Decisions at Stalingrad

Many historians have written about the battle of Stalingrad. The causes for the defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad is a much debated topic as well. Naturaly Hitler made many lousy decisions to attribute to this defeat, but many historians place much of the blame on Paulus instead. Who played a more crucial role in the German defeat at Stalingrad between these two men? Was Paulus doomed to fail under Hitlers commands, or could he have done something else to change the outcome of the Battle?


Cheers,
Daniel

 

Hitler´s role was of course crucial as he had decided to stay in this city whatever it takes. I think he publicly had announced that germany will never leave the Volga, as well.

The first mistake was to send the bulk of armies in two directions, the Caucasus and the the Stalingrad, and send some 9 (?) divisions to Leningrad for the capture of that city;operation parkplatz.Hitler sure could have used them better here.

For Paulus, if he had decided for the sake of his soldiers, he would have withdrawn his troops as the German offence was coming closer in Dec 1942, after that they were doomed. But he was obedient , however he did ask for permission to leave several times, I think. But for him it would be either court martial or surrendering to Russians, and I think he should have sent the troops to freedom and himself to Russians. He ended up in a camp anyway.

 

Paulus was not in a position to make a call if a breakout will not cause a bigger harm to the entire Army Group.

Nor is a simple platoon leader in a position to retreat to save his or his men's ass, without considering the consequences to the platoons to the left or right of him.

Cheers,

 

That is correct, and one of the reasons Hitler comforted himself why he had made the decision to keep Stalingrad, otherwise the Red Army soldiers who were besieging the city would have been attackig westwards.

But one must not forget that Hitler´s view was quite wrong of the situation. To my knowledge he thought the situation could be handled like Demyansk, and the views by generals were just because they were cowards. Paulus knew the situation of supplies, and that they had only one chance by Dec1942. After that the men were simply dying, and there was no more gazoline or vehicles to escape, and the German front was getting further and further away.

In that fact I think the Stalingrad did its purpose, holding out the Russians until the waffen-SS divisions got there. Hitler himself seems to have believed the new divisions could free Stalingrad around mid-february to early March. But the basic facts of supplying the city were totally erroneus by Hitler and thus one can ask whether it was ok due to false assumptions to keep the fighting going on in the city.

The same thing happened in Kharkov later on, but Häusser ordered retreat and saved the war then. By losing the bulk of waffen-SS divisions in Feb-march 1943 the whole southern front would have collapsed and lead to the loss of the Center and Northern Army groups as well, at least these AG´s would have been forced to pull back a long way.

 

First of all, Operation 'Blau' was simply too ambitious for the available German forces to acomplish successfully. But they stood with quite more chances of success if Hitler and OKW would have gone on with the original plan. Spliting Army Group 'South' into two and trying to achieve two distant things at the same time was impossible.

First of all, Von Manstein's XI Army was sent northwards to crush Leningrad once and for all as he had done with Sevastopol, thus reducing the number of troops for the advance towards the Caucasus.

Air cover was not enough to support both new Army Groups —A and B. Von Richthofen's IV Air Fleet had only two corps, one for each Army Group —which is too little air support for an entire Army Group— because the Mediterranean theatre, Germany and ther other air fleets in Russia demanded men, fuel and planes as well.

The German strategic position was going to be precarious —anyone could see it— because the front was going to extend more than 1.000 kilometres, from Kursk to Grózny. Then OKW decided to stuck its two most powerful formations —VI and IV Panzer Armies— into a 40 kilometres front in Stalingrad —in the angle of a salient, extending even more the line— and the entire flank from the south of Kursk until north of Stalingrad had to be rapidly covered with whatever troops available.

And as Army Group 'A' moved southwards, it was extending its supply lines more and more —through a hostile area with no communications at all— and going more and more apart from Army Group 'B' friendly troops. This entire unit deployment was a recipe for disaster. But Hitler and his OKW thugs believed that Soviet winter offensives had bleeded the USSR to death and that it would be just a walk.

Friedrich Paulus has often been blamed for all what happened at Stalingrad. Before and during the battle. But things were very different.
First of all, he had to give up a Panzerkorps and give it to Hoth —who was at the time heading south in a desperate try to entrap a large number of Soviet units— and it slowed VI Army down, preventing Paulus to disrupt and then annihilate Soviet LXII and LXIV Armies, which rapidly withdrew to the Volga and dug-in. Then Hitler ordered Hoth northwards again, but fuel, time and resources had been wasted.

And about 'Winter Storm'. Whether it was Paulus who asked for permission to withdraw or was it Von Manstein who ordered him to do so, it is still a controversy.

But I believe that even if Paulus knew the adverse strategic position of his troops, he was also confident in Hitler, his troops and the air lift and was aware that the VI Army could not perform mobile operations at the time. Not to mention that he had strict orders: not to withdraw, hold ground.

Von Manstein was forced to commit his 11th Panzer division to defend his southern flank and therefore his relief attack lacked force to reach Stalingrad. According to Von Manstein's personality I find rather probable that he then ordered Paulus to try a breakthrough and a link up.

