What would be the effect on the Allied supply situation after June 1944 if both Mulberry harbours had survived the storm intact? IIRC, the UK Mulberry used salvaged parts of the US Mulberry so you are not going to get an automatic doubling of supply. You are not going to get as good an offloading as a proper port but are you going to get an increase that is going to make a difference and if so until when?
Not that much difference, I wouldn't think. Except for a few brief periods the flow of supplies was continuous until the end of the war and though some things were in short supply like special ammo that was more due to production shortfalls AFAIK.
I think the biggest problem wasn't getting stuff ashore but getting it forward to the troops. I believe that was the allies biggest supply problem, certainly after the Normandy breakout. The Logicistic Brake is just as capable of stopping an advance as high quality opposition.
I agree that it would have made little difference to the overall offensive. Fuel was coming in via the pipeline which was unaffected as far as I know, armour and men were also delivered in huge numbers with out any problems. I am also not aware of any specific supply problems whilst the allies were trying to break out though I know that between the break out and market garden the allies were having problems suppling both army groups the full ammount of fuel and ammo needed to maintain momentum on all fronts. FNG
I think the two seasons of fighting is more or less a done thing, but I was wondering if both Mulberry harbours had been intact, would this have affected any operations later. Obviously the further you go away from Normandy, the worse the sitution gets. Were there any thoughts of direct beaching of LST's etc further up along the coast as territory was gained, I cant see there being no beaches suitable for this north of Normandy. Its been suggested the Mulberry harbours themselves were not really needed or caused their own problems - bombardons breaking loose and smashing into other components, swim-ends on Phoenix leaving gaps that allowed scour channels to form. If the steel and manpower used to produce the Bombardons and Phoenix was used to produce LCT, LST etc, what kind of production capacity is left in the UK at this time without affecting other building.
You are correct. That was the reason for the creation of the Red Ball Express. The huge fleet of trucks that ferried the supplys forward from the depots to the frontline units.
Apparently, if you look at the damage caused by running the trucks to death during this the long term result was a reduction in the supply effort.
Where are you getting that from? Everything I have read about the Red Ball Express states it was hugely successful.
Oh I agree it was successful in the short term but it took one hell of a toll on the trucks and used an Army's worth of fuel a day itself just to keep going. I cant find the books that mention the long term damage to supply but the damage to trucks (and men) is mentioned in Robin Neillands 'The Battle of Normandy 1944, Martin van Crefeld's 'Supplying War, logistocs from Wallenstein to Patton', Max Hastings' 'Armageddon' and Carlo D'Estse;s 'Eisenhower'.
supplies A friend was telling me this past weekend that from D Day 1 he was in charge of six DUKWs, he made supply trips , mostly tank shells from beach to forward units, their record was six trips in one day. At night they took the DUKWS out to sea and tied up along side of larger vessels. He crossed the Rhine at Nijmegen supporting the 82nd.AA. He is now 83 years old and I am helping him sort his unit history, very difficult as they were regularly attatched to different units. Inciidentally his vehicle was nick-named HMS Pepperpot as it had so many shrapnel holes in it.!! He was a member of the Royal Army service Corps and still parades for 'Poppy Day'.
The fact of the matter is; the US produced one heck of a lot of trucks and a heck of a lot of fuel. So wear and tar on the trucks wasn't that big a factor. They were rolling off the assembly lines day and night . I also don't recall the Allied armies running out of fuel like the Germans did during the Battle of the Bulge. There were a few times when supplies got tight and they had to slow down but compared to their opponents logistics was not a major problem at any time during the war. I am curious how exactly could you distribute fuel without burning fuel? That is to say without using trucks? Horses? I'm not being facetious I really don't get your point. It is so efficient to deliver supplies by truck that even today that is how supermarkets and department stores and gas stations are supplied. Trains or pipelines may move fuel or goods cross country but when it comes to local distribution it is all trucks.
Studebaker was happy to supply them with all the 6x6 trucks required to get the job-done. Studebaker was an Indiana Company based in South Bend. They were contracted to supply radial engines for B-17s, 6x6 trucks such as those used by the "Red-Ball Express"... and the M29/M29C Weasel. My impression is that drivers for the RBE were made-up of mostly black-supply outfits and they did one heck of a job in getting fuel and ammo to the front-line troops. Tim
Oh I'm not saying it wasn't a success, it was but in the stort term whereas most 'popular history' seem to portray it as a complete success with no adverse effect later on. Unless it could guarentee 'home by Christmass 1944' which was extremely unlikely then it was going to have an effect in later campaigns.
In September 1944 SHAEF had to shut down an entire Army Group to allow another to continue its advance. I'd call this a serious supply problem, even though it wasn't as bad as the situation faced by the Germans in December 1944. The fact that the movement of supplies itself consumes supplies is the biggest problem of all logistics. In ancient times it was impossible for troops to carry more than a three days' supply of food; if they brought more, the pack animals would need a share of it that was larger than the extra amount they carried.
That kind of logic still applies. The further you have to move supplies the more of them is being consumed by the very act of moving them. Efficiency is the big issue. I would guess that in terms of resources consumed per ton of cargo your looking at an efficiency hierarchy something like this. Most Efficient Ships Trains Trucks Horsepower Man Power Least Efficient. Which was why taking the various channel ports was so important.
Intresting quote from Jarrow (an area of the UK for non Brits) MP Don Dixon about 10 years ago. 'If a horse emulated Pegasus and grew wings it might be able to lift about 15lb of books off the table in front of him. If, on the other hand, it preferred to swim , it could probably tow 50 or 60 Honourable members through the sea. He was probably over egging the ship side a bit as he had shipyards in his constituency (Swan Hunter) and this was at a time when the UK's 'phib capability was at stake etc but he had a point.
Lets not overstate the case. An army group stopped advancing in order to shift supplies to another army group for a big offensive. A temporary burble in the logistical pipeline that was soon over and the huge quantities of supplies began flowing again. No major battles and certainly no campaigns were lost due to logistical reasons.
Now this is open to complete misinterpretation! I've heard Geordies called many things before, but never "non Brits" :lol: Vaguely on topic, I seem to remember that one of the major justifications for the Italian campaign was that it was a lot more difficult to switch forces to/from Italy compared with between Eastern and Western fronts. The quantity of German forces tied up in Italy basically removed OKWs strategic reserve which could otherwise have been sent East or West as required. I cant find a reference at the moment (probably Churchill ) but someone might be able to post a link Tom
