Influence of a Japanese attack in Siberia

Hello,

I'm aware of the "Nomonhan Incident" and how it showed several deficiences of the IJA against the Soviets.

Some people however, think that a Japanese invasion of Siberia in 1941 would have defeated the Soviet Union. I'm skpetic about this. The Far East concentrated few Soviet vital industries and a very small percentage of the population. It also would be unlikely that the Japanese would be able to advance deeper in Siberia, since they were already experiencing considerable logistic difficulties in China. Last and not least, if the Soviets managed to just stabilize the front, Japan's situation would be increasingly worse, since there would be not much resources left (I'm assuming the Western oil embargo occuring). If Japan finds itself in such situation, they would have to negociate a peace treaty with Stalin or pull out of China in order to have more troops and resources.

 

The Kwangtung army was not ready for operations and it would have been a major strain on Japan to fight two major land wars at the same time. Apx 60% of the Japanese army was involved in China.

 

this is an old H CH horse ,escaped from the slaughter-house : general Kamasutra meeting general von Sturm und Drang at the Urals

 

Frankly I think you are all wrong. The "Northern Strategy" has nothing to do with trees or lack of raw materials - there were two predatory powers interested in a weak China; Russia and Japan. BUT a simple fact is that Russia and Japan had twice fought over China with Japan the victor both on land and sea. If Japan had not been defeated by the US, then there is a very good chance they have done so again.

Nomohan was a small battle - ill prepared on both sides and not indicative of a thought out campaign. Zukhov's presence was the match winner. It is some time since I read about this battle but I seem to remember that there was a hill which was key to the action and he attacked it frontally with enormous loss in the process he had to fired three commanders who "lacked stamina" and who blanched at the carnage.

Stalin effectively controlled the three Northern Provinces of China and Mongolia, was supplying the Chiang and reining in Mao in order to stiffed resistance to Japanese incursion in China.

Remember it was the US/Japan that lost China (and Indo-China) and Stalin and his heirs who won! So who long term was the most dangerous?

 

Hmmm....What about the pinning down of the Siberian divisions just at the time they were needed in front of Moscow? This would have made the capture of the Soviet capitol quite possible, if not in the late fall of '41, then in the next Spring.

 

An attack into Siberia in the late fall of 1941?
So you mean to mount an offensive in the middle of winter?

How well prepared do you imagine that Japanese troops are for extreme cold?
How well do Japanese logistics & vehicles function in these temps?

The average Dec/Jan temp in Khabarovsk is around -25, (That's about -13 F. for you American folks) and of course the temperatures will get much colder as you move deeper into Siberia.

Since the Soviets would very likely practice "Scorched Earth tactics", the Japanese would need to be re-building, bridges, rails etc in -25 or so weather.

Have you ever tried physical labour outdoors in -25 weather?

 

IIRC, this stuff of the Siberian divisions is a myth. One also wonders why the Soviets would preffer to defend the Far East instead of Moscow? =P

 

I agree. But it showed some serious defficiences in the IJA: tanks, artillery, logistics and planes.

 

The Lend-Lease route by Vladivostok would be closed by the IJN. I don't know if the Allies would be able to circumvent this. But even the whole Lend-Lease shipments were not critical to the Soviet survival. If the US and Britain didn't have to fight Japan, however, the pressure against Germany would be significantly increased.

 

Japan had held Korea and Manchuria for decades - they were well aware of extreme temperatures.

A Japanese Army had been fighting successfully in Siberia in 1920 as part of the "White Russian" Army, reaching the Urals - of course they knew what sort of weather and terrain to expect and would be properly attired.

Jenisch puts his finger on one Russian strength (unknown apparently to the Axis) - superior quality tanks.

In any case the Japanese do not have to take Moscow - just slice of the Soviet Far East.

Its is a lot nearer Japan and its colonies than it is to Moscow.

Those wonderful Russian tanks are going to need transporting to the front many thousands of miles on a single track railway (and then there is oil to consider - all in the wrong in place for the Soviets in 1940). The Japanese would make mince meat of any Russian fleet (again) and in 1940 they possessed superior aircraft to the Soviets.

 

Here's a quote from the Axis Forum of a suppose Russian researcher:


It's not easy to discuss competently what the Red Army had in the Far
East during the first two years of the war. Most of the old soviet
sources provide data that is obviously wrong, post-soviet era authors
give more realistic view but they often contradict each other. So do
not expect from me any complete, hard figures on early Soviet OOB.
It's amazing that this is still a very poorly researched subject.

Official OOB indicates that on 22 june 1941 Far East Front and
Zabaikalsky Military District (actually another front) had 719228 men
in total. According to official sources the following troops had been
transferred from two soviet Far East fronts to the west armies during
july 1941 - july 1942 period: 28 rifle and cavalry divisions, 5 tank
divisions, 1 mechanized division, 5 rifle brigades, 14 artillery
brigades and 8 independent regiments (344676 men in total), during
almost the same period (august 1941 - october 1942) from the remaining
units in the Far East 235518 men more had been sent to the west as
"marching reinforcements".