What if Paulus had decided for a try? Most probably there wouldn't have been a link up and most of his forces would have been annihilated by Soviet counterattacks, cold and starvation outside the pocket.

The defeat at Stalingrad started at the same time 'Blau' was launched.

 

Had Paulus moved faster, he could have met up with Hoth's advance from the South, closed the pincers on the Russian retreat and been in Stalingrad prior to it being fortified.

Paulus was too concerned about the Gaps between the 14pz div and the 3rd motorized division as they were heading towards Stalingrad. This is the only option I can see that would have made a difference other than pulling out when the Russians first linked up and closed Paulus in.

But the fault is still with Hitler's inflexibility.

 

Here´s something I once thought about:

The Russians had two important bridgeheads in the northern sector. By eliminating these it would have been quite hard for the Red Army to create the northern pincer of the attack, I guess. But Germans were too weak to drive them out.

With a nice map to see how the Red Army attack went on:

http://www.ww2forums.com/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=15;t=000525#000000

 

Another important factor was the bomboing of the city druing the first few days, turning the rubble into a fortress. Did Paulus order air attacks of that intensity, or did Richtofen level the city on his own initiative? Or, were they even aware of the possible consequences of the bombing?

 

It was most probably Hitler who ordered Von Richthofen to bomb the city, "breaking its morale, destroying its military instalations, docks, railroads, communications. etc." Sounds very nice on paper.

 

I read in Beevor's book that the Germans at one point were within machine gun range of the Soviet river crossings over the Volga. How crucial was it that Paulus did not exploit this depth of penetration.

 

Even Chuikov's headquarters was within rifle fire range from the Germans, as were the docks. But the question isn't whether Paulus took advantadge of the opportunities he had or not. The Germans simply had tremendous problems just gathering forces for attack; when they concentrated troops anywhere in the city, the Soviet artillery across the Volga immediately decimated them and prevented the Germans from gathering forces strong enough to sweep Chuikov and his troops. ANd that's only one of the reasons why Paulus 'didn't' exploit his gains...

 

Sorry, got caught in mid post on that last one and did not get to finish. Friedrich, I would agree with you about the artillery fire breaking up German formations, yet Paulus was still able to launch some pretty major offensive drives deep into the city, even late in the campaign. I know that some historians beleive that Paulus should have attacked the city along the river bank from the north, rather than attempt many costly attacks through the center of the city. Could Paulus have experienced greater success trying this option?

Cheers,

 

My opinion is that city fighting is always causing alot of damage to your troops so I´d go for cutting the Russian convoys, men shipment, and especially try to surround the city far enough and wait for its surrender. The German forces used itself to exhaustion in city fighting and by Russian counter attack they were tired in the city with thei flanks covered by unproperly armed axis troops ( Rumanan etc ).

Häusser did the same mistake with Kharkov, after getting great victories he could have just surrounded the city, but he had decided to enter it, and I´ve read the SS-Panzerkorps lost 12.000 to 18,000 men dead or wounded ( in several articles quite different values ) which might have been preventable by just surrounding the city.

 

Von Richtofen was very critical of the Army's slow progress so he may have bombed on his own initiative or pushed very hard for it.

 

Had Paulus moved faster, this would have been avoid because there were no significant number of troops in Stalingrad. Because he was so slow, the troops in the pocket had time to withdraw into the city adding manpower and strength to the fortress.

 

Because he had numerical superiority and much more fire power —planes, tanks and artillery.

I don't think it would have succeeded. Paulus tried the best option: meticulous frontal attack.
A pincer movement by Paulus' armoured divisions from the north and from Hoth's armoured divisions in the south along the river which theoretically would have cut Chuikov's communication lines; but in reality, it would have left tanks in the open, stuck in the ruins of the city in the sight of Soviet artillery in the opposite bank. Paulus perfectly understood that a mobile Blitzkrieg attack within the city was not very likely to succeed. He rather chose meticulous and detaily planned attacks in the way general Sir Herbert Plumer made his attacks at Messines in 1917. But such attacks took time and Chuikov's impetous leadership and Russian fierce defence; broke German attacks all the time.

Another important factor of the battle is the inflexibility of German leadership and tactics. Panzer commanders always tended to make pincer movements in a Blitzkrieg style —which is impossible inside a destroyed city—, artillery and Luftwaffe observers went to the front with the infantry as they always did, making perfect and very valuable targets for Soviet snipers. Paulus very soon ran out of experienced observers and reconaisence officers. And yet, German commanders still delayed their attacks to wait for aerial, armoured and artillery support before and during their attacks, thus allowing Chuikov to react more rapidly and more effectively, getting as close as possible to the German lines, forcing Paulus' troops to get engaged in man-to-man fighting. That made very dangerous for the Germans using their 'advantages': artillery and air superiority.
The German command structure within the city still operated —idiotically in these circumstances— in a corps and division level, restricting immensely the flexibility of minor troops, wasting momentums and delaying entire operation because "detailed reports were to be handed back to regimental headquarters, there to divisional and then corps headquarters. Not to mention that Soviet snipers made the whole process even slower... While the Germans had this chaos, Chuikov gave his men complete independence and he destroyed divisional, regimental and even battalion commands. Chuikov only operated with platoon or half-platoon size units, well-supplied and well-armed in groups of three, which he used in turns: first to break the enemy line, then to consolidate the gains and the third one was a reserve in case of counterattack.

