As Germany, what would you have done in 1943?

Specifically, with regards as what would you have done with the German army after Stalingrad?

Attempt Kursk in the same manner as historically done, but not pull units out during the battle as Hitler did in order to support the Italian front? Attempt a Kursk or a similar battle but move as soon as weather permitted? Just sit tight and try to form a solid defensive line? Or maybe try something a bit more daring? (Just some ideas. )

Personally, I would have gone with one of Mansteins proposals, to allow the Soviets their expected offensive into the Donets basin and rapidly withdraw, only to violently counter-attack and try to encircle the large Russian force with the weight of a large panzer force.

Granted at this stage of the war, Soviet production and manpower acquisition was rapidly outpacing the Germans. The long-term outlook was very grim indeed, but perhaps with a bold enough strategy, and admittedly a lot of luck, a severe Russian defeat on a strategic scale such as this could force them back onto a lengthy defensive, giving the Germans time to plan their next move. Of course, the risk of this plan flopping completely was as dangerous as the potential rewards were desirable. For like Kursk, the loss of too many men and material would force the Germans on the defensive permanently. Perhaps even collapse the front.

 

I think Hitler belived that Kursk created at least a 6 months´ breathing space because the Red Army losses were that high. However he did not know that actually Kursk was only the first part of the operation as Stalin saw it. When Kursk ended for Germans it was only the beginning for Red Army.

But all in all looking at the situation I´d start getting the Afrika Korps back on the mainland, and try to take the counter-attack system in Ostfront, and Manstein as the highest commander over there.I think making the mainland Europe protected would be coming next as the German resources would not be up to making attacks but by making the enemy pay with blood Reich could maybe look for a draw somewhere and that would collapse the allied front, maybe?

[ 11. January 2005, 06:47 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

That is the advantage of having a longer view, and the means to support it. In short, of being a better strategist.

 

And I think it was Zhukov who made Stalin realize the advantage of making Kursk the trap...

 

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• Pulling out the Italo-German forces in North Africa for use elsewhere.</font>
• Creating an 'OB Ost' under field marshal Von Manstein, trying a defence-in-depth and strong counter attacks strategy.</font>

Those two things would prevent two of the biggest disasters of 1943: the fall of Tunisia and Kursk. However, we we must consider two things:

1) Some forces will have to stay at Italy, since it can't be left unprotected against a very probable Allied attack. In case of invasion, Germany, as it indeed happened, has to divert 20 divisions from its main fronts.

2) A defence-in-depth strategy, supported by a re-built and re-equipped pre-Kursk-like Wehrmacht with strong mobile reserves behind the line would work in the beginning, even if Manstein pulled back the bridgeheads beyond the Doniets and other undefendable positions. The Red Army would then start its summer offensives along the entire front, which means that if the main Ukraine offensive failed, then amphibious landings in the Crimea, attacks towards Leningrad or Smoliensk would relief all pressure upon the Ukraine offensive. The German mobile reserves would have been consumed much more rapidly than it could be re-fitted, by endless fighting and from too constant transferring.

Let's say the Soviet offensive againts the Doniets is launched as it was. Manstein stops it and destroys large enemy forces while doing so. Then, Soviet Maskírovka gets into action and Manstein has to drop his offensive plans or his build-up because intelligence informs him of an imminent massive attack against Leningrad. Manstein is forced to withdraw his mobile reserve (not in full strenght after the previous fighting) to the Leningrad front, just to find out that the Red Army resumed its Ukrainian offensive a soon as the Germans transferred their strong forces. Manstein withdraws his reserves from Leningrad but they arrive too late to prevent the Soviets from taking Kíev. Then, a massive Soviet attack towards Smoliensk and Bielorrusia starts and then, at the end of the year, against the Crimea and Leningrad. By that time, there are no German mobile reserves and, as always, 2nd rate infantry is doing all the fighting defending endless steppes.

"That is the advantage of having a longer view, and the means to support it. In short, of being a better strategist."

More than right.

 

Friedrich,

On the defence system I think the major German mistakes were in WW2

1. Führer order to hold on to the last man. The Red Army simply surrounded with pincer attacks the troops and got them dead/wounded/POW and Hitler was once again losing soldiers and the front was full of gaps.

2. In the rare event of the Führer giving the retreat possibility this often came that late that the troops were so tired that if there were postitions to be defended they did not have enough time to man them/ were not enough fresh to push back the enemy attack. If they had retreated in good order and time they could have stopped the enemy in front of their lines with "ease". This happened both in the ostfront and I think in Italy as well.

Personally I don´t believe in that moving troops around system between AGS and AGN etc, it takes time to do it ( weeks to months ) and you just cannot defend every place, really. You can shorten the lines or get to the lines that favor the defender. You keep the OKW reserves where you consider the risque of breakthrough highest. After Kursk Germans probably did not have any decent reserves to use so once the line broke you had to retreat as you did not have anything to fill the gap with.

