Barbarossa what-if

Hello, first post.

After reading about Operation Barbarossa and the failure to capture Moscow in Dec. 41, I came up with an interesting what-if.

A)- What if Hitler had ordered winter equipment to be given out to the Wehrmacht during the fall of 41 so they weren't freezing in winter?

B)- What if the OKW had prepared a strategic reserve behind Army Group Center that would only be commited upon reaching Moscow, when Guderian's Panzer Group was about 50km away, but totally exhausted.

Happy to join this group,
Tirpitz.

[ 23. January 2005, 03:20 PM: Message edited by: Tirpitz ]

 

A - But lets not forget those Siberian troops... Slightly more used to cold than your average Soldat...

B - Strategic reserve of what? In my mind the capture of Moscow would have made little difference except perhaps an earlier 'Stalingrad'...

Welcome aboard Tirpitz!

 

Thanks for replying Red Baron!

For arguments sake, even though it would have been impossible at this stage of Barbarossa, the strategic reserve would consist of a full-strength Panzer Army. Considering the Siberian units outnumbered the German troops around Moscow by a considerable margin, a full strength Panzer Army could easily swing the balance towards the Germans.

 

Besides the fact that such a force was unavailable, would it not have suffered due to the extreme cold? Unless they had plenty of anti-freeze!

I would have thought that a larger numbers of troops would be of more use, though were they would be stripped from is debateable. What about a few Gebirgsjager Divisions? Perhaps they would be better suited to the climate!

Now if Crete had not been launched how about the rapid deployment of 7th Flieger into the area!

 

Well, perhaps a panzer assault towards Moscow could be ruled out because of the cold. Maybe supported by several infantry divisions, the panzers could just break through to Moscow's front gate and let the infantry fight for the city already.

It'd be interesting to see if the Germans had formed a Finnish division to be used for winter fighting to lead the assault, but that probably wouldn't have gone over well with Mannerheim. Surely any Finnish veterans from the Winter War could pose a challenge to the Siberians coming in from the East.

And I doubt weather would permit a Fallschimjager assault into Moscow.

 

< the panzers could just break through to Moscow's front gate and let the infantry fight for the city already> So would these 'warm clothed' divisions do as good a job as 6th Army at Stalingrad?

 

Maybe the Germans could use the 8 PanzerKorps....so named because it currently had 8 running tanks....(a joke lifted from another thread). But, it illustrates the problems the Germans had before the Gates of Moscow in 1941. This was the primary, if not the only, reason the Soviet Winter offensive succeeded so well that first winter; the German divisions in AGC were mere shells of what they started with in July. Most infantry divisions realistically could barely muster a full regiment. The panzer divisions were down to a handful of running tanks and a battalion or two of infantry each.
Their supply lines, in good weather, were extremely tenious. Rail heads were still literally hundreds of miles to the rear. The Grosstransportraums formed by stripping trucks from many infantry and rear area formations were falling apart as their vehicles were now literally worn out driving thousands of miles on dusty roads trying desperately to deliver supplies to the advancing panzer divisions.
In fact, the worst situation was with the railroads, the German's most important means of moving supplies. There were only enough Eisenbahntruppen committed to allow for conversion of one rail line per army group when what was really needed was one line per army. The Eisenbahntruppen were also almost totally non-motorized having a very low priority for vehicles. What vehicles they did get were generally French or English captures that were both unreliable and nearly unrepairable due to lack of many spare parts necessary (I have read about one infantry division supplied with British trucks captured in France. The fuel filter and pump were housed within a glass capped cell. In use, the glass frequently cracked and broke, particularly in the cold. They had no replacement parts for these items so if the glass covers broke the truck was abandoned.)
Anyway, another problem was that while much rolling stock was captured few locomotives were making much of this useless. Then there were the German locomotives. They were not designed to go as far between coaling and watering as Soviet models. This necessitated the construction of additional coaling and watering stations along with the necessary sidings. On top of this, the German locomotive design could not operate in temperatures common to Northern Russia. There, many locomotives suffered water tube failures from freezing and rupture.
To quote General der Artillerie Fretter-Pico from a bit later in the war about the state of his 16th PzGr Division: "The division has bled to death."
This was the state of the mighty Wehrmacht before the gates of Moscow....no longer simply a conquoring army but now one desperate just to survive the onset of winter.

 

First of all, welcome aboard, Tirpitz! Hope you enjoy yourself here!

As for your questions:

He did. But not only Germany's capacity to manufacture winter equipment was incredibly limited, therefore, the winter uniforms which were actually manufactured were not enough for three million men fighting in the USSR. And even if there had been enough, the logistical chaos in the rear wouldn't have allowed the majority of them to reach the front.

In reality, some hundreds of thousands of winter uniforms and equipment was ready for use at the end of September, but it remained somewhere in Poland and Bielorrussia for the rest of the year. There were simply not enough trains, lorries and carts to deliver all those things to the men in the front. Ammunition, fuel and food were considered as #1 priorities.

Out of what? The number of the Panzer divisions had been increased from 10 in the summer of 1940 to 17 prior to 'Barbarossa', but these Panzer divisions lacked their paper contingent of armoured, support and transport vehicles. How could an armoured reserve could have been put to-gether if Germany was producing 250 tanks a month? Remember that those 17 Panzer divisions were composed by many self-propelled guns built out of captured French tanks, old models of German and Czech tlight tanks (still quite useful against most Soviet tanks, though) and lorries confiscated from civil service in Germany or the occupied territories.

In fact, after the Battle of Kíev, Guderian reported that there were only 300 spare tank engines and some 150 tanks to re-equip the 17 Panzer divisions fighting in the eastern front, which by that time (mid-September 1941) were down to 50% of their motor force.