When strategically speaking we see that Hitler and the OKW ruined the operations in the South, but within the ruins of Stalingrad what ruined operations wasn't Paulus, but the entire command tradition of the General Staff and German Army...

Fortunately he had Manstein above him, to prevent the Russians from digging into the city.

Richthofen as well never understood the nature of fighting there and if we add to his lack of enough and adequate aeroplanes his inflexibility and medicority of tactics, then we can realise why the Luftwaffe failed to crush Chuikov's greatest advantages:
- Invisible artillery in the eastern bank of the Volga.
- Supply lines across the river.

Within that failure lays the German defeat at Stalingrad.

This wasn't Paulus' fault. Hitler took a Panzerkorps from the VI Army and transferred it to Hoth's IV Panzer Army in the south. It slowed Paulus down and prevented fast-enough movements. When Hitler realised about this, he rapidly ordered Hoth north, but it was too late.

 

From Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel:

Stalingrad-memories and reassessments
Originally published in German in 1962


Paulus had been in active discussions with the Command of his superior Army Group B long before the Russian encircling offensive began. In Vinniza as early as mid September 1942 he adamantly pointed out the weaknesses of the front and demanded appropriate support.With the same objective he warned important guests who visited him: General Blumentritt, General Ochsner, General Fellgiebel, General Schmundt.

He even took an unsual route and contacted the Supreme Commander of the Roumanian Third Army, in order to get support from Marshal Antonescu.

On 21st November Paulus recommended to superior Army group to withdraw the gravely endangered army to an arc on the Don and the Chir. Army Group agreed with the operational intentions of the Army Commander. But on the evening of the same day it passed on without comment an order by OKH which said that the Sixth Army was to hold Stalingrad and the line on Volga at all costs.

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A possible explanation in case the 6th Army had evacuated Stalingrad in von Seydlitz memorandum:

After having completely destroyed the Soviet arms centre of Stalingrad, the army withdrew from the Volga while simultaneously destroying a group of enemy forces.

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It seems many generals though that the escape process should have been started very soon after the Russian offensive started, while Hitler would not have been aware what was going on.This , according to the book, would have been impossible:

" Luftwaffe would have had to top up Sithx Army´s fuel supply beforehand.Therefore, Hitler could not have been presented with an accomplished fact."

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The book also claims that if anybody it was von Manstein who could have changed the fate of the Sixth Army. If von Manstein had been against the Führer order in the first place, this would have unified the commander front on the issue
( Paulus, von Wichs, von Richthofen, Zeitzler ). AS well the book asks who would have been put in von Manstein´s place, and answers as well that Hitler had nobody to replace him in case...

 

From Nuremebrg 1946:

The Q is PROF. EXNER (counsel for Jodl)
The A is Paulus

Q. I would also be interested to know something about Stalingrad. In your written statement, or written declaration, you said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty of the prohibition of capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that?

A. I only intended to say it was the High Command of the Wehrmacht who was responsible for that order. It had the responsibility, and it makes no difference whether it was one person or another. At any rate their group is responsible as such.

Q. Then you do not know anything about the personal participation of either of these two gentlemen? You only known that the O.K.W.---

A. The O.K.W., which is represented by these persons.

Q. Why, when the situation at Stalingrad was so hopeless and terrible, did you not, in spite of the order by the Fuehrer to the contrary, try to give up?

A. Because at that time it was represented to me that by holding out with the army which I led, the fate of the German people would be decided.

Q. Do you know that you enjoyed the confidence of Hitler to a special degree?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. Do you know that he had already decided that you were to be the successor if the Stalingrad operation would be successful, because he no longer liked working with Jodl?

A. I do not know about that exactly, but there was a rumour that late in the summer or early in the autumn of 1942 a change was planned in the leadership. That was a rumour which the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe told me, but I did not get any official information about that. There was another rumour, that I would be relieved of the command of that army and would be given the command of a new Army Group along the Don.

Q. Do you remember the telegram which you sent to the Fuehrer when you were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?

A. I did not send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not send a telegram.

Q. Did you not thanked the Fuehrer in any way?

A. No.

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06/tgmwc-06-57-04.html

 

BTW, anybody read:

"Paulus and Stalingrad" by Walter Goerlitz.
A "semi-official" biography of Paulus.

Worth reading if I happen to find one anywhere??

 

Yes I am reading it right now. I am using it for a paper in which I am trying to prove that despite Hitler's intervention and mistakes made by other important persons, that Paulus can still be blamed for the defeat. Know I have to back that up. Lets get more specific here. What did Paulus do to lose the battle of Stalingrad. We have already mentioned his lack of speed early in the campaign, but what else?

Cheers,
Daniel