The flexible defence , I think was the only possibility once Germany could not anymore be the aggressor, i.e. after Kursk. Hitler lost a lot of men needlessly, if they would have been pulled back to start a new fight somewhere else, that would have been enough to keep the war going for another 6 months to a year at least, I think.After Kursk Hitler probably lost 500,000 German soldiers or perhaps more in pockets in ostfront alone that could have been used later on.And the guns, tanks etc. I don´t say all of them could have been saved they did not even try in real life.


http://wolnapolska.boom.ru/index-cc.html

Quite close figures from the site I suppose.

Korsun Operation, 1944.

~55 000 Germans killed or wounded, and another ~18 000 captured.

Destruction of the Brody Pocket, 1944.

25 000 German troops killed, and 17 000 were captured

Belarussian Operation (Operation Bagration), 1944.

The total casualties of the German Army Group "Center" were estimated at ~300 000 troops

Crimean Operation, 1944.

111 000 Germans and Romanians killed or captured.

Yassy-Kishyniev (Iasi-Cisiniau) Operation, 1944.

~256 000 Germans and Romanians killed or captured.

Belgrade Operation, 1944.

~100 000 German troops killed, wounded, or captured (probably includes local quislings, and even possibly some Croatian and Hungarian troops).

Just to mention some.

 

Kai, thanks for the comments.

This is quite true. But remember that this order saved Army Group 'Centre' in 1941 front of Moscow and in 1943 (this last with the Festung system). Both strategies broke the back of the Soviet offensives. Of course, the same 'not a step back' policy of 1941 had disastrous consequences in 1942, as well as the Festung system (which worked pretty well in 1943) doomed many forces in 1944.

Agreed.

Indeed, but Soviet Maskírovka would be much more effective and would overcome this mobile reserve by simple deceit.

 

This is why I chose the Manstein plan for 1943. So many troops were lost to senseless hold-the-line policies. Even though it worked for the Germans in 1941, this was only due to the disposition of Soviet forces at the time, being heavily depleted and lacking large quantities of superior tanks and massive artillery formations. This policy failed the Russians horribly during Barbarossa, and they learned the value of tactical retreat. After Stalingrad the Germans had lost the initiative and lacking the manpower of the Soviets could not afford a fixed defensive. Why not use the vast terrain of Russia to the advantage of mobile defense?

Friedrich, I'm afraid I'll need more education on the Maskirovka. While the Soviets could be quite cunning, it should be fairly easy to determine where you are weakest and most desperately in need of reserves.

 

Indeed, but it was not easy at all to know where the enemy was going to hit you hardest.

Example:

Before 'Operation Bagration' the Germans transferred the reserve Armoured Corps of Army Group 'Centre' to help the 'weak' front of Army Group 'North Ukraine', since there was a lot of evidence of an imminent Soviet offensive in its sector. Meanwhile, Soviet activity in front of the just-liberated Leningrad increased. The Air Fleet supporting Army Group 'Centre' transferred several hundred aircraft to Leningrad since there was not much Soviet air activity in the central front. Intelligence told field marshal Busch that the Red Army's summer offensive would come against Army Groups 'North' and 'North Ukraine'. The OKW also believed that and transfered fresh infantry divisions to the 'menaced sectors'.

In June 22nd 1944 marshal Busch's front (weak in aircraft and without armoured reserves) faced 3.000+ Soviet aircraft, 3.000+ tanks and almost 10.000 guns, 1.000.000 men in total that had been hiding for almost four months and had not been detected. That's Maskírovka.

 

Agreed, AGC's strength was diluted by diverting forces to the north (among already general wear and tear that was crippling the Eastern Front) but had Hitler done the wise thing and pulled back AGN from the Baltic region after the siege was broken at Leningrad, there would not have to have been such a weakend AGC. I look at Bagration as the Soviets taking advantage of poor German policy as much showcasing their superior strength and ability to hide it until right before using it. Many generals had been expecting something like Bagration anyway, but Hitler was more concerned with keeping East Prussia and the Baltic region safe.

In any case, by the time time Bagration occurred, Germany was in a much worse position than pre-Kursk in 1943. Nothing short of an atomic bomb would have miracled the Red Army away at that point.

 

Indeed, Maskirovka was very effective as history teaches us.

Anyway, Hitler and his staff ( the Lakeitels...) really showed that they had no real view of the situation at all as all the time they were talking that the Red Army had no more men to use and that a new offensive is only bluff. They could never have been more wrong.

And thinking about winter 1941-42. Well, Hitler lead Germany into that ****** situation so it was the least he could do to help them out of it. BUT...he was also helped by Stalin who demanded an attack on the whole wide front. Think if they had used the Siberian forces and the other reserves in a massive stroke in a couple of places only like Zhukov had suggested. The AGC would have been broken trough and ....???

