A humble WHAT IF? Just about how to save many lives not to change the course of war. What if the marines had the Churchill (MK VI or VII) in Okinawa an Iwo Jima? Or MK IV up gunned with American 75 mm gun. These battles were WWI style trench. This tank was made for it. The Churchill’s thicker armour and better all-terrain capacity would be appreciated. A logistics nightmare, but would have be better for the men a slow Churchill than a Sherman stuck in mud or on the beach under the Mount Suribachi. The differences between both tanks are well kwon: Wiki: Churchill tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Wiki: M4 Sherman - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia And many questions: Better with the Sherman’s flamethrower “kit” than the Crocodile? What about AVRE versions? I had read it weren’t possible to install a meteor engine in a Churchill, were possible to install any American standard engine? It wouldn’t have been worthwhile. Would it? Were many shermans with diesel engines? Saw action?
The Shermans used by the USMC were all diesels so as to have commonality of fuel with the rest of the USN. I'll look up the numbers if you are interested, but the USSR got a great many of the diesel Shermans, but the USMC received even more. The US Army used the gasoline versions in the PTO, but most at Iwo were Marine units. And the flamethrowers were much improved over those of the crocodiles, they remained the Ronson Company's design, but had improved pressurization and external napalm tanks as well.
I know the Yanks didn't have a suitable flame tank in Normandy so were loaned the Crocs of B Sqn 141 RAC (the Buffs) for the attack on Brest. Lone Sentry: 29 Let's Go! The Story of the 29th Infantry Division -- WWII G.I. Stories Booklet
I don't think the use of the Churchill would have made a major difference, but I am interested in the claim that the Sherman flame-thrower was better than the Crocodile. The Crocodile had a far greater capacity than the Sherman, and because the napalm was carried in a armoured trailer behind the Churchill (which could be detached if hit) it was less dangerous than the Sherman versions which carried it internally ps, Four M4's were equipped with the Crocodile flame thrower and used by the US 2nd Armored Division in NW Europe from late 44
I may have worded that improperly, not better; just better suited to the environs. The Sherman which was modified into a "flame tank" used the Canadian designed Ronson system, but the napalm fuel could be carried in tanks attached to the hull and I believe they were pressurized by a main engine driven air compressor, rather than in those little trailers like the system used in the ETO using nitrogen as the pressurizing gas. In the sands of the PTO a separate trailer must have been seen as a detriment somehow (?). The USMC used two different designs, one used a smaller flame unit that replaced one of the hull mounted machine guns and used a nitrogen pressure system, but retained the main gun, and the other one replaced the main gun with a larger more long reaching flame system, and kept the hull mounted machine guns. The Japanese were so poorly equipped with anti-armor ability even the thin-skinned Stuarts were nearly impervious to their attacks. Those little Stuarts also made great "flame tanks" apparently. Or at least that is what I've read about them on both Saipan and Iwo Two (Jima).
Unless they made a flamethrowing tank that could fit inside a cave I don't think more of any kind of tank would have made much difference. As far as the PTO was concerned I think the majority of the tanks were used as siege weapons as I have never heard an account of Allied v. Japanese tank on tank battle.
