Chamberlain, Versailles and Appeasement (Again)

I'm going to let someone else comment on that one,

 

The traditional story is that when Winston became PM,the whole country rallied round him :this has been proved to be propaganda ,by sources as Eminent Churchillians,the Roar of the Lion,Churchill and the politics of war,the Road to 1945,...

The Commons (not the country) would decide on Churchill's fate,and the majority of the Commons was deeply hostile to Churchill and his followers (who were considered as renegades and reptiles).Only the fact that Chamberlain supported Churchill,saved Winston .

 

1) No : Chamberlain had the power to fire Winston,a negative power . I never said that he had the power to choose Winston's successor

2) As any significant support I would give will be judged insufficient by you, I don't know what more I could do : I have given the opinion of Churchill : if Chamberlain did quit, it would be the end of the government .But of course, you will say that the opinion of Churchill is not sufficient . Nothing what I would write will be sufficient,even I would give 100 sources .

 

??? Where did I even emply that. Well I guess I implied that if Chaimberlan had Churchill removed he wouldn't be allowed to replace himself i.e. if Churchill was removed he wouldn't be allowed to succeed himself. But if he was removed then someone would replace him therefore if Chamberlan had him removed he would be having him replaced. Pretty straigth forward logic and comprehensable to most with a decent understanding of English.

1. Churchill was known for being a bit dramatic and embroidering on things more than a little in some cases.
2. Even if he was speaking the litteral truth there's a difference between the government falling because Chamberlan resigned and Chaimberland being able to easily replace Churchill. For instance even if the government fell Churchill could retain his position depending on just how the lections went.
So no you have not made a strong case for your position indeed you have hardly made one at all.

No if you gave significant support to it I would not judge it insufficient but you have yet to do so. Indeed it has been very rare for you to do so on any thread on this board. An opinion of Churchill on a different although somewhat related matter isn't sufficent nothing difficult about that. I'd be happy with one clear reliable source several would be better but it's pretty clear that you don't have any and may not even recognize one if you had it.

 

Considering how right Churchill had been about Hitler what was the threat if Chamberlain did try to fire him?? I seem to recall that Halifax was the other candidate, but he did not get the support needed. I would hazard a guess that how ever much he was disliked by the commons even then Churchill had a bit of credibility with the voters who mattered most.

 

I rest my case.

 

Forgive me if I misunderstand something, I never claimed to be an expert on British politics, but if I understand correctly, it was Chamberlain who wanted someone that commanded support across all three major parties in the House of Commons at the time and chose to recommend Churchill as his successor to George VI. Now had Chamberlain later wanted him out (or as you termed it "fired" him) he would have had to have a no confidence vote. If Chamberlain had succeeded, Churchill would have resigned and Parliment would have dissolved, requiring a new general election. In this election if the country was opposed to Churchill's ouster, they likely would have voted against those they saw as responsible, giving the Labour party (or a coalition of opposition parties) a majority in the House of Commons. In this case the Conservative Party would have lost power. This brings me back to my earlier comments about politicians. How many Tories would have risked their seats in Parliament if they perceived widespread support for Churchill within the electorate? How many would have followed Chamberlain's lead if they felt it would lead to their own political suicide? Some surely would have, but enough to dissolve the government? So while the House of Commons did control Churchill's fate, the country controlled the House of Commons fate, so in the end they did have a voice in what happened to Chirchill.

 

It shouldn't be forgotten, though it often is, that between 1935 & 1945 the UK had no General Elections, the process being suspended 'for the duration'. (1940 would have been the date - they had other things on their minds).
Normal electoral politics were not in play and power/position was very much a case of appointment.

No matter what happened, it is exceptionally unlikely that Parliament would ever have dissolved in wartime.

 

Thank you for clarifying.

 

I thought the possibility of a general election in the middle of the Fall of France was highly unlikely.

If Chamberlain's supporters were so voracious, how did his government fall? I understand it was the Commons themselves that were up in arms over the conduct of the war to date. And Churchill wasn't immune from this criticism, either, having suggested the Norway debacle, insisted on mining a nuetral country's shipping lanes, (Operation 'Wilfred'), before sending an expeditionary force to Norway uninvited.

I believe only Falkenburg landing first by a couple of days saved that descision. Winston would also have had Britain openly supporting Finland with troops, shipping and aircraft, and what a sticky wicket they would have found themselves in politically if that star crossed idea had reared it's head.