 

Think that's a matter for another thread… but I don't think the 'Broad Front' thing was all Stalin's fault or entirely ineffective…

'Postwar Russian critiques of Stalin’s direction of the Battle of Moscow, including
those written by his closest subordinates (such as Zhukov), harshly criticize the
dictator’s employment of a “broad front” strategy to defeat the Wehrmacht. This
strategy, they claim, dissipated the Red Army’s limited strength by requiring it to
conduct offensive operations along multiple axes and insured that no single offensive
achieve its ultimate aims. The same critics, in particular Zhukov, argue that, after the
spring of 1942, Stalin finally heeded the advice of his advisers and discarded the “broad
front” strategy in favor of a more selective approach. Thereafter, they claim, Stalin and
the Stavka carefully selected key offensive axis, concentrated the Red Army along these
axes, and tailored the attacking forces to match the missions they were assigned.
However, recently revealed archival materials clearly refute this claim in two
respects. First, while Stalin did indeed adopt a “broad front” offensive strategy in the
winter of 1941-42, his key advisers (including Zhukov) acquiesced in and encouraged that
strategy, agreeing with Stalin that the best way to collapse German defenses in any given
sector was to apply maximum pressure against all sectors. Second, rather than
abandoning that strategy after the spring of 1942, Stalin and the Stavka adhered to it in
1942, 1943, and early 1944 for the same reasons they had in 1941. Only in the summer
of 1944 did they adopt the policy of conducting staggered and successive offensive
operations. As late as January 1945, the Red Army once again employed the “broad
front” strategy, albeit on a smaller scale, in its strategic offensive into East Prussia and
central Poland.' Glantz.

 

In 1968 in Vietnam, the NVA and VC forces launched the Tet Offensive, a massive broad front attack on American positions throughout the country. Yes it failed on a military basis, but it got the point through that they were not beaten and that they would accept heavy casualties if necessarry. And the counter-offensive nearly worked, the Germans were about to break and front may have collapsed if Hitler hadn't ordered them to hold at all costs.

Kai, I'm not sure about this, but had Stalin counter-attacked in only a few places, it is possible the Germans could have encircled those attacks and dealt a very severe blow to the Red Army. I have to read up more on the status of the German mobile forces at the time of the attack though.

 

I guess there are as many sources claiming that Zhukov wanted to use the forces in wide attack and as many claiming he wanted to use these forces in few selected places...



Anyway, by attacking "broad front" they pushed the Germans 100-250 kms back so by using clear key areas for attack they might have surrounded big areas full of Germans and disrupted the supply lines which were already in bad shape. Instead of pushing the lines backwards like they did. No problem, the latter boosted the Russian morale but I think they could have used the forces better.

 

Although this sounds good, I'm not so sure this was entirely feasible, considering the vast majority of the German Army had to rely on their own feet to move. The poor landsers would certainly be the ones stuck in the frontline. The attackers would still have the advantage of speed, considering they are usually composed of mechanized forces.

That's the whole point of the Soviet trickery - getting the enemy to shift forces to the wrong place. That's why Germany had so much armour in place in the south, while the real attack came elsewhere.

For example several big Red Army units, and I do mean big, where quietly slipped out of the line in the south. This includes things like the 5th Guards Tank Army. These were then redeployed against Army Group Center without the Germans receiving more than sketchy intelligence, and this includes a build-up period where huge stores were stocked for the attack.

If memory serves, the Soviet set up and used radio transmitters to simulate units on other fronts, used dummy tanks and other things to mask the fact they were gone. Meanwhile stringent camouflage efforts were taken in Belorussia.

In short, the Germans DID deploy where they were weakest and most desperately in need of reserves. Only they were horribly deceived...

A few links on (mainly) the Bagration deceptions:
Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak (Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library)

The Destruction of Army Group Center (globalsecurity.com)

 

This is somewhat beside the Maskirovka point, but it's funny how things are perceived. If you read for instance von Mellenthin's memoirs he glows ecstatic about the thrashing his friend Balck is giving the Popoffs in the Stalingrad relief operation, and of course it was a heck of string of tactical successes, but then the world is crashing about their ears, for for each tactical success there is a sea of disaster.

A few tactical successes may be fine but one can´t lose perspective and forget about the general backdrop.

 

Since i have a time machine and run Germany in 1943, there's only one answer: Drop everything and develop the atomic bomb!

 

Hi,

after Stalingrad i would go back to an good defendable line and look to get a short frontline first. Than return the Afrika Korps and sent them to Sicilly and Italy. Transport some of the troops from Western France and Norway to Russia. Try to make support depots at russia and build tanks and artillery instead of Monster artillery and sensless other jokes. Try to supply the troops with ammo clothes and weapons of all sorts. Concentrate 60-70% of the Luftwaffe at Russia. If possible, try to provoke the Red Army to make regional assaults and build pockets to eliminate them in the pockets. If they attack in an mass assault the own front has to move like a rubber band and split their power in small pieces. In the meantime we had to trade with the western allies about an partial peace to avoid a second big front. But that are only presumptions that are based on an enemy who want to rest after Stalingrad and who try to use time to prepare himself. Tactical and strategies are nice games but they won´t work at sometime. Manstein is a good choice but why not a leading team with Guderian, Hoth and not to forget Kesselring. Kesselring was at Italy but i think he needed only a short time to react right at Russia too.

So, that are my 2 cent´s!

Regards

Ulrich

 

Marc does have a time machine, he went back all the way to 2005 and restarted a dead thread. Why not after all.

 

Some times it is nice to awake some ghosts of the past!

Regards

Ulrich ( an old boy)