Barbarossa in trouble

I was watching part one of Hitler's Holocaust last night as some interesting comments came up about the first couple of months of Barbarossa. Some of the soldiers and officers felt this was going to be a different war and they were not going to get it all there way.

Even the German High command in July 1941 felt they bitten off more than they could chew, Hitler himself was worried. These comments were interesting there seems to be general understanding things were not running as smooth as they looked.

 

Thats sounds : very interesting I wish I hadn't missed it.

 

I wonder what "troubled" them? The roads that weren't there,the agonizing train ride to the front with men/material for instance.

 

Overall I would have to say that no German commander ever anticipated the Russians to fight to the last man. If Hitler knew that in order to capture Russia he had to exterminated the entire population I dont think he would off walked in.

But then again thats only my opinion.

 

hitler and the generals thought the operation would be finished before winter, and he does so with good reasons.

 

yes, that is because no-one anticipated the Russians to fight for so long.


After all never has there been a country that could take such a punishment in its first year and just keep on coming.

 

Richard, what is the name of this show? On the TV?

 

Some higher ups talked about halting in Nov, a 'very' good idea.

By the end of November 1941 the Soviet retreat had lost ground that contained 63 per cent of all coal production, 68 per cent of pig iron, 58 per cent of steel, 60 per cent of aluminium, 41 per cent of railway lines, 84 per cent of sugar, 38 per cent of grain, and 60 per cent of pigs. Some major centres, notably Leningrad, were effectively isolated. Huge supplies of basic materials and equipment were suddenly cut off, and much more was put at risk by the swift German advance. Faced with the prospect of imminent defeat and overthrow, Stalin reluctantly replaced his talentless and incompetent stooges with other more able commanders, some of them having been released from jail for the purpose:

 

Von Rundstedt advised halting in November, but of course nothing was going to stop Hitler from one last push.

If the Wehrmacht did stop in Nov. would you go on the defensive from then on, hanging on to your gains and letting the Russians come to you, or attack again in Spring/Summer?

 

Well that is the question isn't it? It depends on how long it would take to run through Egypt,( and if ), & through Palestine, Syria etc which then opens the Turkish railroad option to Baku etc.

Perhaps summer when rail lines widened & some improved roads built. But of course that gives Russians time to build up forces as well. Hard to know what the 'best answer' is.

 

If reality proves them wrong, then reasons are in fact not good, are they?

 

Do you mean stop on winter lines and exercise the Mediterranean option?

Kerem, are you there? What, if any, rail lines were there from Turkey over the Caucasus in 1941? Assuming for the argument's sake Turkish compliance, what was the ability of Turkish railwys to support a (very) large military effort from the Mediterranean ports to and over the Caucasus in this time frame?

 

Hitler's Holocaust on Channel 4 here in the UK on Saturday nights, CH4 are re-running this 2002 series started last Saturday night I only saw it because it was right after the news, lucky I caught it.

 

I don't think Hitler was that concerned about Russians fighting to the last man because in truth, they didn't. If I recall correctly, the Soviets lost over three million captured in 1941 alone. It was only in the next few years, once the Russians realized how bleak their chances were if they surrendered, that Russian surrenders tailed off. So I don't think it was mere Russian tenacity that upset Hitler's plans. The vast size of Russia and unbelievable resources of such a huge country allowed the Soviets to recover from their unimagineable losses suffered in the early months of the war. And then, at the end of their supply lines and worn out by months of victorious campaigning, General Winter marched in to put the Germans at a very distinct disadvantage on the doorstep to Moscow.

 

Originally the plan called for beginning that operation one month earlier, but because Italy got in trouble in with Greece Hitler had to waste time going into the Balkans and Greece. Also I recall, at the mid point of Barbarossa Hitler stuck his nose in to divert the thrust of his operation into better securing the Ukraine. So, remove both of these diversions, add in a few train loads of winter gear, antifreeze, and cold weather oil, and the Russians would have been hiking eastward over the Urals.

 

Seatco, we have already discussed this in this forum somewhere, and it has been argued elsewhere that the Balkan and Greek discursions only affected a small number of troops as regards the entire battle order for Barbarossa, and besides invasion had to wait anyway until ground conditions were firm and dry enough all over the front for mechanised action, so that part of the argument does not hold very well.

 

You know it has always surprised me as to how cold weather has been given more credit for beating the Germans then the Russian soldier has, this is very unfortunate. I must say that this forum is an exception as members here are for the most part very knowledgeable..... But then others just dont quite seem to be that well informed...

The problem with not taking Ukraine leaves an open German flank. Also when the Germans took Ukraine they also took pretty much everything that country had including food, livestock and yes WINTER CLOTHING. In fact I remember reading that when Germans were taken prisoners the Russians noticed very familiar sweaters, jackets and coats, that they had on. Also believe it or not, Russian tanks also froze in the bitter cold and even soldiers. Just because a man can be accustomed to cold weather, doesnt mean that he wont be any less cold then his adversary in minus -50 degrees, especially on an empty stomach.