While the Japanese didn’t have any real "tank on tank" battles with the Americans, and the only time they fought with other tanks was against the Soviets (where they lost big time), they did use their tanks at least once that I have found reference to: Battle of San Manuel After the battles at Urdaneta and Binalonan, the 7th Tank Regiment 'Shigemi Detachment', named after Brigadier General Shigemi, dug in at San Manuel. This detachment had over 1,000 men, mortars and machine guns. Shigemi resolved to fight to the death and his forces dug in along a fan-shaped defensive line, converting most of their 40 Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks and 5 Type 95 light tanks into fortified bunkers by digging them into the ground with the turret above, to serve as fixed positions. A total of 75 earthen emplacements, protected by rifle and machine gun pits established at key points around the outskirts of the town, with 30 tanks assigned to them, and the remainder as mobile reserves in the town. In support was the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Mobile Infantry Regiment with fifteen 75mm guns, some 47mm anti-tank guns and 15 mortars. Pre-Bombardment San Manuel began on January 19, 1945 with a five day bombardment. The American assault began on January 23rd by the the US Army 25th Division, 161st Infantry Regiment, supported by tanks of the 716th Tank Battalion, capturing the hills to the south of town. First Attack Halted The main attack on the town began on January 24th, by the 1st Battalion supported by six Shermans but was halted by a drainage ditch and 47mm anti-tank fire. One tank was lost, 4 disabled and one immobilized, and 8 KIA 63 WIA. Southern Attack & House-To-House Fighting The 2nd Battalion attacked from the south towards the town. The first assault was stopped by three Japanese tanks. A second attack gained a foothold in town and destroyed 5 tanks. The next day the attack was reinforced by the 1st and 3rd Battalions, and a slow house-to-house fight took place. On the morning of January 26, 1945 assualted the area with over a dozen Sherman tanks, firing on the Japanese from a safe distance, destroying most. Banzai Attack & End of the Battle By the 27th, the remainng tanks were pushed back to the hills. Knowing they had no route of escape, the 7th Tank Regiment carried out a Banzai attack at 0100 on January 28th with the remaining 13 tanks. Ten were destroyed before breaking the American lines, the remaining three retreated towards the hills. By 1330 on the 28th the Japanese had abandoned San Manuel. The Japanese lost all their tanks, heavy weapons and 750 KIA. Commander Shigemi and 7th Tank Regiment commander Colonel Maeda were both killed. After four days of intense close-combat the 161st liberated the town. For their gallantry in the battle for San Manuel, both Company E and Cannon Company, 161st Infantry were awarded Presidential Unit Citations. After the battle, the US Army 32nd Infantry Division arrived at this town, then proceeded to San Nicolas Goto: Pacific Wrecks - San Manuel
What was doing in IWO Jima? Look the chains to improve armour, and the thin and damged chain. And YES you are right, the infrantry rules that. It was a humble what if, that's all.
When a link in the track is broken or thrown the track will be "puked" out from the powered axle onto the ground. Sometimes this can happen from excessive attempts to free the unit from sand or mud. The powered axle for the M4 is the front axle, not the rear. How these guys got into this pickle cannot be resolved by a photo without knowing the circumstances of the broken track.
Another point of interest is the wooden planks fitted to the side of the Sherman to prevent the attachment of magnetic charges, a common practice in the tank arm of the USMC
Actually, the main purpose of the 2 x 12 planks was to support a 4" layer of concrete they used to increase protection against the Japanese 47mm gun. I have the same picture in a book on WWII Marine Corps tankers by Kenneth Estes, that's his explaination and I've read it in other sources as well. An added benefit was that it prevented anti-tank mine attachment, along with sandbagging the rear engine deck, and (as seen in the picture) mounting track blocks on the turret sides and glacis plate. He doesn't specify why the tank lost it's track. If I were to guess it would be operating in the powdery volcanic ash of Iwo Jima, described as having the consistency of "talcum powder". That goes along with what brndirt1 posted: The practice went back for some time. This is a picture of an M4A2 of Co.C 4th Tank BN taken on Namur. Note: the planks to support the concrete, and that's a Japanese Type 94 on the engine deck. By the time of Saipan the Marine Corps had phased out all M3/M5 light tanks and had gone stricktly with medium tanks, the exception being the "Satan" flamethrower version. There was a big tank battle on Saipan. 44 Japanese tanks supported by 500 infantry, made a nighttime attack, and tried to pierce the line held by the 6th Marines supported by B Co. 2d Tank BN. Initially the M4's had a hard time stopping them because the 75mm AP round passed clean through the Japanese tanks, often leaving them operational. They switched to HE and quickly destroyed the attack. I think there were also sizeable tank on tank engagements on Tinian and Peleilu.
