State of the Soviet military in 1939

1)The statu quo was the statu quo of Versailles,which was created at the expense of the SU.

2) I repeat : Britain did not care about a change of the statute of Danzig,as long it happened without war .It was the same for the SD :the SD being a part of Germany was no problem for Britain,the SD a part of CZ was no problem neither .

3)Stalin was not searching for a war between the west and Germany,but,neither would he join the west in such a war for 2 reasons :

a) his intervention was impossible because Poland refused such an intervention

b ) if he did not intervene ,both capitalist blocks would exhaust each other,and the danger of a united capitalist attack on the SU would disappear.

4)If there was a war between the west and Germany,and Stalin did not intervene,such a war would have 3 possible results :

-the west would win,and would thus be to exhausted to be a danger for the SU

-Germany would win and would thus be to exhausted to be a danger for the SU

-no one would win,and both would be to exhausted to be a danger for the SU

5) If he intervened in such a war,the danger would be that the west would join Germany to fight against the SU,what would be very bad for the SU .

6)The best solution for the SU was a capitalist civil war ,while the SU would remain outside the fighting and doing business with one or both parties .

After Barbarossa,Truman said that the best thing for the US was to remain non committed,while Germany and the SU (tweedledum and tweedledee) were killing each other ;during the war between Iraq and Iran,the west (and the SU also) remained neutral,while tweedledum and tweedledee were killing each other,some times helping Iraq,and than helping Iran .

Stalin did the same .

 

About the British attitude to the Danzig problem :at Versailles,they had opposed an annexationof Danzig to Poland .

The following is from the NYTimes of 12 may 1939,about a speech of Chamberlain :,where Chamberlain said the following :

".........although we would be glad to see the differences between Poland and Germany amicably settled by discussion (which means : if Poland yielded to German threats,no problem for Britain),........,if any attempt were made to change the situation by force in such a way as to threaten Polish independance,that would start inevitably a general conflagration in which this country would be involved (which means : a war between Poland and Germany would result in a British intervention,you will note that Chamberlain did not say that an attempt to change the situation by force,such as an unilateral annexation of Danzig by Germany,would result in a British DOW,the whole problem was a problem between Poland and Germany only,Britain would intervene only if there was a war).


The British attitude about Danzig was the same as the attitude about the SD .And, there,Chambarlain was even more outspoken : a few weeks before Münich,Britain was mobilizing,and Chamberlain said at the BBC : it is inconcevable that we will be at war,because of a quarrel between people we do not know nothing about .

Meaning : we don't care about .

 

1. As we all know, the status quo of Versailles was created mostly at the expense of Germany.

3. Yes, he was. Stalin's speech 19th August 1939 (underlinings mine):

"We are absolutely convinced that if we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. War would be avoided, but further events could prove dangerous for the USSR.

On the other hand, if we accept Germany's proposal, that you know, and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will certainly invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England is then unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. In this case we will have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war.

Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and, with a refusal, politely send the Anglo-French mission home.

It is not difficult to envisage the importance which we would obtain in this way of proceeding. It is obvious, for us, that Poland will be destroyed even before England and France are able to come to her assistance. In this case Germany will cede to us a part of Poland… Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland all the way to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia.
...
Comrades, I have presented my considerations to you. I repeat that it is in the interest of the USSR, the workers' homeland that a war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. It is essential for us/Everything should be done so that it drags out as long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides."

http://www.carlonordling.se/ww2/stalin_speech_complete.html

 

We both are correct. If a war between the Anglo-French and Germany started, the Soviet Union would be benefited. See the situation as in 1940: the Soviets had half of Poland, tried to have Finland, had the Baltic States and part of Romania,

 

Stalin decided the west was not truly interested in fighting Germany when they decided to send a delegation to discuss how a treaty would be implemented and they took a slow boat to Russia. When they finally arrived Stalin found the members were not the highest level officials and they had no power to actually implement a plan. As Stalin saw it, the west was asking the Soviets to fully commit to war with Germany, but would offer no plans or guarantee that the west would actually do anything. Stalin made the mistake in assuming that Hitler would act rationally and not fight the Soviets as long as the west was hostile.