So overall, from the outbreak of the war till october '42 Far East
Command transferred 580194 men to the west. These troops took almost
2/3 of Far East arsenal with them - 247382 rifles, 38921
submachine-guns, 2824 heavy machine-guns, 1210 AA guns, 4928 artillery
pieces, 4425 mortars, 2822 tanks, 13101 motor vehicles, 2563 artillery
tractors and 77929 horses, 65% of ammunition and supplies was taken
from the Far East Command warehouses and send in the same direction.
Most of the Far East competent commanders were also transferred to the
west armies, and very average men came to replace them.

It's easy to figure out what has been left in the Far East by summer
'42 - 139034 men with 2420 artillery (only 88 152mm howitzers left,
almost all others were 76mm field guns and 45mm AT guns), with just
428 light tanks (exclusively t-26) , very limited transport abilities
, ridiculously low on supplies and ammunition.

Officially, on 1 september 1942 soviet ground forces in the Far East
contained 1446800 personnel. However, it is well-known fact that not a
single man drafted in the european regions in 41-42 has been sent to
the Far East during that period. Thus one should suppose that Far East
Command under Josef Apanasenko had managed to locally recruit 1308966
men in just 13 months (and send almost 45 divisions to the west in the
same time), this just cannot be true. Wartime mobilization in the Far
East gave only 682515 recruits by late 1944 (Russian Far East is still
barely inhabited compared to european areas), there was also another
manpower source - prison camps, but again, out of 320000 or so gulag
inhabitants in the Far East in january '42 only ~80000 could have been
drafted theoretically.

There are some sources that describe in detail what General Apanasenko
did to maintain his forces during first two years of the war and how
difficult it was. For example "Sickle and Hammer Against Samurai
Sword" by К.Е. Cherevko and "Final in the Far East" by A.B.Shirokorad,
those are in russian obviously. Both authors are skeptical about
official figures for 1941-42 period they try to analyze how Apanasenko
had managed to double his forces during such a short period of time
with almost no manpower in the area while his armies had been used as
reinforcement source and what NKGB and GRU with their numerous agents
in Manchuria, China and even in Japan (Richard Sorge for instance) did
to convince Japanese of the presence of a large fully-equipped force
guarding soviet Far East during entire 1941-1942 period.

http://www.infanata.org/2007/04/29/serp ... mecha.html
http://v3883.vps.masterhost.ru/catalog/ ... 89/313107/

Far East Command ordered total mobilization in September '41, but it
brought too few recruits to replace those who had already left ,
during the second mobilization round in late november Apanasenko
called up even 40-55 aged men, so actually all who were able to carry
a weapon. In january '42 personnel bureau officers were inspecting the
camps of Kolyma and the whole Far East in order to seek out military
officers and soldiers who had fallen victim to the purges and tried to
put them back in service. How many men had they managed to draft that
way is unknown, since all these activities were barely legal and thus
undocumented, Stalin was unwilling to interfere and was determined to
protect Apanasenko from NKVD bosses. It just shows how dramatic
situation was.
Apanasenko really did an excellent job by keeping strong cover forces
at manchurian borders, but their numbers never exceeded 365000 men
during 1942. He really tried to replace leaving divisions with the new
formations, but none of these had full complement before late 1943.
Circumstantial evidences of this can be found in the open sources.

Monthly allowance directives of the Far East and Zabaikalsky Fronts
HQs in august-october 1942 are referring to "regular allowance order
#4/120", this means that all but one Far East rifle divisions were
"reduced formations" and did not contain more than 5800 men, 9 rifle
companies instead of 21 in full division (regular allowance directive
#4/100 - full rifle division with 14483 men).

Almost 38000 soviet soldiers, captured by germans in august 1942 in
Stalingrad area, were supposed be in the Far East according to their
papers, but instead were "temporary assigned" to the 62nd army units.
Take it as an educated guess - there were up to 200000 such "temporary
assigned" men, if 38000 such soldiers became POW.

In many personal accounts of the war written by far-easterners
interesting stories can be found, during 1942-early 1943 Far East
command practiced "false reinforcement" tactics, several temporary
formations of 1000-5000 men each were constantly moving from one
fortified region to another, imitating serious military activity in
those sectors. They were usually moving into positions visible by
japanese during the daylight with their "flags high" only to leave
them secretly by night.

In november '42 Apanasenko did a little sabre-rattling when he staged
in Kharbarovsk on the anniversary of the revolution "the largest
military parade that has been held in Russia since the outbreak of the
war". The Far East Command quietly allowed the Japanese to hear of
this force demonstration by publishing a short story of the mechanized
equipment that took part in the parade. In reality only one regiment
took part in this parade with heaviest armament in form of manually
towed Maxim MG.

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far
East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in
the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to
wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,
"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet
territory until reinforcements arrive.

