Interesting views form Martin Van Crefeld in ‘Supplying War – Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton’ The lessons from the period of the Libyan campaigns proper seem clear. First, Rommels’ supply difficulties were at all times due to the limited capacity of the North African ports, which not only determined the largest possible number of troops which could be maintained, but also restricted the size of convoys, making the business of escorting them impossibly expensive in terms of fuel and shipping employed. Second, the importance usually attributed to the ‘battle of the convoys’ is grossly exaggerated. At no time, except perhaps November-December 1941, did the aero-naval struggle in the central Mediterranean play a decisive part in events in North Africa, and even then Rommel’s difficulties were due as much to his impossibly long – and vulnerable- lines of communication within Africa as to losses at sea. Third, the Axis decision in summer 1942 not to occupy Malta was of far less moment to the outcome of the struggle in North Africa than the fact that the port of Tobruk was so small and hopelessly exposed to the attacks of the RAF operating from Egypt. More significant even than the above factors however, were the distances involved that had to be overcome inside Africa. These were out of all proportion to those that the Wehrmacht had met in Europe, including Russia, and there was littlie motor transport available to bridge them. Coastal shipping was employed on some scale in 1942, it is true but given the RAF’s domination of the air its effect was limited because, the nearer to the front a port lay, the more exposed to attack from the air it became. Given these facts, Rintelen was right in pointing out that only a railway could solve the supply problem. This, after all, was part of the British solution. The Italians, however, never mobilised the resources for this purpose, nor did Rommel have the patience to wait for them. That the reverses inflicted on Rommel during the summer and autumn of 1942 were due to the non-arrival of fuel from Italy, or to the fortuitous sinking of a disproportionately large number of vitally important tankers, has frequently been maintained but it is in fact without foundation. A detailed scrutiny of the list of ships sunk between 2nd September and 23rd October 1942 reveals that, out of a total of 27 vessels, only 2 were tankers. Also, the average quantity of fuel that Rommel received during the month July-October was actually slightly larger than that which he got during the halcyon days from February to June. This suggests that his difficulties stemmed from the inability to transport the fuel inside Africa, rather than to any dearth of supplies from Europe. This impression is reinforced still further by the fact that, during the battle of El Alamein, no less than a third of the Panzerarmee’s very limited stocks were still at Benghazi, many hundreds of miles behind the front. Finally, the often-heard claim that Hitler did not support Rommel sufficiently is not true. Rommel was given all the forces that could be supported in North Africa, and more, with the result that, as late as the end of August 1942, his intelligence officer estimated the Panzearmee was actually superior to the British in the number of tanks and heavy artillery. To support these forces, he was given a complement of motor-trucks incomparably more generous than that of any other German formation of similar size and importance, and if the problems of securing Panzerarmee’s communications inside Africa was, as a result of the above-listed factors, Rommel himself was largely to blame. Given that the Wehrmacht was only partially motorised and unsupported by a really strong motor industry; that the political situation necessitated the carrying of much useless Italian ballast; that the capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, the distances to be mastered so vast; it seems clear, that for all of Rommel’s tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble. Under these circumstances, Hitler’s original decision to send a force to defend a limited area in North Africa was correct. Rommel’s repeated defiance of his orders and attempts to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases, however, was mistaken and should never have been tolerated. NOTE: VAN CREFLED IS CONSIDERED TO BE A BIT SUSPECT BY SOME Are Van Crefeld's views justified and given the point about port facilities could Churchill's idea of a block ship have been not such a wild idea after all – though not using the Queen Elizabeth class battleship Barham. Some answers from another board. http://p069.ezboard.com/falltheworldsba ... 1071.topic
you cannot blame Rommel Hitler gave him crap compared to the eastern front so Rommel hade to use the best of it and try to trick his enemy's hence the name DESERT FOX
Although Rommel was not supposed to go on the offensive - just stop the British taking North Africa. Which he was amply equipped to do. Although - it is interesting that the Germans put an officer known more for his offensive tactics than defensive tactics into a 'hold this territory' war, while the rest of the Wehrmacht lined up to invade the CCCP...
Rommel wasn't given crap, he was given some well trained and equiped panzer divisions. However he always said that he was not given enough supplies and needed one more panzer division to drive all the way to Jerusalem. It is odd that such an offensive general was given orders to carry out a defensive role, and again in France in 44. However the tactis of the desert showed that traditional static warfare would fail, as the Italians proved. I have seen the desert campaign likened to a naval battle where terriatory was not as important as mobility. In that sense Rommels appointment was very well thought out. It was a shame that Hitler was distracted by Russia and Rommel languished forgotton in Africa. FNG
A shame really. You can just as well say: it was a shame Hitler was distracted by the British in Africa and Greece, as well as by his admirable friend Mussolini´s exploits. How many kilometers short of Moscow Wehrmacht was stopped? Wasn´t it 40 ?
Less, there are rumours that some scout units actualy got within sight of red square and the Kremlin. But I don't understand your point. I said it's a shame on a purely detached and military viewpoint in that Rommel was not able to bring the results that people believe he was capable off. Clearly Rommel being stopped at El Alamein as far as the world today is concerned is nothing but a good thing. But that does not detract from his fantastic miliatary skills. FNG
Churchill was Lord of the Admiralty back in WW1, right? Izaak: the smileys can indeed be important since a whole lot of human conversation is communicated through facial expression, which on a forum is completely absent. Either we choose to be 100% factual or we use smileys, it's that simple. This is an interesting point. It might be that Hitler favoured important parts of his line to be held by aggressive generals who would take the fight to the enemy, but then again he also often insisted on holding places to the last man and bullet, which doesn't allow for much flexibility or aggression.
The Grand Plan was, after all, a pincer: its northern part coming through Caucasus towards the Middle East, and the southern - through Egypt, in the same direction. The main objectives being oil and the control of Suez Canal. Isn´t this the explanation why Rommel was chosen?
Rommel was told not to attack, he had no orders to do so, no supplies to such an action or enough reinforcements to allow such an action to continue. He was supposed to sit tight and keep the british at bay whilst bolstering the italians. As for Normandy, I suppose it could be a morale and enthuisiasm matter. Rommel was very motivated and certainly made a difference to the defences in the short time he had to prepare. FNG
The 'Grand Plan' was only ever concieved after Rommel had his initial successes. Germany was more interested in Knocking the CCCP out to bother with such things before then.