 

Which may or may not have changed by the late 30s.

SD?

That phraseology brings the quote to question. "Do not know nothing about." is very questionable.

Not in standard English it doesn't. Indeed I doubt any native speakers would interpret it that way.

 

How reliable are the supposed statements of Stalin in Karjala's link?

 

The quote is

from Chamberlain's radio broadcast on September 27, 1938. The entire text of the broadcast can be found here:
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pv/munich/czdoc09.html

It's meaning is not that the British did not care, Chamberlain considered that the matter is far removed from immediate British concerns(in other words, for the British to go to war, the situation must be considerable larger than a territorial dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia), and that the British already considered the matter already settled.

Chamberlain essentially restates that he does not consider the matter worthy of going to war in his second to last paragraph

 

Following a lot of people,they are questionable and not reliable

 

Chamberlain considered that the matter was far removed from immedite Brirish concerns,thus means that for Chamberlain,the whole thing was not Britain's business,that Britain did not care if the SD belonged to CZ or to Germany :between 1919 and 1938,the SD belonged to CZ,and,no one in Britain protested against this,OTOH,no one defended this situation : it was not Britain's business,Britain did not care about it ,as no one in Britain was interested/cared about the fact that Armenia belonged to the SU,that Transsylvania belonged to Romania,that Teschen belonged to CZ,that Vilnius belonged to Poland and not to Lithuania,etc,etc.
The quarrel about the SD was a quarrel between Germany and CZ only .Britain was it giving some attention only when it was obvious that the quarrel could result in a war .
Chamberlain restates that he does not consider the matter worthy of going to war:yes,he did not care about if the SD belonged to Germany or to CZ,he did not care if Danzig became a part of Germany,....as long as everything happened without a war .
When in 1908,A-H annexed formally B/H,Britain did not care about,as long there was no war .It was the same in 1908.

 

Analysis of the electoral speech of Chamberlain one year before the elections (all PM speeches are electoral)


1)A good start is to frighten the electors(who are as children ,liking to be frightened ): next week,we will be at war .This is causing panick from Dover to Thurso : Jim,where are the gas-masks?

2) Reassure the children (sorry : the voters) :it will not happen(it is incredible,impossible),reaction from Dover to Thurso : Jim:no need for the gas-masks.

And,why will it not happen ?
a)because it is about something insignifiant :a quarrel between 2 people of whom we don't know anything
b)because everything has already been settled ( by me :thus,next year :vote for me),and,if there yet is a war :it will be the fault of Adolf ;reaction from Dover to Thurso : the PM is right : those....Germans

Informed people (thus not the electors) will observe that the PM was here economical with the truth ,because: nothing was settled)

3)And this is adressed also to Adolf and Benesj:we sympathize with the Czechs ,meaning : we will do nothing,"we sympathized " also with the people of Hungary in 1956,with the Czchs in 1968,with Afganistan, Tibet,etc,etc.

4) Adressed to Adolf and the whining brigade (which are the believers of the principles of Versailles,and,to the regret of Chamberlain,the majority of the voters): If we were convinced that Adolf wanted to conquer the world (haha),we will fight (translation :as long as we are not convinced that Adolf want to conquer the world,we will not fight).Thus Adolf,let this be your warning ;

Reaction of the voters : very good of the PM,till here,and no farther .

Reaction of Adolf : haha.One of Neville's good ones.

Reaction of the cabinet:very good ,PM. This will save us a lot of marginal constituencies .

My reaction : Neville would be a good spin-doctor.

 

"A lot of people"? You and your friends perhaps? ;-)

You have to be a lot more specific to question that source...

 

Following this source :

Stalins "Kriegsszenario 1939":Eine Rede die es nie gab .(published in the serious Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte)

the whole story was a falsification by the French Intelligence .


BTW: I take offence at your insinuation "you and your friends".

 

Correct up to this point.

