The Atomic Bomb & Soviet Union

Yes I am bit busy over next few days but I think your suggestion of starting a new thread is a good one.

 

This is a lot of hindsight:

1)The Bombs were ready

2)A Soviet invasion of Hokaido is not a fact,but a questionable claim

3) A division of Japan also is a questionable claim :in 1945,the Soviets captured Vienna and a big part of Austria,but Austria was not divided.

4) before H + N,the Soviet threat was not recognized

5) Whatever : the US wanted 2 things :a quick end of the war and a total humiliaring surrender of Japan :the voters never would admit talks with Japan;

6) No one objected to a Soviet participation ,because :any Soviet KIA would save the live of an US soldier .

7)May I also remind that even after H + N,the Japanese continued to execute US POW's?

8) The US public was not interested in Japanese peace offers,the US public wanted the Japanese to creep and to sign the unconditional surrender .

 

“4) July 22, 1945. Japan makes peace offering, which is rejected by the U.S., ostensibly because it came with the proviso that the Japanese be permitted to retain the institution of the emperor and thus fell short of the unconditional surrender the U.S. demanded.”

The reason I asked for specifics of this supposed peace offering – which you failed to answer – is that the above statement is patently false, even correcting the date to June 22. The first actual peace offer by the Japanese, which included the Imperial provision, came August 10 – after Nagasaki. What did happen on June 22 was the Emperor broke tradition and addressed the Big Six. He stated his desire that they explore options for ending the war. He did not mention surrender and the path that the Japanese pursued was a negotiated peace on terms highly favorable to Japan.

Japan dispatched Ambassador Sato to seek Russian assistance in obtaining a negotiated settlement. Togo’s instructions to Sato included “Please bear in particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians’ mediation in anything like an unconditional surrender”. The Russians refused this request for mediation and no message or offer was ever passed to the Allies.

What type of negotiated peace the Japanese might have agreed to at that point can be alluded to by the Big Six debate late August 9 into the early hours of the 10th. After two atomic bombs and the entry of Russia into the war, half of the Big Six was holding out for four conditions on which to surrender. Those conditions were the Imperial provision; self disarmament; Japanese control of any war crimes trials; and no Allied occupation. They were basically telling the Allies “you go home and we’ll take care of ourselves”. It was only after the second intervention by the Emperor that cables were sent to the Allies stating that Japan would accept surrender with the Imperial provision.

 

Indeed. The Soviets simplly didn't have the lift to do so. They might have been able to take a few more small islands but they weren't up to a major amphibious operation at least without US help.

That's not quite correct. By late July early August there was a growing distrust of the Soviets in Washinton and of course Churchill had expressed considerable distrust much earlier. It had reached the point where the Soviet entry into the war was not looked at as a totally positive thing in Washington. Another consideration in this is the way the Soviet time table for operations in the Far East changed over time. The fact that they pushed it up near the end is worth looking into.

 

Hmmm...if you google the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation (Operation August Storm) you will see that the Soviets invaded not only Manchuria but Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and had plans for Hokkaido except the Japanese surrendered. Interestingly enough, to this day there is a dispute between Japan and Russia over these 2 islands. It makes me think that not only did they have the capabilities to invade Hokkaido, but would put in a claim on it also.

Right or wrong, FDR is criticized by many historians for his appeasement of Stalin at Yalta. They criticize him for knowing about Russian aggressions and intentions, but not doing anything about it. Also, I ran across this today:

"Documents released Monday and seen in advance by The Associated Press lend weight to the belief that suppression within the highest levels of the U.S. government helped cover up Soviet guilt in the killing of some 22,000 Polish officers and other prisoners in the Katyn forest and other locations in 1940. The evidence is among about 1,000 pages of newly declassified documents that the United States National Archives...released.
The long-held suspicion is that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt didn't want to anger Josef Stalin, an ally whom the Americans were counting on to defeat Germany and Japan during World War II.

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Katyn-massacre-Roosevelt-Stalin/2012/09/10/id/451258

Wouldn't Russia pushing up the timetable imply they wanted to get in on the spoils of Japan? After all, there are reports stating that the Japanese kept trying to meet with the Russians in the summer, 1945 to discuss peace with the U.S., but the Russians kept delaying them as they didn't want a peace treaty signed until after they were in Japan.

