Argentine Battleship Moreno

Like most here I often visit Wikipedia. Today's featured article ( 23/09/11) really caught my eye -- Battleship Moreno. The article describes her as a dreadnought, though her armament and protection suggest to me that she was more like a super-dreadnought, if there ever really was such a warship type except in the fevered prose of propagandists. Comments and instruction on what really constitutes a dreadnought would be welcome.

What really has me puzzled is this picture which accompanies the article. This shot appears to be Moreno fitting out in the Fore River Shipyard just prior to her delivery to the Argentine navy, but a close inspection shows the United States colors flying from her jackstaff. Is this normal practice when a warship is built for a foreign navy?

 

Well the term dreadnought is both an adjective and noun. A type of ship with nothing to fear and a specific ship itself. The British launched HMS Dreadnought in 1906, a revolutionary ship for it's day. Massive cannon mounted in turrets, heavily armored, for it 's day and fast for the period, steam turbine driven. I would have to look up it's specifics. No existing ship was considered it's equal hence the term "dreadnought" it dreaded no other warship....perhaps a bit foolishly given the soon rise of submarines , but in 1906 probably true. It set off a naval arms race and similar ships were referred to as dreadnoughts . By WW1 they were employed by major navies in fair numbers. It reality an antecedent to the yet to come term battleship. So the most powerful fighting ships of the 1906-WW1 era were dreadnoughts , followed by battleships in the pre-WW2 era and to now as a fair number of battleships remain as museum ships. The USS Texas is probably the closest thing to a dreadnought still afloat and open to the public.

At least battleship did not imply they had nothing to fear ! WW2 proved they had much. Battleship did spawn battle cruiser and pocket battleship as naval terms. In the Falklands War the news "termed" the Argentine ARA General Belgrano a battleship but she was in fact an Ex-US WW2 cruiser.

Terminology is always interesting and fun....or can be.

 

After reading up on Moreno I've come to the conclusion that she was a typical transitional battleship, a decided improvement over HMS Dreadnought -- two more 12" guns in a more effective layout (12-gun broadside vs. 8), better range and speed due to a more efficient powerplant -- but not up to the standard of vessels that were ordered just a year or two later, the real "super-dreadnoughts" such as the 15" Queen Elizabeths and, most importantly, the 14" New Yorks, which were just a few months behind Moreno on the stocks. In other words, something old and something new.

It's hard to appreciate how rapidly battleship technology advanced between 1906 and the end of WWI. Dreadnought and her immediate imitators, formidable though they were in the 1906 through 1910 time-frame, turned out to be mere test-beds. The naval arms race pushed ahead so relentlessly that by the time the High Seas Fleet decided to contest control of the North Sea Approaches the 12-inchers were decidedly vulnerable ships. In the end they were fit for "colonial" duty only. For all the money and hype their useful lives were remarkably short. The "super-dreadnoughts" were another story. Most of them were laid down between 1911 and 1915, yet their designs were so right that many served right through to the end of the battleship age.

For example, all of Japan's WWII battleships (with the exception of the two Yamatos) were either in commission or on the stocks during WWI, and all of those except Nagato and Mutsu were pretty much by-the-book "super-dreadnoughts" in the same league with the Bayerns and the Queen Elizabeths. Truth be told Nagato and Mutsu really weren't particularly exceptional except that both received 16" guns (16.1" to be exact in the case of Nagato) which was a bit of one-upmanship to compensate for the Royal Navy's evident intent to standardize on the 15-incher. All of these veteran ships had plenty of potential in their hulls because Japan had insisted on high speed. They were upgraded several times in the inter-war decades and proved worthy opponents right to the end.

The same can't be said of America's WWI supers. Though a lot of them were retained in the active fleet their 21-knot flank speed was a real liability by 1941. Every admiral with a working brain knew the CV was going to be vital -- if not the capital ship of the coming war, at least a significant arbiter of any fleet action in the Pacific. The dog-slow battle-wagons rendered the fleet seriously unbalanced. Hence the two North Carolinas and the four South Dakotas which were built to redress that imbalance.

The eight WWI-vintage battleships lost or damaged at Pearl Harbor were a humiliation, but not really the crippling blow Yamamoto intended. Had PH never happened war between America and the Japanese Empire would have broken out somehow in the spring of 1942, and those eight would have seen action, though I don't see how any of the 21-knot battleships could have done any better service than they actually did historically, probably worse since Kimmel would have likely used them without modernizations. Ironically the only time the battle-wagons got an importunity to fight as their designers intended their lack of speed wasn't an issue.

 

Well, Wiki is Wiki, it's a good place to start, but is far from being the last word on any subject.

The article for the ARA Moreno states that it was a dreadnought type. Yet, the article for the dreadnought type states that they were "super dreadnoughts": Dreadnought - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Not the first time Wiki articles have contradicted themselves, and unfortunately, not the last.