More infantry divisions? Gebirgsjäger? Fallschirmjäger? They certainly would have helped, but these units were re-fitting or in occupying duties and were not suitable for the meat-grinder of the eastern front (as they were going to find out later in the war). What Germany neded were perhaps some 100 more regular infantry divisions, but they couldn't be created out of nowhere. Taking into account Germany's obsession in waisting man —Luftwaffe's field divisions or the Labour Front— and material resources, I doubt it all could have been achieved in less than a year, since the fall of France until the beginning of 'Barbarossa'.

 

A. Hitler was in the late autumn 1941 facing the question whether to send ammunition or food/winter clothing to the troops and he decided to send ammo. So if it was clothes the men would not get ammo. So it is as bad both ways because of the poor supply system.



I think by operation Typhoon Hitler should have understood that the Russian was not beaten and "the last final attack" would not bring victory. Hard to say what would have happened if Stalin had fled Moscow but I suppose Hitler should have prepared for winter and let the troops take suitable positions to defend themselves and wait for the spring. By keeping the veterans alive the Wehrmacht would have been a totally different machine in the summer 1942
( even if it was quite capable with what it had left ) and could have made operations in more than one sector ( Stalingrad ).

B. I do believe that much force could win Moscow but could they keep it as well? The sad fact is that Hitler´s victory was based on the "Kick the door in and the whole thing collapses " but the longer the Red Army could fight the better their chances were. And definitely T-34 was the miracle maker here as well!

All in all I read that ostfront got during the whole autumn 1941 some 116 new tanks to replace the lost ones....makes you wonder if Hitler at times really trusted his instincts too much...

 

Since this is a 'what-if', say Hitler had an fully equipped panzer army at his disposal. Should he have wasted it attacking Moscow, hopefully Stalin sueing for peace? If Stalin didn't surrender, Hitler gets Moscow but little else. Then Gardner's 'logistics' come into play.

 

Yes comrade...what if...
Id probably be living it up on a nice piece of land in russia, and also my poor country wouldn't have went through a long commie regime {czech}
We should not have stalled for 15 days!!!
My grandfather said that he and his men saw the towers of the kremlin, and were very very dissapointed when the order to advance was given a halt. Before he died he said that was the Fuhrer's bigest mistake.

88

EIN VOLK EIN REICH EIN FUHRER!

 

I now see why…

Fascist…

 

Well, Super Chicken got one star * before the boot.

 

And even that´s too much....!!!

 

Its obvious than that if Hitler had applied for the winter equipment needed, he would have been much more successful in Moscow. However even with the reserve ground forces and winter equipment there is not guarantee that he would of had a clear victory. What would have guaranteed victory was air support from the Luftwaffe, considering the Soviets had minimal aircraft/defenses to hold of assaults from the air.

 

Welcome, US11thairborne!

The problem with preparing for winter war with Hitler was that he feared it would lower the morale as it´d mean he wasn´t sure the war would be over by Xmas. Then again he should have understood this by November that it´s going to be a long war...

One interesting thing about the warfare during the first months of Barbarossa is that even if the Soviets lost a whole lot of troops they almost always had fresh troops ( even if not well prepared ) to fight Germans (thus) but the Germans barely received any new troops to cover the losses and the same guys practically fought since June 22nd!

 

Welcome aboard US11th!

Why would it have guaranteed victory?, if I may ask.

The Luftwaffe's numbers had suffered quite significantly since June 22nd because of many accident and temerary ground fire. During the winter fighting, weather and visibility didn't allow the Luftwaffe to take off most of the time and to not attacking effectively during the rest of it.

The Red Air Force, however, turned to appear (this is during the early years of the war) in the middle of winter and, if not cause great problems, lowen the morale of the Germans.

 

With the Luftwaffe helping, it would have been able to provide another conflict the Reds had to deal with. Additionally the Germans could of then pinpointed large ground targets discovering them quicker and destroying them, before large amounts of damage were inflicted upon the Germans. The Luftwaffe was simply a perfect option even if there was not much, it would of certainly helped the Germans break through, destroying the dreadlock of the Soviets, and demoralizing the Red Army.

[ 04. April 2005, 03:53 PM: Message edited by: us11thairborne ]

 

The problem would not be just the destroying of Red Army forces by Luftwaffe if that could be done. There´s also the fact that Hitler could only give 200 tank engines in AUg 1941 when Guderian was asking him for new tank reinforcements. Also it seems Hitler could send either ammo/weapons OR winter clothing/food in late 1941 due to poor road and railway conditions.

The main problem was that Hitler had prepared his troops only for the famous 8 week campaign as he declared when he told the generals about Barbarossa.

 

What makes you think it could have made a difference, when in fact it didn't, even when it had absolute air suppremacy? And even more, how is it that the Luftwaffe can turn the tide in winter?

Let's check the battles of Lieningrad and Stalingrad, where the Luftwaffe had overwhelming air supremacy, but where it failed miserably at achieving its main objective: isolating both cities and cutting off their water-supply lines.

At Lieningrad, patrol and torpedo boats kept operating from the city's harbour and the supply line across Lake Ladoga was never entirely cut, despite the efforts of an almighty Luftwaffe with summer weather.

At Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe failed to support ground offensives inside the city (in fact, teh bombings made it even more difficult for the ground forces), failed to discover and suppress the Soviet artillery at the opposite side of the Volga, failed to cut the constant flow of resources and reinforcements across the Volga, and, finally, failed in its reconnaissence of the great and growing Soviet forces in the German's flanks.