Level of impact. For example, strategic bombing attacks the enemy's infrastructure, manufacturing capability, fuel production, and things like that. His overall ability to wage war. Tactical bombing, on the other hand, aims at troops, vehicles, roadways, bridges, and the like. Think wargames. Squad Leader is tactical. Third Reich is strategic. Are you dealing with Armies and Fronts (S), or Divisions and Regiments (T)?
I've always thought of it as Tactical is outdoing the enemy in the field, Strategic is outdoing the enemy before they even get there.
A simple way of determining the difference between tactical and strategic is with tactical you destroy an enemy's tanks on the battlefield, but with strategic you destroy his tanks( and his ability to make them) whilst they are under construction in his factories. BG
I had to do a business defintion of strategy once, here are some notes I made on the military definitons. Today, and for the Germans and Soviets in WWII, there are generally considered to be three levels of command and direction: 1. Strategy is the identification and planned deployment of resources required to achieve an objective. 2. Operations bridge the gap between strategy and tactics. The operational level was not generally recognized by the Western Allies in WWII. For them the gap between strategy and tactics was the campaign. 3. Tactics are the actual employment of the available resources against an opponent. Strategy, which can apply up to the level of national political objectives and include economic considerations, is a general framework that provides guidance for actions to be taken, and is shaped by those actions. WWII Strategic level formations were Theater Commands (SHAEF), Army Groups (21st AG), Air Forces (8th USAAF), and Fleets (3rd Fleet). Operations are the coordination and combination of (tactical) battles to achieve a strategic objective. Operational level formations are able to conduct operations on their own, and are large enough to be directly controlled or to produce an effect at the strategic level. Armies, Corps and Divisions are examples of WWII operational level formations. Tactics are the detailed maneuvers and specific techniques and actions for the application of resources to achieve battlefield success. Battalions, companies, platoons and squads operate at the tactical level.
. Thanks canambridge , can you expound on the operational art , it bug me heaps I've guess it so far as the chaining together of different operations, changing the rythm and place of the action within the limit of supply and fresh forces , a bit as a boxer would send a combination of punches , keeping his breath under control or stepping up the pressure ?!?!? is it nearly wrong or partly right ? .
I think you've got a better handle on operational art than I do jeaguer, I have also seen Operational Art described as conducting a symphony orchestra. But not being one to pass up a chance to pontificate here's my take on it. Operational art is defined as the method by which higher level commands manage individual battles to achieve a principle goal, which is the objective of the operation. The Soviets developed the concept (they initially referred to it as "Deep Battle"; see “The Nature of Modern Armies” by V. K. Trianafillov) following studies of WWI and the Russian Civil War of 1918-1922. They concluded that it would be impossible to defeat a large modern industrialized state in one battle of even campaign. Victory would only be possible by winning a series of individual battles each of which would share a common goal or objective. The thinking was that any large industrialized nation would have too many resources, human and material, to be overcome by a loss in one or more battles or campaigns, is those fights were not part of a general plan. A series of properly conducted victorious operations would be required for the ultimate strategic victory. It seems like the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 and the British Offensive at Amiens in August 1918 had a major influence on the formulation of the concept. The Soviet conclusion from those battles was that an unexpected attack on a large tactical front confused the defenses and allowed the attackers to concentrate overwhelming strength at a few decisive points to achieve a breakthrough. To make the victory complete it was then necessary to exploit the breakthrough in depth, beyond the artillery and command and control areas of the defense. It was also felt that the operation must be stopped once certain limits had been reached (logistical, command and/or due to a relative loss of combat power advantage) to retain the benefits of the success. The concept relies very heavily on the classic ideas of Clauswitz and von Moltke: unity of command, mass, objective/center of gravity, simplicity, economy of force, primacy of the offensive, maneuver and security. The Soviets (i.e., Stalin) seemed to have the biggest problem with the knowing when to stop and operation. The Counteroffensives of 1941 and 1942 both outran their successes and even the late summer/autumn offensives of 1943 often ended only when a German counterattack devastated the attacking Soviet forces. By the time of Bagration in 1944, the Soviets defined the limit of the operation as part of the objectives. The Composition of an operation: The operational objectives are defined in conjunction with other operations to contribute to the strategic goal. A plan is developed to attack the entire framework of the enemy’s positions in depth, and all at nearly the same time. The plan must be flexible to account for the unforeseen, either positive or negative. A deception plan is instituted to prevent the enemy from identifying the area and main axes of the operation until it is too late to effectively respond. An appropriately sized and balanced combined arms assaulting force of infantry, artillery, armor, and air assets are assembled for the attack. Economy of force is respected by massing the attack force at critical points to achieve the breakthrough and maneuver to seize key geographical features and threaten the enemy’s center of gravity, forcing him to fight (at a disadvantage). The operation is completed when it has reached a point where the attacking force no longer enjoys a superiority of force and/or before the force has reached a position where it can no longer be logistically supported.
. It help some , the point I take is your assertion of late soviet strategy identifying offensive end point . I agree that until early 44 they would flog their troops until they dropped it was at this time that soviet strategical planning took off in a big way , stalin stepped back into the shadows , still ever watchful , but less concerned about the trivial of corps boundary and direction . vasilievski and joukov having a freer hand . .