The Churchill would have made no difference whatsoever there. In fact, it would have been a poor choice. A major problem was that it was never designed or made watertight like certain versions of the Sherman were. This makes its use in an amphibious assault something of a problem where it has to wade ashore. Armor is hardly an issue as the Japanese had few antitank weapons capable of taking on a Sherman let alone something with more armor. The Sherman also has better visibility for the crew, something that is very important. It also by Iwo had an external telephone for infantry to use to talk to the crew along with several radios in every vehicle for communication with other units as well as between tanks. If anything, the Marines could have gotten M4's with 105mm guns that would have made excellent bunker busters. These would have been better than the AVRE "flying dustbin" in that they could shoot far further making it unnecessary to close in really rough terrain with a target. Another consideration is that all the Marine vehicles are diesels. This allows them access to fuel from any Navy vessel or landing craft. The gasoline powered Churchill would have required re-engining.
Jeeze you guys are picky!!! regardless of these two instances my statement remains mostly correct......
Sorry but, What about the churchills in the D-Day? (Dawn of the D-Day, David Howarth) I thought they made a good job. In fact they saved the Day after the DD Shermans failed. I'll never understand the navy accepted this idea in SEA operations.
While the Churchill was never used as an amphibious tank(Duplux Drive) it was capable of being fitted with deep wading gear, and did see service in the intial stages of a number of Commonwealth amphibious assualts. One version of the Churchill, the BARV was produced in small numbers to recover tanks on the beach head
The American "auto park" in the ETO was basically gasoline based as it was mostly an Army operation. In the PTO it was the USMC and a USN based operation in the main. The various Army groups did yeoman's work in the PTO, but the USMC dominated on land in the early and middle years. In the ETO the interchangability of AFVs was less of a complication. As per the use of the Churchill Croc. And BTW, the DDs didn't fail in reality. The only ones that didn't get to shore were those at Omaha beach. All the other beaches were successfully reached by the DDs. The US DDs were launched at a slightly too great a range, manned by army commanders who rigidly stuck to their orders of aiming toward a church steeple (not going with the sea), and ending up crosswise to the waves. The Brits on the other hand used coastal small craft pilots to "drive" their DDs, and those on one of the beaches (Gold or Sword, I forget which) launched furthur out, and made it safely to shore. The currents at Omaha, the winds, and the inexperienced commander/pilots doomed those particular units.
We are going far off topic by referencing the D-Day Normandy tanks, since the original post was about Churchill tanks at Iwo. But I simply must add this to the post about the DD Shermans "failing". What isn't widely known or remembered is that the great bulk of the DD amphibious Shermans actually made it to shore and were greatly appreciated by the troops on the beach. It would appear that the "Hobart funnies" model called the DDs (duplex drive) were only poorly served by the US forces on one beach when they were launched too far from shore in too rough a sea at Omaha. But it wasn’t because the US didn’t value Hobart's contribution of his "funnies" (I think his first Duplex Drive unit was designed for the Valentine in the medium class?). The entire Canadian Fort Gary Horse squadron of 18 Sherman DD tanks arrived on Juno beach safely (with no sea loss), partly due to the Royal Navy's insistence on getting as close as possible to the beach before releasing the tanks (unlike we Americans who lost nearly all of our DD Shermans assigned to Omaha). Those launched toward Sword also made it with little loss (2 I believe), and they were launched at slightly more distance out as those at Omaha, but the currents and winds were different at that beach. It is also sometimes forgotten, but true that when floating in the water, the longer hulled British Sherman V (powered by that bizarre Chrysler 30 cylinder engine) displaced more water and floated slightly higher than the other Sherman models. So it may have been the shorter distance