Battle for Ukraine

In the openning months of Barbarossa, Hitler decided to briefly stall his advance on Moscow and ordered the capture of Ukraine and Kiev and the destruction of the Red Army with in. Commanders such as Heinz Guderian strictly opposed such a decision as it would give much needed time for the Russians to build up their defenses at Moscow and risk attacking the Russian capital during winter.

Even today this is a hot topic for debate, as some consider this to be Hitler's biggest blunder which cost Germany the war. However there are also those who are not so quick to jump on the band wagon and there by defend Hitler's decision, as the right one.

So I am here, (following our very own Adam's advice) trying to prevent this thread from falling into the common abyss of the "what if" section by asking all of our members here a question.

Was Hitler's decision in attacking Ukraine and capturing Kiev with the complete destruction of 4 Soviet Armies with in, while at the same time halting the advance of Moscow, the right move or a catastrophic military blunder?

P.S.

My apologies, however since I was not sure as to this threads proper destintion I stuck it in "Russia at War" section. Moderators please feel free to move it accordingly.

I am also aware that this has been briefly discussed here in this forum but since I have stumbled upon this debate several times, perhaps this very topic deserves its own thread

 

Without using hind-sight, I'd go with that decision.
Destroy that large a force in the field and that should leave the way open to Moscow relatively undefended.
Unfortunately , this wasn't the Low Countries or France, this was Soviet Russia which was bigger and there were more Reserves.
I don't believe any other Army could take losses on that scale and continue fighting.
Then again I could be wrong.

 

Strategically I think it was the wrong move. Moscow was the main target

I agree with von Bock and Guderian. Once the route is open...use it. That is my opinion.

Once the number of counted Red Army divisions went over 300 hundred it´s a gamble anyway and trying to destroy the Red Army completely not possible.

 

"The southern of these two army groups - in the center of the whole front - will have the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then co-operate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states. Only after the accomplishment of these offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are further offensive operations to be initiates with the objective of occupying the important center of communications and of armaments manufacture, Moscow.
Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of the Russian ability to resist could justify an attempt to achieve both objectives simultaneously."-Führer Directive 21

The plan indicates that the first goal of the operation was to capture Leningrad and Kronstadt, then Moscow. It also points out that Moscow and Leningrad was not to be attacked simultaneously without the "surprisingly rapid collapse of the Russian ability to resist". The capitulation of Ukraine was not the priorty of the operation, and the goal of Army Group South was merely to tie up the enemy forces on its sector of the front.
Army Group South did not have any trouble doing what was assigned to it. The Red Army in that area was not a threat after the Battle of Uman, in which it had lost most of its tanks.
So the decision to move south was completely unnessercery.

 

While the Red Army in the south might not have been a threat yet, given the chance to escape and fight another day might pose more then just an inconvenience in the future?

 

The plan of the operation was made with the consideration of the strength of the Wehrmacht. It was impossible for the Wehrmacht to destroy the Red Army in the south and still have time to achieve its original goals. The capitualation of the Moscow area would substaintially reduce Russia industrial strength, which was far more important.

 

But the plan of the operation was also made with the consideration of the Red Army's strenght as well. The German intelligence estimated the Soviet Union's strength at around 300 divisions and wanted to destroy as many as possible to the Volga River. Surely eliminating 43 of them in one blow while leaving the way through Briansk virtually clear to Moscow, would benefit the 3rd Reich?

As for the Industiral strenght, many facturies were already evacuated to the east and those that were not were booby trapped as Moscow was expected to fall by the Government and even Stavka.

 

The Battle for Ukrain did not help the Wehrmacht to achieve its operational goals, therefore it was unnecessary. As for the flaws of the operational planning, I can make no comment.

 

One thing that surprises me is that WWII, the capture of cities did not result in the end of the war. The whole concept of Blitzkrieg is to focus on a point, break through and with speed head towards the rear to cause havoc and force the frontlines to pull back. Blitzkrieg, as I understood it, was to defeat enemies but surrounding their armies and forcing a surrender. The loss of manpower would weaken the enemy's defense capabilities.

