Battle of Britain

Although - the RN was mostly based up in Scapa Flow. The entire naval presence (not counting MTBs etc) on the South East coast was around 4 destroyers. Other assets had been removed due to the dangers of bombing. A quick & unexpected Channel crossing by the Germans could have been largely unapposed.
However, their supply lines would not exist...

 

In 1940 actually getting a shore is the easy bit. Keeping your supply lines open in the face of RN attack is the point when you can start playing the mission impossible theme tune

 

I am not trying to sound defeatist, however, if the RAF was defeated, then the Luftwaffe would have bombers to attack the RN. The subs would not need to be near Dover but just far enough out to stop them from entering the straits. There is plenty of open sea in the North Sea and out by the Scillies.

It was not a dead certainty but a very realistic outcome. As you point out the RN would attack the supply lines, maybe Hitler knew more than he let on and refused to invade for a reason.

 

The Luftwaffe was not (certainly in 1940) trained for naval attack, indeed not one British capital ship was lost to German air attack. The RN was able to cover the Dunkirk evacuation and the evacuation of Crete in the face of German air attack. No doubt some British ships would have been lost had Hitler gone ahead with an invasion, but the result would have been a humiliating and costly defeat for Germany - compare the plans for Sealion with thise for Overlord.

 

If the RAF had felt they were on the verge of losing they would have pulled everything out of Bf-109 range. As soon as the invasion began the RAF would have gone all out against the invasion fleet. At best the Geramsn would ahve been left with a situation simialr to Guadalcanal, the LW ruling duirng the day, the RN at night. I believe the only way Sealion could have succeeded would havce been if the British had decided enough and given up. Hard concept to swallow.

 

I also think that sealion did not have any chances of sucess, Hitler probably never really believed in it himself.

Germany in 1940 just didn't have the necessary tools for large scale landings, and as Hitler rapidly focused on Russia, he was not likely to ever have them.

 

My and not only mine impression is that Sealion was not a serious proposition for long. Soon, already in autumn it was but a Potemkin village (iow a deception maneouvre for Barbarossa). Anyways, since USSR took Bessarabia nad Bukovina and hitler got scared.

 

the real problem

germany's real problem [ and a fatal one as far as the B of B went] was the very limited range of her fighters. they could only threaten a very small percentage of england. in some ways it was a preview of the trouble they had with russia later. its tough to beat somebody when they can back out of range to rest and rebuild whenever they wish. at no time was the RAF in danger of losing enough of its logistical support to matter. maybe an simple point but one to remember since it effects everything else.

 

Re: the real problem

The effect of German fighters having drop tanks or longer range on internal fuel on the outcome of the battle of Britain is quite often discussed.

In his book ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy – a history of the Battle of Britain’ Stephen Bungay makes an interesting argument, what do you think of it?

‘Suppose the Bf109 had the range of the Mustang. What would the Luftwaffe have done with it? Similar endurance would have enabled the Germans to send escorted bombers to John O’Groats. Why would they have wanted to do that? Given the goal of establishing local air superiority, there was no point in attacking any target north of London. A bit more endurance would have helped in raiding Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden, but unless the RAF could be caught on the ground, attacking airfields was not in itself going to win the battle. The key aircraft factories (at the time) were at Kingston-upon-Thames and Southampton, which were within range. The range of the fighter escorts was only critical if the plan was to conduct economic warfare as part of a long-term siege. It was not critical to gaining air-superiority over the invasion beaches.

Had they had an extra margin of 15 – 20 minutes, the 109 pilots would probably have been able to do a bit more damage and somewhat reduced their losses. They would certainly have been more relaxed. However, their cannon only had seven seconds worth of ammunition and although they had sixty seconds worth machine gun rounds, their two machine guns alone would have greatly reduced their effectiveness. So if their fuel had not been used up, their ammunition would have been. Any pilot who spent more than five minutes in a dogfight would have been exhausted anyway. When the Mustangs went to Berlin they spent most of their time in getting there and back, not dogfighting. When RAF Fighter Command took the offensive in 1941, the pilots carrying out sweeps over Northern France in order to draw up the Luftwaffe complained about many things, but not the range of the Spitfire. It was only when the target was further away that range became critical’

Note he is making a difference between the Luftwaffe goals (air-superiority over the invasion beaches) and the later Allied goals (economic warfare as part of a long-term siege).

 

at no time was the RAF in danger of losing enough of its logistical support to matter. maybe an simple point but one to remember since it effects everything else.