That is not logically deriveable from what preceeded it.

This is obviously fallacious. Here's a clue. The boarders of CZ were established by the treaties that ended WWI and Britain was a signator to them. The break up of AustroHungary and borders of the Balkans was obviously something that concerned them at the time. Furthermore if you could do an exaustive search of the British papers of the time I'd give you more than even odds you'd find at least one article or letter protesting and/or defending the situation. Britain obviously had concerns on the otherhand if matters were settled peacefully Britain was willing to accept most if not all those settlements.

I disagree. Britain was concerned with the rise of German power. Given Hitler's writeings and speaches actions such as the invasions of Austria and CZ were very telling and unsettleing. That they might lead to war was an indicator of how significant they were.

Again you are reading more into the situation than is there. Pretty clearly he did not want to see Germany expand. The fact that he was not willing to go to war at the time doesn't mean that he didn't care. Indeed Britain simply wasn't ready for war at the time so it behoved him to delay the onset while Britain rearmed.

I think there's a typo in there as well as another overstatement or two.

 

I just had the idea that Chamberlain was a man who finally understood that Hitler was never going to stop, but he still was not prepared to take the steps necessary to actually fight Hitler. I read once that the biggest mistake the allies made was believing that a blockade was all that was needed to bring the Germany economy crashing down and so they failed to consider that Stalin could keep the German economy going.

 

Answer to posts 74 and 75 : no :Chamberlain was no Saulus who became a Paulus,not a man who finally saw the light.

Very simplified : before 1914,British foreign policy was to intervene in a war on the continent,if such war threatened its essential interests as the 2 Balkan wars did not threaten its vital interests,Britain did not intervene .

After WWI,the situation changed : Britain would ,unwillingly,intervene in every war on the continent,even if such a war did not threaten its vital interests :it could not remain non committed,if some one attacked his neighbour.In WWI,the British public was told that Britain was at war because Germany attacked its neighbours and because such a war was a crime .It was unthinkable that Britain would hold aloof,if it happened again .After WWI,peace was sanctified,and,if some one violated peace,it was Britain's duty to punish this criminal .

In november 1937,on a visit to Germany,Halifax repeated cery clearly Britain's (traditional) policy to Hitler:

Appeasement and international policies (by Stephen Rock) P 59 :

1)Certain changes in the European system could probably not be avoided in the long run.

2)The British did not believe that the status quo had to be maintained under all circumstances

3)Among the questions in which changes would probably be made sooner were Danzig,Austria and CZ.

4)England was only interested that such changes were brught about by peaceful development.

The same was said by Eden and the French PM Chautemps (Origins of the First World War P 175)


Conclusion :


1)Britain and France had already given up Central Europe :Britain in 1919,France 10 years later by the building of the Maginot Line.

2)The Region east of the Rhine was not vital for them,and,as thus,they had no objection to a (renewed) German domination in this region.

3) But,this had to happen peacefully,without war :as long as Hitler "limited" himself to bulliying his neighbours,no problem.

4)Once he started a war,Britain and France would intervene,unwillingly,but they would intervene:it was unthinkable that they would hold aloof,when some one violated the sacred principle of Versailles :WWI had been fought to end all wars (this was what the public believed) and war could no more be used as an instrument of international policy :an agressive war was a crime (this was what the public was convinced of)and it was the duty of B+F to intervene and to punish the responsibles .

And,the speech of Chamberlain on the BBC about the SD,is only repeating/proving these points .

Britain was not willing to intervene in these quarrels : its policy was : solve it your self,but : woe betide the man who starts a war:as Chamberlain said : we will fight only for larger issues than that :as there was no war between CZ and Germany,Britain had no reason to intervene .

 

Ljad...depends what you call Europe..or the influence or something that threatened Europe..Britain was indeed at the forefront of theTurkish war of Independance from day one to day of ending between the wars...In fact its highly questionable that Greece would have done anything themselves if Britain had not stirred the waters and come out openly and shooting wise on the side it did. Turkey may not have been part of Europe politicaly, but as always, the geography is deceiving. The rest of Europe has considered it so even if politicians rally against the idea. Britain was wrong to do so then and its people knew and the prime minister was lucky to survive his actions.