from the shore at Juno, coupled with different currents in both the more northern and southern beaches, and using trained Royal Navy coxswains as pilots which were the deciding factors. Freeboard for the British Sherman V was 3 to 4 feet, while the American Shermans only had 2 to 3 feet of freeboard above the waves. Any appreciable swell could spill over the collapsible screen of the American Shermans, especially during launching down the carrier vessel's ramp in rough seas when the DD tank would sink like a stone if the electric and mechanical bilge pumps could not keep up with the entering water. This is what happened to the DD Sherman tanks of the US 741st Tank Battalion when they were launched in the too heavy seas too far away from the Omaha beach on D-day without trained "seamen" piloting them. If they had been piloted by men with more training in small craft (Coast Guardsmen come to mind) perhaps they would NOT have continued to steer toward the objective of the "church steeple", and actually gone "with the sea" as did the British units. Of the 29 Sherman DD tanks in this unit, only 2 made it safely to shore, most of them became either lost assets, or coffins in the Channel. Most of the men in the tanks actually escaped when they sank, which is why only five men were lost in total. It is still felt that the radio transmission of the USNCDU’s (Navy Combat Demolition Unit) was either missed or ignored which advised that the DDs NOT be launched at the original distance planned on. It was these and other things that sent nearly all of that group to the bottom. Here is a timeline from a CMH site I found concerning the DDs: 0535 hours. DD tanks of A & B Squadrons, 13th/18th Hussars, on order 'Floater' launch tanks approx 5,000 yards from shore. (about the same distance as Omaha launching) 0558 hours. Sunrise. Due to tidal variations along the French coast H-Hour on the various beaches was as follows:- Utah and Omaha.. 06.30 Gold and Sword 07.25. Juno right wing (07.35) Juno left wing (07.45). both later delayed by ten minutes. 0629 hours. 28 DD tanks of 743rd Tank Battalion plus 14 conventional Sherman tanks land dry on the western part of Omaha beach. Of those DD tanks from 741st destined for the eastern end of Omaha 29 were launched at 5,000 yards from shore, of which 27 foundered in rough seas. 0630 hours. First Landing Craft reach Utah and Omaha beaches. 0640 hours. First DD tanks of 70th Tank Battalion come ashore on Utah (10 or so minutes after the shore was "secured"). 0650 hours. Sexton SP guns of 86 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (Hertfordshire Yeomanry) commence firing from Landing Craft. 0655 hours. Swimming DD tanks of A Squadron 13th/18th Hussars are overrun (passed) by LCTs containing AVRE tanks. 0708 hours. 2nd Ranger Battalion, U S Army, lands at the foot of cliffs below Pointe du Hoc. 0720 hrs. Landing Craft bring C and D (DD tanks) Squadrons of 4th/7th Dragoon Guards close enough to drive ashore with screens raised due to rough conditions. B and C Squadrons, Sherwood Rangers launch DD tanks at 500 yards for a (very) short swim to the beach. 0725 hours. Flail tanks of 22nd Dragoons start to come ashore. 0730 hours. DD tanks of 13th/18th Hussars come ashore on Queen sector of Sword Beach. 0739 hours. Self propelled artillery of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade start to fire from Landing Craft on the run in to Juno. 07.58 hours. DD tanks of 6th Armoured Regiment (1st Canadian Hussars) land on Mike Sector, Juno Beach. 0800 hours. No movement possible on Omaha beach. 0810 hours. DD tanks of 10th Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse) land on Nan Sector after a "very wet wade". C Squadron and RHQ 13th/18th Hussars land on Sword Beach. 0900 hours. Panzer Regiment 22 leaves Caen, heading north-east for the coast. Subsequently recalled to defend Caen. 0930 hours. DD and other tanks of A Squadron, 13th/18th Hussars and 1st Battalion South Lancashire Regiment capture Hermanville-sur-Mer. 1030 hours. Tanks of Staffordshire Yeomanry land on Sword Beach. 86th Field Regiment RA start to land Sexton SP guns on Sword Beach. So, whether they "played a major role" or not, the Sherman DD tanks did mostly "make it" and didn't FAIL, and those tanks (not just the DDs) of the 13th/18th Hussars became among the first Allied tanks to lay a track on French soil. Some of the British DDs had swum for almost two miles from their launching craft.