 

I am going to have to disagree with this. Yes there were 3 million that surrendered in the first few months but how many did after that. There are numerous accounts of the " IVAN " fighting till he simply ran out of ammunition then took a grenade into his hand a ran into a tank. Also there are numerous accounts of German officers being absolutely baffled by the tennacity and pure stubbornness of the Russian soldier. With many journal entries stating that " when all seems abosolutely lost, these Russians just keep fighting ".

Bottom line is that the Germans have never before come across an enemy that was willing to sacrifice so much more then the German in order to prevent the invader from entering his country. Also remember that when the Germans invaded, they outnumbered the Russians in every aspect other then empty stomach's as the Russians to that title.

 

I'm not sure we actually disagree on this. Remember, I stated "It was only in the next few years, once the Russians realized how bleak their chances were if they surrendered, that Russian surrenders tailed off." I completely agree that the Russians were tenacious defenders in Late 1941 and 1942; Stalingrad is more than proof enough of that. However, I don't think you can extrapolate this case back to the beginning of the war in summer 1941, certainly not to the Red Army as a whole. You have to admit that incredibly vast numbers of Red Army soldiers did not fight to the death in 1941. More Russians surrendered in 1941 than made up the forces facing the Germans on June 22.

Agreed, by 1942 the Russians were easily the most stubborn enemy the Germans had ever faced. In 1941 I don't know if the Germans would have said the same thing, however.

I don't think this is actually true. The Russians easily outnumbered the Wehrmacht in tanks and artillery and the Luftwaffe in planes. The Soviets had more divisions and just slightly fewer overall men in the field of action on June 22.

 

I agree that it is a mistake to underestimate the Russian defence in 1941 as slowing up the Germans and preventing their conquest of Moscow. However, I also think it is a mistake to underestimate the effect of the weather on the German campaign. The facts, I think, speak for themselves. The Russians were defeated in practically every battle in 1941 until the Battle for Moscow (except for the minor and ultimately unsuccessful Yelnya Offensive). The Russians put up a spirited defence of Smolensk but even so they still lost and had to retreat further. But this held up the Germans enough that by the time they started Operation Typhoon, their final push towards Moscow, the mud season was about to start and held up the German advance significantly. And yet the Germans continued to advance despite this and made it right up to the outskirts of Moscow. By this point the Germans were all but exhausted, with most divisions down to 1/2 or even 1/3 normal strength. But so were the Russians.

What the Russians did have at this point, however, were more than 50 Siberian divisions that had been keeping eastern Siberia protected from any potential stab-in-the-back from the Japanese. But by the end of November the Russians knew that the Japanese were about to head south and east, leaving Russia safe and able to transfer these exceedingly valuable troops (who had already been blooded in a victorious and poorly known series of battles in the late 1930s versus the Japanese) to the defence of Moscow. It was with these troops, well adapted to winter conditions, that the Russians carried out their winter counter-offensive. Yes, the cold winter weather was as hard on Russian troops as it was on German ones. However, Russian equipment was, for the most part, adapted to work in such conditions. German vehicles were not and this meant that many times even though Germans outnumbered the Red Army in terms of equipment their equipment and vehicles were completely out of commission and had to be abandoned, useless in battle. And while practically none of the Germans had winter equipment by the start of the cold weather the Russian Siberian forces they used for their counter-offensive were well prepared to fight and survive in such a climate.

It is interesting to note that General Guderian reported in December 1941, at the height of the Russian counter-offensive, that he was losing more men to frostbite and the cold weather than he was to battle casualties. Despite all of the disadvantages that the Germans posed at this point they weathered the Red Army storm and survived a number of Russian counter offensives before renewing their own offensive in the summer of 1942 still, for the most part, confident of victory.

So what can we say in the end about what saved the Soviets in 1941 and what stopped the Germans? Certainly we have to credit the Russian soldiers because only a few weeks after the start of the campaign the Germans were already half way to Moscow. Russian defence at Smolensk certainly held up the German advance. But it did not stop that advance and the Russians were forced to continue to retreat after suffering atrocious casualties. The German offensive continued until the winter weather and Russian defence, in combination, kept them from taking Moscow. And then the Russian Siberian troops initiated their counter-offensive against Germans whose previous advantages in better equipment was entirely negated by the winter weather.

We have to give due credit to the Russian soldiers but I am not convinced that the Germans had already lost the war the moment they invaded Russia. Would the result have been the same if we removed the winter and mud weather from the equation? I'm not sure and the evidence suggests to me that the Germans did have a very real chance of taking Moscow and winning the war. However, Russian tenacity at Smolensk slowed down the German advance long enough to bring General Winter into play and that allowed the Russians to initiate their own counter-offensive in December in a situation where their enemy's technical advantages were all but entirely negated.