From the accounts I'd read of the Battle of Britain I'd disagree, I don't think the RAF was in imminent danger of losing the battle at any particular point though but one account by a pilot who was a trainee during the Battle of Britain told of critical shortages of ammunition at the gunnery schools, and as much as Beaverbrook's excellent efforts put many damaged fighters back in squadron service that may have otherwise been wasted they couldn't keep recycling written-off fighters for ever.

Most effective were the German attacks against the sector airfields, for example Biggin Hill which gravely damaged the RAF's command and control systems, probably more so than the effect of the attacks on the radar stations.

I do also disagree with the assertion that extra fuel tankage couldn't have altered the outcome of the Battle, I'll try and find and copy over my response to this from TGPlanes, but in a nutshell fewer Bf109s and fewer Bf109 pilots would have been lost because of running out of fuel whilst the RAF would have had to keep more squadrons in the air for longer further fatiguing already tired pilots and depriving exhausted units of desperately needed rest.

Added to that there is the possibility of opportunistic strafing attacks on RAF fighter fields, two machineguns may not be that impressive in air-to-air combat in 1940, but they'll still make a mess of a bowser, a parked Hurricane and anyone who happens to be standing near it pretty easily!

To paraphrase from PMN1's extract, the Bf109 pilots may have complained about many things in the Battle of Britain but the shortage of cannon ammunition wasn't one of them, fuel tankage however was.

 

Excellent points, IMO, PMN1.
very informative and logical to me.

When do you think hitler finally dropped any thought of Seelowe and why?
Did he turn agains USSR because he couldn´t take Britain or he didn´t take Britain because he was afraid of Stalin?

 

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Both of these I think.

Taking Britain would force him to go for a long war and concentrate on air+seapower rather than on land warfare.
Hitler didn't want to take such a risk while having the biggest land force of the world as a neighbour.

Also he tought that having Russia conquered, Britain would see that it was in a hopeless situation and ask for peace.
If not, he could then still lay a long siege upon the british isles, using the combined ressources of Europe for building up his air and submarine force.

 

Beaverbrook

mmhh - I had the impression that Beaverbrook caused chaos while at MAP especially in the repair system - there is a section about this in 'Wilfred Freeman - the genius behind Allied Air Supremecy 1939 - 1945' by Anthony Furze.

I'll have to dig the book out and read the 'Beaverbrook myth' section again.

 

I would agree with Castelot and there its alwys said he admired the British Empire and have like it to survive (under German control of course) to counter the US and Russia.

As to when he dropped the idea, who knows what went on in his head but I susepct he started having doubts as soon as reports stated coming back that Fighter Command were coming back time and time again despite Goring's promises beforehand.

 

I don't think a German invasion and conquest of Britain in 1940 was a realistic possibility even had they gained air superiority over southern England, in the words of the Admiralty "I'm not saying they will not come but that they will not come by sea". Had the air battle over Britain been lost though whether the country would have had the morale and the will to continue the war to the bitter end must be debatable. Without Russia the threat to Britain continuing the war would have been long term - a vast U boat campaign, how to fight the rescources of a whole continant etc, even with the USA in as well it is hard to see the war being won.

 

Had the air battle over Britain been lost though whether the country would have had the morale and the will to continue the war to the bitter end must be debatable.

Agreed, the political importance of the Battle of Britain will to me always out-weigh the military significance.

...even with the USA in as well it is hard to see the war being won.

Would we have had the USA as well? No disrespect to our American colleagues but they were not going to carry on backing a lost cause indefinitely. Britain needed to show the world that Germany was not unbeatable, that we were not a lost cause in order to secure international backing. That was what the Battle of Britain gave us and the world, the proof that we could fight and were worth backing.

 

I agree I was simply emphasising the importance to the Western Allies of Germany turning east after France fell

 

I will go along with that .... he says with a tear in his eye.

 

I know :roll: , I couldn't help feeling that it came over as a bit of an emotional patriotic rant as I wrote it, I just couldn't think of a better way of expressing it )

 

I´m not sure whether hitler was interested in controlling Britain in any way. He just wanted not to have Britain against himself.

A further war across the Channel (but minus the threatening presence of USSR and minus the supplies from USSR) would have been equally devastating for both parts, I think. The end of it would probably have been a sort of ceasefire or even peace. But the absence of USSR in this equation makes this line of discussion less than theoretical, I´m afraid.