All such facts do not correspond well with proclaimed soviet military
superiority over japanese. 1,5m battle-ready force simply did not
exist in the Far East in 1942. Officially recorded OOBs and some Far
East Front documents are just residual artifacts of brilliantly
executed by GRU disinformation campaign, which was never officially
announced. With japanese absolutely sure that there is numerically
superior force in front of them in 1941-1942, Soviet General Command
was able to freely move larger part of Far East forces to the West and
had a luxury to do nothing to rebuild that force until mid-1943. After
the war, Soviet historiography used false numbers to claim that USSR
was never on the verge of collapse during the war, since it was
capable to maintain such a big force in the Far East during crucial
period of war and kept "larger part" of Japanese army at bay. Abwher
advised IJA that there were no battle-worthy soviet troops in spring
'42 trying to persuade Japan to join the war, but they strongly
believed in soviet myth, they could not see beyond the soviet
trenches, had no abilities to collect data on Soviet territory
themselves and were unwilling to risk.

Even if there were only 365000 soviet troops maximum, they still could
be, theoretically, a force to be reckoned with. But in reality only
40th Rifle Division was adequately trained unit (almost untouched by
autumn '41 troops requisition), others being understrength, poorly
equipped, barely trained formations capable of only stationary defense
against equally weak opponent. As I've already mentioned, Far East
Front lost most of its heavy artillery, almost all tanks and transport
to the west armies, and received very little to replace that loss
before 1943. Apanasenko organized small arms production in major
cities, but that was never enough. In fact the need for armament was
so sheer that Apanasenko ordered to put back into full working order
thousands of training rifles in late 1941. Supplies situation was also
critical during first two years of war. There is one well-known
wartime letter written by certain Nikolay Soloviev, sergeant 1148 AT
battalion, he said that in 1942-43 soldiers at the front were
virtually starving, and some of them were so weak that they could not
hold rifle for more than 10 minutes, those in critical conditions were
usually sent to the regional collective farms or the "military state
farms" to recuperate.

So here is the picture - 360000+ poorly trained men, some 50+ aged
some former prisoners already exhausted by gulag, with refitted
training riffles with very limited supplies, guarded soviet Far East
for almost two years. That was a blueprint for disaster. Of course
situation has changed dramatically in 1943, and even before the
"autumn storm" armies arrived in summer 1945, Apanesenko already had
far more capable forces. But the fact is, in 1942 Japanese had a clear
cut chance to grab soviet Far East, Kwantung army was more than
adequate force to do the job.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=149223

 

Actually, you wouldn't have to mount any offensive. If the Japanese government had meant to attack at all, at any time, this would have been picked up by Soviet intellegence and would have required the Siberian divisions to stay put. (Freebird, could you provide some documentation as to your statements re. the Siberian divisions being a myth.)

 

I don't have information at the momment, perhaps someone can help me. But the thing of the Siberian troops is that the Moscow counter-offensive was not dependent of them. And even if was, people, think a little: why the RKKA would try to defend the non-vital Far East with elite troops instead of sent them to the vital Moscow?

 

Seeperation barbarossa:siberian division myth.
Other points :
-the Siberian divisions did not better in the fight against the Germans,than the other divisions
-there were only a few of them
-most were going to the front in the summer
-I doubt that the Far East Front had a lot of Siberian divisions :Wladivostok is not Siberia.
-Only 3 Siberian divisions were going west after august 1941.
-6 other Siberian divisions were already going west BEFORE 22 june, and were practically destroyed at the beginning of october
-In july,3 divisions were going west

The total is thus 12 Siberian divisions,compared to the 6 million men the SU was sending to the front in 1941,this is meaningless.

 

About the strength of the Far Eastern Front n 22 june 1941 (I don't know why some people are talking about an impossible Japanese attack in 1942):

23 divisions,500000 men,,3200 tanks,4100 combat aircraft.

 

As Jenisch noted, it's a popular myth that the Soviets denuded the Far East to send troops to what was for them the western front. Here are some figures:

Soviet troops in the far east on 22 June 1941:

17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies.

Soviet troops in the far east on 1 January 1942:

19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies.

Apparently, units sent west were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front.

Source for the data is:

http://www.tashv.nm.ru/BoevojSostavSA/

The Soviets were continually mobilizing troops and forming units across the country, many of which of course were dispatched to the front lines against the Germans. Many of the individual units were probably not the same, but they maintained sufficient overall strength to protect themselves in the Far East.

While the Japanese army conducted a number of successful campaigns in the Asia-Pacific theater, it was lacking in many of the areas that would have relevant to a renewed confrontation with the Red Army such as armor, motorization, and heavy artillery. It might be likened to German allies like Finland or Romania and it would have about the same impact on the overall problem the Soviets faced.

Lend-Lease via Vladivostok started as early as August 1941 and delivered almost half of LL to the USSR. The Persian route took until mid-1942 to get going, and the Arctic convoys were almost cut off after the PQ-17 debacle in July 1942; only six convoys went through in the next eighteen months, until early 1944.

 

BTW, why the Soviets didn't supplied the Chinese with a great quantity of tanks?

 

The Communist's (Mao) had neither the infrastructure to use tanks or the doctrine to effectively use them.

The Nationalist's (Chaing) was rabidly anti-communist and the Soviets would never have given them to such a foe.

After the war Russia did supply the Communist's, but there was a dramatically different situation in place post war.