Churchill was lucky that the House of Commons aimed their criticism squarley at Chamberlain over the handling of the French debacle. Chamberlain had nothing to do with the Dyle Plan, whilst Churchill had been to france and openly supported the service Chiefs. So, the House of commons fixing it's criticism on Chamberlain was a generous thing for Winston. His head really should have rolled as well, along with the CIGs and a host of other incompetent officers. I also understand that the speech that finally forced resignation was from none other than David Lloyd George, who hadn't made a speech of worth in the House for a long time. It drove home to everyone on either side of the debate that even the quiet ones at the back were having trouble coming to terms with Neville's handling of the war so far.

I also believe that the man of choice, (Churchill), apart from other factors, had the support of the Commons for a simple reason. Winston had the full support of His Majesty, and Halifax, for whatever reason, was unwilling to serve.

Since Halifax was the only other candidate proffered, Churchill won by default.

And Chamberlain's 'supporters' had no argument for that. No-one did. It was the wish of the Monarch, undebateable.

 

We should add bombing the Caucasus oil fields to the list of bad ideas supported by Churchill, even more likely than a landing in Finland to have huge political repercussions for no gain, the 1940 allied air forces had close to zero chances of doing significant damage even without considering what a couple of regiments of I-16 could do to unescorted bombers.

 

I have a hard time believing that Chamberlain had any credibility left even in his party after the takeover of the Czechs.

 

I am not sure,because the policy of Chamberlain remained the same : appeasement .For most Britains (except the tabloids) ,the Coup of Prague was a small incident,and the problems remained the same :what would Britain do if the conflict between Germany and Poland escalated in a real war?And what could Britain do to prevent such escalation ?

The answer was double

1) There was little that Britain could do

2)The risk that there would be a real war was smaller than at the time of Munich .

 

The 'Chamberlain Appeaser' tag is quite tricky when you look at things more coldly.
I'm never really certain how much he genuinely appeased, or was just conned by some master conmen.
Decent enough basic article on the pros and cons of it:


Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leader?

 

Theoretically, that idea might work but not in 1942. Perhaps in May 1940 when similar ideas were considered carefully for short period of time. Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax was open to the possibility of a compromise peace. In May 1940, whole Britain’s policy including the War Cabinet debated what to do. Halifax told the Italian ambassador that Britain would consider "any proposal" that promised "secure and peaceful Europe". That was a possibility, but just for very short time

 

Indeed. It seems that it was a very tricky line Chamberlain was walking.

On the one hand, no sane person remembering the first world war wanted a repeat. It had to be absolutely certain, that the utmost had been done to salvage peace. It was only when Hitler showed himself to be a contemptuous liar and utterly unreliable in International agreements, that war was declared.

On the other hand, it was earlier important to re-arm Britain. (Which Chamberlain did, to certain loud criticism from some quarters) But at the same time, not to the extent as to be seen as provoking further German armament.

I think he did an admirable job of preparing Britain for war, in a time of utmost difficulty internationally. He doesn't deserve the epitaph.

 

Hitler took back the Rhineland, then the Saar, then Austria and then Munich and each time that was the last demand. He became an appeaser because he kept believing Hitler. It took 4 lies before he woke up. He was partially conned because he believed that Hitler was a reasonable man and that Germany had the capacity to destroy London from the air when their bombers couldn't ever reach England

 

I was given a lecture in College on the subject. Chamberlain was no coward and knew he was playing a very weak hand; the opprobrium he bore was probably undeserved. However, he really did fail to provide inspirational leadership, and moreover, his measures for the physical preparation of war was insufficient.

 

This is not correct

1) Britain had not the means to prevent Hitler from taking back the Rhineland,etc


2) What Hitler took back was not endangering the security of Britain and the Empire (the Dominions were adamant in their opposition against an intervention on the continent)

3) As Schusnigg and Benesj refused to fight ,why should Britain fight?

4) Hitler did not take back the Saar : it was decided in 1920 that in 1935 the population of the Saar would decide on its future,and the result of the plebiscit was very clear : return to the Reich,and no one protested

5) Chamberlain became an appeaser in 1919,because in 1919,appeasement became the British official policy; Austen Chamberlain and Eden also were appeasers

6)Chamberlain had no illusions about Hitler :he knew what Hitler wanted,every one knew it :Hitler's predecessors from Weimar wanted the same .

 

The point is Hitler kept saying this is my last demand and then he comes up with a new one. The allies refuse to believe that refusing to fight a war did not mean preventing one from happening. But the Saar and the RHine land were not have any troops in them which Hitler did.