 

The deciding factor in the "short" lives of the dreadnought type was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which saw the scrapping of many of the dreadnought type battleships, otherwise, the dreadnought type would likely have remained longer than it did. As to the relatively "long" lives of the "super dreadnought", it had nothing to do with their designs being "so right". Here again, the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 played a major part, in that it declared a "building holiday" on battleships. Thus, the "supers" were essentially guaranteed a minimum 20-year service life before being replaced. The "supers" were given a further lease on life with the onset of the world-wide "Great Depression." The nations of the world did not have the finances to replaces the "supers" when stipulated by the Naval Treaty. Had the world's nations been able to afford new construction of battleships when stipulated by the Treaty, many of the "supers" would have gone to the scrapper yards by the beginning of World War II. The Treaty text and replacement tables can be found here: CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, 1922.

Well, the Japanese battleships, Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise, and Hyuga, were originally not all that faster than their American counterparts. Those four were a knot or two faster, but that is not fast enough in an engagement to be useful. What helped the Japanese was that they rebuilt the engineering plants of their older battleships when they went in for reconstruction, this, in essence doubled their shaft horsepower, bring these battleships up to an average trial speed of 25 knots. Whereas, the Americans did not radically modernize the engineering plants of their battleships. Another favorable advantage given to the Japanese battleships during their modernization was to increase the elevation of the main battery guns to between 40 degrees and 45 degrees, thus giving them the capability of firing at much longer ranges than their American counterparts.

Still, the Japanese battleships were only "worthy" opponents on paper, reality proved to be much more sobering. Hamstrung by fuel shortages early in the war, the Japanese battleships saw little use, and later in the war, when used, their gun accuracy was abysmal.

After the 1930's modernization, their speed was more like 18-20 knots, and not 21. Still, this is not the great liability you presume, since the fleet was still needed to be supplied with oil and the tankers were slower than the battleships. The carriers only needed their speed when they conducted "hit-and-run" raids, other than that, they remained with the battle fleet to serve as it's "eyes" and to protect the battleships from air attack.

As to "Every admiral with a working brain...", there were very few of those admirals at the time. Even after Pearl Harbor, several remained tied to the big guns - Spruance being the most notable. Further, in the early stages of the Pacific War, the carriers conducted "hit-and-run" raids as put worth in pre-WWII naval doctrine. Although, this, of course, was mostly done out of necessity, since the carriers now had nothing to protect or protect them, and the aircrews were in great need of "on the job training." So, introducing them to combat against low-risk targets, before they had to engage the "cream of the Japanese crop" was a very wise decision.

The North Carolina class and South Dakota class were not intended to redress any imbalance within the US fleet, but to put them on equal or better footing against their intended opponents, the now much faster battleships of Japan. FYI, your "carrier" admirals still felt that the 27-knot battleships were still too slow to serve as carrier escorts. However, given treaty limitations on tonnage, they did not have much of a choice.

I'd like to go on further, but work calls..

 

Bugger work....Get back posting. Interesting stuff.

 

No, carriers also needed their speed to launch and recover if the natural wind over the bow wind wasn't sufficient. This situation happened quite often, especially late in the war when larger and more heavy laden planes were the norm. This "hit-and-run" raids speed stuff is just malarkey. That's NOT why carriers were built to be fast.

 

That's a distinction with little difference.

 

Spruance was cruiser admiral. He didn't get a carrier task force command until Halsey became ill with a severe psoriasis flareup. Halsey, Mitscher and Aubrey Fitch were well ahead of Spruance in carrier s&t. Spruance did a brilliant job at Midway, but he followed Halsey lead. He was no a pre-war carrier visionary as you're tried to portray him.

 

That's what you get with selective quoting, next time read and quote the whole sentence and not just parts of it. The sentence in it's entirety

Now I ask you, with this sentence, how am I portraying Spruance as a pre-war carrier visionary?

 

Now whom is spouting malarkey?

Back then, high speed was desirable, but not necessary for launching aircraft. Low-wind or no-wind conditions were overcome by the use of a catapult to launch aircraft, also the early carrier aircraft had relatively low landing speeds.

The original reasoning behind for high-speed carriers was that they were intended to be part of the scouting force and would be working with much faster combat vessels than battleships, thus they would have to keep up with them. Further, speed was considered to be part of their protection - they could run away from anything that they could not handle.

Still, you are partially correct, later in early 1920's, the Bureau of Construction & Repair was pressing for a 10,000 pound torpedo-bomber that they wanted as the main carrier bomber, this bomber would, of course need faster carriers to operate safely from, since the catapults of the time were IIRC, not capable of or barely capable of, launching such a heavy aircraft in a low-wind/no-wind condition.

 

Good discussion, keep it up gents!

 

"Battleship" was in general use from the late 1800s and continued to designate the older ships; in fact a 1914 Jane's Fighting Ships I've seen has separate sections for Dreadnoughts (including battle cruisers) and battleships. As mentioned earlier, the distinction evaporated after the Washington Treaty, since there were no longer battleships that weren't dreadnoughts.