So, with Barbarossa, it would have been smart to entice the Russian armies forward and then do a blitzkrieg, surround them and force a surrender. A war of attrition per se. The taking of Moscow would not necessarily force Stalin to surrender. But destroying his armies in the field would force him to think about it.

 

Well argued, properly documented. Ironcross back at his own self. :grad:

Positive reputation added.

 

Whatever it was, it didn't work, o Mighty Texan!

 

True due to Hitler's insistence on holding ground or city fortresses and to the Russian leadership's recognizing the value in withdrawals and saving their armies. The Russians adapted very well and did one better with their huge bombardments at the onset of offenses and going for destroying armies and not so much in taking of cities. I cannot think of any large battles for cities other than Berlin and Budapest. The Russians have been and still are a formidable force to reckon with.

 

From what I know, the German historicaly had more or less 5 weeks of operations under good conditions to move forward and to take over Moscow :

- 2 weeks starting in the very end of sept – begining of october to the 20th of october when rain started falling in huge quantity and the mud set in, really making mechanized advance real almost impossible

-then the mud froze and germans could resume offensive for about 3 weeks (approx. 08/11 -> 30/11), then the weather is getting too cold and Germans men, hardware and logistics are no longer able to cope with Soviet defenses. Operation Typhoon is called to an end on 05/12.

It gives a total of more or less 5 weeks of operations, if Typhoon had started in mid august (after german armored units had rest and refit), Germans would have had 6-7 more weeks to take over Moscow.

Launching Typhoon before mid-august, like for example Guderian the diva advocated it in mid-late july - begining of august, and made a fool of himself in Yelnia, when the Smolensk pocket was not even sealed and AGC was very weakened after 1 month of intense blitzkrieg, was totaly impossible IMHO.

 

I agree with.

Unlike Hitler, Guderian and Von Bock were not politicians. Brilliant commanders, but not politicians. It may seem that they were simply unaware of how vital Ukraine was to the German cause in the East while Hitler did. Guderian and Von Bock both believed that capturing Moscow was the end of the war. As we know now, there is more evidence to contradict their assumptions then support them.

Here is a question which David Glantz asks,

If the Germans had such a hard time defending their flanks against the Red Army numbering 4.1 million men and reletively short supply lines, then how might they fair against a Red Army numbering 5 million men and even longer supply lines?

 

Turning to South would not end the war and the 600,000 POW´s would not be the end of Red Army. Hitler´s Wehrmacht was not going to win a war that would last long. Would there be an alternative 3 because neither of these would end the war soon enough for Hitler?!

 

Dont know about the third alternative

But in my view of things, Ukraine seemed to be the correct choice as that country was able to provide and at the same time eliminate certain difficulties which Moscow would fail to accomplish.

 

Found this on Jacek Solarz " Wiking 1941-1945 "

On July 10th 1941, Hitler unexpectedly changed the direction of the advance in the South
( i.e. AGS ). Thus, instead of moving toward Kiev, the German forces headed in the direction of Human. The Wiking division participated in this attack, took Zhitomir on July 14, and then redirected toward Biala Cerkiev. On July 20, Kleist´s armored corps reached Human and surrounded 25 Soviet divisions.

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So the "Great One" messed it up himself with changing directions every two weeks...??

 

I agree. Once Moscow was under control the armies to the south could have been dealt with at leisure. I suspect they may have been ordered to evacuate the Ukraine also. Would this have been practical for the Russians? I think not.

 

Quite right, Chuikov. In war, number alone doesn't mean much. The Russian divisions in Ukraine were in no position to carry out a successful offensive operation. Any attempt to do so would have resulted in total annihilation.

 

Having nearly 1 million men on your flank while trying to besiege the worlds most fortified city surely seems more of a discomfort then a mere "pebble in a shoe?"