes, I will assist the Empire of Japan in preserving her sovereignty and national interests against the hostile Western economic attack through military action in the Southern Resource Area against the European Colonial Powers that would do us grave injury. You have my full support.

Rear Admiral Noka Shijin

 

I am generally in accord with Prime Minister Belasar's ideas, but I would pose for the group whether we should give a specific time limit; that basically tells our potential opponents when to be prepared for attack. Although we will do our best to achieve surprise, time and distance ensure that our movements will be somewhat apparent, especially if we proceed with an assault on Singapore through the South China Sea. Perhaps we could issue a forceful statement that the issues need to be resolved promptly but without stating the exact hour we will consider ourselves free to attack.

I completely endorse refraining from attack on United States forces and possessions. We should be prepared to respond if the US intervenes, which frankly is a strong possibility, but I believe we can protect ourselves against this eventuality without a preemptive attack. In particular, attacking the eastern East Indies immediately on the outset of hostilities will isolate the Philippines, and I would like to have sufficient forces in that area to promptly attack the southern Philippines if necessary, further isolating the main American forces on Luzon.

I support Belasar-sama's adherence to the Geneva conventions. These allow prisoners other than officer to be used for labor, and there seems little reason to starve or mistreat persons we can use in furtherance of our war effort.

 

When I suggested that we decide upon a time line for our ceasing negotiations:

I did not intend that we give our adversaries any forewarning. In fact, I think when we set a definitive date for commencement of hostilities we use every weapon in our arsenal to confuse them. A general outline I have considered would use a series of actions to make our actions unpredictable and the axis of our attack unlikely.
1.) Take actions that would lead the United States to believe we are attacking elsewhere than we are.
2.) Initiate a propaganda campaign to attempt to sway US public opinion in such a manner that public approval will preclude direct US action.
3.) Use the knowledge that the US is reading our diplomatic code to allow them some foreknowledge of our unusual actions and lure them into a sense of security that "reading our mail" provides them with insight into what we are planning.
4.) Immediately prior to our SRA attack start feeding disinformation through the diplomatic communications so their interceptions mislead them.
5.) Actually attempt to resolve the oil situation diplomatically, but set a firm deadline, I suggest 15 or 20 November, whereby if we do not attain a diplomatic solution we attack and resolve our problem militarily.
6.) I further propose that since we are going to attempt to avoid conflict with the US, we do not need to advise them of our declaration of war against Britain and the Netherlands. I further suggest that we advise those two countries that we are breaking diplomatic relations and declaring war, no more than 12 hours in advance. The difference in the time would make a dawn attack, 06:30 in Singapore, take place at 10:30 pm the previous day in London. So if we advise them of our intent to go to war at close of business, 17:00 or so London time, they only have 5 hours or so to react and the time of day would further complicate matters. The attack would take place at 17:30 Washington time, so Britain's warning that we have declared war would hit there in the early afternoon, again giving them little time to decide upon action and react.

 

I have a new variation on the China problem that could be of major benefit. The essential problem is that there is no military way to force Chiang and China to surrender. We have defeated China for almost ten years with no end in sight. So the only way to end the war is through a political solution. I therefore propose we acknowledge Chiang as ruler of China and offer him our support against Mao. Now I have suggested this already, the carrot is that we agree to joint exploitation of resources. We also build new factories to use these resources. The new kicker is we ask Madam Chiang to use her American influence to get American help to start building factories that can build farm equipment and vehicles for the Chinese by Chinese. Americans were found to help build the Soviet so China should be easy. We establish a joint command to go after Mao. Of course tractors and such can be used to build military equipment and we can acquire on the side valuable machinery to copy for our own use. The ultimate goal is to build a joint army that can seize Siberia in 5 to 10 years say. Even if Chiang wont cooperate, we can start by working with willing warlords and by changing our approach to the Chinese and become benefactors instead of enemies we can go a long way to eliminating American hostility and give a new economic base.

 

General Terauchi,

Your suggestion is interesting, and we shall give it full consideration during our debate about our China options. I would however ask that you offer us your thoughts on the matter currently under debate, to wit formal agreement to seize the SRA unless some acceptable diplomatic arraingement is met in the very near future.

The Prime Minister

 

Endorse your proposal, Hon. Teki. Sorry for my absence.

 

General Terauchi,

your points on China are good ones and i ´m sure that we will try to get a deal with Chiang. But if he won´t agree on such a deal, we are well prepared for him and his men.

Field Marshal T.Nishio

 

I had originally thought 24 hours might not be too much, but your reasoning and timing behind a 12 hour ultimatum makes good sense to me and I can support that.

Not to distract from the SRA question, but has the debate on the proposed New Caledonia operation been closed? Were we to undertake that it seems to me it should come before the SRA operation and that it could potentially sew confusion about our intentions. Our enemies should not as yet know that we have been outfitting our forces for underway replenishment.

If we strike New Caledonia with a substantial portion of our fleet our enemies might be led to believe that we will not attack them until at least such time as we could return to a suitable port and resupply. If instead we resupplied en route we could strike Singapore and our other objectives in the SRA about three weeks later. I have provided some rough concepts in the War Room.