 

We are going totally of topic,but there was no appeasement at Yalta . That's only one of the big WWII myths .If the Allies wanted the Soviets to go to Berlin (which they did),they had to accept (and they did) that the Soviets would march trough Warsaw,Budapest,and other capitals , and,they knew very well that the Soviets would not give up their conquests .

 

What could he do ? Start a new war ?

 

In a previous post I mentioned General McArthur's memo to FDR, and the Japanese contacting Sweden and the Soviet Union in the spring-summer of 1945. I even stated the terms of their surrender proposal. Sorry but I can't be more specific than that. Feel free to look it up to verify- there are many sources for it.

 

No, I brought up Yalta to point out that FDR and others were very aware of the threat by Russia at that time (February, 1945).
By the way, I don't know if there was appeasement , you are right that is for another thread, but as you could tell from my discussion on this thread, I think he made a very serious error in asking for Russia's help in Japan.

 

They may have had plans but those plans revolved around the US giving or lending them massive logistical assets sea lift wise. I think we've dealt with this in another thread but the Soviets simply didn't have the fleet to move or support an amphibious operation of any significant size.

Indeed but only if they thought there was a chance of peace breaking out before they acommplished their objectives. That suggest that they thought there was a good chance the atomic bombs would end the war.

 

Ah...that's a significant point, then. Will look for that thread.

 

David M. Glanz wrote an article "The Soviet Invasion of Japan", it can be found in the Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 96–97. AFAIK, it is not to be found online - at least the last time I had checked.

The first invasion of Northern Hokkaido was to be a fairly small one, comprising of only three divisions, and would not have relied on any "massive logistical assets sea lift wise." If this invasion went well for the Soviets, they would have went on the offensive to take over the rest of the island. Given the light Japanese defenses on Hokkaido, the Soviet invasion would probably have stood a good chance of succeeding. The conquest of Hokkaido would have then led to an invasion of Northern Honshu, but I have not seen any details on this Soviet invasion.

It has been covered a few times over on AHF.

 

There was a thread somewhere, could have been here or axis history or perhaps j-aicraft, where the details of the Soviet sea lift capablity were given. I think even the Northern Hokkaido invasion required a significant influx of US vessels. I believe we had agreed previously to give or lend them to the Soviets although I'm not sure if the deal was complted. I seem to recall it was not and that second thoughts were being expressed about it. Landing craft and such had just no been a Soviet priority at least in any numbers up to that point in the war. Nor did they have much of a navy for gunfire support at least in the Far East.

All of the above is from memory, I should point out. So may be flawed to a significant extent.

 

Well it sure would have been interesting had it gotten that far. Would have liked to been a fly on the wall when Truman et al are saying "let's see....it looks like the Soviets are locking up Eastern Europe...and now they want us to keep our promise and help them to take over Hokkaido...."

 

Here's a link that has some info:
http://www.ww2f.com/topic/26913-soviets-invade-hokkaido/
It's also discussed here:
http://www.tank-net.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=31181
This page is also relevant:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula
Note that the US transfered 30 LCI(L) class ships in the summer of 45 and the Soviets lost 5 of them before the end of the war.

Here's the thread on the axis history forum:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=33&t=168954

 

Thanks a lot lwd. Looks like I am the last one to the party on this discussion

And Takao, that still isnt online but I will look for it. Googling Glanz led me to some good stuff also- will need to read him.Thanks also.

 

Actually it's pretty obscure. Asking questions about it helps make keep the material easier to find and sometimes something new surfaces.

By the way while I'm pretty sure the Soviets lacked the lift I haven't run all the numbers to prove it conclusively so there's still an opening here as far as I'm concerned.

 

If you aren't familar with Glanz, whom Takao suggested, you might want to look him up. I dont know Glanz but when I googled him I came across another forum which implied Glanz, a war historian, believed Russia could do it. In fact, Takao, was your suggestion of how they would do it taken from Glanz? The scenario you described makes a lot of sense to me. I just don't think Russia would draw up specific battle plans for Hokkeido, intentionally avoid Japanese diplomats for a while, etc unless they had the intention of taking it, and keeping it. They certainly knew by mid-late summer that they could keep Eastern Europe, so why not part of Japan? They only had one warm-weather port and have always wanted more on the Pacific side, they had fought Japan 40 years earlier, etc.

 

It was taken from a previous thread over on Axis History Forum

Full thread link: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=33&t=20999