But yes...Britain would at the time of Chamberlain had found a way, of washing its hands of Poland too if done peacebly...Which brings us to the whole chabang...If we were willing to sell out central Europe to a system we knew was the system we knew...the hypocracy of just going to war because the Germans did not do it in a peaceful manner is even more perfidious of Albion. So we went to war on your basis because shots were fired and we would have left millions to their fate if only Herr.Hitler would just brow beat us down and enter to flower petals, real or imagined...Damn Poles...why could they not be like the good cheks...

 

That Britain was wrong to do so is a moral statement,from an interventionistic POV of 2013 :Britain having the right/duty to intervene around the war ,in Libya, in Syria,etc .

But,80 years ago,14 years after Passendale,people had an other opinion,which was : to stay away from the quarrels in Central Europe .

No one wanted to start a war with Japan because Japan had invaded China in 1932. As usual,from FDR(and his predecessor Wilson),the only thing to be expected was :do as what I am saying,but,do not what I am doing .The moralising preachers from Washington were blaming Britain,because it was not opposing the dictators,but,one should not ask them to give some help ,

3 quotes

1) the francophile foreign secretary and brother of Neville : Austen Chamberlain in a letter of 16/02/1925 to his POSS (E.Crowe) about the Polish corridor : no British government will and can risk the bones of a British grenadier for it .

If Poland would yield to the threats of Adolf and give him the Corridor,Britain would not say : you can't d this .

2)Neville on 24 august 1939:we would fight,not for the political future of a distant city (=Danzig),but rather for principles whose destruction would ruin the possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the earth (remember his speech about the SD)

3)That Austen was so uninterested (about the quarrel between Poland and Germany) could be a criticism,but it also places him firmly in the British tradition of viewing eastern Europe as having limited British interests,a tradition with a long history before the 1920s.
Source : A.Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe .

It is thus unfair to blame Neville for the appeasement policy,which was only a continuation of the policy started by LG.

N.Chamberlain was MP from Birmingham West,and,as thus he had to take care of his constituency,otherwise he would not be reelected .

N.Chamberlain also was the leader of the Tories and had to take care of them (giving OBEs,peerages..) otherwise they would choose an other leader.

N.Chamberlain was also PM of the UK,and had to follow the electors,otherwise,they would choose an other PM.
The problem was that ,as usual in a democracy,the electors were hindering the work of the government :they wanted no new taxes for the army,but expected the government to put Adolf (a bawler and a Hun) on his place,and when this was failing,they blamed government .

N.Chamberlain was also the primus inter pares of the Commonwealth,,but,he could do nothing,unless every one (including the PM of NZL) agreed,and,as the Dominions were more than sceptical,and refusing to a British political/military intervention/commitment on the continent, the manoeuvrability of Chamberlain was very small .,his manoeuvrability was that of a rope-danser above the Grand Canyon .

What N.Chamberlain was not,was being the PM of Poland:he was not the guardian of Poland,neither of CZ,or of China,Albania,etc

 

I thought he was responsible for a big up tick in military spending during the period in question. Indeed I think it was through the efforts of his adminstration that Britain had the tools in place to do as well as they did in the BOB.

 

1930 : GDP: 4,615 billion £;Total spending :1,356 billion £; military spending :118.6 million £ = 2.5 £ of the GDP


1935:GDP:4,72 billion £ ;Total spending : 1,348 billion £ ;military spending :121.9 million £ =2.5 % of the GDP

1939: GDP:5,918 billion £.Total spending :1,724 billion £;military spending :266.2 million £ =4.5 % of the GDP.

The German rearmament resulted in a British rearmament with defensive goals .While Mr and Mrs Jones were willing to pay more taxes to protect them from German air attacks,they were not willing to pay more taxes for a BEF that would fight on the continent,what would result in a new Passchendaele (following the Jones family)