Carlo D'Este's 'Decision in Normandy'

Have been dipping into this book constantly over the past few days to write an essay on Normandy. It's been really useful and seems very good. I'm getting the impression that I'm going to have to sit down and read it properly at some point.

Anyone else read it and what did you think of it?

 

Whats the essay on???

 

"Why did it take the Allies so long to defeat the Germans in Normandy? Were the Germans superior to the Allies as all-round soldiers?"

Ended up at 2225 words. Suggested length was 2000, found it very restrictive.

[EDIT] My conclusion, incidentally, was that the reasons were the difficulty of the terrain (and the failure of the Allies to account for it in their planning), the logistic difficulties of supplying the beachhead (especially after the storms of 19-22nd of June), the experience level of Allied troops (some US troops too green, some British troops over-experienced and so over-cautious), combined with the tenacity, skill and (in some cases) fanaticism of the German defenders. On the question Germans as superior soldiers, I concluded that it's impossible to say in such simple terms, and pointed out that it's misleading to emphasise the 'slowness' of the bocage phase without also taking into consideration the rapidity, decisiveness and comprehensiveness of the Allied victory that followed after Cobra.

[ 23. March 2005, 08:26 PM: Message edited by: Greenjacket ]

 

The sinopsys sounds great, but may I ask why you are writing an essay?

 

University course. I'm doing a BA in War Studies and History at King's College London, the essay was part of a War Studies module on the Experience of War.

 

Although I can't call myself a serious student, Greenjacket, I've personally always rated 'Decision In Normandy' very highly.

D'Este does seem to be quite objective ( ie not just another American author indulging in 'Monty-bashing' ) and his book is generally rated alongside Keegan's 'Six Armies In Normandy' as an essential Normandy title.

 

Greenjacket - Your conclusion seems fairly sounds. But i would add that the german soldiers, despite the writings of Max Hastings et al, were not superior than the allies. They all had their failure. Take for example armoured ops. The germans had the advantage of defence but when they did attack they tended to suffer similar rates of casulties as the allies did. at the end of the day typical battle ranges in the bocage tended to lesson the german advantage of gunnery range. Though the british did face this advantage on the eastern flank during goodwood.

D'este is fairly orthodox in his opinion and seems to have a problem with Montgomery and his 'style' of command. But altogether a good book. For some more revisionist opinions on Normandy and the problems facing the allies, in particular the anglo-canadians, where my inetrests lie, I can only suggest the following:

Buckley J 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign'
Hart S 'Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945'
Copp T ' Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy'

 

Add to Mahross's list
Chester Wilmot's "Struggle for Europe"

I would add from the German view, take it with a grain of salt but use the general feel,
Paul Carell's "Invasion, they're coming"
It has a number of faults, but is a different look at the assault.

 

Zetterling - Normandy 1944 may be worth a look...

Im off on our yearly Uni trip to Normandy next month. A week of showing undergrads the battlefields and answering their questions... Plus lots of calvados...

Bocage... Good defensive terrain. Ideal 'Panzerfaust' terrain. MAhross states that the GEman troops were not superior. In many ways this is true, but I would look at previous combat effectiveness of certain units to judge this. Also there is the wide difference in quality between German formations. This is less apparent in the Allied force. I did GErman Combat Effectiveness in Normandy for one of my extended essays.

Just a word of advice from someone who marks essays. Watch your word count. You are allowed 10% over and under, anymore can run you the risk of losing marks. The word count is there to make you put your points simply and succintly and to stop students rambling on... I know as I have marked essays and rambled on in essays! Depending on how harsh your marker is I have know markers not bother reading anymore after they have got to the word limit and marked accordingly. Harsh but when you have 50 2000 word essays on 'The Blitzkreig Myth' its understandable...

 

Yeah, I understand the importance of word limits, but the guidance we were given was vague. 2000 words was a 'suggested length', and there wasn't a maximum specified. In any event, the essay doesn't count for anything, so it hardly matters. Thanks for the reminder though.

Indeed - summarising this variation succinctly was a bit of a challenge.

 

Try to get hold of "June 1944" by H.P. Willmott (no relation to Chester Wilmot- note spelling). My copy is a well used, retired library loaner which cost me a dollar or two.

First published in 1984, Willmott attempts to write a concise history of that month on all fronts. Starting with "NW Europe and the Mediterranean" he sets the stage for his chapter on "Overlord and its Aftermath"

Millmott illuminates the Normandy campaign by also concentrating on what the Germans were trying to do. D'este and Hastings seem to imply that the enemy actions were directly the result of Allied actions; the German forces were there primarily for the Anglo-americans to strategize against. Keegan devotes a chapter to high level German strategy but fails to explain the Allies' failures in terms of German success.

Willmott is able to show the reader that sometimes the Allies failed because of German superiority and sometimes they failed because of poor strategy or tactics on the part of the Allies. He also points out similar conclusions about German strategy.

btw, if you read Hastings and D'este together, concurrently, as I am wont to do, you might come to the conclusion that the two writers were cribbing from each other as they wrote their books. Many passages are identical.

 

This begs the question, what do you mean by "so long?"

Why did the Allies so long to drive the Germans from North Africa? would be a good question. It took 8 months or so from Alamein to conclusion.

Why did the Allies take so long to defeat the Germans in Italy? would be a good question. From July 1943 to May 1945 with no real conclusion.

But the Normandy campaign went according to schedule. Cherbourg was captured at the planned end of Neptune and the front line extended to the Somme as planned by D +90.

So why did it take so long? Maybe because it was planned that way?

 

Yeah, I said something about the unfair criticism of the Allies, implicit in the title, in my conclusion.

 

In the end ( =September ) the campaign in the west went better than according to the initial plans but until the breakout the allied were definitely struggling with getting out of Normandy. How about Caen? wasn´t it supposed to be taken on the first day i.e. 6th June and it took until late July to get it?

 

I've always thought it typical of Monty's mindset to prepare a 'schedule' for the post-invasion advance ie to 'keep things tidy' and create an impression of everything going to plan.

Which, of course, virtually nothing in war ever does !

But Greenjacket is right - the end result did 'go to plan' and in fact, considering the speed of the German retreat through Northern France, even better than planned.You could say that it worked out strategically, if not tactically.

Monty made a mistake post-war by insisting that his 'plan' had been strictly adhered to (which in retrospect was rather silly).

 

According to the timetable yes, things went smoothly in the end (!). But considering that the area to put the new troops or tanks did not grow that much in June-July for the allied, as well as the harbours were not enough plenty in numbers to bring in troops and armor in numbers needed, the situation was not good even if stable in my opinion. It was inevitable to get out of Normandy and get those harbours
( although they did not get them until later that year because of the German tactics to hold onto them ). And in the end Hitler himself sent his tanks to certain death at Mortain and later Falaise pocket.Without these losses the next stop might have been at Seine river and not the Reich border?