"Super dreadnought" was first applied to ships like the Orion and Lion classes with guns heavier than 12" (13.5" in those cases), but there was not a hard and fast definition as there was for "dreadnought".

There was also the retroactively coined term "semi-dreadnought" for ships with an intermediate battery of 8-10" guns. Most of these eliminated the ~6" secondary armament and could be considered "all big gun" ships in that they mounted only heavy guns in turrets and light anti-destroyer weapons around 3-4". However they lacked the hallmark of the dreadnought, a uniform heavy gun battery; this became especially significant with the invention of director/salvo firing.

The Japanese had wanted to arm their Satsuma class with twelve 12" guns, but sufficient 12" could not be made available in time, so they ended up with four 12" and twelve 10". This at least spared a generation of battleships from being called "satsumas"

Turning to aircraft carriers, their primary mode of operation in the 1920s and 30s was unassisted deck takeoffs, for which ship's speed was important. Catapults were for capital ships and cruisers which lacked flight decks, many of the early carriers did not have them - Japanese carriers never did. IIRC from Friedman's carrier book, Saratoga only got catapults about halfway through WWII, and Essex was commissioned without them, although she received them shortly after.

 

Carronade,

Well said about the battleship definitions throughout the years.

However,

The first three American carriers, Langley, Lexington, and Saratoga, all were equipped with catapults. Cats were done away with on the Ranger, but she would receive them late in World War II. After the Ranger, all US carriers would be designed for them.

You are correct, the Japanese never used catapults on their carriers, although their aircraft were more lightly constructed than their US counterparts.

You must be thinking of the USS Ranger(CV-4), as she wasn't equipped with cats until late in WW2.

The Essex was designed for three catapults, but on CV-9, only the hanger deck catapult was fitted by her commissioning.

 

As Friedman puts it "At this time carriers were considered not only as platforms for wheeled aircraft but also as depot ships for floatplanes carried aboard cruisers and battleships." This was the rationale for the early flight-deck catapults (and also for cranes which could lift floatplanes from the water). In the Lexingtons "The catapults were removed in 1934 after relatively little use." Plans of Langley (about 1930), Lex (1936), and Sara (1943) show no cats. Rolling takeoffs were the routine practice for the carriers's own air groups until well into WWII, as described for example in operations at Midway. Even ships that had catapults made relatively little use of them, Enterprise used her flight deck units only 36 times in fiscal year 1940 and 18 in FY41, as late as April 29, 1943 her captain asked to have them removed. Sara finally had catapults installed at the end of 1943 when being fitted for service as a night carrier: "They were considered essential for night operations because of the guidance they provided for an airplane taking off in total darkness." Ranger received one catapult in 1944, ironically when she was being fitted for training duties including night fighters. Previously she had supported Operation Torch and conducted air strikes against Norway and numerous ferry missions without.

 

I thought I remembered reading about the Japanese having catapults on some of thier carriers at least in the 30s.

 

One thing, the Japanese had several seaplane carriers, these used catapults to launch the same type floatplanes carried by battleships or cruisers and hoisted them back aboard by crane. Sort of low budget light carriers, using cats and water landings in lieu of flight deck and arresting gear. They carried up to 24 aircraft and had fairly extensive maintenance and support facilities. Besides reconnaissance, they could conduct light attack missions and provide a degree of air superiority in areas where fleet carriers or extensive land-based air were not operating. Several navies experimented with the type, the French Commandant Teste was another example.

The Japanese seaplane carriers sometimes also carried midget submarines, and their carrying capacity and cranes made them useful for supply missions. In 1943 Chitose and Chiyoda were converted to light carriers; helpfully, they already had aviation fuel and ordnance storage.

The term 'seaplane tender' was used for ships which supported large flying boats like PBYs or H6Ks. The larger seaplane tenders could hoist a flying boat aboard for maintenance, but their charges spent most of their time in the water (or the air ).

 

I've found a couple of referances to Japanese carrier catapults but other references that say they didn't have them. Two I found are:
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Aircraft Carriers

and Aircraft Carrier on Imperial Japanese Warships

I wouldn't consider either of these to be defintive though.

 

I ran across a plan of Shokaku which shows catapults, or pairs of lines where catapults would be, no detail. This is in Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1869-1945 by Jentschura et. al. and is captioned (1941) i.e. about when the ship was completed. The book has plans of all Japanese carriers, and none of the others show catapults, including smaller and slower ships like the Hiyo and Zuiho classes and CVEs which would benefit from them more. With their speed and flight deck length, the Shokakus were the least likely Japanese carriers to need or use cats. And of course we have other sources like Fleets of World War II by our Tiornu aka Richard Worth stating that Japanese carriers never had them. I wonder if they might have been considered during the design process but not adopted?

wikipedia, citing Brown, David (1977). WWII Fact Files: Aircraft Carriers, describes Shokaku's flight deck, arresting gear, elevators, etc. but makes no mention of catapults. Photographs of both her and Zuikaku's flight decks do not show them.